the anglo irish treaty

the truce, 11 july 1921

de valera accepted an offer from PM lloyd george to call a truce in exchange for an unconditional offer of negotiations.

after talks and letters it was finally decided in sept 1921 that both sides send a delegation to london.

however, the british establish their position as negotiations but only within the british empire.

preliminary negotiations: july 1921

in july de valera and lloyd george met four times in london, but failed to secure agreement.

valera went with griffith, stack and childers, but left a bitter collins behind.

he didn’t want to be seen to compromise on sinn fein’s demand for a republic and was determined to keep sinn fein united. valera was afraid that an early concession on ireland’s future would result in extremists within the movement breaking away.

craig arrived in london as a physical reminder of northern ireland’s existence, the unionist leader's strategy was simple: he would sit on his ulster rock and defend Northern Ireland's position.

preliminary negotiations july 1921

20 july lloyd george confirmed no consideration would be given to a free republic. he would offer Ireland dominion status, but only if she agreed to undertakings on defence, trade and finance, while partition continued until the people in Northern Ireland decided otherwise.

de valera found it unacceptable so lloyd george threatened an end to the truce.

“mercury with a fork”

external association

devaleras delayed response was an attempt to hold sinn fein together rather than a serious counter offer.

• the Irish suggested 'external association', though the meaning was unclear.

• to appease republican hard-liners in the cabinet, notably cathal brugha and austin stack.

• ireland could enjoy the freedom of an independent state but be externally associated with the british commonwealth.

• unacceptable to the British, over the course of the next few weeks,

august - september 1921

• eventually lloyd george invited de valera to send a delegation to london to hammer out a compromise.

• in agreeing to go, it can be argued that sinn fein had accepted that some form of compromise was going to be the outcome as no preconditions were laid down.

why did de valera not go?

when the Dáil cabinet voted on the issue, he used his casting vote to decide the result.

Griffith, Collins and Cosgrave supported him going, but de Valera backed Brugha, Stack and Barton who were against his attendance.

This decision infuriated Collins, and he arguing he was abdicating his responsibilities. Later, on 14 September, Cosgrave in cabinet, concluded that it was like playing a vital match with their "ablest player in reserve”.

• de valera argued that as the president of the republic he was now a symbol who shouldn’t go to london. He also thought that his presence in Dublin could keep such potential opposition under control.

• however, he knew that a significant compromise on Ireland's status was inevitable, and he did not want to be associated personally with that compromise.

• but, Collins's acceptance of any compromise would influence the IRA's response, and de Valera recognised that any settlement approved by Collins had a better chance of being accepted in Ireland.

the irish delegation

• was led by Arthur Griffith and included Michael Collins, - prepared to make concessions, George Gavan Duffy, Eamon Duggan, - lawyers, Robert Barton, the dáil's minister of economic affairs to work with Erskine Childers as secretary, who ended up playing an important role

weaknesses in the irish delegation

The Irish team were divided in their aims from the start: Both Collins and Griffith sought a compromise settlement, realising that neither a republic nor a united Ireland could be won at the conference.

Duffy, Barton and particularly Childers were more hard-line and less likely to compromise on major issues.

• Collins argued that he was a soldier and that it was not his place.

• Childers was a close ally of de Valera’s and sent him private reports of the talks. Collins and Griffith resented this and didn’t trust him.

• They were to negotiate for external association, something which neither Griffith nor Collins fully understood.

• The Irish delegation was given plenipotentiary status but de Valera instructed them to consult the cabinet “before decisions are finally reached on a main question”. - griffith and cpllins chose to ignore these orders

strengths of the irish delegation

• Griffith was experienced, able and determined, Collins could easily hold his own in negotiation. Although he had undoubted ability, Collins had an inferiority complex, as he considered himself a soldier, not for politics.

• However, Collins was open minded and pragmatic. more interested in securing practical changes which would give Ireland considerable freedom and enable her to extend that freedom. Crucially, he did not want more war because he was certain that this would result in defeat for the IRA.

the british delegation

• led by Lloyd George, a brilliant politician with experience in dealing with Ireland.

• He was joined by the two senior Conservatives in the Coalition government, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead. Chamberlain was an outstanding politician and Birkenhead was a charismatic figure who supported Carson during the Ulster crisis. He was also a tough negotiator.

• Winston Churchill had experience in Anglo-Irish relations and was the British team's expert on defence.

• They were joined by Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Laming Worthington-Evans, the Secretary of State for War, and Gordon Hewart, the Attorney-General. Tom Jones, another expert who had worked closely with Lloyd George, acted as secretary and was to make an important contribution to the negotiations.

the british position

British public opinion was firmly behind Lloyd George as he pressed the Irish delegation to accept dominion status.

All through the negotiations Lloyd George used this to his advantage, and the prospect of a resumption of the war was kept firmly before the Irish delegation.

british aims

• Their priority was defending British territory, fearing that Ireland could be used by an enemy to attack Britain in the future.

• to protect the British Empire, avoiding boosting independence movements in places like India.

• Lloyd George could not give too many concessions because he depended on the support of the Conservatives for his coalition and they were close to the unionists but was willing to put pressure on unionists.

• autonomy for the Irish as long as the King was accepted as nominal head of state.

CROWN/OATH/EMPIRE /SECURITY/POSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

irish aims

less clear:

• Irish unity and an independent republic loosely bound to the Empire and accepting the crown as head of the Empire only

• De Valera proposed external association, but this has already been rejected by the British.

• if the need arose, to break off negotiations on the question of Ulster.

• no alternative to external association

negociations begin

lasted from 11 October until 6 December 1921

insistence on dominion status - not a republic

Inexplicably the Irish delegation sent counter proposals until 24 October. Griffith wrote to DeValera urging him to forward their alternative as they had left Dublin with an incomplete document. The Irish document was based on external association which the British would not accept

The delay in counter proposals allowed LG to dismiss the Irish proposals as being outside the scope of discussions, seizing the initiative.

plenary sessions

the British proved willing to make concessions on finance and trade but insisted on defence facilities in Ireland, provoking disagreement with Childers who wanted Ireland to remain neutral in any future conflict involving Britain.

The two key issues that came to dominate the treaty negotiations were STATUS and ULSTER

the British wanted Dominion status with allegiance to the crown which Childer’s believed ignored Ireland’s rights to proclaim her separate nationality.

The 4th plenary session was dominated by Ulster. Griffith and Collins focussed on nationalists forced into an artificial state despite their being majorities in Fermanagh and Tyrone. Griffith wanted the BG to put pressure on the Unionists, something which LG was willing to do.

In the 7th plenary session on 24 October, irish proposal involved association with the empire rather than membership, giving up on a free republic.

sub conferences

suggested by the british following the failure of the initial talks.

sidelined unreasonable childers, giving collins and griffith more say but concerned some delegation members and tensions in the dublin cabinet.

trade and defence were successfully dealt with.

The Irish would make provisional concessions on status which would be contingent on the government guaranteeing the essential unity of Ireland. This allowed the Irish to break on Ulster. LG also drew the Irish into having an interest in the survival of his government.

negotiations

30 October – LG met Griffith. The Diehard Conservatives had expressed ‘grave apprehension’ at the government’s negotiations with SF. LG asked Griffith for personal assurances on the Crown, free partnership in the empire and naval facilities in Ireland and in return to crush the Diehards and fight on the Ulster matter to assure unity. Griffith gave the desired assurances and LG won the vote

1 November: Griffith penned a letter stating that he would ‘recommend free partnership with the British commonwealth, if he could be satisfied on irish unity

boundary commission suggested

LG tried to pressure the Unionists in Belfast. LG had promised Griffith he would resign if Ulster was unreasonable. Craig sat on his ‘Ulster Rock’ .

8 November – Jones , the British secretary informally met Collins and Griffith. He stated that LG would make one last effort to persuade Ulster to accept an all Ireland parliament and if he refused they would resign. However, this would, collapse the coalition government with its likely replacement being a Conservative govt under Bonar Law which would be hostile to SF.

It was at this point that jones suggested a Boundary Commission. Griffith understood that NI would lose such a large chunk of territory with the rump eventually falling under Dublin rule.

lloyd george tries to cajole the unionists

10 November – LG wrote to Craig urging the unionists to accept an all Ireland parliament

He tried to apply economic pressure, stressing that taxation under the UK parliament would be much higher than that under an all Ireland one.

Craig reaffirmed they would not buckle under pressure. Historians belief Craig was personally willing to make some concessions but his colleagues did not share his wider imperial concerns.

LG had failed to shift the Unionists but the idea of a Boundary Commission had compensated adequately

griffith formally agrees to a boundary commission

12 nov with LG - failing to realise he was limiting SF’s options to break on Ulster. LG instructed Tom Jones to draw up a memo of the proposals which was shown to Griffith on the following day. Griffith agreed to the contents and LG retained it for a future use…

draft treaty

16 November the British presented the Irish delegation with a draft treaty which contained the Boundary Commission proposals.

Duffy returned to Dublin to complain about the way Griffith and Collins were negotiating by sub conference. deValera argued that the delegates could not sign any treaty without first submitting it to the cabinet for approval.

Childers and Barton presented a document to the British which was basically just external association again!! The British delegation were very disappointed by this document and there was talk of the conference breaking down.

24 sub conference issue of symbolism

they agreed that the title Irish Free State, a less controversial one than Saorstat Eireann, would be used in the Treaty. Chartres, the second secretary to the Irish delegation was in attendance.

Birkenhead assured the Irish that the Crown would be no more than a symbol. Yet as a symbol the Crown was of vital importance to the British as it bound together in voluntary union all the members of the Commonwealth.

Chartres emphasised that Ireland was not like Canada or any other dominion as Ireland’s proximity to Britain and history of conflict put it in a unique position, and that in his opinion the British would interfere

25 nov dail cabinet debates the crown

The cabinet decided they could recognise the crown for the purposes of association, as symbol and accepted head of the combination of associated states.

The cabinet stopped short of accepting allegiance to the crown, due to the reasons already put forward by Chartres

The British offered Griffith the chance to word any phrase which would ensure that the position of the Crown in Ireland would be no more ‘in practice’ than it was in any other dominion. The Irish found it very difficult to counter this move.

final proposals - 1 dec and dail cabinet reaction

• it was apparent that they had made some minor concession but in reality the british had not strayed far from their original proposals in July.

• The Irish delegation returned home for a crucial meeting with the cabinet on 3 December.

Griffith supported by Duggan judged that this was Britain’s final offer and no further concession could be gained. Barton and Duffy disagreed, convinced more could be gained

Brugha stated that the British had ‘selected their men well’ in reference to sub conference and the selection of Collins and Griffith, implying that they were weak. Griffith reacted angrily and Brugha withdrew the statement. Collins suggested he should select a new team to negotiate.

Collins agreed with Griffith but did express concern with the wording of the oath of allegiance. The IRB Supreme council had also expressed concerns to Collins about the oath and had supplied Collins with an alternative form of words they found acceptable.

reaction to the draft treaty

DE Valera struggled to come up with a new form of wording that would be acceptable but was unwilling to give a clear lead and returned external association which he wanted the delegation to put forward again!!!

Barton appealed to De Valera to join the delegation in London, arguing that it was unfair to ask Griffith to press for these terms, which could only be successful if the Irish threatened war, when he was not prepared to do this.

The issue was only settled when Griffith said he would bring the treaty to Dublin and submit to the Dail, assuming the British would grant this extra time without threatening war.

The Irish delegates returned to London confused about the instructions they had been given.

4 december - negociations break down

Childers, Barton and Duffy quickly produced yet another draft based on external association.

Collins did not accompany them, regarding it as a hopeless mission. Griffith led and argued vigorously and with considerable skill for the irish alternative.

the Dail only instructed to reject the oath in its existing form and if the conference was heading for a breakdown, to break on ulster.

A careless remark by Duffy, ‘our difficulty is coming into the Empire’ had allowed the British to break on empire.

5 dec - the final session: the boundary commission card

On the night of 4th December, Jones visited Griffith in an attempt to resurrect negotiations. Griffith said they needed some concession on Ulster, to push the Treaty through the Dail.

On 5th December Collins discussed Dominion status and the Boundary commission. The talks recommenced. Birkenhead and Collins worked on a rewording of the oath.

When status came up, Griffith argued that the Irish delegations initial concessions had been contingent on the satisfactory conclusion of Ulster, and he refused to sign any Treaty until they had Craig’s decision on the acceptance of unity.

LG got the memo and insisted that if the Irish now broke on ulster they were breaching faith. Griffith angrily said he would sign. His protest that the other two were not party to this agreement, and therefore should not be expected to sign was ignored by Lloyd George

5 dec ultimatum issued

LG produced two letters claiming that he had promised to let Craig know the outcome of the negotiation. one informing peace, one war.

Griffith had already pledged his signature, in the car on the way back Collins announced he would sign. Duggan also. Barton and Duffy held out for an agonising few hours. Duffy relented after a plea by Duggan who recalled seeing young Volunteers hanging in Mountjoy. Barton eventually gave in and the Anglo-Irish treaty, formally known as the Articles of Agreement was signed by both delegations at 2.30am on 6 December 1921.

In the final exchanges LG had dropped the British demand for free trade and given the new irish Free State fiscal autonomy

articles of agreement

• 1 and 2 - the Irish Free State has the same constitutional status as Canada and the other dominions

• Article 3 - the king’s representative would be a governor general

• Article 4 - the oath to be taken by all members of the irish parliament

• Article 5 - covered the Free state’s share in the UK’s war debt

what extent were the objectives achieved

The British ensured that Ireland did remain inside the empire.

Ireland was to be known as the Irish Free State, Sinn Féin had managed to dilute the symbolism of the oath by swearing true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Free State and not allegiance to the King George V.

The Free State would contribute towards the Public Debt of the United Kingdom.

a Boundary Commission determined the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland. Griffith and Collins had been assured by Lloyd George that this would lead to the essential unity of Ireland,

british reaction to the treaty

• british public were proud of the coalition govt

• diehard extreme conservatives were savage in their criticism, saying they negotiated with murderers and scorned the terms, claiming they humiliated the empire.

• Carson described the treaty as shameful, "with a revolver pointed at your head”, he berated the government for being unable to deal with criminals in Ireland or to rule over the Empire. He then turned to his old political ally, Lord Birkenhead, describing those "who will sell their friends for the purpose of conciliating their enemies" as "loathsome”.

unionist reaction to the treaty

endorsed by an overwhelming majority with only the Diehards and the Ulster Unionist MPs in opposition.

Craig's brother, Charles, was repulsed by the Boundary Commission clause in the commons and accused the government of betrayal. Sir James also thought Lloyd George was guilty of duplicity and sent a letter to Chamberlain, expressing Unionist anger and warned that if the Treaty was not modified, the government should withdraw British troops and “allow us to fight it ourselves".

the Southern Unionists found that the new Conservative leaders, Chamberlain and Birkenhead, were unwilling to defend Southern Unionist interests. They had to suffice with personal assurances from Griffith who promised to consider Southern Unionist claims, particularly representation in the new state.

Thus Midleton and his followers in the Lords voted for the Treaty, as they waited to lobby the Provisional Government of the Irish Free State on possible safeguards which might be included in the new constitution.

irish reaction - the cabinet

Both Griffith and Collins knew that Sinn Féin would be split on the Treaty, but they were prepared to argue the documents merits in the Dáil. Collins had even spoken of signing ‘his death warrant.’

De Valera was shocked that the delegates hadn’t consulted him before signing the Treaty, describing it as an "act of disloyalty". It appeared that he was more annoyed by this personal snub than by the actual terms of the Treaty.

DeValera called a full cabinet meeting where old arguments were again played out, but when a vote was taken in favour of referring the Treaty to the Dáil, it was passed by a 4:3 majority. Griffith, Collins, Barton and Cosgrave were in favour; de Valera, Brugha and Stack against.

Barton countered by insisting that the real problem had been caused by de Valera's refusal to attend the conference.

irish reaction - devalera

Before the Dáil could meet de Valera issued a proclamation, outlining the cabinet split and stated that he could not recommend accepting the Treaty to either the Dáil or the Irish people.

De Valera not going to london was compounded by his refusing to offer whatever decisive leadership he could from Dublin.

This allowed Griffith and Collins to present him with a done deal which was acceptable to a majority of the Dáil cabinet.

He had known since July that compromise was inevitable but, rejected the Treaty because it was not his compromise.

dail debate on the treaty

The Dáil debate on the Treaty opened on 14 December 1921, maintenance of Sinn Féin unity had already been abandoned.

DeValera’s alternative, known as 'Document No 2' was based on the idea of external association and rewrote all dominion status clauses.

Crucial to the debate was the the oath which de Valera found unacceptable. Article 4 of the Treaty had the oath which Griffith defended as honourable.

Document No 2 didn’t mention an oath, stating that "Ireland shall be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth".

However, Griffith also pointed out that Document No 2 made no mention of the word 'republic'.

pro treaty views

griffith emphasised that the Irish delegation had not negotiated for a republic. He reminded devalera that this was an undertaking to do the best he could for Ireland. While not ideal, griffith thought it merited support, because it gave Ireland equality with England.

Collins was convinced that it gave, "not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it". The speech impacted both inside and outside the Dáil. rallied irb and ira for support, if acceptable to collins it’s acceptable to them.

kevin ohiggins acknowledged its defects but acceptance was the only sensible course. he declared that the British Commonwealth would see a natural and inevitable progression towards increased freedom for the various nations and 'equality of status’. warned opponents only to vote for its ratification if they could demonstrate how more concessions could be won.

arguments against the treaty

De Valera denounced the Oath of Allegiance for making the King head of the Commonwealth and Ireland.

Stack promised to fight on for full independence “even if this rotten document be accepted.”

Childers complained that the Treaty Ports prevented the Free State from pursuing an independent foreign policy.

The 7 women of the Dáil opposed as lives had been lost pursuing an Irish Republic. Many such as Margaret Pearse, Mary MacSwiney and Kathleen Clarke had relatives die in the struggle for independence. ‘We Republicans are going to carry out this fight’, announced MacSwiney. ‘Death is preferable to dishonour’, Markievicz declared.

Partition was not a major focus of the anti-treaty debate.

anti treaty arguments / the result

In the debates de Valera's was supported by Brugha, Stack and Childers and by most of the women deputies, including Mary MacSwiney, Kathleen Clarke, Margaret Pearse and Countess Markievicz.

Childers argued that it gave less freedom than other dominions like Canada.

For Austin Stack 'full Canadian powers' fell well short of Ireland's legitimate demands, and he gave pledged to the dail that he would fight to destroy the oath of allegiance.

There was strong popular support for the Treaty; many people wanted peace and to begin re-building their lives.

Twenty county councils passed resolutions in favour. Some TDs were influenced by popular opinion particularly at their constituencies during Christmas - others were not.

The vote in the Dáil was close; it was passed by 64 votes to 57 votes.