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What makes Scotus different from thinkers who give priority to the intellect (such as Aquinas in a stronger intellectualist reading)
Aquinas: the intellect presents the good â> the will follows
Scotus: the will is not determined but the intellect
What does Scotus mean but the will is a rational appetite?
a power that desires, but not blindly. It operates with awareness and reflection
Why is the will no determined by the intellect?
even if the intellect judges something as âbest,â the will can still accept it, reject it, or choose something else
What does it mean to say the will is self-determining?
the will is not forced by anything outside itselfânot even reason
The willâs ability to choose between oppsites
do something or refrain from doing something; choose what reason says is best or reject it
Why is ability essential for freedom?
freedom requires real alternative, if you cannot otherwise, you are not free
Why does Scotus reject the idea that the intellect determines the will?
the intellect judges what is best and the will follows that judgement necessarily so, if you truly know what is best, you must choose it. Scotus thinks that this makes human action too automatic
What would be lost if the will were determined?
no real responsibility, no genuine moral praise or blame, human action would become mechanical
What does Scotus mean by indifference?
the will is open to multiple real possibilities
How is indifference different from randomness?
random = no control
Scotusâ freedom = controlled openness
What is freedom not?
chaos but the real possibility of alternatives
What is contingency (things could be otherwise) essential to moral life?
if actions were necessary, they wouldnât be moral choices
How is contingency different from necessity?
contingency: could be otherwise
necessary: could not be otherwise
Affectio commodi
desire for advantage, happiness, benefit; self-interested inclination
Affectio iustitiae
desire for justice, goodness for its own sake'; can override self-interest
Why are affectio commodi and iustitiae distinct inclinations?
humans sometimes can pursue self-interest and sometimes an act against it for moral reasons
How does affectio iustitiae allow us to act beyond self-interest?
it is an independent inclination toward justice itself, enabling the will to choose what is right even when in conflicts with personal advantage
Why would morality collapse into self-interest without affectio iustitiae?
without it all actions reduce to self-interest and morality composes into egoism
Where does Scotus locate moral goodness (not primarily in consequences)?
the will (intention), not the outcome
Right willing
and action is morally good if it is will rightly
Why does external success not guarantee moral goodness?
morality likes in the willâs intentionsâspecifically whether one chooses what is right for its own sakeârather than outcomes, which are often beyond oneâs control
What is the role of intention?
a bad intention + a good result doesnât equal morally good
a good intention + a bad result can still have moral worth
God establishes moral obligation
moral laws depend on Godâs will
Some moral truths are not arbitrary
some truths are necessary, for example: loving God or basic logical/moral principles
Why is Scotus not a simple relativist?
although he allows that some moral laws are contingent on Godâs will, he maintains the fundamental moral principles are necessary and that Godâs commands are grounded in rational goodness rather than arbitrary choice
How are natural law can be partly necessary and partly contingent?
its fundamental principles are grounded in unchangeable truths about God W goodness, while its specific moral manna's depend on Godâs free will and could have been otherwise
Which moral principles could not be otherwise?
because moral principle is grounded in Godâs nature, logical consistency, what it means for something to be good at all so denying them would involve contradiction
Which could God have commended differently?
those that do not involve contradiction if changed, cancer the ordering of human life, not God as the highest good, depend on Godâs free (but rational) will
What does it mean to say that Scotus is a voluntarist?
the will has priority over the intellect in moral matters
Why does the will have a kind of priority over the intellect in moral matters?
means that knowing the good is not what makes action moral; choosing it is
How does morality connect to freedom and responsibility?
knowing the dood is not enough; choosing the good is what matters
Why is freedom required for responsibility?
you must be able to do otherwise
Why does coercion or ignorance affect moral evaluation?
coercion reduces freedom and ignorance reduces accountability
What does Heidegger mean by Dasein?
means âbeing thereâ; refers to human existence as aware and engaged
Why is human existence always situated?
we are never isolated or detached observes; we always exist in specific world, context, and set of relationships
Why are we never detached observers?
we are always involved, acting, and interpreting
What does it mean to be involved in a world of meaning?
we never encounter things as isolated, neutral objectsâwe always experience and interpret them through their significance in our life and context
How we normally encounter things infuse (ready-to-hand)
things we use them; ex: hammer while building
How things appear when we step back and observe (present-to-hand)
things as we observe them; ex: analyzing the hammer
Which comes first: practical engagement or theoretical observation?
practical engagement comes first, not theory
What does it mean the we âfind ourselvesâ already in a world?
human existence is not self-created or chosen from scratchâweâre always born in pre-existing context
Why do we not choose our starting point in life?
we are âthrownâ into existence, born into a time, culture, situation we didnât choose
How does âthrownnessâ differ from determinism?
you donât choose your starting point but you still choose how to respond
Why is death not just a biological event?
it is the possibility that ends all possibilities
How does awareness of death shape existence?
forces you to confront your life dn pushes you toward authenticity
How does morality relate to authenticity?
shapes how we take responsibility for our existence
Living according to oneself vs. conforming to âthe theyâ
at the heart of authenticity vs. inauthenticity
What does âthe theyâ (das Man) represent?
social norms, expectations, conformity
Why is conformity a problem for Heidegger
it leads to inauthentic existence, here individuals fail to take responsibility for their own lives and drift passively in the world of âthe theyâ
Why is care not just an emotion?
care is the structure of existence, you are always concerned, invested, oriented toward something
Why is care the basic structure of human existence?
not just an emotion, itâs your whole way of being
Fear vs anxiety
fear has a specific object
anxiety has no specific object
Why does anxiety reveal something deeper about reality?
the inability of meaning and the ânothingnessâ behind everyday life
Why does anxiety not have a specific object?
it is not directed at something particular in the world, but at the structure of existence itself
What does it mean to absorbed in everyday directions?
we tend to get lost in directions, follow routines, conform
Why is fallenness not necessarily moral failure, but existential drift?
it is a default human existence
Scotus and Heidegger: freedom vs. authenticity
Scotus: freedom as power of the will
Heidegger: authenticity is existential ownership
Is Heideggerâs view of freedom the same as Scotusâ?
no because Scotus is moral psychology and Heidegger is existential structure
Scotus and Heidegger: will vs. being
Scotus: focuses on moral agency (decision-making and morality)
Heidegger: focuses on the structure of existence (what it means to exist at all)
Scotus and Heidegger: Metaphysics
Scotus: operates within a classical metaphysical framework
Heidegger: critical of traditional metaphysics