European Integration

Patel, Project Europe, 2020 C1 European Integration

General argument

• This is broadly just trying to trouble the assessments of the EU as being the inevitable creation of the project of European integration, and foreground why this form of integration became the most popular. It became most important because of the Cold War narrowing of options, American support, and a technocratic disposition.

• The post-war period massive age of internationalism - e.g. 1945-48 100 institutions were created, with the EC one among many. Relatively small compared to e.g. the UNECE (1947) which had the US and the USSR in it initially. Or the OEEC (1948).

• The EC was not pursuing the most important concern at the time, peace (West Geramny with 57% saying feared war, and only aided this indirectly through Franco-German collaboration. Military done instead through both the WEU in 1954 (from 1948 Beneleux-UK pact) or NATO (1949).

  • The ECSC formed in a period of narrowing circumstances in the Cold War - e.g. the declining importance of the UNECE compared to the e.g. Bretton Woods institutions or OEEC which was larger and more monied (16 vs 6)

• It existed in a time of fractured and undermined ideas of integration from various organisations.

  • Interesting in that West Germany admitted - anticommunism already more important than fear of Germany. E.g. Grosser’s comment that Stalin deserved the Charlemagne Prize for serves to integration because they were all fearful of him.

• Writing against the idea that it was (in the words of Hallerstein (first president of EEC)) sui generis. This is neither true (mostly technical not political) and not the first (1804 Rhine navigation treaty).

• The creation of the EC as a single community is itself contingent, and was negotiated - e.g. only cemented in 1965 and various suggestions denied (e.g. the idea of the EDC in 1954 which the French rejected). E.g. Monnet thought Euratom would be most important, rather than the EEC which became supreme.

  • The overlapping ideas of the departments often a benefit - e.g. the reality that crises could be compartmentalised like the 1965 Empty Chair Crisis when De Gaule paralysed it.

• The group benefitting from several implications as a latecomer: was jack of all trades, so had room to develop in each; international cooperation was established (e.g. taking Spaak had already been UN president, or from Nazi occupation). Various challenges also made it more technocratic in character - e.g. from 1956-59 EFTA challenge in the OEEC.

  • Importantly also US support from elite networks (Monnet, Spaak, etc) though this was spread also to the OEEC. Had US support but not too US-based like the OEEC which was undermined.

• After these 50s challenges, became supreme from several reasons

  • Economic spillover (collaborate on e.g. food standards), European law, and financial resources

• As the EC became more important, there was a tendency to negotiate into forms of ‘variable geometery’ or ‘multiple speed’ integrations. E.g. when UK joins in 1973 got special agreements for Caribbean sugar etc.

• And declining alternatives (nationalism, US, and empire)

Patel C2 Peace and Security

General Argument

• The EC was a beneficiary of peace rather than an architect of peace. NATO created peace, and the EC only consolidated it as a capitalist Western block. It made some culture of compromise, and symbolic Franco-German integration. But they e.g. do not stop France going to war with e.g. Algeria / third parties in 1954

• Contrary to public imagination (e.g. due to the 2012 Nobel peace prize) the EC did not create much in the way of peace. Contribution to peace delineated in 3 ways:

  • Reconciliation between France and Germany, Peace in the Cold War, and Social Peace. It is not to be overestimated, but also not to be dismissed.

• The majority of the integrationist perspectives after war were capitalist and anticommunist except UNECE which was quickly pushed away, until integration significant under the Marshall Plan.

  • Moscow initially in favour until ‘spiral of radicalisation’ due to mutual overestimation of oppositions’ aggression, indicative of Cold War whole. The EC was seen by the East as ‘tool of US imperialism’. It is a player in Cold War.

• On Peace: too late for much material impact (Cold War lines made at Yalta). Stability of Western Europe a starting point for integration rather than its end goal. Indeed, divided Western Europe between the ‘inner six’ and the ‘outer seven’ of the EFTA in 1960. This was less integrated than Comecon in 1949.

  • The significant contribution was peace through economic cooperation between France and Germany. 1951 Treaty was explicitly about this in the terms of Schuman.

• Though there are other significant incentives here - French attempts to contain German industry (1950 announcement limits would drop and 11.1m tonnes of steel annually), and to integrate the West Europe bloc against the East and US. The gap between public-facing peace and internal self interest.

• But peace limited by infighting - e.g. 1950 suggestion of ‘European army’ blocked by French in 1954 after suggesting it themselves to contain the Germans. This is the gap between parlimentarians and prime ministers / the legacy of war - even as they saw as an ally would not rearm.

• Contribution to peace through institutional cooperation and decision making - deeply international model (members, comissioners, etc) brought confidence in decisionmaker. This is Middelaar’s ‘de-dramatisation’ of politics. But still divisions - e.g. the inequity of the CAP policy.

• EU is mainly just the way in which Western Europe trusts each other and builds greater connections from it - e.g. 1963 agricultural policy being ‘la victorie’ of Europe. E.g. de Gaulle meeting Adenauer in 1962 symbolism.

  • This allowed more connected policy with the East, especially through the economy and in rapid normalisation after the East falls.

Sargent, European Integration and the Cold War, 2010

Broad Argument

• Integration and the Cold war were intertwined, but have been studied separately. This is doing 2 things 1) showing how the Cold War shaped integration and 2) how integration shaped the Cold War. Broadly suggesting Integration was able to work because other Atlantic initiatives (e.g. NATO) solved important problems.

• It is mutual impact rather than causative one way or the other.

Separate historiographies because:

• Successful parts of integration are economic not military, e.g. Schuman Plan of the ESCD rather than the EDC in 1954 and were focused on non-Cold War issues, and were day-to-day ignored.

On the US influence:

• Washington from 1947 believed that Europe could not become a ally without the economic development of collaboration and the continuation of ‘internectine’ rivalries. Was not guaranteed.

• US attempts at direct interference (e.g. Marshall Plan) did not work, national interests of e.g. France kept the OEEC weak, and the US learned to become an outside sponsor of integration.

  • E.g. of the Schuman plan, where Acheson was the second person to hear of this only after Adenauer and got benefit from Monnet’s extensive personal network to undermine domestic criticism. Some of the US’ most unsubtle pressure was counterproductive, e.g. mainly backing Euratom.

On rehabilitation of Germany':

• main motivation of Adeneaur to move away from the East and link into the West - Westbindung - in case of US ambivalence. Integration opposed by erhard, economic authority in Germany. Allowed them more leverage w/ east since locked in.

  • Kohl argued integration of Germany could only happen at the same time as integration of Europe itself.

• French similar interest - could not stop rebirth of Germany, so needed to link into them.

  • Same thing was true for Euratom later in 1957 - lure of quickening their development of nuclear weapons parallel to civillian usage.

  • And because it became too valuable - could not sustain empty chair in 1958

On Britain

• 3 part structure. Early Cold War interests made them support the movement, post 1955 Britain started to object (more of a threat since had US support) and then realisation that could undermine their ties to the US and so started to support.

On Size:

• The cold war ensures only West Europe could integrate (6 not 27), which makes decisions easier (split between 3 sig countries), ‘almost certainly a necessary precondition’. Germany split so not dominating it.

On the Cocoon

• This is most significant argument, where US dominance in other institutions made collaboration easier - enforced foreign and economic policy similarity in various areas, and could limit spats between them - e.g. Saar region. Who led Europe less important as US de facto in control. When this falters in the 1970s crises (Detente, Vietnam, etc), Europe is not doing it very well.

On integration Cold War

• 1) Economic self-confidence, they pushed a more independent international course which creates debates about NATO, nuclear non-proliferation.

• 2) Germany becomes a Cold War player - they can become a community leadership.

• 3) Destabilises East through image of Western creation. E.g. from patel, East Europe intellectuals ‘dream’ of joinig it.

Gilbert, European Integration: A political History, 2020

• The most notable element of European integration has been the intent of the states to abandon traditional power-politics, even as they have continued to assert their economic and national self-interetst. This has made supranational organisations that cooperate only to the degree at which they don’t want it.

  • Again articulating an anti-Whig history perspective, and noting the contingencies and villains in the story of integration.

• This does not advance any particular argument of why Europe integrated but showing what the possible options were.

• European Integration about not letting economic and political nationalism divide the continent again, though there was nothing inevitable about this, politicians chose to do it.

• Integration not new, about significantly in the 19thC - e.g. Seeley appealing for common ‘European citizenship’ .

• European integration about not letting Economic and Political nationalism happen again, a moral response to the dispair inherent in the ruin of the 20th century and its total war.

  • Though this around before 1945 - e.g. John Seeley in the 19th century. War no longer part of policy, war is avoided.

  • War was previously policy depsite economic integration - e.g. Geneva World Economic Conference in 1927 and Technocratic internaitonalism.

  • E.g. the formation in 1929 of the Briand Plan which would have interlinked German and French economies to prevent them going to war.

• Visions of World War 2 as the end point of nationalism in the sense of failing to create markets - e.g. the foundation of Brailsford basis of raising standard that would entice people into being liberal. peace through economic growth

• Focus on the US as the model for the EU - Marjolin (early EEC representative) suggesing US ‘hypnotised’ Europe with their larger internal market.

  • Economic reconstruction to form legitmacy of the common market through investment in the form of the 1947 Marshal Plan. Formation of the CEEC.

• Federalist Ideas of the Marshal Plan made internationally through the work of Churchill in the United Europe Movement turning into the Congress of Europe.

  • 1948 idea with many of the ideas of the future EU - reducing protectionism integrating Germany - presented their projects to the Western Union where it was signed by Brussles, Britain etc.

• Opposed by Britain due to pragmatic concerns (would have hurt own advantage due to colonisation) - moved towrad accepting ‘Europe’ through organisation, but limits required on single market and military - consultative. Some engagement in that accept ECHR in 1950

Hitchcock, The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West, 2010

• Marshall Plan as less significant to setting up the war, though important in forming integration of the ‘West’

• Plan formed over considerations of Germany - you needed to form growth whilst keeping the rest of Europe also growing - was forming an integrated coherent solution of American policy.

• Americans approve the Economic Cooperation Act in 1948 under the conditions European economices would work to eliminate trade barriers within their states.

• Arguing less needed by 1948 - European Economies largely past their pre war condiitons by 1948 - though in some (e.g. France) needed for monnet plan.

• Important to the fostering of strong central parties - legitimised their actiosn through paying money.

• Important to the formation of the WEst - e.g. integration through the lragely Western OEEC. Signalling the integration of Germany - the first foundations of the French and German economies together in the context of this work.

  • e.g. 1947 at the same time as act in Congress, the Us demand that UK and Fra support Germany integration and the nascient formation of the state. Frnace gets hand in ormation - US as an advisory actor in the Ruhr region.

• Marshall Plan founding the push for France ot integrate with Germany in the ECSC as they feared German developement exceeding the French.

Lundestad, 2003

• Suggesting America forms an empire in Europe - one that allowed Germany to be led into Europe.

  • They were invited into the state in the West, though once this happened people often complained of US interference.

• The relationship has not been perfect but the alliance is generally in line with what is reasonable - several crisis, but shared incentive to control Germany.

• Hope for American leadership as an alternative to European leadership which would be more contentious.

  • Movement became more ‘Burden Sharing’ rather thaan US leading.

• In instances shared collaboration based on the conception asa both White European culture.

• Collaboration shared on European issues but not on non European ones (e..g Asia or Cuba) though not hard and fast - e.g. Falklands.

• US totally dominant - c half the world’s infrastructure. controlling global exchange rates and acting as lender of last resort.

  • Able to leverage this into the creation of trade organisations though their failure BY WHAT MARGIN form the basis of regional powers - the creation of positivist constructive supranational European formations rather than divide and conquor.

    • Self interest though (formation of stronger Atlantic organisation)

• No ‘natural’ leader of Europe - e..g France attempting to balance against Germany though the Monnet plan which aimed to capitalise on reduced German markets, and the need to be protectionist.

  • e.g. the rejection of the Customs Union in March 49 CHECK THIS and cooperation with the Benelux nations.

• French would do integration (e.g. Dunkirk Defence treaty) but not economic integration. Refused to do so without the UK who were less ingrained - e.g. Socialists in power rather than nationalists.

  • Greater integration only as Moscow becomes no longer an option - e.g. they agree to the formation of West Germany in 1949

• France more subtle with alliances than the US - initially rejected, e.g. trying to have 1944 treaty with Soviet Union. They seek money from the US for the Monnet Plan and push from the US through CIA (e.g. 10m on the 1948 French election) for them to become more anti-communist.

• All European countries fighting for American money.

• NATO as suggestion of Belvin, first cooperation between the Benelux countries in 1947 as supported by he US.

  • Despite individual misconceptions and lack of enthusiasm people joining under the agreement of US presence to prevent the Europeans doing naything.

• European strength through American necessity - too important for the US to stop listening to them. Some infleunce (e.g. making Italy spend counterpart Marshall plan funds in specific ways) but little in the way of a real affection of politis.

• increased appetite to integration but limited actual assigning integration as a path.

Prucha, The Integration of Czechoslovakia, 1990

Broad Argument

• Nazi incorporation of Czech into their greater economic space is a form of enforced economi integration dominated by German interests. This is important in undermining Czech enthusiasm for Western-dominated visions of economic integration.

• Pre WW1, integration difficult since post-Hapsburg states economically protectionist and had broken apart the market. Thus, economically Little-Entente failed by 1930s.

• Nazi victory creates ‘drive to the east’ through predatory trade and military threat. Initial success in resisting. This was based on German general view of the economy as Nazi-led European economy.

• 4 characteristics of dominance: initial resistance, Munich approval, differentiated treatment of Czech than Slovak land and Germanisation.

  • from Munich in September 1938, West gives Germans approval of exploitation - within a year integrated. Powerful leverage - cut supply of Coal and ousted local capital.

• Czech becomes main industrial supplier to Germany to their East including armourments, and suffers little war damage whilst taking modern equipment.

  • Since significant, nicer occupation characterised by social demagogy (blaming local regions and slavaks) and the controlled economy (imported the autarkic vision of Germany from 1939, e.g. compulsory organisation of business and state-controlled pricing).

• Slovakia is created as semi-indipendent state (officially independent from 1939). Tiso in control but legalised German military occupation udner Protection of Slovakia Treaty.

• Even as integration occured economically, there was a closure of universities and significant abuse of raw material.

• Long-term this discredits economic integration, aversion to supranational formations but at the same time brought together the Czechs and Slovaks.

Hansen, Eurafrica Incognita, 2017

• Trying to forefront the Colonial Association programme of the EU which integrated colonial products of the nataion into the common market.

• Instead of integration diminishing colonialism, most efforts of integration in the 20th century based on the integration of colonialism - visions of prosperity of Europe through Africa and development of Africa as a unitary goal CHECK FOR EVIDENCE.

• e.g. position of the Economic arm of the Council of Europe suggesting Africa key to keeping EUrope rich in the West. Competition driving tensions in this - Belgians angry thta more EU mone for investment rather than Belgian bits in the Treaty of Rome.

• Germany choosing EEC rather than EFTA due to France wealthier in key products e.g. Saharan Uranium.

• Hope to reduce calls for nationalism through integration into a political system - a ‘vanishing mediator’ between two systems - colonial dominance and exploitation

• lack of vision as a form of ‘methodological continentlaism’ - at odds with the regionalism of Eurafrica - visions of Med as a great unitor.

• Mixed African reactions - some seeing as opportunitiy - most supporting for fear of isolation and limitation of strength. Consolidating basis of Equality.

Deighton, Entente neo-coloniale, 2006

• Britain and France seeking Neo Coloniale Entente to emerge as thrid force.

  • Unclear what form - customs union all the way to political defence project.

• Bevin as someone with long-term Europeanist ideas - e.g. in 1938 suggesting formtaion of economic defence pact to stop the war.

• Visiosn of utilising empire to ensure propserity to prevent war - similar to Foreign office ideas of using colonial power to ensure welfare is increased.

• Challenges of support from the Left wing of the party until 1948 when support was significant. Though the colonial office instead advocated for africa-up rather than colonial-down.

• Collapse of colonial suggestions in teh Western Union WHAT WERE THESE

• Cold War bipointilist ideas linking them.

Weigall, British Ideas of European Unity, 2018

Visions of European unity in the war sigificant in teh UK - though these were viewed as future rather than short term.

• Tensions of European collaboration with Soviet Eastern policy - e.g. 1948 London poles seeking the regular meeting of an 8 power Eastern aagreement. 1943 Soviets make clear that collaborations was unrationalisaable.

• Eden 1943 tensions growing due to anti-soviet stance. Broadly more anti-communist stance until 1946 than the US.

• 1942 Churchill ideas of European unity and federated states under the aluf leadership of the UK (who would continue the atlantic agreement with the US.

  • US rejected this idea, instead pushing for ‘four policemen’ idea that would not threaten American imports.

  • Noting ideas are contested even within national frames - Foreign Office prefering the internationalist US perspective.

• Anglo-French integrationist ideas pushed throughout the early 40s, with Eden being one of the cheif architects of Soviet collaboration instead.

• Churchill pursuing a policy against the Soviets utilising Germany - hope to be a foil against the Soviets

• Suggesting that concessions to the USSR reason for failing postwar collaboration

RE READ

Burgess, Political Catholicism, European Integration, FIND YEAR

Broad Argument

• The strong connection to integration of post WW1 political parties was a direct result of their Catholic social principles which demands the dispersal of political authority across several levels, naturally fitting the federalism of European integration. There are both historical/contingent arguments and ideological ones to support this.

• Focused on the shift from Political Catholicism (defensive institutional policitics) to Christian Democracy (progressive politics)

• The continual threat since the French rev to Catholic dominance was twofold - liberalism and seige-like conservativism. In those regions with Protestant dominance (Germany) they become liberal, in those with Catholic dominance (Spain) they become massively conservative.

• To counter declining influence, Church under Leo XIII (c 1880s/90s) becomes much more liberal - it was no longer hostile to progressive social reform, though still condemns socialism.

  • Though this does not officially approve democracy, just allows Catholics to be democrats, e.g. Leo calls on French Catholics to improve their position through working with the third republic.

• In the interwar period, as Catholics increasingly take up democratic politics, Church starts to allow democratic parties - e.g. Italian PPI - became a broad-based centre party or also ones in Germany.

• In late 1930s the Church largely supports authoritarianism - at the extremes recognising the ‘virtues’ of the totalitarianism.

  • But the democratic Catholics continued to retain their views and ‘flocked’ to the liberation movements against occupied nations in many instances. Compare this to Prucha’s discussion of Tiso in Slovakia.

• Over the war becomes increasingly anti-authoritarian as an institution and Catholic patriotism superceded Authoritarian connection as they started to attack the Church itself.

  • In e.g. Germany they linked with Protestant groups during the wartime resistance against the Nazis or that the French Catholics could work with Republicans.

• Church stands as only significant untarnished ground left standing - ‘practically the whole of Western European Catholicism’ koined in.

• They push European integration siginficantly - e.g. the DC in Italy pushing for this from 1945 already. They push toward the West rather than the East for this reason. They had malleable views toward Protestants, could hold their nose. Catholic anti-communism.

• The resistance had created natural leaders in the movement, gave them moral legitimacy and ensured they were untarnished with the fascism of the more traditional right.

• Conducive for several reasons:

  • soldarism, subsidiarity, pluralism etc. Brought together a certain brand of European federalism.

Parsons, Showing ideas as Causes, 2002

Broad Argument

• 1) Methodological - when ideas ‘cross-cut’ prevailing lines of interest, they are autonomous causes rather than as a reuslt of ineterests because actors make decisions. 2) France’s choice of community ECSC rather than federal alternatives comes from individuals’s actions.

• This is writing against structuralists (e.g. Milward) and institutionalists (e.g. Haas), who variously discuss why the EU became so large, not why it was chosen in the first place. It was the ideas of individuals that created this.

  • So we should look at cross-cutting - ideas divide actors who share same conditions and so variations only come from ideas. We may say this is dumb, people have different ‘objective’ conditions that push them into certain postitions.

  • This is significant in cases where there are ‘multiple equilibria’ of support - all options are equal, so individual choice becomes significant to determine ultimate agenda.

• In 1947 France has an ‘epochal moment’ - there is US pressure for German revival which undermines French intent to keep Germany weak. 3 models - traditional model with security through control of Germany (backed by De Gaulle), Confederal (broad, weak institutions with Britain which was path of ‘least resistance’), and Community (functionalist, supranational institutions, break with Britain who dislike supranationality)

  • This is against structuralists (this meets the need to solve problem) and neo-functionalists (this was an early obvivous idea and ‘spillover’ grows this

• That this was not structural shown by broad response agaisnt Schuman plan across the French parliament (incl. Christian democrats). Only c1/3 votes for this, rest split. interest groups opposed - steel and coal firms opposed competition. US opposed, only Monnet convinced them of them.

• Passed only with difficulty, e,g by making side-payments on colonial policy to get centrist votes. He did this not by his credentials on Europe - he was elected for other reasons.

• Illustrative of cross-cutting was the EDC - very split domestically in France and only followed because individuals in the foreign policy liked the idea. The concept of this rose and fell as minority groups did on the back of other disputes and issues.

  • E.g. the policy had no coherent dominant community of support - sectors, regions, wealth etc were all split.

• After EDC failed, more support for the WEU and brigning britain in, though traditionalists viewed it as an ‘Anglo Saxon’ plot in order to turn France to a minor European organization. And sothtye push more bilateral agreements ot push them out (intra-European trade doubled from 1953-7)

• The EEC accepted as various contingencies - not least the appointment of Mollet in 1957. He lobbyed interest groups and farmers etc, and got support through colonial side-payments though many rejected this europeanisation of empire.

  • This was then continued under De Gaulle as institutional inertia rather than spillover, it blocked backwards movement. De Gaulle needed Germany for his ‘third way’, though he did not like it initially.

  • Nobody changed their mind on integration. Structural factors set the overton window, ideas determine thing this. Essential for CAP.