Lecture 1.5: Logical Behaviorism
Origins of Psychological Behaviorism
Psychological behaviorism is a theory in psychology that emerged from the work of figures such as William James, J. B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner.
The foundational premise of this theory is the epistemic limitation regarding internal mental states: one cannot actually look into the mind of another person.
To conduct an empirical study of psychology, a researcher must restrict their observations to behaviors exhibited as responses to specific stimuli.
Theoretical Framework:
Behaviorists conclude that any theory of mind should focus exclusively on external behaviors.
The model follows a structure of inputs (stimuli) and outputs (behaviors).
This is both an epistemological claim (concerning what can be known about a mind) and a methodological claim (concerning how the practice of psychology should proceed).
The Shift to Logical Behaviorism
Logical behaviorism represents the transformation of psychological behaviorism from a methodological stance into a metaphysical and linguistic claim.
Key proponents associated with this shift include members of the Vienna Circle and logical positivists like Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel.
Logical behaviorism is considered a form of physicalism.
Core Thesis: All discourse regarding mentality, thought, or mental states can only ever mean things that involve potentially observable behavioral criteria.
Definition of Mind: Having a mind is defined simply as having a propensity or capacity to exhibit certain patterns of behavior.
The Argument from the Verifiability Criterion of Meaning
The argument for logical behaviorism is rooted in the positivist view of the world and specifically the verifiability criterion of meaning.
Defining Meaning: The meaning of a sentence is equivalent to its verification conditions (the specific conditions that must hold true for the sentence to be verified).
Concrete Example: The statement "There are number of books in this room" is made true and given meaning by the process of physical verification, such as going through the room and counting the books to reach that specific number.
Meaninglessness in Philosophy: Sentences that lack empirical verification conditions are deemed meaningless under this criterion.
The speaker provides a parody of Hegelian philosophy: "The nothing contains the absolute and progresses towards plurality of meaning."
Terms like "the absolute" or "the nothing" are criticized because no empirical tests exist to determine their truth or presence; therefore, they have no meaning to a positivist.
Shared Meaning and Public Observability:
For a sentence to be understood by multiple people (shared meaning), the verification conditions must be publicly observable.
If the meaning of a sentence consists of its verification conditions, and those conditions must be shared to be understood, then the conditions must be behavioral and physical phenomena.
Conclusion of the Argument: The meaning of any sentence about the mind refers solely to the behavioral and physical conditions that hold if the sentence is true.
Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box
Ludwig Wittgenstein provides a famous thought experiment to illustrate the problem of private mental states.
The Scenario: Suppose every person has a box. Each person looks into their own box and sees something they call a "beetle."
The Epistemic Barrier: No one can look into anyone else's box. Each person only knows what a "beetle" is by looking at their own private case.
The Problem: It is possible that the thing inside my box is completely different from the thing inside your box, or even that your box is empty. Since we cannot compare the contents, the word "beetle" cannot refer to the private object if we are to use the word to communicate with each other.
Positivist Conclusion regarding Pain:
Pain behaves like the "beetle." We cannot look into another's consciousness to verify their pain.
Therefore, the word "pain" cannot mean an internal private state; it must mean only the "pain behavior" that can be shared and observed.
Wittgenstein’s Nuance:
Wittgenstein agreed that "pain" refers to behavior in a linguistic sense, but he suggested that there might be ineffable things that are more important than what can be spoken of.
He posits that when we use the word "consciousness," we are referring to behavior, but there remains a "thing" we don't have a word for which is highly significant.
Contemporary Behaviorism and Eliminativism
Traces of behaviorist thought persist in contemporary philosophy, notably in the works of Paul Churchland and Daniel Dennett.
Paul Churchland and Folk Psychology:
Churchland argues that "folk psychology"—our everyday talk about beliefs, desires, pains, and intentions—is not just inaccurate but is actually about nothing at all.
He compares folk psychology to the "phlogiston theory of fire," which was an outdated and eventually discarded scientific theory of how fire worked.
He suggests that eventually, a superior theory based on brain function and behavior will replace these illusory concepts.
Daniel Dennett and Qualia:
Dennett argues that the ordinary concept of "qualia" (private, qualitative, conscious mental states) is an incoherent concept.
Objections to Logical Behaviorism
The Super Stoic Objection:
One can conceive of a "super stoic"—a person who has trained themselves to show no pain behavior whatsoever while experiencing intense internal pain.
If it is logically possible to have pain without pain behavior, then pain does not logically entail behavior.
Behaviorist Counter: The behaviorist may argue that "pain behavior" refers to a disposition to behave as if in pain, which the stoic merely suppresses.
The Comatose Patient Objection:
A comatose patient might exhibit no behavioral responses, yet a brain scan could show that the pain centers of the brain are activated.
This suggests that pain can be verified via internal physical states without any external behavioral output, contradicting the claim that behavior is a conceptual requirement for pain.
Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Worry:
Kim points out the lack of a universal behavior pattern for pain across different species (e.g., humans, cows, cats, snakes, squids).
He argues that while there may be a causal relationship between consciousness and behavior, there is no logical or analytic relationship.
To be in pain is not identical to exhibiting behavior; behaviorism fails to prove that pain is behavior as a matter of conceptual truth.