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Analytic
A claim is analytic if the truth of the claim is contained in the meaning of the words in it.
So, if your understand the meaning of the words, you know whether the statement is true.
Whether it is true or false depends solely on the meaning of the words.
If a true statement is analytic then the negation (denial of) the statement will be self-contradictory
e.g. a triangle is a three sided shape
Tautology - where the same thing is said twice over different terms
Synthetic
A claim is synthetic if the truth of the claim is not contained in the meaning of the words.
You need to know more than the meaning of the words to know whether it is true.
Whether it is true or false depends on the way the world is.
e.g. my mother has red hair
Necessary
A proposition that must be true (or if false, it must be false), a state of affairs that must hold. A statement can be necessarily true or necessarily false.
e.g. a triangle has 3 sides
Contingent
A proposition that could be either true or false, a state of affairs that may or may not hold, depending on how the world actually is
A priori
Refers to the way in which we acquire and justify knowledge. Truths that can be known independently of experience, without the use of senses, are said to be known as a priori.
We can be certain of a priori knowledge prior to any experience.
Gained without any sense experience
You donāt need to go and find anything out from the world
It is acknowledged that we need experience in order to understand language and concepts, but the key point is that a priori knowledge is not generated on the basis of experience.
A posteriori
Truths that can only be known via the senses and so are dependent on experience are termed a posteriori.
Gained through sense experience
You need some kind of experience of the world to find out the answer
Truths can only be known via the senses (or inner feelings) and so are dependent on experience are termed a posteriori.
Empiricism
All synthetic knowledge is a posteriori. Apart from analytic knowledge (which tells us nothing new about the world), all our knowledge comes from sense experience. The view that all concepts are derived from sense experience. We are born with no ideas. As we have sense experiences, we form ideas in our mind. We canāt have an idea of something weāve had no sense experience of.
Simple and complex concepts:
Simple impression (the sight of the colour brown) ācausesā simple idea (the idea of brown)
Simple impression (the colour brown) + the simple impression (the smell of tea) + simple expression (the taste of tea) ātogether-causesā complex idea (the idea of tea) āalternatively causesā complex impression (painting of a cup of tea)
According to empiricists like Locke or Hume, all concepts ultimately derive from sense experience, whether that is directly (for simple ideas) or indirectly (for complex ideas)
Humeās copy principle:
For Hume, ideas are simply copies of our impression made by a rubber stamp or a printing press. We can replicate these copies in our mind and combine them to form complex ideas. Locke says that ideas come from sensation (sense experience) and also reflection. This could mean generalising across several specific ideas or noticing what is common to different ideas. (e.g. forming an idea of beauty by reflecting on your sensations of beautiful things).
Humeās extreme form of empiricism
If you think you have a concept, but canāt trace it back to an impression, then it is not a concept at all. Although you may have a word for it, that word doesnāt actually mean anything.
Rationalism
We can have a priori synthetic knowledge by using our rationality/reason. Without sense experience, and just by thinking, we can figure out things we didnāt know before.
Innatism
We can have a priori synthetic knowledge because it exists within us innately. Since itās already within us at birth, we donāt need experience of the world. Innatism is the claim that there is some innate knowledge, not derived from experience, but somehow part of the structure of the mind. Innatists claim that we can have synthetic a priori knowledge about the world, however, they may disagree with each other about which examples of knowledge are innate, but a key suggestion is knowledge of God. Innatists tend to claim that this kind of knowledge is
there at birth
a priori
universal, meaning it is known by everyone
clear and distinct which is self-evident, infallible and the foundation of all our knowledge.
Innate ideas
Knowledge or ideas that are in some way built into the structure of the mind, rather than gained from sense experience
Plato and universals
Plato was puzzled by āthe problem of universalsā of the relationship between a concept and an individual instance of that concept.
We seem to have a concept of beauty, but never witness beauty in its pure form, only imperfectly in different people and objects. So what is beauty itself?
No real objects are perfectly circular. So our concept of a ācircleā must not derive from our sense experience - it must be innate. This applied equally to all mathematical shapes
Plato argues that numbers are universals and are therefore innate. Although you may have sense experience of various instances of two things (e.g. a pair of gloves), you never have sense experience of ātwoā itself.
Another example from Plato is the concept of being equal. Because two things we can experience can never be exactly equal, we must not get our concept of equality from experience so it must be innate.
Platoās argument for innate knowledge in standard form
P1. The slave boy has no prior knowledge of geometry/squares
P2. Socrates only asks questions; he does not teach the boy about squares
P3. By the end of the questioning, the slave boy is able to state an eternal truth about geometry/squares
P4. This eternal truth was not derived from the boyās prior experience, nor from Socrates
C1. This eternal truth must have innately in the boy to begin with
Leibnizās claim of sense experience
Sense experience only tells us about the particular thing weāve experienced (an instance) - contingent truth. E.g. If we saw the sun rise this morning, we know that it rose this morning. We might think that it will rise every morning, but we canāt possibly have sense experience of it rising every morning. But, there seem to be some truths that we know will always be true (necessary truths). E.g. whatever our sense experience was, there couldnāt possibly be a time when 2 + 3 doesnāt = 5. āThe senses never give us anything but instances, i.e. particular or singular truths. But however many instances confirm a general truth, they arenāt enough to establish its universal necessity; for it neednāt be the case that what has happened always will - let alone that it must - happen in the same wayā
Platoās Theory of Forms
concept innatism = the claim that some of our concepts are innate, not derived from experience, but somehow part of the structure of the mind
everything in the world is imperfect and changing. (e.g. Circles, universals)
But we have the innate idea of perfect circles and universals. So they must exist somewhere else, not in the material things of this world.
These perfect ideas (or forms) exist in The Realm of Forms, which is non-physical and eternal.
Physical objects in this world are imperfect copies of the forms
Our souls are the forms of us, which lived in the Realm of Forms before we were born, and will return there after we die.
Knowledge of the forms
we have forgotten most of these āformsā but they are in us innately and Plato believed that through a process of reasoning, we can achieve a perfect understanding/apprehension once again.
although this theory of forms is not widely supported today, Platoās account contains some of the classic features of innatism that have been repeated through the ages
Innate ideas are āinā us, although we might not be aware of them (exactly like a forgotten memory is āinā us)
We can realise these innate ideas through a priori reason
Innate ideas provide timeless truths
Necessary truths
truths that have to be true - they couldnāt possibly be false. Weāve already looked at some examples such as ābachelors are unmarriedā. Leibniz uses the laws of logic as examples of necessary truths, such as āit is impossible for the same thing to both be and not to beā. Everyone uses the sort of knowledge all the time, but without really being aware of it: āEven if we give no thought to them, they are necessary for thought. The mind relies on these principles constantlyā. Leibniz argues that we come to know these innate truths by āattending to what is already in our mindsā.
Leibnizās law/the identity of indiscernibles
a metaphysical principle stating that if two entities are identical (numerically one and the same), they must share all the same properties.
Leibnizās argument for innatism
P1. The senses only give us particular instances
P2. A collection of instances can never show the necessity of a truth
P3. We can grasp and prove many necessary truths
IC. (P1 + P2 + P3) Therefore the necessary truths that we grasp with out mind do not derive from the senses
MC. Therefore, our knowledge of necessary truths must be innate.
Leibnizās marble analogy
Leibniz disagrees with Locke that the mind is a tabula rasa or āan empty pageā. In contrast Leibniz says the mind is like a block of veined marble - the marble cannot be cut into any shape; the shape is in part dictated by the veins which are already there. It is the job of the sculptor to work with the veins to create the desired shape, they do not have a āblank slateā which could create any shape at all. They are ārevealingā shapes which are already there. Leibniz argues the mind is like the veined marble in that it has pre-existing knowledge of necessary truths and logic which are ārevealedā by sense experience or learning and which give shape to our knowledge. The ease with which we know these truths implies we already have the shape of them within us (as pre-dispositions and natural tendencies to knowledge rather than āactual thinkingā), like a block of marble already containing the shape of Hercules would be more easily revealed.
Ockhamās razor
The principle that states we should not put forward a hypothesis that says many different things exist when a simpler explanation will do as well. āDo not multiply entities beyond necessityā. A simpler explanation is a better explanation, as long as it is just as successful.
The mind as tabula rasa
The idea that the mind can be compared to a tabula rasa (which is Latin for blank tablet or slate) goes back to the early days of Western philosophy, where we find it in the writings of Aristotle, but it was Locke who gave the theory its first clear articulation. The tabula rasa theory works as a powerful argument against the theory of innate ideas. For if it can be shown that our ideas come from experience, then claiming that we have innate ideas would seem to be an unnecessary theory and so it would be unreasonable to hold it. This argument implicitly relies on a principle known as Ockhamās razor, which is the idea that, wherever possible, we should always go for the simplest explanation. (The idea of the ārazorā is that we should shave off any unnecessary elements to an explanation.) Locke uses the example of our ideas of colours to make the case, but it suggests that it will apply to any supposedly innate idea. He argues that it could be the case that:
a) we are born with an innate idea of each colour
And it certainly is the case that:
b) we see colours with our eyes.
The question is, why would God, or even nature, bother with a) given that b)? It is a simpler explanation to say that our idea of colour is derived from b). Claiming a) seems to add no extra explanatory value and so, according to Locke, is an āabsurdā additional claim. The general principle in play here is that we should go for the simplest explanation - in other words, Ockhamās razor.
*Lockeās criticism 1: the theory of innate ideas is unnecessary
Locke uses Ockhamās razor to argue that if we can explain the existence of all our concepts without the need for supposing that innate ideas exist, then we should do. Innatism claims that some of our ideas cannot have come from sense experience alone e.g. knowledge of universals (P&L) and knowledge of necessary truths like laws of logic (L) - Locke attacks this saying we can equally explain these ideas, and without postulating the existence of more entities i.e. innate ideas, and additionally the further entities on which these rely, e.g. a realm of forms. Innatism argues there is not equal explanatory power without postulating the existence of innate knowledge - no number of individual sense experiences can lead to knowledge of a universal or necessary truth.
Lockeās criticism 2: No knowledge is universal
Many people in Lockeās day argued that certain ideas must be innate because they are universally accepted. Locke says that whichever idea the innatist suggests (such as simple mathematical concepts), although it may be the case that most people share the idea, there are no ideas that everyone shares. For instance, he claims that āchildren and idiotsā do not have these ideas. So the argument that they are innate because they are universal, fails.
The innatist can respond by claiming that innate knowledge doesnāt require that everyone actually knows it, but that everyone would know it they used their reason correctly to work it out.
Locke responds by asking, if it really is innate, so we already have it, then why do we need reason to discover it?
In response, Leibniz points out that universality cannot be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for innateness. There could be ideas that everyone shares that are not innate, they all just happen to agree. And God could give innate ideas to certain people and not others. Leibniz is agreeing with Locke that universality is not a good argument for innateness. But he still thinks there are other good reasons for accepting innate ideas.
Lockeās criticism 3: the mind must be transparent
In response to Lockeās criticism of universality, some innatists have claimed that there are innate ideas which āchildren and idiotsā have, they are just not aware of yet. The ideas are in their mind from birth, but they donāt know they are there.
Locke argues that this canāt be the case. The mind must be ātransparentā, so that any ideas which are in it, we are aware of (this doesnāt mean we have to be thinking of them, but that we have thought of them at some point). Otherwise, Locke asks, in what way can they be said to be āin the mindā? He argues you cannot have something "in the mind" without ever having known it is there.
Leibniz responds by arguing that we can have innate ideas which we are unaware of. (He was way ahead of his time here in effectively suggesting the idea of āsubconsciousā thoughts.)
Lockeās criticism 4: reliance on the non-natural
Most innatists of Lockeās time claimed that innate ideas are put into our minds by God. As we saw above in his first criticism, Locke believes that these same ideas can be explained naturally, without the need for anything supernatural like God. Platoās answer is that the non-physical mind existed, containing this knowledge, before birth. Leibniz and Descartes argue that innate knowledge must come from God.
If we donāt accept these non-natural explanations, then it doesnāt seem like we can accept the existence of innate knowledge.
A modern response to this is that there are forms of innatism that donāt rely on anything supernatural. Chomsky argues that our ability to rapidly learn language is only possible if we all have an innate idea of grammar. Others argue that we all have an innate sense of morality. Many people believe that through evolution, we have developed innate instincts to interpret and respond to the world in certain ways. This non-supernatural form of innatism is often called nativism.
Lockeās criticism 5: Self-evidence
The innatist might claim that innate knowledge is āself-evidentā. That is, we agree that it is true as soon as we think of it. But, this seems to be the case for lots of knowledge that is not innate. For example, āwhite is not blackā is self-evident. But our knowledge of it seems a posteriori (based on sense experience).
āInnateā knowledge is actually a posteriori
The empiricist could respond to suggestions of innate knowledge by claiming that these examples are gained not by reason, but by sense experience.
For instance, the slave boy was basing his knowledge on his experience of squares.
Some philosophers, such as Mill, have argued that all mathematical knowledge is actually based on experience. For instance, I know that 2 + 3 = 5 because I have seen 2 things and 3 things, and when I put them together I have seen that they make 5. Mill claims that there is no a priori knowledge. All knowledge is a posteriori.
If sense experience is required to know these propositions, then they are not innate.
The empiricist can respond to Plato by claiming that our concepts of universals really are based on sense experience. For example, by experiencing lots of beautiful things, we can form the concept of the beauty by working out what these things have in common. And we have the concept of two by experiencing two things.
Although this may seem plausible for the case of small numbers like two, I can have the concept of the number 8,346,231 without ever having seen a collection of that many things!
Similarly, the empiricist may convince you that you have derived the concept of circle from your experiences of circular things. But Descartes responds to this by pointing out that he can form a concept of a thousand-sided shape, even though he has never experienced one, and he canāt even imagine one.
āInnateā knowledge is actually analytic
Another way the empiricist can respond is to claim that these proposed āinnateā propositions are only analytically true. They are true just because of the meanings of the words, so they tell us nothing new about the world.
For Leibnizās example of āthe same thing canāt both be and not beā, again if you understand all the words in this sentence, then you know that the claim is true. This truth isnāt something separate from the definitions in the sentence.
If these truths are not synthetic but analytic, then the innatist has failed to prove that there is innate synthetic knowledge.
the mind as a ātabula rasaā - locke
the mind is like a blank slate. the sense organs allow us to have experiences. these experiences are imprinted in the mind as ideas. one result of the tabula rasa view is that individuals without working sense organs will be unable to form ideas associated with that sense organ
Empiricism criticism 1: Humeās Fork
Humeās fork is his distinction between two types of knowledge. Anything that can be known must sit on one of the two prongs: Relations of ideas (analytic propositions) and Matters of Fact (synthetic propositions). Anything which is neither can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. Hume argues for empiricism that impressions are both necessary and sufficient for ideas, where you canāt have an idea without having had the sense impression and every time you have a sense impression, it generates an idea.
Empiricism criticism 2: Impressions are not necessary
Humeās missing shade of blue example
Response (simple and complex ideas): We can form an idea of that particular shade by combining the idea of blue with the ideas of darkness or lightness. So our concept of the missing shade does derive from sense experience.
Problems with the response: If the idea of this shade is a complex one, isnāt every idea a complex one? Every example of blue is of a particular shade (dark-blue, turquiosey-blue, sky-blue, etc). So could we ever have a simple idea of blue? If we couldnāt have a simple idea of blue, then we couldnāt combine it with anything to form a complex idea of a particular shade
The empiricist can claim that we canāt in fact imagine the missing shade. Then they can stick with the copy principle.
Empiricism criticism 3: Impressions are not sufficient