Con Law

Justiciability Rule

Under Article 3, judicial power extends only to cases and controversies. To determine whether a dispute is appropriate for review, courts use justiciability standards, including (1) standing, (2) ripeness, (3) mootness, and (4) the political question doctrine.

Standing

The standing doctrine allows courts to hear a case only if the plaintiff can show (1) injury in fact which is a concrete and particularized harm, (2) causation which is a direct connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury, and (3) redressability which is a likelihood that a favorable court decision will remedy the harm (Allen, Lujan).

Political Question

A claim presents a political question and is non-justiciable if it involves: Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment (Nixon), Lack of judicially manageable standards (Baker), Risk of grave embarrassment on foreign policy (Goldwater)

Ripeness

Ripeness determines whether a case is ready for judicial review. A case is considered ripe if (1) the issues are fit for judicial decision, meaning they present a concrete legal dispute, and (2) withholding review would cause harm to the parties (Abbott).

Commerce Clause

Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate all commerce among the states, but this power is exercised through regulation of (1) channels of commerce, (2) instruments of commerce and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce (Darby, Gibbons, Lopez).

10th Amendment Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

The 10th Amendment reserves powers not delegated to the federal government to the states. The federal government is prohibited from compelling states or their officials to carry out federal regulatory programs. (New York, Printz).

Taxing Power

Under Article I, Congress may lay and collect taxes to pay debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare. Congress can also use its taxing power to influence behavior, as long as the measure is (1) plausibly aimed at raising revenue (Doremus), (2) non-coercive (Obamacare), and (3) not punitive in effect (Bailey).

Spending Power

Under Article I, Congress may exercise their spending power only if (1) it serves the general welfare, (2) conditions are stated clearly, so states can make an informed choice, (3) conditions are related to the federal interest in the program, and (4) the spending does not coerce states by threatening the loss of existing funding or violate any other constitutional provision (Dole, Obamacare).

Section 5, 14th Amendment

Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enforce provisions of the 14th Amendment through appropriate legislation. It may prevent or remedy constitutional violations but may not redefine the scope of the rights themselves. The legislation must be congruent and proportional to the identified constitutional violation (Katzenbach Morgan, Boerne).

11th amendment and Sovereign Immunity

Under the 11th Amendment, a person cannot sue a state without its consent (Hans). However, Congress can override state immunity under §5 of the 14th Amendment if it enacts a law to prevent or remedy constitutional violations by the states but only when there is a record showing that the law targets actual or widespread state misconduct (Kimel).

Treaty Power

Under Article II, the President has the power to ratify treaties with the Senate’s advice and consent, requiring a two-thirds vote. Treaties become the supreme law of the land and can be either self-executing or require implementing legislation to be enforceable domestically (Medellin).

Dormant Commerce Clause

Under Article 1 commerce clause courts have inferred that when Congress is silent in regulation, states regulating commerce are prohibited from passing legislation that is (1) facially discriminatory (City of Philadelphia), (2) discriminatory in effect (Hunt), or (3) unduly burdensome to interstate commerce (Bibb).

Facial Discrimination

A law that discriminates against interstate commerce is invalid unless the state shows (1) a legitimate local purpose and (2) that no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives exist. (Maine v Taylor)

Discriminatory Effects

A state law may be neutral on its face but still be invalid if in their practical effect (1) favor in state interest or (2) substantially affects interstate commerce (Washington Apples)

Undue Burden

Using the balancing test, A state law will be invalid if the burden it imposes on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits (Bibb).

Privileges and Immunities Clause

Under Article 4 Privileges and Immunities Clause, states cannot discriminate against out-of-state citizens in fundamental rights. Courts consider two questions: whether the state law affects a fundamental right protected by the Clause, and whether the state has a substantial reason for treating out-of-state citizens differently. If a fundamental right is implicated, the discrimination is unconstitutional unless the state shows a substantial justification and that the differential treatment is closely related to that reason. (United Building)

Preemption

Under Article 6, federal law preempts conflicting state law through express or implied preemption, though states retain power where Congress has been silent (Pacific Gas). Express preemption exists when Congress clearly states its intent to displace state law, while implied preemption occurs either when federal regulation occupies the entire field or when state law conflicts with federal law by making compliance impossible or frustrating federal purposes.

Procedural Right to Sue

When Congress creates a procedural right to sue, a plaintiff need not meet traditional standing requirements so long as: (1) Congress has identified the class of persons entitled to sue; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is connected to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and (3) there is at least a possibility that the requested relief will prompt the defendant to reconsider the conduct causing the harm (Mass v. EPA).

Mootness

A case is no longer a live controversy when the injury has ended (Roe v Wade)

Marbury Madison

The Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus was unconstitutional because Congress cannot expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specifically granted in Article III of the Constitution, and therefore the statute attempting to do so was invalid.

McCulloch

The Court held that Congress had the constitutional authority to create a national bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that Maryland could not tax the bank because Congress may use any means that are appropriate and plainly adapted to carrying out its enumerated powers, even if not expressly listed in the Constitution, and that the creation of a national bank was a legitimate exercise of that implied authority. The Court further reasoned that states may not interfere with or tax valid federal operations because “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,” and allowing state taxation of federal institutions would undermine federal supremacy.

Martin Hunter

The Court held that SCOTUS has authority to review decisions of state courts on issues of federal law because the Constitution establishes federal judicial supremacy and requires uniform interpretation of federal law across all states, which would be undermined if state courts had final authority over federal questions. Therefore, the SCOTUS appellate jurisdiction extends to state court decisions involving federal law to ensure consistency and supremacy of federal law.

McCardle

The Court held that Congress had the authority to remove the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases because Article III permits Congress to make exceptions to and regulate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and therefore Congress validly stripped jurisdiction by repealing the statute that had granted it, requiring dismissal of the case for lack of authority to review.

Roe v Wade - Mootness

The Court held that the case was not moot and could still be decided despite the underlying dispute no longer being live in the traditional sense because abortion cases are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” because pregnancy is inherently time-limited and typically ends before the appellate process can be completed. Therefore, even if the specific pregnancy at issue would end, the legal controversy itself could repeatedly arise without ever being fully adjudicated, making judicial review appropriate.

Abbott Labs - Ripeness

The Court held that the drug manufacturers’ challenge to the FDA’s labeling regulations was ripe for judicial review because the regulations had a direct and immediate impact, requiring costly and burdensome changes to labeling practices making it a present and concrete controversy. It further reasoned that withholding review would force the manufacturers to either comply at significant expense or risk serious enforcement penalties, making the hardship of delayed review substantial and the issue sufficiently final for adjudication.

Allen v Wright

The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claim because the alleged injury of stigmatization and diminished ability to attend desegregated public schools was too abstract and not fairly traceable to the IRS’s grant of tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools. The Court further reasoned that the connection between the IRS’s conduct and the alleged harm depended on a series of speculative decisions by third parties (parents choosing to enroll children in private schools), making the causal link insufficient to satisfy standing requirements.

Lujan

The Court held that the environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge the federal regulation because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a concrete and imminent injury when their asserted plans to observe endangered species abroad were too speculative and unsupported by definite, concrete plans. The Court further reasoned that a mere interest in protecting endangered species was insufficient to establish Article III standing, and that the alleged injury was not fairly traceable in a way that would satisfy the requirements of imminence and redressability.

Mass v EPA

The Court held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. the Court reasoned that Massachusetts had suffered a concrete injury through the loss of coastal land due to rising sea levels, and that this injury was fairly traceable to the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. The Court further reasoned that even partial regulation of emissions could meaningfully reduce the harm, making the injury at least partially redressable and therefore sufficient to establish Article III standing.

Raines v Byrd

The Court held that the members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act because the plaintiffs failed to allege a personal, concrete injury and instead asserted an institutional injury shared by Congress as a whole. Because this injury was abstract and not individualized, it did not satisfy Article III standing requirements.

Elk Grove

The Court held that Newdow lacked standing to challenge the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools because he did not have legal custody of his daughter, he lacked the authority to assert her rights in federal court and therefore failed to establish the personal, concrete injury required for Article III standing.

Murthy

The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge federal officials’ alleged pressure on social media platforms because the plaintiffs failed to establish redressability because a court order would not necessarily stop the officials’ conduct or ensure that the platforms would restore the allegedly suppressed content, making the claimed injury too speculative to satisfy Article III standing requirements.

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine

The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the FDA’s approval of mifepristone because the alleged injury was too speculative, relying on a chain of uncertain events involving third parties. It further reasoned that the harm was not fairly traceable to the FDA’s actions and was undermined by existing conscience protections allowing doctors to opt out of participation. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish redressability, as blocking the FDA’s approval would not necessarily prevent the alleged harm.

United States v Texas

The Court held that Texas lacked standing to challenge the federal government’s immigration enforcement policies because the alleged injury was not judicially cognizable because decisions about how to enforce federal law are core Article II executive functions committed to agency discretion. The Court further reasoned that federal courts cannot order the Executive Branch to alter its enforcement priorities, making the claim non-redressable and therefore insufficient to establish Article III standing.

Biden v Nebraska

The Court held that the states had standing to challenge the federal student loan forgiveness plan because Missouri demonstrated a concrete financial injury through MOHELA as a state created entity and serves a public function tied to the state and revenues would decrease as loans were forgiven. Injury was fairly traceable to the federal action, as the loan forgiveness program would directly reduce the number of accounts MOHELA services. the Court found redressability because enjoining the program would prevent that loss of servicing revenue, thereby alleviating the injury.

Baker v Carr - Judicial Standards

The Court held that legislative redistricting claims are justiciable and may be heard by federal courts because Equal Protection challenges to districting provide manageable standards because courts can determine whether district lines are drawn in a way that unfairly disadvantages certain voters. It further reasoned that these claims do not present a political question, as they do not involve issues constitutionally committed to another branch or lack clear standards for judicial review.

Vieth - Judicial Standards

The Court held that claims challenging Pennsylvania’s congressional redistricting as a partisan gerrymander presented a non-justiciable political question because there are no judicially manageable standards for determining when political considerations in redistricting become unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. It further reasoned that because the Constitution provides no clear, workable standard to measure or limit permissible political influence in district drawing, the issue is left to the political branches rather than the courts.

Nixon v United States - Textually Demonstrable

The Court held that challenges to the Senate’s procedures in impeachment trials present non-justiciable political questions because the Constitution grants the “sole power to try all impeachments” to the Senate indicating a textual commitment to a political branch. It further reasoned that because the Constitution provides no judicially manageable standards for reviewing Senate impeachment procedures, courts lack authority to second-guess how the Senate conducts impeachment trials.

Powell - Textually Demonstrable

The Court held that the exclusion of Powell was justiciable because although Congress has authority over its internal proceedings, that power is limited by the Constitution’s express qualifications for membership, and courts may review congressional actions to ensure they do not exceed those constitutional limits. It further reasoned that because the House’s exclusion was based on criteria beyond age, citizenship, and residency, it was subject to judicial review and therefore unconstitutional.

Goldwater - Grave Embarrassment

The Court held that challenges to the President’s termination of a treaty presented a non-justiciable political question because disputes over treaty termination involve the President’s constitutional authority over foreign affairs, an area where the Constitution does not provide judicially manageable standards for review. It further reasoned that judicial intervention in such a dispute would risk interfering with sensitive executive functions and could create embarrassment in the conduct of foreign relations, making the issue inappropriate for judicial resolution.

Zivotofsky v Clinton - Grave Embarrassment

The Court held that the dispute was justiciable and not a political question because although the case involved foreign affairs, it required the Court only to interpret a statute and determine whether it impermissibly intruded on the President’s exclusive constitutional power to recognize foreign sovereigns. It further reasoned that courts are competent to resolve separation-of-powers disputes between Congress and the Executive when there are judicially manageable standards, so the case did not present a non-justiciable political question.

Channels of Commerce - Rational Basis Review

physical routes through which commerce moves

Instruments of Commerce - Rational Basis Review

people and things that move through the channels

Substantial Effects on Commerce

must decide if the activity is economic or noneconomic.

Rational Basis Review

an automatic deferment to Congress discretion and judgment.

economic activity in commerce clause

Courts can add up (aggregate) the effect of many people doing the same thing to see if it substantially affects interstate commerce. (Wickard)

noneconomic activity in commerce clause

You cannot add up lots of small instances to claim a substantial effect. requires clear substantial effect on interstate commerce. (Lopez)

Gibbons

The Court held that Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and that federal law is supreme over conflicting state law because navigation falls within the scope of interstate commerce, giving Congress authority to regulate it when it crosses state lines. It further reasoned that New York’s monopoly grant to Ogden conflicted with Gibbons’s valid federal license, and under the Supremacy Clause, federal law prevails over inconsistent state regulations, rendering the state monopoly invalid.

NLRB

The Court held that Congress could regulate unfair labor practices under the Commerce Clause because even activities occurring within a single state, such as labor disputes at a steel plant, may be regulated if they have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce. It further reasoned that strikes and labor unrest at the company could significantly disrupt production and the flow of goods across state lines, giving Congress authority to regulate to protect interstate commerce.

Houston Railroad

The Court held that Congress could regulate railroad rates under the Commerce Clause because railroads engaged in interstate transportation fall within the scope of interstate commerce, giving Congress authority to regulate their operations. It further reasoned that regulating rates was necessary to prevent discriminatory pricing practices and to ensure the fair and efficient functioning of interstate commerce.

Wickard

The Court held that Congress could regulate a farmer’s wheat production for personal use under the Commerce Clause because even purely local, non-commercial activity may be regulated if, when aggregated with similar conduct by others, it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It further reasoned that a farmer’s homegrown wheat, though not sold, reduced his demand on the national market and therefore, in the aggregate, could significantly affect overall supply and price in interstate commerce.

Darby

The Court held that Congress could regulate labor standards under the Commerce Clause because Congress may regulate the production of goods intended for interstate commerce, and that labor conditions in industries producing those goods have a direct effect on interstate commerce. It further reasoned that because Darby’s employees produced lumber for shipment across state lines, Congress could impose labor standards to prevent unfair competition and protect the integrity of interstate markets.

Heart of Atlanta

The Court held that the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on discrimination in places of public accommodation was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because hotels serving interstate travelers are closely connected to interstate commerce, and discrimination by such establishments places a substantial burden on the movement of people across state lines. It further reasoned that discriminatory practices, when considered in the aggregate, can significantly obstruct the free flow of interstate travel and commerce, giving Congress authority to regulate them.

Katzenbach McClung

The Court held that Congress could prohibit racial discrimination in a restaurant under the Commerce Clause because although the restaurant’s operations were local, it served food that had moved in interstate commerce and its discriminatory practices, when considered in the aggregate with similar establishments, would discourage travel and reduce the flow of interstate commerce. It further reasoned that Congress could regulate such conduct because it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even when the individual business impact appears minimal.

Perez

The Court held that Congress could regulate loan sharking under the Commerce Clause because loan sharking, as part of organized crime, affects the flow of money and credit across state lines and is therefore part of a broader economic class of activities that substantially impacts interstate commerce. It further reasoned that even purely local instances of loan sharking may be regulated when considered in the aggregate, because the overall practice has a significant effect on interstate economic activity and Congress may regulate the entire class of conduct to address that impact.

Lopez

The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power because possessing a gun in a local school zone is a non-economic activity that does not substantially affect interstate commerce.It further reasoned that the government’s theory of regulation rested on a multi-step chain of speculation (1) guns in schools might lead to violent crime, (2) crime could weaken the quality of education, and (3) weaker education could, in the long term, reduce economic productivity which was too indirect and attenuated to qualify as a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Morrison

The Court held that the Violence Against Women Act’s civil remedy provision was unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because gender-motivated violence is a non-economic, criminal activity that falls outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power. It further reasoned that Congress’s claim that such violence would indirectly affect interstate commerce by deterring travel, reducing productivity, and increasing medical costs was too indirect, attenuated, and reliant on aggregated social and economic assumptions rather than a direct substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Obamacare (Commerce Clause)

The Court held that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to regulate inactivity or compel individuals to engage in commerce by requiring them to purchase a product, such as health insurance. It further reasoned that while Congress may regulate existing economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, it may not “anticipate” or create commerce in order to regulate individuals who are not already participating in the market.

New York v US

The Court held that provisions of the federal radioactive waste disposal scheme were unconstitutional because Congress cannot compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program because the “take title” provision impermissibly coerced states by forcing them to either regulate according to federal instructions or take ownership of radioactive waste, effectively making state officials responsible for carrying out federal policy. It further reasoned that this kind of commandeering violates the Tenth Amendment because Congress must implement federal policy through federal officials, not by forcing states to govern on the federal government’s behalf.

Printz

The Court held that the federal requirement forcing state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers was unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because Congress cannot “commandeer” state executive officers by requiring them to administer or enforce federal regulatory programs, as doing so treats state officials as instruments of the federal government. It further reasoned that the Constitution’s structure preserves state sovereignty by requiring the federal government to execute its laws through its own officers, not by compelling state officials to act as federal agents.

Doremus

The Court held that the federal tax on habit-forming drugs was a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power because Congress may impose a tax for revenue-raising purposes even if it has an incidental regulatory effect on conduct such as drug distribution. It further reasoned that the statute was structured as a bona fide tax because it imposed an actual monetary exaction collected by the federal government, generated revenue, and was enforced through the usual tax mechanisms, rather than functioning as a penalty scheme aimed solely at controlling conduct reserved to the states.

Drexel

The Court held that the federal tax on companies employing child labor was unconstitutional because although Congress has broad taxing power, this statute functioned as a punitive penalty designed to regulate child labor rather than a genuine revenue-raising tax. It further reasoned that the law’s structure of imposing a heavy tax triggered specifically by unlawful conduct, coupled with enforcement features resembling punishment showed its primary purpose was to control behavior reserved to the states, making it an impermissible attempt to circumvent constitutional limits on federal regulatory power.

ObamaCare (Taxing Power)

The Court held that the “individual mandate” penalty was a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power because although labeled a penalty, the payment functioned as a tax because it was collected by the IRS, produced revenue for the government, and was calculated based on income and other tax-like factors. It further reasoned that the provision was noncoercive in the constitutional sense because individuals retained a lawful choice between purchasing health insurance or paying the tax, making it functionally similar to other permissible federal taxes that influence behavior without directly compelling action.

Butler

The Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was unconstitutional. In United States v. Butler, the Court reasoned that although Congress has broad taxing and spending powers, this scheme was not a legitimate exercise of those powers because it used taxes on farmers who did not reduce production to fund payments to those who did comply, effectively coercing agricultural regulation. It further reasoned that the program’s true purpose was to regulate agricultural production, a domain reserved to the states, rather than to raise revenue or spend for the general welfare, making it an impermissible attempt to achieve regulatory ends through the taxing and spending power.

Steward Machine

The Court held that the Social Security Act’s unemployment compensation tax was constitutional because Congress may use its taxing and spending power to encourage state participation in a cooperative federal program so long as it does not amount to coercion. It further reasoned that the system was structured as a tax with a credit incentive, allowing employers to receive credits if their state created an approved unemployment fund, and that states retained a genuine choice to participate or decline, meaning the arrangement was persuasive rather than coercive.

Dole

The Court held that Congress could condition federal highway funds on states raising their drinking age because Congress may attach conditions to federal spending when the conditions are in pursuit of the general welfare, clearly stated, and related to a national interest like highway safety. It further reasoned that the condition was not coercive because the loss of only a small percentage of federal highway funds left states with a genuine choice whether to comply, making the financial pressure permissible encouragement rather than unconstitutional compulsion.

ObamaCare (spending power)

The Court held that Congress could not compel states to expand Medicaid by threatening to withhold all existing Medicaid funding because while Congress may attach conditions to federal funds, those conditions become unconstitutional when they are coercive. It further reasoned that the threatened loss of a substantial portion of a state’s existing Medicaid funding was so significant that states had no real choice but to comply, effectively turning the program into a form of compulsion rather than permissible encouragement.

Katzenbach Morgan

The Court held that Congress could prohibit voting discrimination against Puerto Ricans under its Section 5 enforcement power because Section 5 allows Congress not only to enforce rights as defined by the Court, but also to enact measures to prevent or remedy constitutional violations where it rationally identifies a problem. It further reasoned that Congress could conclude that English literacy requirements effectively denied equal protection to Puerto Rican voters educated in Spanish, and that banning those requirements was an appropriate and plainly adapted means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the Court itself had not found such requirements unconstitutional.

City of Boerne v Flores

The Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress exceeded its Section 5 power by requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to all laws burdening religion, even though the Constitution did not require that standard for neutral, generally applicable laws. It further reasoned that Section 5 allows Congress to remedy or prevent actual constitutional violations, but RFRA was too broad because it applied to every level of government and was not tied to a documented pattern of unconstitutional conduct. As a result, the law was not “congruent and proportional,” but instead an attempt to expand constitutional protections beyond what the Court had recognized.

Hans v Louisiana

The Court held that a citizen could not sue the state of Louisiana in federal court to recover unpaid bonds because although the Eleventh Amendment explicitly bars suits against a state by citizens of another state, it reflects a broader constitutional principle of sovereign immunity that also applies to suits brought by a state’s own citizens. It further reasoned that allowing such suits would contradict the structure and history of the Constitution, which was understood to preserve state immunity from unconsented suits in federal court, even when the text does not expressly address that specific scenario.

Alden v Maine

The Court held that state employees could not sue the state of Maine in its own courts without the state’s consent because sovereign immunity is a fundamental constitutional principle that predates the Eleventh Amendment and protects states from private suits in both federal and state courts. It further reasoned that Congress cannot use its Article I powers (such as the Commerce Clause) to subject nonconsenting states to private damages actions, because doing so would undermine the states’ retained sovereignty and dignity within the federal system.

Kimel

The Court held that state employees’ suits under the ADEA were barred by sovereign immunity because although Congress clearly intended to abrogate state immunity, it lacked the authority to do so under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It further reasoned that age is not a suspect classification and is subject only to rational basis review, so the ADEA’s broad prohibition on age discrimination was not a congruent and proportional response to any pattern of unconstitutional state conduct, making the attempted abrogation invalid.

Garrett

The Court held that Congress could not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for disability discrimination claims under the ADA because disability classifications are subject only to rational basis review, meaning the Constitution does not require states to make accommodations so long as their actions are rational. It further reasoned that Congress failed to identify a widespread pattern of unconstitutional disability discrimination by states, as much of the evidence involved private actors or non-constitutional conduct. As a result, the ADA’s broad accommodation requirements were not congruent and proportional to any proven constitutional violations, making the attempted abrogation invalid.

Nevada Department of HR v Hibbs

The Court held that Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for family leave claims under the FMLA because Congress documented a pattern of states administering leave policies in ways that reflected gender stereotypes like assuming women are primary caregivers and denying men equal leave. Because sex-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny, many of these practices were likely unconstitutional. The Court further reasoned that the FMLA’s requirement of gender-neutral leave was a congruent and proportional response to that pattern of discrimination, making the abrogation valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Coleman v Court of Appeals

The Court held that the state employee’s suit under the FMLA’s self-care provision which entitles employees to take leave for their own serious health condition was barred by sovereign immunity because although Congress intended to allow suits against states, it did not validly abrogate immunity under Section 5 for this provision. It found that, unlike the family-care provision in Hibbs, Congress did not identify a pattern of unconstitutional gender discrimination by states in granting or denying self-care leave. It further reasoned that the self-care provision was not sufficiently tailored to remedy or prevent constitutional violations, making it not a congruent and proportional response.

Tennessee v Lane

The Court held that Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in this context because a paraplegic plaintiff who was denied meaningful access to a courthouse due to the absence of an elevator, implicated the fundamental right of access to the courts. Congress documented a pattern of states failing to provide accessible judicial facilities for individuals with disabilities, and that requiring reasonable accommodations was a congruent and proportional response to remedy and prevent those constitutional violations, making the abrogation valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

United States v Georgia

The Court held that Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for ADA claims because a paraplegic inmate’s confinement in a state prison without accessible facilities or basic accommodations effectively denied him meaningful access to services and alleged conditions that independently rose to the level of Eighth Amendment violations. It further reasoned that because the same conduct constituted actual constitutional violations, Congress’s abrogation of immunity was valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly in light of a broader pattern of unconstitutional treatment of disabled prisoners.

Missouri v Holland - Treaty Power

The Court held that Congress could implement a treaty protecting migratory birds even though it affected areas traditionally regulated by the states because Missouri challenged federal legislation enforcing a treaty between the United States and Canada regulating the hunting of migratory birds that cross state lines, arguing that wildlife regulation was reserved to the states and beyond Congress’s enumerated powers and the Supremacy Clause gives valid treaties the force of federal law, overriding conflicting state law even in areas of traditional state authority. It further reasoned that because the treaty was validly made under the federal treaty power, Congress could enact implementing legislation necessary to carry it out even if it would lack independent authority to regulate migratory birds under its enumerated powers alone.

Medellin v Texas - Treaty Power

The Court held that the President could not unilaterally enforce an International Court of Justice decision requiring Texas to review Medellín’s conviction because the relevant treaty provisions were not self-executing. Medellín relied on the ICJ’s Avena decision under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations but although the United States had international obligations, the treaty language did not create domestically enforceable federal law without congressional implementation, meaning neither the ICJ judgment nor the President could independently bind state courts or require them to reopen final convictions.

City of Philly v New Jersey - Facial DIscrim

The Court held that New Jersey’s law prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it was protectionist that New Jersey attempted to keep out-of-state waste from its landfills while still allowing in-state waste, effectively burdening interstate commerce to protect local interests at the expense of other states. It further reasoned that if New Jersey was concerned about environmental harm, it could have enacted a nondiscriminatory ban on all waste rather than discriminating against interstate commerce based solely on origin.

Maine v Taylor - Facial Discrim

The Court upheld Maine's ban on importing out-of-state baitfish as a legitimate exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, citing the state's need to protect its fisheries from parasites. The law was justified due to the lack of nondiscriminatory alternatives and a clear conservation purpose.

Carbone v Clarkstown - Facial Discrim

The Court held that the ordinance requiring all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because Clarkstown’s “flow control” ordinance effectively required all waste to be processed at a single, privately operated facility, thereby discriminating against interstate commerce by favoring that local facility and its operator. It further reasoned that although the town claimed health and waste management goals, those interests could be achieved through less discriminatory alternatives, such as general regulations or nondiscriminatory fees, without forcing waste to be routed through a particular private business.

United Haulers - Facial Discrim

The Court held that a local ordinance requiring all waste to be processed through publicly owned facilities was constitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the flow-control ordinance treated in-state and out-of-state private businesses equally because it required all waste to be delivered to a publicly owned facility rather than favoring a private in-state operator. It further reasoned that laws favoring governmental entities serving traditional public functions, such as waste management for health and safety purposes, are not inherently protectionist and fall within the authority of local governments to regulate in the interest of public welfare.

Dean Milk Co. - Facial Discrim

The Court held that the city ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk processed outside the city violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because Madison required all milk sold in the city to be processed and bottled within five miles of the city center, effectively excluding out-of-state processors and protecting local dairy businesses from competition. It further reasoned that although the city justified the rule as necessary for public health and quality control, that interest could have been achieved through reasonable, less discriminatory means such as inspecting or certifying out-of-state facilities, making the local geographic restriction an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.

West Lynn Creamery - Discriminatory Effects

The Court held that Massachusetts’ milk pricing order violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because Massachusetts imposed an assessment on all milk sold in the state but distributed the resulting revenue exclusively to in-state dairy farmers, effectively offsetting their production costs and disadvantaging out-of-state competitors who paid the tax but received no benefit. It further reasoned that this structure functioned as economic protectionism in practical effect, because it combined a facially neutral tax with a targeted subsidy that distorted interstate competition in favor of local producers, making it unconstitutional even though neither the tax nor subsidy alone would necessarily violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Washington Apple - discrim effects

The Court held that North Carolina’s statute requiring all apples sold or displayed in the state to bear only the USDA grade violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because Washington apple growers used a superior state grading system that reflected higher quality standards and was widely relied on in interstate markets, but the North Carolina law prohibited the use of those state grades and required all apples to be labeled only with the less informative USDA grade. It further reasoned that this facially neutral rule had a discriminatory effect because it raised advertising and marketing costs for Washington growers, eliminated their competitive advantage, and provided no comparable benefit to in-state producers, effectively burdening interstate commerce in a protectionist manner.

Clover Leaf - Discrim Effects

The Court held that Minnesota’s statute banning the sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable containers was constitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the law prohibited the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable containers statewide while still allowing sales in paperboard cartons, and it applied equally to both in-state and out-of-state milk processors. It further reasoned that the statute was supported by legitimate local interests in environmental protection and solid waste reduction, based on legislative findings that plastic containers contributed more significantly to landfill waste, and that any incidental burden on interstate commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to those environmental benefits, making it constitutionally permissible.

Exxon - Discrim Effects

The Court held that Maryland’s statute prohibiting oil producers and refiners from operating retail gas stations in the state was constitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the law required all petroleum producers and refiners, regardless of whether they were based in Maryland or out of state, to sell gasoline only through independent retailers, meaning it did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce or favor local businesses. It further reasoned that although the statute may have had uneven market effects by impacting national oil companies more heavily, Maryland had no in-state refiners to benefit, and the Commerce Clause does not protect particular market participants from competitive disadvantage so long as interstate commerce is not discriminated against.

Bibb - Undue Burden

The Court held that Illinois’ statute requiring trucks operating in the state to use a curved mudguard was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the law forced interstate truckers to stop and replace federally compliant straight mudguards with curved ones when entering Illinois, creating delays, added costs, and safety risks due to constant equipment switching. It further reasoned that Illinois’ asserted safety justification was weak because studies and industry practice showed no clear safety advantage of curved over straight mudguards, and the conflicting regulations across states created confusion and increased the risk of accidents, making the local benefits minimal and uncertain compared to the substantial burden on interstate commerce.

Kassel - Undue Burden

The Court held that Iowa’s statute limiting most trucks to 55 feet in length was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the law forced interstate trucking companies either to break down standard-length double trailers at the Iowa border or take longer alternate routes to avoid the state entirely, increasing fuel costs, travel time, and logistical complexity for national carriers. It further reasoned that Iowa’s asserted safety justification was undermined by evidence that the longer trucks banned in Iowa were safely used in neighboring states and that the state’s own data did not show a meaningful safety improvement from the restriction, making the burden on interstate commerce clearly excessive in relation to its minimal and disputed safety benefits.

United Building - PIC

The Court held that the city ordinance requiring 40% of workers on city-funded construction projects to be city residents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because access to private employment in construction is a fundamental economic activity protected by the Clause because it is part of the right to pursue a livelihood across state lines. It further reasoned that the ordinance facially discriminated against nonresidents by reserving a fixed percentage of jobs for city residents, and such discrimination can only be upheld if Camden can show (1) nonresidents constitute a particular source of the problem the city is addressing and (2) the restriction is closely tailored to that problem; because the record did not clearly establish those findings, the justification was insufficient on its face and required further factual development on remand.

Baldwin Fish - PIC

The Court held that Montana’s higher hunting license fees for out-of-state hunters did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because nonresident hunters were charged significantly higher fees to hunt elk in Montana than residents, but the activity at issue was recreational big-game hunting, not a means of earning a livelihood or engaging in a fundamental economic activity protected by the Clause. It further reasoned that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only protects rights essential to national unity, such as the pursuit of a common occupation, and because elk hunting was a recreational benefit tied to state-owned resources rather than a fundamental right of economic participation, Montana’s fee distinction did not implicate the Clause.

Pacific Gas - Preemption

The Court held that California’s statute temporarily banning new nuclear power plants was not preempted by federal law because California adopted the moratorium because it believed no new plants should be built until a federal solution for nuclear waste disposal existed, due to the economic risk and uncertainty of managing spent fuel. It further reasoned that this made the law about economic feasibility and resource planning, not nuclear safety, and federal law only preempts state regulation of nuclear safety, not economic decisions about whether to build plants at all. Because the statute did not set safety standards or conflict with Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety rules, it was not preempted.

Inherent Presidential Power

Article II makes the President Commander in Chief and requires that he faithfully execute the laws. Presidential power depends on Congress: it is strongest with authorization, uncertain with silence, and weakest when against Congress, where it is valid only if the President has exclusive constitutional authority (Youngstown).

Youngstown

The court held that the President lacked authority to seize the steel mills because his power must stem from either the Constitution or Congress, and here neither authorized the seizure. Congress had explicitly rejected seizure as a remedy, placing the President’s action in direct opposition to legislative will, and the Commander-in-Chief power does not extend to domestic lawmaking or property seizure.

Foreign Affairs

The President has broad authority in foreign affairs. Congress may delegate more broadly in this area, especially because the President acts as the nation’s “sole organ” in external relations (Curtiss-Wright). The President may act with congressional authorization or where Congress has acquiesced (Dames Moore). State laws that conflict with federal foreign policy are preempted, and executive agreements can preempt state law even without Senate ratification (American Insurance).

Curtiss-Wright

The Court held that Congress’s delegation of power to the President, by authorizing him to ban arms sales during the Chaco War if he found it would promote peace, was constitutional because in foreign affairs the President serves as the sole organ of the nation, meaning he acts as the country’s single voice in dealing with other nations and is better able to act with speed and flexibility when he has broader discretion.

Dames Moore

The Court held that the President had authority to suspend, transfer and terminate claims against Iran, because although Congress had not expressly authorized this, it had passed related statutes and consistently allowed similar practices without objection, demonstrating implicit congressional approval, so, the President acted within the zone of twilight.

American Insurance

The Court held that California’s law requiring insurers to disclose information about Holocaust-era policies was unconstitutional because it conflicted with executive agreements the President had entered into with foreign countries to resolve Holocaust-era claims, and in foreign affairs the President, as the nation’s sole organ, has authority to speak with one voice, so state laws that interfere with the federal government’s foreign policy must give way.

War-Making Authority

Article I grants Congress the authority to declare war. The President may act defensively or respond to emergencies, but the power to initiate offensive war rests with Congress. (Dellums). As Commander in Chief, the President also has the authority to respond to attacks or insurrections and to take necessary defensive military action without prior congressional authorization. (2 Prize Cases).

Dellums v Bush

The court held that the case was not justiciable, where Members of Congress sought to block President Bush from initiating military action against Iraq without congressional authorization, because the dispute was not yet ripe since Congress as a whole had not taken formal action and hostilities had not begun, meaning there was no clear constitutional conflict for the court to resolve; however, the court explained that the power to initiate offensive war belongs to Congress, while the President’s role as Commander in Chief is to conduct military operations once authorized.