Final Exam Africa in IR

International security

-the study of the threat, use, and control of military force;

But recently, other definitions are broader and focus on international security as the study of threats

Interstate war

armed conflict between states

Civil war

• armed conflict between multiple armed factions within a country; internal  

Secessionist violence

• one part of the country tries to split away from the rest 

Insurgency

rebel forces attempt to overthrow the government

Genocide

a purposeful attempt at the eradication of a particular group

The concept of international security on the African continent

is a little less as states trying to protect their border and more about states or groups attempting to protect or threaten “People security.” 

we are thinking of actors such as

• State forces (or fragments thereof [Sudan army led by this general] )

• Foreign armies (African or beyond) 

• International peacekeeping forces [also elsewhere, but a lot of them are sent to the African countries]

• Private security forces (hired by politicians, or even firms)

• Communal militias 

• Political militia; fighting on behalf of a particular politician

• Ethnic militia; surrounded by an ethnic group and interest   

• Rebel groups: overthrow the government; restructure and revise the governmental structure  

• Vigilantes or mobs perform justice on specific groups

• Pro-gov militia: they are a type of political militia specifically trying to protect the government, a loose association of armed citizens, “thugs,” who operate outside gov    

• Criminal groups; an organization and an economic system that benefits themselves, not a lot of research on it

Why does conflict look like this on the continent of Africa?

• The state is often weak and does not reach everywhere in the state 

• Weakly institutionalized democracies often foment election violence and political militias

• Enclave economies spur corruption and “bandits” which lead to resource violence

• Old divisions splitting some groups and unifying others may lead to tension

• Distributional conflict from not enough resources

Civil wars on the continent 2021-2022 example

• The Sahel civil war; going on in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and 3rd party states involve USA , Italy, France; peacekeepers involves EU, Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique, African Union, G5 Sahel

Sahel

has held the designation of the most lethal theater of militant Islamist violence in Africa for 4 yrs in a row, accounting 4 55% percent of all non-combatants killed by militant Islamist groups in Africa are in the Sahel

• (Ten African Security Trends from 2025 in Graphics)

Authoritarain regimes example

Chad, Uganda, Congo, Guinea

__ of Africa’s 54 national leaders have now come to power from coups or military actions

GROWING IMPUNITY AND ABUSES OF POWER

20

African leaders who took power via coup, in turn, are far more likely to evade term limits and perpetuate their time in power—expanding repression.

Of the 10 elections scheduled in Africa for this yr, only 3 were considred free and fair (2025)

• (Ten African Security Trends from 2025 in Graphics)

Coups and Military Dominated Regimes in Africa

Africa now has more authoritarian govs than at any time since 1998;

growing # of military govs is part of the broader trend of democratic backsliding landscape.

Corruption is also more likey to thrive under authoritarian govs

• (Ten African Security Trends from 2025 in Graphics)

Who might be involved in direct intervention of security challenges

• Inter-governmental organization (IGOs) like the UN

• Non-governmental organizations, like Save the Children 

• States or groups of states from within or outside Africa can send aid or forces

Protection of civilian (PoC)

“all necessary means”

integrated and coordinated mission action to prevent, deter, or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of deployment, up to and including deadly force

the mandates are set by the UN Security Council, need to ask them for perssion, the clear

Responsibility to Protect; R2P

states have a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; the international community should assist and may take collective action through the Security Council when national authorities manifestly fail

• The state is doing something horrible, need outside intervention, not on the request of the people doing the geniocde

What kind of challenges do interveners face?

• Even seemingly nonpolitical interventions are political 

  • e.g. feeding the hungry is an act of war Somali 1990s

  • Information, there is manipulation with info

  • Politics! African actor agency

  • Community mistrust

  • Access

But UN peacekeepers do have some positive impacts

• More UN troops and police associated with fewer civilians targeted with violence

  • aid workers typically aware of how their assistance is being captured or abused, but the alternative of not providing it at all is often less desired

• Local peacekeeper presence can raise political and military costs for rebel civilian targeting; constraints are stronger on rebels than on governments when access depends on government consent

• UNMISS local military presence improves security (observed and perceived) and boosts consumption and subjective well-being by enabling markets and labor activity.

Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations textbook 8

What are some humanitarian interventions forms?

• economic sanctions: can be targeted at specific leaders or broader restrictions

• diplomatic punishment: rhetorical condemnation, suspension from international organization, and explosion of ambassadors

• military interventions: air strikes, arms embargoes, or the deployment of peacekeeping troops

Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations textbook 8

Humanitarian Assistance is typically presumed…

to be neutral and above politics; any sort of external intervention is political

Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations textbook 8

International NGOs vs local NGOs

International NGOs such as the International Rescue Committee and Doctors Without Borders typically are more experienced and better funded, but local NGOs often win major UN relief contracts as well.

Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations textbook 8

why is the most basic decisions about the provision of humanitarian assistance can become quite contentious?

• it is a dominant power-sharing approach

• info needed to determine how much aid to send; food rations, tents to medical suppiles, docts

• official may have incentives to overestimate or underestimate the # of people affected

• govs officials might want to discredit a domestic rebel group by claiming it has killed or wounded more people than it has.

• manipulate aid by using political instead of humanitarians considerations to determine its distribution; example Ethiopia during the mid-1980s famine did this

• govs use their control over aid distribution to legitimize their approach to counterinsurgency; that is may mandate that aid be distributed only in specific areas

Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations textbook 8

Unlike Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian ___ has become common only more recently in African conflicts

• interventions;

  • since the cold war, there has been a dramatic increase in the # of peacekeeping operations

    • nearly thirty UN missions have been deployed to twenty African countries since 1988

What kind incentives are provided to member states by the UN and/or the African Union to contribute troops to participate in peace operations?

Money! Countries that contribute troops to UN missoins have been reimbursed more than 1,300 k per solider per month (less for regional peace operations)

• top ten troop-contributing countires in africa:

  • ethipohia, rwanda, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ghana

may have interest in outcome

prevent refugees from reaching their borders

face pressure from a domestic interest group to intervene

Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations textbook 8

What can happen with third-party intervention?

can also prolong conflict by applying inappropriate solutions and failing to address underlying sources of violence

expect always help

use it to generate funds to cover military budgets

Managing Mistrust

When would govs vs rebel groups allow for peacekeepers more?

• a large UN force elicits cooperation when rebels are militarily weak

• when facing a stronger gov, rebel groups welcome the intervention by a large mission

Managing Mistrust

when is it most and least effective sending missions?

• the UN should allocate its scarce resources by sending missions to countries where rebels are weak and governments are strong

• In contrast where governments are weak and rebels are strong, PKO deployment is most inefficient—in the sense that deploying more troops yields less cooperation

Managing Mistrust

The UN PKOS are a response to

commitment and mistrust problems that are prevalent in civil wars and postconflict agreements.

What is distinctive about protests in sub-Saharan Africa?

Often occurs in electoral democracies/around elections

◦ Conducted in an environment where high levels of state violence against protesters

◦ Main effects are not policy changes but changes in “popular organization, political consciousness, and political imagination

What are the three waves of political protest?

independence protests, pro-democracy protests, contemporary wave

South Africa’s FeesMustFall Protests; what happened?

“Narrow” protest in a democracy

• Triggered by University fee raise by 10 percent in Oct 2015, spread across Universities

• Student march on South Africa’s parliament on October 21

• Resulted in President Zuma establishing a commission to look into the possibility of free tertiary education; in 2018 a generation national bursary scheme for poor and working class students established

• Some success in changing policy, protests revived in 2019 and 2021 to

Sudan’s protest; what happened?

Countrywide protest broke out in Dec 2018 over increase in bread prices

• lead to military depose of the president, Bashir

• new rule replaced

  • power-sharing military and civilansl; but eventually miltary takes full power dissolving civilian gov 2021

• leads to a civil war broke out between sudanese armed forces and rapid support forces in 2023

what are some conclusions from protests?

• Most popular protests in SSA do NOT have immediate policy and political consequences

• Even those protests that do have consequences may have difficulty sustaining gains if extra-institutional support is not complemented by formal political representation

What makes civil war more likely?

honestly many reasons;

• many political scientists have emphasized the importance of grievances/discrimination in causing rebellion (Gurr; Horowitz)

• Ethnic groups whose status is low relative to their sense of entitlement/self-worth are likey to rebel

• Ethnic groups who are excluded from power are more likely to rebel (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009)

Conflict is rare, grievances are not! why?

• Paul Collier in The Bottom Billion: “... the sad reality seems to be that grievances are pretty common. Rebels usually have something to complain about, and if they don’t they make it up. All too often the real disadvantaged are in no position to rebel; they just suffer quietly.”

• Instead Collier and Hoeffler emphasizes the ability of rebels to hire soldiers on the cheap and to finance themselves as key conditions for civil conflict

Greed vs. Greivance: Can you measure one independent of the other?

can be viewed mutually exclusive explanations …

• Grievances are widespread

• Rebellions are the result of readily available rebel financing and a low opportunity cost of joining rebel movements

• Greed argument: Conflict caused by atypical opportunities for rebels

  • Availability of financing

  • Natural resources, diaspora

  • Low opportunity cost of conflict (high unemployment, underemployment)

What are a more immediate threats to rulers

coups > civil war

• leaders of non-co-ethnics included in governing coalitions cannot credibly commit to not organizing a coup d’etat (especially if former co-conspirators)

• The cost of purging one’s former allies from the central government, however, is an increased likelihood of civil war…

  • the enemy within article also argues this

THE ENEMY WITHIN: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil war in Africa Philip Roessler

what makes the coup dangerous compared with other antiregime sirgese?

the coup, as a swift, surprise strike, poses a much more immediate and unpredictable threat, coming not from those based in society but from those inside the government who have the capability to use the state apparatus, especially the military or the police, to depose the incumbent.

THE ENEMY WITHIN: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil war Africa Philip Roessler

what is one of the most prevalent tactics rulers employ to prevent threatening centers of power from coalescing" within their regimes, especially in security services, and the police?

the frequent replacement of cabinet ministers, commanders of armed forces, party leaders, and top bureaucrats “musical chairs” since it prevents amassing too much power within their respective field

• gives people a believe they can get into the position

THE ENEMY WITHIN: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil war in Africa Philip Roessler

what is the problem with ethnic stacking or other discretionary appointments?

they can be perceived as a conspiracy on the part of the ruler and his allies to build a “shadow state”

• leaves those excluded from the shadow state unable to monitor the distribution of patronage and control of coercion and increases their fears that in the future, they could be completely marginalized from power or face an even worse fate

THE ENEMY WITHIN: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil war in Africa Philip Roessler

what can the exclusion strategy lead to?

it is a short term strategy as it does not resolve the underlying conflict over the distribution of power and wealth between competing elites and their constituencies

• key downside of exclusion, especially when it is carried out along ethnic lines, is that it tends to facilitate insurgency formation, while compromising the regime's counterinsurgency capabilities

  • leaves regimes vulnerable to a future civil war

THE ENEMY WITHIN: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil war in Africa Philip Roessler

overall findings:

suggests an alternative explanation as to why there has been the concentration of civil wars in the rural periphery of poor, postcolonial states:

• “It argues that peripheral civil deeply connected to the center than is often recognized literature; elite bargaining and the incumbent's state survival can be as significant as drivers of large-scale political violence as are underlying structural conditions or bad neighborhoods”

Election and Civil war in Africa

TBH

Ethnic cleansing allegations in Nigeria - Farmer/ herder conflict

Historically, northern farmers went down with their cattle when there grass levels went down, it also helped the souther famers: “The violence, involving largely Muslim Fulani herders and Christian farming communities, has escalated from agricultural disputes into deadly reprisal attacks, with both sides accusing each other of ethnic targeting.”

What are some indirect interventions punishments nations can impose as punishments?

• Economic measures: sanctions, embargoes, boycotts

• Rhetorical measures: official condemnation, rebukes

• Legal measures: international courts, bringing of motions

Which states are condemned/ punished ?

“With the end of the Cold War, [UNHCR] targeting was based less on partisan ties, power politics, and the privileges of membership, and more on those countries’ actual human rights violations, treaty commitments, and participation in cooperative endeavors such as peacekeeping.” (Lebovik 2006)

Who implemented sanctions?

UN Security Council and many individual states and provinces, cities

• since 1966, the security council has established 31 sanctions with the majority being in Africa

Why did some want sanctions (or not)?

• Pro: ANC and Mandela encouraged sanctions early on as a non-violent means of crippling the apartheid regime; garnering international support and pressure

• Even in South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement: “Morality is cheap when someone else is paying.” ◦ Also concerns re: free trade, hypocrisy, Cold War, etc.

What were the effects of these sanctions?

Impossible to know for sure, layered response

◦ Considerable capital flight → decline in international exchange rate of South African currency → imports more expensive → inflation rises 12–15% per year

◦ Some unwanted spillover (e.g., enriched mining conglomerates who benefited from increased gold price)

IGOs?

Inter-governmental organizations like the United Nations can pass condemnations or motions, organize sanctions regimes

NGOs?

Non-governmental organizations like Save the Children can do research, make statements, alert policymakers → Firms get involved when we’re talking about economic measures

who else can implement sanctions and make statements?

states from within or outside Africa

ICC?

The International Criminal Court investigates and, where warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.”

Pro ICC?

• OAU leader at Rome conference in 1998, “Africa had a particular interest in the establishment of the court, since its peoples had been the victims of large-scale violations of human rights over the centuries (amnesty IntI)

• Six out of nine African situations under ICC investigation were from requests/granted jurisdictions by African states; Two other investigations in Africa (Sudan, Libya) were referred to the court by the UNSC, and African states on the Council either approved or abstained (Coalition for the ICC)

Anti-ICC?

Out of 54 individuals indicted by the ICC, 47 are African... No Western political/military leader has been investigated/ charged by the ICC Preliminaries Nigeria

• there is no legal binding to do what the ICC says

Africa and the International Criminal Court - Max du Plessis

what is the AU stands on the ICC?

A large number of African states are states parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute but the AU is very critical of the ICC and has adopted a number of resolutions reflecting this. (Yet most African states at one time strongly supported the ICC.)

Africa and the International Criminal Court - Max du Plessis

main problem of the ICC’s witness protection programme

is that it must rely on local partners to carry out protection measures.

Africa and the International Criminal Court - Max du Plessis

A fundamental aspect of the ICC statute is that the court can only

try cases where domestic courts are unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute (the complementarity principle).

Without an army: How ICC indictments reduce atrocities - Andrew Cesare Miller

why is that they argue ICC indictments can still reduce violence against civilians?

Armed groups affiliated with indicted leaders believe that if they reduce violence, their punishment might be reduced.

Without an army: How ICC indictments reduce atrocities - Andrew Cesare Miller

Findings

Short-term effects

After indictments: Violence drops significantly (about 30–35%).

This supports the idea of initial deterrence through assurance.

Long-term effects depend on outcome If punishment is lifted (charges dropped): Violence continues to stay low.

If punishment is maintained: Violence returns to previous levels.

Getting help military ness; from whom?

• Pro-government militias

• Private security companies and mercenaries

• Other countries

Private security what does it include

mercenaries (soldiers for hire)

private security corporations

purveyors of surveillance equipment,

etc

What is the problem with bilateral security arrangements with political militias

• Loyal but unwieldy

• Not large or sophisticated enough

• Plausible deniability is helpful; but also principal-agent problems

History (Western) Military Cooperation

At independence

Many countries retained core ties; colonial defense forces → national armies (Gutteridge 1971)

• UK military training in Ghana, Kenya until 1970s

• France bilateral defense agreements immediately upon independence

History (Western) Military Cooperation

Post - independence

Pressures to diversify; aid from UK, France, US, Israel, USSR, China

History (Western) Military Cooperation

Post-Cold War

• Disinterest, loss of clients

• Post 9/11: Global war on terror (U.S. base in Djibouti)  

Context: France in West Africa and the Sahel I

French troops long acted as de facto guarantors of stability in its former colonies

• Operation Serval (2013–2014)

• Operation Sangaris (2013–2016)

• Operation Barkhane (2014–2022)

Introduction: The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa —Rita Abrahamse

what is security privatisation linked to?

broader global transformations in governance, contestations over political community, issues of state capacity, and transnational networks.

Introduction: The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa —Rita Abrahamse

what is the articles focus

the complexities security privatisation has created on the African contient compared to others; it becomes more consumer driven than human driven

Introduction: The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa —Rita Abrahamse

an issue with Privatisation of security

When previously public goods and services become commodities that can be bought and sold in a competitive marketplace, the public is also increasingly seen as consumers with the right to ‘shop around’ for the best-quality service. Security is no longer an exclusive service provided to all by the state, but instead something to be bought from a marketplace where the state is only one of many potential providers, and not necessarily the most effi cient and reliable

Introduction: The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa —Rita Abrahamse

what is responsibilization?

Garland

the acceptance that individuals are increasingly held responsible for their own security and that it is both their right and their responsibility to actively engage in its provision.

Introduction: The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa —Rita Abrahamse

Outside the military arena, the day-to-day delivery of security in Africa has also become increasingly privatised.

• As the market for private security has developed, the presence of international security companies has expanded.

• The neoliberal ethos has also allowed private security actors to defend their business in the face of state protectionism or allegations of threats to national security.

Security privatisation in Africa cannot therefore be understood or analysed in isolation from global discourses and practices. But at the same time there are crucial differences between private security in Africa and security governance in the North.

D. Kohnert (2022) “The impact of Russian presence in Africa."

Russia and most African leaders shared a common vision of anti-colonialism, ‗modernization‘ and nation-building, stimulated not least by the Russian interest in Africa‘s resources and markets.

D. Kohnert (2022) “The impact of Russian presence in Africa."

what was the Bandung Conference (1955)?

In April, 1955, representatives from twenty-nine governments of Asian and African nations gathered in Bandung, Indonesia to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development, and decolonization.

D. Kohnert (2022) “The impact of Russian presence in Africa."

what did Soviet Union and Western powers puropse in helping>

the Soviet Union‘s leaning to exploit instability and conflict for its own ends did not necessarily promote peace in Africa (Barratt, 1981). Neither did the involvement of Western powers. Rather both used African independence movements to fuel proxy wars in SSA.

D. Kohnert (2022) “The impact of Russian presence in Africa."

Although African countries will suffer most under the direct and indirect consequences of the Russian war in Ukraine they have been reluctant to support Western positions concerning Russia‘s aggression for various reasons. why?

• there still is a great dependency of many African states on Russian delivery of military equipment and services.

• African leaders, for example from Kenya, Ghana and Uganda, repeatedly deplored political double standards of the West, lastly in the UN general assembly in early March where the votes however are not legally binding.

• Moreover, many of the socialist‘ African states had additional ethical and political reservations. After all, Moscow had supported African liberation movements substantially over decade

What is Regionalization?

consists of geographic diffusion to neighboring/nearby countries, or active involvement of neighbors or other African countries, or inter-related conflicts across neighboring countries

what is Mutual intervention?

when opponents of existing regimes all receive some kind of support from governmental or other forces in neighboring countries

Regional Hegemons

means leading (usually “biggest”) country in the region; past and current possible hegemons might be South Africa (south), Kenya, Ethiopia (east), Nigeria (west), etc

Intra-Africa peacekeeping: African Union (AU) who does it rely on to fund its missions?

external actors such as the UN and the EU

• in gen tho, AU not super effective; between 2021 and 2023, 93% of AU decisions weren’t implemented by member states)

Regional Economic Community (REC)

regional groupings of African states, recognized by the African Union (AU) as pillars and building blocks for continental economic integration

REC Examples

• IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development including eight countries in Eastern Africa

• EAC: East Africa Community, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda

• SADC: South African Development Community including 16 countries in the South

The Regionalization of Conflict 7

main ideas

• After the end of the Cold War, conflict in Africa did not decrease—it actually increased and became regionalized.

• The main causes of conflict are internal (within African states), not external.

• Weak states, economic decline, and political instability created conditions for:

  • Warlords and rebel groups

  • Cycles of violence and state failure

The Regionalization of Conflict 7

why did African conflicts become more complex after the Cold War

• Internal instability combined with regional involvement

  • Weak governments and economic crises allowed:

    • Rebel groups to grow

    • Conflicts to spread across borders

  • Neighboring states often joined conflicts due to:

    • Fear (security threats)

    • Opportunity (resources, political gain)

The Regionalization of Conflict 7

Each conflict is different but follows similar patterns:

• Weak states

• Cross-border actors

• Economic motivations

The Regionalization of Conflict 7

There is no single explanation—conflicts are caused by combinations of:

• Political instability

• Economic decline

• Ethnic tensions

• Resource competition