POLI130 UNC

Authors and Arguments

Fukuyama

Strong institutions are essential for development, more than government scope.

• Ex: Developing countries fail from overambitious projects; Europe & Latin America grew due to strong institutions.

Herbst

African states are weak due to lack of wartime pressures that historically built European states.

• Ex: European wars increased taxation efficiency and national identity; African countries rely on foreign trade taxes, facing fragmentation.

 

Weber

Some cultures value individualism, productivity, and hard work, allowing them to become more developed

• Protestantism promotes capitalistic values (ascetic work)

Acemoglu & Robinson

Inclusive institutions promote prosperity, leading to state development; extractive institutions block growth.

• Ex: South Korea’s inclusive post-1945 institutions fostered growth

• Ex: North Korea’s extractive ones caused stagnation.

Sachs

Geography shapes economic development.

• Ex: Temperate coastal regions prosper (southern Brazil); tropical/landlocked regions face disease, poor soil, high costs

Eisenstadt

Modernization transforms traditional societies via literacy, urbanization, and exposure to new ideas.

• Ex: Social mobilization exposes people to modern life; modern societies develop specialized institutions, democracy, and media.

Frank

Latin American underdevelopment stems from exploitative ties to developed countries.

• Ex: Colonies sent resources to Europe; post-WWII industrial growth in Brazil reinforced dependence.

Seth

South Korea’s postwar development came from state-led industrialization, elite cooperation, education, and reforms.

• Ex: Five-year plans and conglomerates; investment in education and urbanization policies.

Baer

Latin America’s ISI spurred short-term growth but lacked long-term efficiency vs. East Asia’s export-led model.

• Early ISI policies promoted domestic production of consumer and capital goods, generating industrial growth but neglecting agricultural productivity and export competitiveness.

 

Schmitter & Karl

Democracy holds rulers accountable but may be slower than authoritarian regimes.

• Ex: Democracy needs fair elections, citizen participation, and independent associations, but it can be slower and prone to compromise compared to authoritarian regimes.

Huntington

Third Wave democratization expanded globally, but economic, cultural, and leadership conditions affect outcomes.

• Ex: Growth and middle class supported democracy in Spain & Portugal; Soviet withdrawal aided Eastern Europe, but cultural barriers slowed adoption elsewhere.

Levitsky & Way:

Competitive authoritarian regimes hybridize democratic forms with authoritarian control.

• Ex: Peru & Russia show manipulation despite formal institutions.

Anderson

Autocracy is politically exclusive rule, not just “not democracy.”

• Evidence: 20–35% labeled autocracies don’t meet this; democratic backsliding often creates competitive authoritarianism.

Linz

Presidential systems are prone to instability due to fixed terms, strong executives, and winner-take-all elections.

• Ex: Spain’s 1977 parliamentary coalition reduced divisiveness; a presidential system could have worsened deadlock.

Shugart & Carey

Presidential systems have important advantages, greater accountability, clearer electoral choices, stronger institutional checks, and more stability

Lijphart

PR + parliamentarism = inclusive, stable democracies via multiparty coalitions and balanced power.

• Ex: Germany, Sweden, Austria allow minority representation and strong legislatures.

Quade

Plurality systems produce two-party governments, moderation, clear accountability, and decisive action.

• Ex: Single-party responsibility contrasts with PR coalitions.

Grzymala-Busse

Populists thrive when mainstream parties fail to offer distinct, responsive policies.

• Ex: 2010s European populists capitalized on inequality, economic crisis, immigration, and elite disconnect.

Howard

Ethnocracies reduce post-conflict violence but limit political freedom and efficiency.

• Ex: 1970s Belgium required separate parties, education, and posts for Flemish/French speakers.

Reilly

Preferential voting in divided societies are the best for divided societies because it encourages candidates to appeal beyond their group, fostering moderation.

• Ex: Northern Ireland’s AV system promoted multiethnic cooperation.

Putnam

Democracy thrives where civic engagement, trust, and horizontal networks exist.

• Ex: Northern Italy had more effective governments than southern regions due to civic life.

Berman

Strong civil society can be exploited if political institutions are weak.

• Ex: Nazis infiltrated associations to build cross-class support.

Yang

Ethnicity shaped by ancestry, society, and strategic interests.

• Primordialism: Inherited and fixed (e.g., kinship determines membership).

• Constructionism: Socially constructed and flexible (e.g., adversity or symbolic ethnicity).

• Instrumentalism: Strategic for resources (e.g., choosing identity for advantage).

Mamdani

Hutu/Tutsi identities socially/politically constructed via colonial policies and institutions.

• Ex: Education, administration, church, and land policies privileged Tutsi.

Gagnon

Wars were deliberately provoked by Serbian elites to consolidate power; ethnicity was a political tool.

• Ex: Milosevic purged reformists, demonized Albanians, and fostered nationalism.

Wilkinson

Ethnic violence used strategically by elites; local/state electoral incentives shape occurrence.

• Ex: Hindu-Muslim riots in towns with incentives to incite majority voters; competitive states prevent violence.

Varshney

Civil Society is the determinant for ethnic conflict, Interethnic civic networks reduce violence; intraethnic or weak networks increase risk.

• Ex: Calicut peaceful due to interlocked Hindu-Muslim civic ties; Aligarh experienced riots with weak networks.