How Shoud We Treat Non-Human Animals

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people

if its wrong to torture puppies its wrong to support factory farming, and since its wrong to torture puppies, its wrong to support factory farming

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: fred

fred can’t taste chocolate unless he uses the cocoamone from torturing puppies (he feels bad but human pleasure is at stake)

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: fred torture’s himself

objection: fred tortures the puppies himself unlike people who consume factory meat
response: what if fred hired someone else? he wouldn’t be any betters

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: fred can prevent suffering

objection: fred can prevent suffering but the average consumer cannot prevent suffering of the factory farmed meat
objection: a morally decent person would not order the chocolate even if puppies will be tortured
objection 2: deny the casual impotence (single effect won’t do anything) because if less people did it we could “save 35 chickens per year” since we consider small risks of great harms unacceptable in other contexts

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: doctrine of double effect

objection: Fred intends the suffering of puppies as a means to pleasure; meat eaters foresee but do not intend the suffering
response: that requires that there is an outweighing good effect but the good of factory farming does not outweigh the harms

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: but puppies!

objection: but puppies!
response: it’s unlikely that there is a morally relevant property possessed by puppies that is absent in other animals, if people care more about that its a psychological difference not a moral one

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: texan’s challenge

not wrong to support factory farming, therefore not wrong to torture puppies (humans have a moral status so far above that of other animals that human interests (ie. for pleasure) are worth much more)

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: rationality gambit

rationality is what separates humans from other animals, so they are more important, but what about humans that lack those capabilities?
response: we do not have to attribute a different moral status to marginal humans as humans as a type of species are more morally significant

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: rationality gambit objection

objection 1: the trial (giving a defendant a specific role as more significant) couldn’t this be done with other categories?
objection 2 : accountant as a category, doesn't necessarily reflect moral significance over others.
response: cognitively deficient humans do have an inferior moral status… but we cannot use them as we do animals → that would be outrageous!
objection: even if it is true that humans would freak out if we used cognitively disabled humans the way we use animals, that is not the right kind of reason to conclude that those humans really do have higher moral status than animals

norcross’ puppies, pigs and people: moral agents and moral patients

is rationality even relevant? even if animals are not rational, they are still moral patients that should be protected

cohen on animal rights

rights entail obligations (family, commitments, duties) but not all obligations are entailed by rights, and do not arise only from the rights of others

cohen on animal rights: rights are essentially human

animal lives are amoral, no right or wrong, therefore cannot violate their rights as rights do not apply to them

cohen on animal rights: moral action

what differentiates human actions from those of other animals?
kant: a moral will, capacity to formulate moral principles and graps maxims underpinning them (animals cant)

cohen on animal rights: moral status of animals

objection: no moral distinction because animals can also be rational and capable of communication
response: this misses the point, regardless of their abilities its impossible for them to act morally

cohen on animal rights: conceptual mistake

a concept of moral rights is being applies in the context of humans which makes no sense in the context of animals

harman on animal death: the common belief

while there is something deeply morally wrong with factory farming, there is nothing wrong with ‘humane’ farms

harman on animal death: surprising claim

we have reasons to not cause intense pain but no strong reasons to kill? this is FALSE. if an action painlessly kills a healthy animal in the prime of life, then that action significantly harms the animal

harman on animal death: harm objection

cause of bad experiences and deprivation of future goods is bad.
objection: only causing bad experiences is harm
response: active interference can be harm such as killing

harman on animal death: future oriented objection

objection: death is only bad if you have desires/plans, animals don’t so death isnt bad
response: death can be bad without having desires because it cuts off a future life that would have been good

harman on animal death: time relative interests

objection: animals have weak psychological continuity (little memory or future planning) so death is less harmful
response: psychological continuity is not what makes death harmful; death can still harm by depriving an animal of a good future life.