Lecture 1.5: Logical Behaviorism

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Flashcards covering the definitions, core arguments, and philosophical critiques of logical behaviorism as presented in Lecture 1.5.

11 Terms

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Psychological Behaviorism

A theory in psychology with origins in William James, J Watson, and B. F. Skinner, asserting that because we cannot observe another's mind, empirical study should focus on behaviors as responses to stimuli.

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Logical Behaviorism

A form of physicalism claiming that all talk of mentality or thought refers to potentially observable behavioral criteria, defining the mind as a propensity or capacity for certain behavior patterns.

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Verifiability Criterion of Meaning

A positivist view stating that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its verification conditions, or the conditions that must hold for the sentence to be true.

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Publicly Observable Verification

The requirement that for sentences to have shared meaning between people, their verification conditions must be rooted in observable behavioral and physical phenomena.

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Beetle in the Box

Wittgenstein's thought experiment illustrating that if everyone has a private, unobservable 'beetle' (consciousness), the word 'beetle' cannot refer to that private object but must refer to shared behavioral criteria.

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Ineffable

A term used by Wittgenstein to describe things that may be important but cannot be spoken of through shared language, such as private consciousness.

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Folk Psychology

Our ordinary talk about beliefs, desires, and pains, which thinkers like Paul Churchland argue is an outdated and false theory similar to the phlogiston theory of fire.

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Qualia

Qualitative mental states or private conscious states; Daniel Dennett argues these are incoherent concepts.

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Super Stoic

A hypothetical person who feels deep pain but has trained themselves to show no outward pain behavior, serving as an objection to the idea that pain logically entails behavior.

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Disposition

A behaviorist's counter-argument suggesting that even if behavior isn't shown (as in a super stoic), the mental state consists of a tendency or capacity to exhibit that behavior.

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Jaegwon Kim's Objection

The argument that the relationship between pain and behavior is causal rather than logical, noting there is no common behavior pattern shared across all species that experience pain.