Future Issues for the EU Legal Order - Lecture 10 - EU Law

What is the ‘union of values’ that the EU focuses on? And why is this complicated - the positives and negatives? Question that arise with values?

Certain level of ideological conformity is needed in order to share power the way they do in order to be accept being bound by each other's decisions the way EU system allows.

But how many shared values? What is the minimum degree of shared beliefs that a union needs?

The pros and cons -

• Because on one hand, to be meaningful and for the member states to trust each other, they all have to sign up to certain principles. The EU couldn't have North Korea as a member because they don't share the same values, such as non-compliance with free expression and political freedom.

• But also the EU is a democracy and in democracies, there has to be space for different worldviews to compete for power. And if the list of fundamental values becomes very long. Then, issues arise with countries who disagree with those values who won't be able to live by them.

Why does the open-ended nature of shared values create tensions to the EU legal order?

Certain things like belief in democracy, judicial independence could be broadly expected. But what about contentious topics such as same sex marriage or migration?

If the EU says all member states must have it, then those who are socially conservative will start feeling alienated from the EU.

It won't be as much of a democracy in that, since it won't have space for socially conservative worldviews.

What is meant by European intergration is a story of intergration through law? And compare this to international organisations?

Other international organisations issue recommendations. They even have things that are binding at international law level, but they're not. They don't issue rulings or legislation that is binding on the member states in their own courts.

The EU does. That's what makes the EU a much more powerful international actor. Its legislation is enforced in local courts by national judges and if there's a clash to national law and EU law, EU law takes precedence.

What are Karen Alter’s observations on the usage of Article 267 reference procedure and which courts utilise the procedure more?

She noted how lower courts have in general been more enthusiastic promoters of EU law and users of the Article 267 reference procedure than apex courts.

What did AG Poiares-Maduro state in relation to a clash between CJEU and national courts?

He argued that -

• the unclear answer as to who would ultimately prevail in a clash between the CJEU and national courts was not a problem as the EU existed in a state of ‘constitutional pluralism’ with a number of legal answers to this question and

• a process of dialogue between courts is used to resolve disputes

Taricco I and II in relation to Article 267 reference procedure, what is the relevance, context and outcome?

Context → In the Taricco I case, Court held that Member States should disapply national criminal law provisions which have an adverse impact on the fight against fraud. As a response, The Italian Constitutional Court made a preliminary reference to the Court in Taricco II in relation to the disapplication of limitation periods of time-barred VAT fraud prosecutions, expressing the concern that such a disapplication would violate the constitutionally enshrined principle of legality according to which offences and penalties must be defined by law, rules of criminal law must be precisely determined and cannot be retroactive.

Outcome → The Court stated that it is up to the national court to ascertain whether the finding that the national limitation periods prevent the imposition of effective criminal penalties in cases of fraud gives rise to a situation of uncertainty as regards the applicability of the national limitation rules, which would be in breach of the principle of legality. In such a case, the national court is not obliged to disapply the national limitation periods.

Relevance → The Taricco II judgment introduces an exception to the Taricco ruling, insofar as national courts are required to disapply national criminal rules which prevent the application of effective criminal penalties in fraud cases, unless such disapplication entails a breach of the principle of legality.

German Constitutional Court Weiss case in response to AG Poiares-Maduro, is there conflict between CJEU and national courts? What is the context and outcome? What are the distinctions in how the German Constitutional Court and CJEU approached the matter? And what is the doctrine of ‘budgetary sovereignty’ as per Weiss?

Context → The case concerns a very substantial bond buying programme known as PSPP, which has been pursued by the ECB, which was part of a broader programme which aims to expand the money supply in the Eurozone in order to stimulate consumption and to increase the inflation rate to just below the limit. Eurosceptic politicans argued that the PSPP was in violation of their individual rights under the Constitution, because it was a breach of the prohibition of monetary public sector financing in Article 123 TFEU and proportionality.

CJEU’s preliminary reading conclusion → CJEU agreed with the earlier Opinion of the Advocate General and found that the PSPP did not go beyond the ECB's mandate, did not violate the prohibition of monetary public sector financing and did not violate the principle of conferral. The Court also found that the ECB Decisions satisfied the principle of proportionality.

German Constitutional Court’s response → The judgment holds that the ECB’s decision to launch the PSPP programme was legally flawed in having not taken into account the full economic consequences this programme it was likely to have. The German Court adds that the same failure was repeated by the Court of Justice of the EU which in its own judgment also failed to apply proportionality correctly. The German Court found that the PSPP constitutes a violation of the strict mandate of the ECB to pursue monetary policy, unless its own assessment on proportionality can show that the ‘economic’ effects are ‘proportionate’ to its monetary aims.

What is the doctrine of ‘budgetary sovereignty/autonomy’ as per Weiss? → It means that the current German Parliament must have complete control over all ‘financial matters’ that concern the state. It cannot share decision making powers with any foreigners nor can it share risks with them.

Distinctions? →

• The CJEU implemented proportionality, in the lens of ‘rationalism’ which gives the decision maker very wide leeway to make policy decisions

• The BVG disagreed, arguing the court had to decide matters by ‘balancing’ the economic arguments more fully. Whilst proportionality applies in a slightly different way in Luxembourg, the German Court demanded that the CJEU – and by extension all other jurisdictions of the EU - adopt the German sense as the only ‘methodologically’ acceptable. This by itself shows that the Court was not willing to tolerate any departure from German law at all.

R(HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport in response to AG Poiares-Maduro, is there conflict between CJEU and national courts? What is the context and outcome?

Context → These appeals arise out of the decision of the Government to promote the high speed rail link from London to the north known as HS2. The decision was announced in a command paper, referred to as the “DNS”. The DNS included confirmation of the Government’s high speed strategy and a summary of its decisions, and set out the process by which the Government intended to obtain development consent for HS2 through two hybrid bills in Parliament.

Outcome → The appeal was dismissed. HOWEVER, the UK Supreme Court held obiter that, while it would normally presume that Parliament, through the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) intended EU law to prevail of any inconsistent UK law, the ECA was just one of a number of constitutional statutes and should it come into conflict with another constitutional statute or fundmental constitutional principle, the Court would not necessarily accord priority to EU law.

Importance → This was a notably more qualified acceptance of primacy than seen in Factortame II.

The Ajos Case (Denmark) in response to AG Poiares-Maduro, is there conflict between CJEU and national courts? What is the context and outcome?

Context → Denmark's legislation aims to prevent the formation of "parallel societies" in public housing areas through various measures, including forced evictions, rehousing, and the sale of public housing to private owners to change the area's demographics. An area is classified as a "parallel society" if it meets specific socio-economic criteria (e.g., on employment, education, poverty, criminality) and more than 50% of the residents are "non-Western immigrants or their descendants". A group of residents from the Mjølnerparken area in Copenhagen, facing eviction due to these laws, filed a case in a Danish court, which in turn referred the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EU anti-discrimination law.

Issue → "Whether the (unwritten) general principle of EU law forbidding discrimination on grounds of age could be relied upon to set aside national legislation? In answer to a reference under Article 267 the CJEU unambiguously said it could.

Importance → It challenges the Mangold-principle.

Outcome → The Danish Supreme Court, on the other hand ruled that CJEU “could not set aside national law since the Danish EU Accession Act did not confer sovereignty to the extent required for the unwritten EU principle prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of age to take precedence over national law.”

• If the courts were to set aside national law they would be acting outside their constitutional limits to their competences as judicial power. Thereby the Supreme Court chose to set aside the judgement from the CJEU.

Landtova case (Czech case) on challenges to the primacy of EU law by national courts, what is the context and outcome?

Context → It was a dispute about different pension levels between different kinds of workers.

Outcome → The Czech Constitutional Court said this is our constitutional identity, and instead of saying EU law might not have primacy when something absolutely core to the state, they emphasised their identity was at stake.

Costello v Government of Ireland on challenges to the primacy of EU law by national courts, what is the context and outcome?

Context → Ireland rejected the ratification of the Canada-EU free trade agreement on the basis that elements of the agreement violated the core of the Irish constitution.

Outcome → It is not clear how far the Court is willing to qualify its acceptance of primacy on this basis. However at least three of the seven judges indicated that the exceptions in Irish law have the primacy of EU law and this primacy was contingent on not violating the core of the Irish Constitution.

The decision highlights the tension between international trade agreements and national constitutional/EU law, forcing a pause on CETA ratification until specific legislative safeguards are in place.

Asociația Inițiativa pentru Justiție v Commission (Romanian Prosecutors Case) on challenges to the primacy of EU law by national courts, what is the context and outcome?

Context → A professional association of Romanian prosecutors lodged an annulment action seeking to annul the Commission Decision to close the CVM. This is the first time that an association of national prosecutors has directly sued the European Commission for failing to uphold the rule of law and ignoring the continuing lack of compliance with the rule of law judgments of the CJEU in Romania. The annulment of the CVM undermines the work of Asociația Inițiativa pentru Justiție and its members in protecting the rule of law. It also has direct consequences for the work of prosecutors, as regards a continuing climate of fear of unjustified disciplinary sanctions and criminal prosecutions as well as illegitimate obstruction preventing prosecutors from fulfilling their functions properly in fearlessly pursuing corruption cases as they should and are ethically committed to.

Outcome→ According to the Commission, “Bulgaria and Romania have now met all the benchmarks and fulfilled all the recommendations under the CVM” which is why the Commission has decided to put an end to the CVM. At the same time, the Commission has indicated that all “remaining shortcomings and possible new emerging issues” will continue to be monitored “within the Rule of Law Cycle”.

What does Daniel Sarmiento argue in relation to challenges to primacy of EU law in relation to Ajos case, Weiss 2020 case and Taricco II? And what approaches should the CJEU take to address clashes?

• The Court of Justice would be wise to be more empathetic towards national supreme and constitutional courts. And paradoxically, the Court of Justice is also being asked to take a tougher stance, particularly when it comes to complex technical analysis. This does not require to stand firm.

• Empathy is not deference, if it is done carefully and with care. But the current approach of the Court of Justice towards judicial challenges, asserting an authority by using the rationale of a “Mangold means Mangold”, or “a nullity means a nullity” kind of approach, might be the quickest path towards a painful (yet, alas, avoidable) disaster.

• It is about making careful and well-thought decisions that persuade national courts. But interpretation among different legal cultures will demand special attention towards the courts that are more strategically located

All three decisions have one point in common: all three of them are strongly reacting to three different judgments of the Court of Justice. They are all unsatisfied national supreme and constitucional courts with the Court of Justice’s decisions.

Sarmiento argued that they weren’t nationalist reactions, but justified for the following reasons -

• The German Constitutional Court is unimpressed with the quality of the reasoning of the Court of Justice in the OMT ruling. The passages on inadmissibility, where the Court of Justice deals with the German Constitutional Court’s threat of setting aside a judgment coming from Luxembourg, are blunt and uncompromising, but lacking hardly any reasoning. The factual analysis of the case is practically non-existent, despite the complexity of the file and the underlying problem. I insist that the Court of Justice reached the right solution, but I also confess that the German Constitutional Court’s critique, particularly on the point of the intensity of judicial review, is not completely unfounded.

• The Danish Supreme Court is upset with the activism of the Court of Justice in Danks Industri and others. The Court of Justice has stuck to its Mangold case-law quite firmly, but during this time it has hardly refined it or struggled to explain why it works and when does it not, and they had the chance of explaining the limits of the Mangold case-law. In the past ten years, the Court has been applying a sort of “Brexit means Brexit” approach towards Mangold: “Mangold means Mangold”, but, alas, national courts need something more than that before making a leap of faith.

• The Italian Constitutional Court is horrified with the approach towards fundamental rights of the Court of Justice in Taricco. I would not say that these are nationalist overreactions. Taricco is a powerful decision of the Court of Justice rendered by the Grand Chamber, but its reasoning is based on a fragile premise: that time-limitations in criminal liability are a question of procedure and not of substance. The financial interests of the Union are relevant, to be sure, but the legal certainty of citizens, particularly in criminal proceedings, is no minor thing. The Italian Constitutional Court is right in giving the Court of Justice a second chance, but the fact that it is making the reference is good proof that there is something wrong with the judgment in Taricco.

What does Daniel Sarmiento say about the Gutierrez Naranjo case and how it demonstrates solving clashes between CJEU and national courts? What is the context and outcome of Gutierrez Naranjo?

Initial CJEU judgement → The CJEU has recently stated that all Spanish courts have to set aside a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court which limited the temporal effects of the nullity of an abusive clause in a consumer contract.

Context relating to the previous subsequent CJEU judgement → The Spanish Supreme Court took their decision in 2013, right in the middle of the Spanish financial assistance programme, shortly after avoiding a complete bail-out of the country. The Spanish Supreme Court’s judgment concerned real-estate mortgage contracts, and thus the impact of the initial judgment of the CJEU fell entirely on the struggling Spanish banking system at the time. The Central Bank of Spain issued a report stating that a full retroactive judgment (aka CJEU setting it aside) would have required another financial assistance programme, and thus the Supreme Court decided to limit the temporal effects of its judgment.

Final CJEU Outcome → The Court of Justice rectified it’s judgement, aligning with the Spanish Supreme Court outlining that Spain shouldn’t set aside the judgement, stating that a nullity under Directive 93/13 cannot be limited in time.

Why did Daniel Sarmiento say about this? → CJEU does not need to defer to MS national courts, it is about making careful and well-thought decisions that persuade national courts. The Court of Justice and national supreme courts are not antagonists, they share the same task of interpreting and upholding the law. But interpretation among different legal cultures will demand special attention towards the courts that are more strategically located. And to simply tell them that my decision stands because I have the authority, is a risky way of flirting with disaster.

Why does Francis Fukuyama state that liberal democracy is over - there are 3 components? And how does this relate to the EU?

Francis Fukuyama explains this in three components -

1. First, everybody has some form of democracy.

2. Second, large democracies don't appear to be doing as well as non democracies and

3. Third, we have seen democratic countries elect leaders who are openly spectical of liberal democratic values, but keep winning elections nonetheless, such as Orban within Hungary (who undermines the independence of Hungarian judges, kicks out a central european university, restricting freedom of press.)

How this relates to the EU? -

The EU never expected the shift away from liberal democracy, since the procedures in the treaty for responding to a country who backslides are very weak such as Article 19(1) TFEU where the EU have authority to take action to combat discrimination, which requires council unanimity and European Parliament consent, or Article 7 TFEU to suspend MS voting votes if it breaches Article 2 TEU though this also requires unanimity.

There is now no competition for a liberal democracy in the world, since democracy is a system factory that all countries are moving towards - not the same during the Cold War with the existence of dictatorships versus democracy, there is no opposing enemy. It’s a really big issue for the European Union because the European Union is based on member states having a high degree of political consensus between them.

What are the 4 concerns with democratic backsliding in the EU?

• The disagreement between theses governments and EU institutions have come from attempts to dismantle key liberal democratic norms, most notably judicial independence but there have also been attacks on media freedom and the rights of civil society institutions such as NGOs and universities.

• These governments have also clashed in relation to substantive values, in particular through their hostility to migration from outside the Union and in relation to issues of LGBTQIA+ rights.

• Although the Treaties make the imposition of sanctions such as the loss of voting rights (article 7 TFEU) effectively impossible to enforce.

• There has been significant criticism of the Commission and Member States for failure to react with sufficient strength in this area, as demonstrated in the Romanian Prosecutors case on removing CVM on Romania hampering rule of law efforts, and cases akin Pancherevo, and Coman

What has the CJEU done to fight back against backsliding? Their actions and relevant cases?

1. The Court of Justice has imposed fines on states refusing to accept asylum seekers and has issued a series of rulings aiming to block removals of judges or other attempts to curtail judicial independence in both Hungary and Poland.

2. The Court of Justice held in Hungary v Parliament and Council and Poland v Parliament and Council that the values listed in Article 2 are enforceable against Member states.

What has the Commission done to fight back against backsliding in two ways? And two examples of this?

The Commission in later years litigation in this area has been characterized by the use of interim measures to block implementation of changes in these areas. The European Commission can request that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) enforce an interim order against a Member State. The primary mechanism for this is based on Article 279 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which allows the Court to prescribe "any necessary interim measures" in cases before it.

The Commission began to refuse to release funds to states whose policies were judged to violate EU norms (either substantive norms such as non-discrimination or principles such as judicial independence) such as Commission refused to release covid funding to areas of Poland where certain municipalities would declare themselves LGBTQ+ free zones.

Such as -

• Hungary pays every single day of the year €1 million fine to the European Union for refusing to accept its quota of asylum seekers under EU law. Court of Justice now also has issued a series of rulings that have blocked the removal of judges in Poland or attempts to curtail judicial independence.

• When Poland tried to do the same thing as Hungary in regards to the removal of judges, unlike the previous time where they waited a long duration of time in which the judges already appointed by the executive were working in their role, the Commission got smart by implementing interim measures from the CJEU, blocking Poland from adding new judges aligned with the government and they kept judges who were attacked in office.

Why do some criticise the notion that strong action by the EU can be solved through the issue of populist politics?

Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is currently trailing his opponent in the upcoming Hungarian general election.

However, populist parties are either in power or close to the top of the polls in a range of countries (Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands).

The EU is not likely to be able to bring an end to support for populist parties, no matter what it does. The populist-anti-populist division has become the main split in politics in a large number of states.

What does Joseph Weiler state in relation the issue of what degree of adherence to common values is necessary for the Union going forward? (3 points)

• Some minimum degree of shared values is necessary in a Union where Member States are bound by each others’ decisions.

• As a democracy, the EU also needs to provide a political system within which different worldviews can compete. If it cannot accommodate the political choices of majorities in several member states, the Union is unlikely to endure.

• Weiler points out that shared values is not just nice for the EU, it's a necessity for the EU. The European Union is a system where member states agree that they can be bound by each other's decisions. This system needs the member States to trust each other and trust that they share each other's values, therefore the EU needs a high degree of ideological cooperation.

What therefore should the approach of the Union be? Should it distinguish between issues like judicial independence where the functioning of the Union’s own legal order would be compromised by policies that undermine the independence of national judges, and issues such as migration where Member States can take different approaches without affecting the functioning of the Union? What are the arguments?

Distinguish between them -

• Judicial independence has a structural importance to the functioning of the European Union. The EU system cannot work if national judges don't uphold EU law. For instance, so the value of judicial independence has a moral value, but it also has a practical instrumental value to the EU. If we don't have judicial independence across the EU, the whole system will fall apart.

• Knowing that another country (whom you disagree with morally) will be voting on laws that will bind them. The other side would be to say in relation to moral issues, should abortion be legal, should there be same sex marriage? Actually, the EU needs to give space for different worldviews to compete, especially those who are conservative and those are liberal.

• Upholding Article 2 would have create a broader agenda of populist governments like Viktor Orban who will have more allies at EU level. They already have this or have support really from Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and growing support in countries like Spain where the right wing party is doing very well. If the EU goes in maximally and says no, you got to protect all of these rights and all of these principles like judicial independence, it might break the union. The EU will not get the coalition necessary to get really tough punitive actions through either the hand. The EU might defend judicial independence.

Include all -

• Reinforces the importance and non-negotiable nature of Article 2 TEU as fundamental rights, a component of liberal democracy and shared values and beliefs upon joining the EU - the EU relies on unanimous consensus and cohesion in order to create a ‘European identity’ and an ‘ever closer union’

• The plus of the wider agenda is protecting minorities impacted by Article 2 TEU violations, such as refugees, migrants and LGBTQ+ community as demonstrated in Hungary. They will get a bit of more support from the EU. The EU will adopt their cause and they'll probably get further than they otherwise would.

• The European Union is all in on democracy. It has been all in on equality and fundamental rights. If we do not include all, we will also lose the sense of the EU as a liberal actor, and moral actor/a community of values which is united around certain fundamental principles of democracy and equality and freedom.

Ronan Mcrea’s approach on Commission v Hungary, what is his opinion on the ruling?

And as per Ronan McCrea's article, he believes that this is not a sustainable approach, since the constant attempts to challenge backsliding nations like Hungary is responded with Hungary arguing that whilst EU expects judicial independence, the wishes of Hungary in regards to immigration and LGBTQ rights are contrary to the EU's values and conservative ideas has a lot of political support in a lot of member states. It's very hard to mobilise all the countries needed to really punish Hungary, for instance, for its attacks on judicial independence.

What does Van Malleghem argue in relation to legalism and backsliding?

Van Malleghem argues that ‘legalism’ is the idea that deep political differences can be resolved through legal means, which has bedeviled the EU’s response to the issue of democratic backsliding.

• An example → Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the liberal judge who was pro-choice activist and later became a judge in your Supreme Court. She said she thought it was a mistake that the abortion issue was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 70s rather than the democratic process. And she contrasted the U.K, where six years before Parliament debated, just passed the Abortion Act, and the issue was regarded as closed. Or, she said, because it was done by courts. People felt it was illegitimate, and it remained a political issue for decades. And she and others have a doubt about the ability of courts to provide definitive answers to contested question. But there's also a real danger that if the law comes to be seen as merely politics by other means, it's loses its claim to authority.

What is the 3 components of EU voting rules and lawmaking? (based on the ordinary legislative procedure)

1. Commission proposes legislation.

2. The Council of Ministers must approve (by unanimity or by Qualified Majority Vote which means 55% of the states representing 65% of the EU population).

3. The European Parliament has a veto (under the ordinary legislative procedure) or the right to be consulted.

What are the negatives of EU competences still being subject to unanimous approval in the council (such as employment law, taxation or the budget)?

• The chances of getting unanimous agreement on anything controversial are virtually nil, due to differing leaders and political parties of members. The recent track record of the Hungarian government which has wielded its veto repeatedly on issues such as aid for Ukraine and accession, shows how under current rules a single country can paralyse the Union and how other states and EU institutions can be forced by the threat of such vetoes to give concessions that undermines key objectives

• This is particularly problematic as EU law covers areas such as environmental policy, monetary policy and employment law where knowledge changes or what works changes over time.

• The current system was designed on the assumption that political identity would transfer to the EU (aka an ever close union) and it would eventually be replaced by more flexible versions as the union became ever closer. It will struggle to be effective if this does not happen.

What has Francis Fukyama describe the EU voting system as?

• The European system as a whole is beginning to resemble that of the United States in depressing ways

• more rigidity and less accountability

• EU legal and political system is overreliant on judges and courts to resolve fundamental issues

Two criticisms regarding removing the current EU voting models - relating to the Open Method of Coordination and the requirements of QMV/Unanimity in the ordinary legislative procedure and special legislative procedure?

• The Open Method of Coordination allows more flexible alignment of policy (But this does not change the fact that large areas of EU law are covered by almost unamendable EU legislation)

• Reducing the QMV threshold and removing the veto in key areas involves granting the EU the authority to make winners and losers through political decisions that it does not have.

Ronan McCrea on the future of European Intergration, what does he argue in regards to the EU and it’s influence/abilities in foreign policy relating to EU voting rules?

Foreign policy is being done through the EU, but the EU is stuck with very rigid rules. So for instance, in relation to Ukraine, the Hungarian government has repeatedly vetoed attempts to toughen sanctions, or to give more aid to Ukraine because they are more sympathetic to Russia.

That means one country at a 27 can paralyse the EU action. Foreign policy is such a sensitive area of matter of national power, the member states will never reach that. So we have an EU foreign policy that had to coordinate 27 very different positions. That means that often the EU ends up being unable to say anything. Coordinating through the EU means very little is done, it takes away from the ability to act.

What are the arguments regarding the EU being either a ‘peace project’ and ‘power project’?

Peace Project

• The EU was founded as a peace project that aimed to make the repeat of war between Germany and France impossible

• Demonstrates how cooperation, rule-making and rule of law can replace nationalism and war in an internalising world

Power Project

• President Macron is of the latter view and has argued that the EU needs to become a geo-political actor, a tendency reinforced by the alarm in much of Europe caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

• High negotiating power → There is no European country that is over 100 million. So no EU country that has a population of over 100 million, EU population is declining, is share of global GDP is declining. Because of colonialism, and so many European countries were ruling kind of half the world. Hundred years ago, European countries have a kind of exaggerated sense of their own power and importance, and it is slowly dawning on them that actually, they're not that powerful anymore. And that in a world where there's very big powers like the US and China, if Europe doesn't cooperate, European countries don't cooperate with each other. They will have no say over their future.

What is the UK’s relations with the EU? What are the agreements involved, and how does the UK still interact with the EU in other areas such as military and trade?

• UK and EU relationship is now governed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Free movement has largely ended and the UK does not take part in EU decision-making.

• The UK government has indicated that it may voluntarily increase the alignment of UK and EU regulations in order to facilitate trade.

• As the UK has significant military capabilities (matched only by France among EU member states), there is renewed attention to cooperation in defence and foreign affairs between the UK and EU.