TASK 3 FLASHCARDS/EVIDENCE

Essay question 1 P1 - why indochina

• containment - truman doctrine 1947

• Domino theory - if one country were to fall to communism, others in the region would too

• Truman icreaased aid to french - mid 1952- US cover 40% of fench costs and by late 1952 it was 75%

• Geneva accords - set up SV as a non-communis state - goal to have a non-communist state in indochina

• HCM - nationalist-communist leader with mass appeal - US knew if 1956 elections went ahead he woudld win

Essay 1 paragraph 2 - why south Vietnam

historian opinion - Seth Jacobs- US chose south vietam as they percieved laos as being ‘weak’ as oppssed to the vietnamese being ‘willing to fight for themselves’

• US provides significant mlitaru and financial support to the south - establishment of MAAG in 1950 and by 1960 there were more than 680 US advisors in the region

• Supported Diem (SV leader) - despite his leadership not being higly democratic - showcases their hyperfocus on stopping spread of commmunism

• Kennedy - sends 18,000 additional advisors and approves use of US helicopters to transport ARVN soldiers

• rural population reportedly supporting the NLF, according to historian Marilyn B. Young

Essay 1 paragraph 3 - why escelate

non-communist state in SEA under threat - insurgency movement in south due to disapproval with Diem

• 75% rural population reportedly supporting the NLF, according to historian Marilyn B. Young

• implementation of strategic hamlet program - placing peasnats into fortified villages in order to esnure they do not fall into the hands of the VietCong

• Johnson’s decision to escelate in the region with the approval of ground trooops in jan 1964 and the approval of OPLAN 34A raids + gulf of Tonkin resolution

Essay 1 thesis statement

• the statement, which implies that american leaders misread the nature of the conflict  is highly accurate as US involvement in the Indochina region was primarily driven by a desire to contain international communism

Essay 2 thesis statement

Whilst the Tet offensive was a significant turning point, resulting in a shift in the political and theoretical militaristic standing of both the North and the US/South, it did not immediately change the military reality on the ground, due to the length of prior fighting.

Essay 2 paragraph 1 - change in Vietnam

• none of the main objectives of the NLF-NVA were realised (main objective to inspire a general uprising in the south) - military loss

• Loss of support for the southern govt due to the abilities of the north

• Creation of provisional revolutionary government that included the NLF - change from their more military role pre-tet to a more advisory and polrtical role

• Depletion of the NLF as the main force driving the conflict - NVA took over from this point - loss of approx 45,000 NLF soldiers

Essay 2 paragraph 2 - change in US

• widely reported in media - pressure for General Westmoreland and Johnson to explain the situation - Cronkite- announced on broadcast the war was ‘mired in stalemate’ - shift in homefront opinions

• US won militarily but lost politically

• Failure of US to anticipate the attack “‘implied the participation and the complicity of a significant part of the population’ (david hunt) - showed that the south was not as supportive of the US as though beforehand - exposed problems in the US war effort

• Erosion of support for south Vietnamese govt - US effort relied on this support

• Led to Johnsons decision to de-escalate in 1968 - partial halting of bombing of the north + stepping down of his presidency

• Led to vietnamisation policy - US troops replaced with Vietnamese troops and withdrawl

essay 2 paragraph 3

• whilst the NLF was heavily  depleted militarily, they still remained a threat, especially to those in the south who has previously only thought of the NLF as being a countryside threat

• Whilst the Tet offensive directly led to a decline in US forces, a full US withdrawal of troops did not occur till 1973, showcasing that whilst the period from 1968-1973 showed a gradual decline in troops, US activity still continued - operation linebacker - mass US bombing campaing in 1972 that killed at least 1642 NV citizens

• US military victory in Tet continued to showcase how the US was militarily superior to the North, despite the political losses that came with tet

paragraph 1 essay 3

• failure to not recognise the nationalist element

  • US saw the popularity of HCM and the VC as entirely communist, and failed to see the anti-colonialist/nationalist aspects

• Support of an unstable RVN

• Diem - Thieu

  • Diem’s government was highly corrupt and undemocratic - nepotism - anti-US ideals - rigged elections

  • Lacked charisma and broad appeal

• Reliant on US aid

  • US provided large amounts of aid to the ARVN’s war - MAAG -training of soldiers and advisors and by 1960 there were 680 US advisors in VIetnam

  • Over the 10 yr period between 1955 and 1965 the US provided approximately $2.8B worth of non-military aid

Essay 3Paragraph 2: military  - failure of strategy

US strategies not effective in protracted war

• DRV using protracted war, US unable to keep up due to it’s traditional war sstrategies, and the weariness that comes from a war not on own front

• Limited war - while NV is running a total war, the US is only partially moblising the US army in order to not alienate US pop - inadequate resources

• Attrition, big unit war incongruent with pacification and ineffective

  • Used big tanks and traditional fighting methods, which didn’t match with the Gurella strategies utilised by the north - failure to secure ground in territorial or political sense

  • ‘Body count’ - whilst the US killed large numbers, this was innefecitve in propelling their war effort forward

- pacification - desire to win ‘hearts and minds’ of southern peoples - dislike for US tacticyics/big unit war

• Alienates peasantry and US public

  • US public becomes increasingly dissatisfied with war

• HCM trail isn’t shut down

  • Gives North a strategic advantage

Vietnamisation failure

Largely reliant on US support, unable to sustain on their own -

Paragraph 3 - polticial falure to end the war

Paragraph 3: political failure to end war

• protest movements

  • Growing public dissatisfaction showcased - burning of drfts, sit-in’s

  • Mike smith - refused the draft

  • By 1973- 60% of americans thought the war was a mistake

• Congress - war act 1973

  • Revokes presidential power to invoke war without congressional approval

• International pressures

• Failure of Vientamisation - prevented any possibility of a US/ARVN victory