SDiP Energy

Bond et al 2025

Ember, electrotech revolution. Argues that humanity is already transitioning. in 2000 only 25% of final human energy demans could be powered by electricity, now its 75% (through heat pumps, electric motors, EVs). Examples a huge global shift. Also introduces the 4 battles and says Electrotech winnin 3 (in growth terms) (1) How we generate energy (thermal vs electro) Electro wins (96% of new electricity) (2) How do we power movement - again electro winning - 53% of useful work done globally, 80% of growth (3) How do we produce heat - electricity 300-400 % efficent vs ~90% for gas boiler (4) How do we make molecules we need- fossil fuels winning here.

Walter et al 2026

Ember. Argues that the ‘primary energy fallacy’ understates the scale of transformation underway. A consumer-first analytical framework, starting with useful demand, and working back to supply, reveals that universal prosperity is achievable with far less primary energy (resources) than orthodox projection suggest

Grubler et al 2018

Contrary to mainstream inergrated assesment models, the 1.5C target is acheivable without negative emissions technology. Requires radical reduction in energy demand throuh efficency and service system redesign, rather than scaling up energy supply. Assumption that energy demand growth is inevitable, they argue, is wrong.

Ember 2025

China an ‘electrostate’ account for 60% of global EV sales, half of new solar. Also, 63% of emerging market electricity demand has higher solar share than the USA- leapfrogging is already happening

Cherp et al 2018

Meta-level framework- we need to combine insights from economics, sociology of technology, and political sciences. Transitions require co-evolution, optimising for tech alone fails. Varied challenge needs combined insights

Carton et al 2020

‘negative emissions’ have a long history of failure. Lanc based removal like CSS risks continuing fossil fuel production in the global North whilst harming the global South. Also using future removal promises to justify present inaction is politifcally and ecologically dangerous.

IRENA 2023

Current pledges + policies will result in an emissions gap of 16Gt by 2050 relative to the 1.5C pathway. Annual investment must more than quadruple from $1.3T to over $5T. Power sector made progress but transport, heating, and heavy industryy remain far behind. We need 1000GW of new renewables annually, only 300GW in 2022

IEA 2024

Progress towards SDG7 (universal access to modern energy, increased share of renewables, doubled efficency) is dangerously insufficent. The number of people w/o electricity reversed course in 2021. 750 million people w/o electricity (80% of those in SS. Africa). 2 billion people w/o access to clean cooking as of 2023. $4.5T investment gap

Rolffs et al 2015

Argues headline statistics within SDG7 might overstate real progress- being ‘connected’ counts in the stats, but running a pump or clinic requires reliable, affordable, and consistent supply

Bazilian et al 2012

Gender + Energy Nexus. Women bear disproportionate burden (from polluting cooking fuels + unreliable electricity) of energy poverty. Progress metrics that ignore this miss the point of development entirely.

WHO 2023

3.7 million premature deaths per year from household air pollution (from toxic cooking fuels)

Newell + Mulvaney 2013

Foundational ‘just transition’ paper. 3 competing axis of justice: access to electrivity, employment, climate risk. All pull policy in different directions. Just transition is not a technical component of decarbonation, it is a political project requiring deliberate redistribution.

Burke + Stephens 2017

‘Energy Democracy’ - emergent social movement advancing renewable energy transitions by resisting the fossil fuel dominant energy agenda while reclaiming and democratically restructuring energy regimes. Intergrates technical change with socioeconomic and political change.

Sovacool et al 2021

“The decarbonation divide” - benefits accrue to Global North, while costs (mining, e-waste), are concentrated in the Global South. Based on fieldwork in Colbalt mines in the DRC and e-waste scrapyards in Ghana. St

Steckel et al 2018

India context: development, jobs, and energy security reliant on the coal sector. Decarbonation is thus political: balancing the right to develop and the Northen-framed net-zero pathways.

JETP

Fix for Steckel et al 2018- balancing the right to develop and net-zero can be done through these patnerships. Example in South Africa - rich nations fund energy transitions as to not unjustly force them to not develop.

ESMAP 2020

(Part of the World Bank)- Solar hybrid mini-grids can provide high-quality electricity to nearly half a billion people in unpowered/underserved communities. Represents the least-cost solution to closing the energy access gao by 2030 in the relevant geographies. In SS. Africa, 291,000 population clusters have profiles that favour solar mini-grids. Needs to reach 2000per year, per country, with $127b of cumalative investment

Ockwell et al 2010

North-South technology transfer faces barriers beyond finance: IP protection, absorptive capacity constraints, power dynamics. Complicates leap-frogging. Evidenced by UK-China case- tech. diffusion is as much a political/governance challange as a finance one

Diallo + Brunsel 2013

Africa specific Water-Energy-Food (WEF) nexus. Energy transitions cannot be seperated from water + food dynamics. E.g. Thermal power generation requires vast water volumes.