Global Politics 30 Marker Essay Plans

Extent to which nation states have become more or less influential in global politics since 2000

W1: Economic globalisation has undermined nation state - need to attract investment so conform to Washington Consensus and global governance institutions (e.g. IMF)

S1: Nation states which have benefitted from massive economic growth (e.g. China) have asserted greater influence over their own citizens and become more nationalistic

W2: Regional organisations such as the EU have achieved greater integration (e.g. shared EU law)

S2: Global political governance has not challenged state sovereignty - institutions require cooperation of members (e.g. UK ignoring ruling of ICJ re: Chagos Islands)

W3: Decisions of MNCs can impact sovereignty (e.g. Twitter banning Trump in Jan 2021)

S3: Shift of global balance of power towards authoritarian states means this is easy to prevent (e.g. Russia limiting social media and China's crackdown on external social media)

Extent to which cultural globalisation has had a more positive impact on the developing world than economic globalisation

W1: Cultural globalisation has provided access to popular brands, such as Amazon, Apple and Google

S1: But this encourages materialism and consumerism, eliminating valuable cultural differences and homogenising into a global monoculture

W2: Economic has led to widening inequality, undermining social stability - 'race to the bottom' from MNCs (e.g. factory fires in Bangladesh)

S2: Economic globalisation has lifted many out of poverty - more than cultural has done, which is far more superficial (e.g. 500 million out of poverty in China since 1980)

W3: Economic has had overall neutral impact on LDCs - greater consumer choice, but worsening conditions for workers

S3: Cultural globalisation has had negative consequences - 'Americanisation' has led to greater animosity and nationalism amongst others

Overall: Economic may have been mostly neutral but cultural arguably negative

Extent to which globalisation has decisively changed the global balance of power

W1: Encouraged rise of developing countries, shifting power away from USA - especially rise of China, making it more assertive (e.g. aggressive attitude towards Taiwan)

S1: USA most powerful member of key alliances e.g. NATO and AUKUS, with allies across the globe (West and East), so large diplomatic and military influence

W2: China spreading economic influence through Belt and Road initiative, demonstrating growing assertiveness, contesting US dominance

S2: USA military spending in 2022 was $768 billion - significantly greater than China and Russia combined

W3: Militarisation of reefs in South China Sea shows growing self-confidence & Russia invasion of Ukraine shows power transition - emerging powers more willing to challenge USA

S3: US able to exert influence in a way China cannot yet - has 800 military bases worldwide, China has one - USA also has far more aircraft carriers, being assertive globally

Overall: Has changed somewhat, but not decisively

Extent to which human rights are better protected as a result of globalisation

W1: Globalisation of communications = rights abuses better monitored - international PGs (e.g. Human Rights Watch) can report on abuses anywhere, so harder for states to conceal abuses (e.g. lobbied Saudi Arabia into improving women's rights)

S1: Lack of Western response to persecution of Uighur Muslims in China shows power shift makes it harder to act on abuses (contrast to interventions in 1990s e.g. Kosovo)

W2: Social movements (e.g. BLM) can quickly use social media to create widespread engagement - not possible without internet

S2: Economic globalisation has shifted power away from liberal democracies, towards authoritarian states (e.g. China & Russia) - harder to establish liberal world order based on respect for rights

W3: Political globalisation = new institutions of protection (e.g. ICC) which has achieved successes (e.g. prosecution of Congolese warlords) and UN tribunals have done similar (e.g. Charles Taylor in Sierra Leone)

S3: Western powers focused on protecting own interests against Russia & China so less able to commit resources to intervention

Overall: Worsened protection for human rights - may be able to know about more, but are acting less

Extent to which globalisation has made it more or less difficult to resolve the challenge of climate change

W1: Economic has created more trade than ever, lifting millions out of poverty and increasing life expectancy - this increases waste and methane emissions (meat eating)

S1: Spread of technological ideas (e.g. carbon capture) facilities progress by encouraging free exchange of ideas

W2: Shifting balance of economic power to developing world has made things harder - LDCs prefer to use cheaper fossil fuels to power industrialisation (e.g. China responsible for more carbon emissions than ROW combined in 2021)

S2: Political has provided chance for states and NGOs to collaborate at COPs through UNFCCC - e.g. creation of NDCs at Paris Summit

W3: LDCs view some policies as 'neo-colonisation' still - i.e. developed nations not letting others industrialise as they did to develop for the sake of the environment

S3: Increased communication has enabled activists (e.g. Greta Thunberg), PGs and social movements to highlight extent of problem

Overall: Still difficult, but institutions give hope of progress

Extent to which the UN has been successful in achieving its founding objectives

W1: Significant achievements since MDGs in reducing poverty - renewed in 2015 with SDGs

S1: Inequality still persists around the world with a divide between Global North and South persisting

W2: Improvement in quality of international human rights law - UDHR creates binding covenants and further conventions to protect minorities (e.g. children)

S2: Human rights laws may have improved, but states remain too powerful and UN too weak in terms of enforcement - can monitor but cannot prevent (e.g. China and Uighur Muslims)

W3: UNSC has authorised peacekeeping missions to stabilise conflicts, and has kept P5 members under 'great power unanimity', avoiding world war

S3:Effectiveness is dependent on members being able to agree on policy responses to global challenges - especially challenging with UNSC due to veto

Overall: Has achieved some objectives, but not particularly well

Extent to which the UN is effective in responding to the challenges of a globalised and interconnected world

W1: UNSC has been able to take some action where P5 do not have direct interest involved - e.g. sanctions regime against Iran and peacekeeping operations (e.g. funding AU operations in Somalia)

S1: UNSC frequently unable to respond to challenges due to P5 veto power - e.g. Ukraine has had little involvement from UNSC

W2: Climate change has seen progress - Kyoto Protocol led to impactful targets and Paris Agreement has established framework for ambitious targets

S2: Struggled to make progress with climate change (driven by globalisation) - UN talks have not been effective as states are unwilling to sign up to more ambitious targets

W3: Significant achievements since MDGs in reducing poverty, followed by SDGs

S3: MDGs and SDGs have not led to fundamental change in nature of North-South divide, nor changed inequalities highlighted in dependency theory

Overall: Not hugely effective

Extent to which NATO is more powerful and effective than the UN in addressing conflict and global stability

W1: NATO focuses on a narrower set of security interests - perceives international security through prism of Western viewpoint. UN takes more worldwide and neutral view, able to address all security threats and deploy peacekeepers in areas where NATO may not

S1: NATO is an alliance of like-minded states with core objective to protect each other, UN comprises states with very different national interests, so NATO naturally more effective (not necessarily powerful though)

W2: NATO arguably plays a more aggressive role, exacerbating global security issues (e.g. Russia perceived NATO as a threat)

S2: NATO has an organised military structure and troops in a state of constant readiness - UN has no standing army, so NATO is more of a permanent deterrent

W3: UN has all the major world powers within it, so this shows its power

S3: NATO is backed by the world's largest military spender in the form of the USA

Overall: More effective, but debatable as to more powerful

Extent to which economic global governance is failing when it is needed most

W1: Reference to it being 'needed most' refers to increasing inequality and continued impact of Covid-19 - impact of sanctions on Russia are also likely to have an impact on prices, notably oil & gas, affecting everyone

S1: Economic global governance activity to reduce poverty now very well coordinated, with clear division of responsibility and many IGOs and NGOs working to same objectives

W2: Seen to have failed during financial crisis in terms of IMF's role in predicting and mitigating against the crisis

S2: G20 acted decisively after the financial crash at 2009 London Summit to ensure banking system did not collapse

W3: WTO has been increasingly sidelined in trade disputes between the US and China - signs of increasing protectionism returning to global trade

S3: MDGs and SDGs made significant progress, with extreme poverty falling by half

Overall: Could be better, but unfair to say it is failing

Extent to which economic global governance is effective in dealing with issues of poverty

W1:MDGs and SDGs have made progress, but this has been inconsistent - sub-Saharan Africa lagging behind, with progress skewed by development in China

S1: MDGs and SDGs have made big progress - extreme poverty has fallen by half amongst other things

W2: Bretton Woods Institutions still don't do enough to make trade more accessible (e.g. failure of WTO Doha Round), and SAPs have often had detrimental effects on economies

S2: Global governance is now very well coordinated with clear division of responsibility, and World Bank now does many long-term development projects with grants

W3: Continues to be a North-South divide and dependency theory keeps some states underdeveloped - global economy remains deeply hierarchical

S3: North-South divide has been reducing, showing dependency theory is no longer inevitable - newly emerging economies (e.g. BRICS) show it is possible for new competitors to emerge

Overall: Relatively effective

Extent to which economic global governance institutions are in need of reform

W1: IMF has played important role in resolving recent crises (e.g. Greek debt crisis) - has also been proactive during pandemic (>$100bn for developing states and debt relief)

S1: Bretton Woods Institutions have lacked significant reform since founding - remain US-dominated and are wedded to Washington Consensus which has caused 'shock therapy' in many states

W2: WTO's dispute resolution mechanism remains a useful tool - has resolved disputes between US and China and has continued to expand membership

S2: WTO needs reform to revamp talks - Doha Round has stalled since 2001, with no major trade liberalisation since 1994

W3: World Bank remains useful for projects in support of SDGs - remains closely aligned with UN and has useful technical expertise to help states break out of under-development

S3: World Bank now struggling to compete with alternative investment banks with larger funds (e.g. AIIB) - private investment vastly outstrips resources of the World Bank too

Overall: Not completely useless, but do need reform

Extent to which the enforcement of an international standard of human rights protection has been made more or less effective by globalisation

W1: Globalisation of communications (e.g. social media) means evidence of abuses are now more widely circulated

S1: Evidence may be better documented, but action not always taken (e.g. no action against China for Uighur Muslims, whereas there was for Kosovo)

W2: Human rights pressure groups use social media to win support, and social movements (e.g. BLM) can use the internet to raise public awareness

S2: Shifting balance of power towards more authoritarian states has made interventions less likely

W3: Political globalisation has led to establishment of UN tribunals and the permanent ICC

S3: These organs have not been particularly effective - e.g. ICC has only secured 8 convictions since it was founded

Overall: Helped identify abuses, not necessarily stop them

Extent to which NGOs have done more than the ICC to encourage greater international respect for human rights protection

W1: Jurisdiction of ICC is ignored by leading states (e.g. USA, Russia, China), significantly undermining its authority - members can also withdraw (e.g. Philippines)

S1: ICC encourages respect as it sits in permanent session, providing a constant reminder - shows there can be a standard of justice above the nation state

W2: NGOs have global influence via the internet - can hold countries responsible for abuses by highlighting issues and pushing for reform

S2: NGOs have no coercive power - they can make abuses known but they cannot rectify them

W3: The ICC has only secured 8 convictions in its first 20 years, all of whom have been African, damaging its reputation in the developing world

S3: ICC secured eight convictions of human rights abusers by 2021, including Congolese warlords, holding the guilty accountable

Overall: Can't say NGOs have done more, but ICC should be doing more

Extent to which the rise of emerging powers is making attempts to establish a universal standard of human rights impossible

W1: USA still the world's dominant military power (spend more on military than next 10 combined), being harshly critical of abuses (e.g. Uighur Muslims in China)

S1: Shift in global balance of power towards Russia & China is challenging US unipolar dominance - they both prioritise national security over liberal interventionism, reducing humanitarian interventions

W2: ICC still has 123 members, showing near-universal standard of legitimacy

S2: Both Russia & China are UNSC members, using their veto to stop interventions and investigations into Syria and Myanmar

W3: Spread of democracy around the world often brings more liberal values, including respect for the individual and their human rights

S3: Emerging powers are often non-Western, with different cultural values, which tend to be more traditional / religious, potentially contrasting to the West's liberal interpretation of human rights

Overall: Emerging powers have very little interest in discussing human rights

Extent to which the success of a humanitarian intervention depends most upon international support

W1: Can be very important as can provide international legitimacy - e.g. Kosovo was led by NATO and were fully resourced

S1: International support not effective if there is no commitment to nation building - e.g. NATO overthrew Colonel Gaddafi but then left, leading to Libya becoming a failed state

W2: Can encourage popular support - e.g. UK's successful intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 was backed by the African Union

S2: Important that intervention has achievable objectives - e.g. NATO's Afghanistan intervention had a humanitarian element but nation building with a small number of troops was impossible

W3: Invasion of Iraq suffered from a lack of international legitimacy due to inability to secure second UN resolution - hence little global support for post-war rebuilding

S3: More important than support is feasibility and whether sufficient resources are committed to long-term success - e.g. was in Kosovo, but not Libya

Overall: Is important to have support, but not most important factor

Extent to which humanitarian intervention in sovereign states has done more to advance human rights than the work of UN aid agencies

W1: Several interventions have had long-term commitment - e.g. in Sierra Leone

S1:Interventions not always successful - e.g. US intervened in Somalia but became involved in ethnic fighting, before withdrawing

W2: Well-planned operations, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo have stopped ethnic cleansing and war crimes

S2: If poorly planned and inadequately resourced, may worsen the problem - e.g. in Libya there was no commitment to subsequent nation building

W3: Successful interventions can enable aid agencies to conduct work in security, enabling further success

S3: UN aid agencies have achieved success, even if less reported - e.g. UNHCR and UNICEF

Overall: Mixed picture with interventions, but aid agencies have not done much either

Extent to which there are still competing views about how to tackle environment issues

W1: Increasing consensus about need for developed and developing states to act - Paris Agreement reduced divisions between developed and developing states over responsibility

S1: Still considerable divisions between the two groups - e.g. China continues to produce massive emissions, rendering many states' work useless

W2: Increasing consensus on importance of sustainable development - this is now the predominant model pursued by the UN via its SDGs

S2: Realists believe it is important to address the issue, but not before others do - any action must consider the economic impact too

W3: Increasing consensus that states should be able to set their own targets - e.g. Paris NDCs, with progress verified by the UN

S3: Liberals believe climate change is a collective action problem and global governance is required to fix it - IGOs provide useful forum

Overall: Might be more consensus, but definitely still competing views

Extent to which global civil society and non-state actors are successfully influencing nation states to change their environmental policies

W1: Other actors have grown in impact recently with emergence of high-profile campaigns - e.g. XR and Greenpeace

S1: States are the ultimate decision-makers, so other actors can simply be ignored by states

W2: Use of social media spreads campaigns, with globalisation helping to unite many to lobby more effectively - there are more ambitious targets being set, perhaps as a result

S2: Public campaigns may gain media attention but governments can still ignore campaigns, pointing to current policies instead

W3: Many pressure groups have come up with clear policies they want states to implement - e.g. net zero emissions

S3: Other actors lack ability to take large-scale strategic decisions - some direct action has been criticised for distracting from messages of the campaign itself

Overall: Have had occasional influence, but not enough to say successfully

Extent to which international action on climate change has been blocked by conflict between developed and developing states

W1: Disagreement has reduced in recent years, notably with the Paris Agreement ensuring all states would commit to emissions targets

S1: But these are nationally determined, due to the fact no shared action could actually be agreed

W2: Steady increase in funding to developing states - level of consensus that developed states recognise need to help developing ones

S2: But this funding has often been delayed, with promises not fully kept following summits and agreements

W3: Increased recognition from some developing states on the need to act - 90% of African Union states have ratified Paris Agreement as of 2021

S3: But exemptions for developing states (e.g. Kyoto Protocol) then make it hard for developed ones to justify policies to their populations

Overall: Not the only issue stopping international action, but is a major one still

Extent to which international climate change summits may be described as making progress

W1: NDCs do at least provide some form of progress which may partially help

S1: Has been progress, but this has been slow and still no commitment to targets that will keep rises below 1.5 degrees

W2: Progress in terms of getting developed and developing states to take action together

S2: No progress in terms of enforcement of states' pledges though - UN can only monitor, with no consequences for failing

W3: Progress in assistance given to developing states, with funding strengthened at successive summits

S3: But insufficient to deal with IPCC's latest assessments and reports published

Overall: Progress is minimal and not enough to deal with the problem

Extent to which the current world order conforms to a multipolar distribution of power

W1: No longer one clear hegemonic power - US used to dominate, but now rivalled by China (e.g. fewer exports) and US reputation damaged by things like War on Terror etc.

S1: USA still carries hegemonic power - USA has largest economy, less poverty, more military power, structurally dominant etc.

W2: Distinct increase in global governance, accompanied by need to discuss global issues (e.g. climate change) - encourages multilateralism and greater interconnectedness - less chance for hegemony to develop, system lends itself to multipolarity

S2: Global governance is ineffective and often ignored - e.g. IGOs rely on members for legitimacy - there will always be one state that is most powerful, even if not truly hegemonic

W3: System of international law to prevent states from breaching others' sovereignty - prevents one state from being able to totally overtake international system

S3: International law not effective and most powerful states ignore it - e.g. ICC has African Bias present

Overall: May not be the hegemony it once was, but world is still not multipolar

Extent to which failed and rogue states present the greatest threat to world stability and security

W1: Most states are not rogue or failed and value structural power, so will work to stabilise system - mechanisms of global governance ensure sanctions are by multiple states

S1: Rogue states have little diplomatic investment in others and tend to use hard power - e.g. Russian invasion of Ukraine (acting in own interest)

W2: Failed states have little power to be a true threat and rogue states lack structural clout to be truly dangerous role - too insular, focusing on domestic populations

S2: Failed states have sometimes ben used by stronger states - e.g. proxy wars in Middle East by USA and Russia, causing instability (e.g. Afghanistan) - often exacerbated when rich with resources

W3: More significant threats present (e.g. environment) for the world to deal with

S3: Threaten cooperation for other issues (e.g. environment) - failed lack capabilities to properly contribute, rogue states lack incentive to make concessions - massive barriers to international agreements being made

Overall: Not necessarily that big a threat, but probably are biggest threat - especially with Ukraine invasion

Extent to which hard power is the most effective means for states to achieve their desired outcomes

W1: Hard power gets quicker results - military and economic actions have immediate impact

S1: For long-term strategic goals, soft power is more effective - more sustainable and complex solutions to improve structural power and diplomatic relations

W2: Always need hard power to protect borders and civilian populations, regardless of use of soft power

S2: But spread of democracies makes hard power less relevant with fewer wars between states - soft power more pertinent in a world of increasing global governance

W3: Hard power can enhance other types of power - e.g. greater economic power = greater structural power (often soft powers comes from having significant levels of hard power)

S3: Hard power is used alongside other forms, but it is not effective on its own - need carrot and stick - may be only effective way of negotiating with like-minded countries

Overall: Depends on the goal (e.g. long term is better with soft) so not always most effective means

Extent to which the changing nature of the world order since 2000 has impeded political global governance

W1: Greater acknowledgment of rising powers empowers many states - drive to reduce poverty, giving certain issues more global attention they may not have otherwise received

S1: Clear hegemony has dwindled with emerging powers - USA used to uphold rights and was model for liberal values - decline, as well as USA's flouting of laws, has made global governance ineffective again (like Cold War)

W2: Multipolarity benefits global governance as enables cooperation - encourages regionalism which can act as a building block for global governance

S2: Move towards multipolarity has made it harder to organise international system - rise in regionalism has meant more inward-looking groups and battle for regional hegemony (e.g. rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Middle East)

W3: International system relies on global solutions for global threats - significant role to play in providing long-term solutions to these

S3: Increasingly globalised world has led to new threats (e.g. cyber attacks and terrorism) - new technology can create immediate situations requiring instant responses, which global governance is poor at responding to

Overall: Has been impeded mostly

Extent to which the EU has been a model for regionalism around the world

W1: EU has clear identity and purpose - has been the same for other groups (e.g. AU, shared history of colonialism)

S1: EU has been unique in promoting a shared cultural identity and values - level of integration not replicated by others

W2: EU started as economic block and then developed - e.g. ASEAN has done similar

S2: EU's economic integration hard to replicate elsewhere - UMSCA shows no indication of anything like EU's integration

W3: EU's pooling sovereignty can lead to more structural power - e.g. Arab League

S3: Structural power of EU now in decline - Brexit arguably has weakened EU's structural power and put other regional groups off deep integration too

Extent to which regionalism can be seen to address global issues such as poverty and the environment

W1: Regionalism arguably splits and divides the world, so not easy to solve issues - encourages more divide, not cooperation

S1: Can act as a building block to organise global governance - group countries with similar goals, more manageable to negotiate - also more structural power with pooled sovereignty

W2: Inward-looking nature means vying to be regional hegemony, arguably causing destabilising effects

S2: Closely associated with multilateralism - essentially a move to multipolarity, enabling states the mechanisms to negotiate in a legitimate way

W3: Different regions have different agendas - e.g. economic development vs environment - potentially seen as neo-colonial to restrict developing countries

S3: Encourages compromise by nature - complements global governance and encourages negotiation over issues such as global commons, creating more consensus

Extent to which the EU is a federalist system

W1: EU has more supranational organisations (e.g. ECJ can make judgements) which erode sovereignty of members

S1: Most powerful parts of EU (decision-makers) are intergovernmental (e.g. Council of Ministers) - these steer the direction of the EU as a whole

W2: EU has become increasingly strategic - has a clear figurehead with long-term goals, even creating foreign policy

S2: States can withdraw at any time (e.g. Brexit), or withdraw from specific agreements (e.g. from the Euro) - so remains state-centric

W3: Has significant diplomatic and structural power - especially over environment and human rights, and is a member of various IGOs (e.g. G20)

S3: Continues to lack a cohesive foreign policy - each state has different interests, unlikely to form a comprehensive one

Extent to which regionalism can help to promote global stability in a more multipolar world

W1: Arguably a stumbling block for global governance - divides could prevent successful agreements

S1: Building block for global governance - coordinates states into like-minded groups, making agreements easier to achieve - encourages mutually beneficial agreements

W2: Inward-looking with own geo-political interests, as opposed to fostering a climate for global cooperation - divisive nature creates regional hegemons, potentially leading to international tensions

S2: Encourages cooperation - focus on multilateralism and interconnectedness is compatible with approach taken by global governance

W3: Multipolarity is inherently unstable (realists) - regional hegemons cause instability on global scale (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran in Middle East)

S3: Multipolarity is most stable form (liberals) - regionalism promotes democratic peace theory, given regional blocks tend to operate in line with many democratic principles, such as accountability and legitimacy

Extent to which economic regionalism is the most significant form of regional alliance

W1: Most of the integrated regional blocks began as economic blocks and then evolved (e.g. EU and beginning to be ASEAN)

S1: Economic does not have huge impact as it is nothing new - states cooperate for mutually beneficial outcomes - political and security integration is a far newer and more significant concept

W2: More immediate impact as uses hard power - e.g. sanctions - has ability to have fast impact

S2: Other forms becoming more prominent - economic no longer most prominent, with security especially important (e.g. Arab League)

W3: Political and security regionalism can be unenforceable and take too long to achieve, hence it is ineffective and lacks power against sovereign states

S3: Economic is not deep integration, so easy for states to walk away and withdraw - e.g. USA left what was then NAFTA - pooling sovereignty is more significant

Extent to which regionalism inevitably weakens state power and sovereignty

W1: Regionalism requires a degree of sovereign power to be relinquished - deeper the integration, more power eroded - especially with supranationalism (e.g. EU, leading to nationalist backlash and Brexit)

S1: Economic regionalism requires very little weakening of state power - where cooperation is mutually beneficial, state may actually be stronger

W2: When sovereignty is pooled, states cannot act in their own self-interest - inevitably means concessions

S2: Even in most deeply integrated blocks, states retain ultimate power to walk away entirely, or from specific agreements - continue to be principal actors in global politics

W3: Emphasis on regional IGOs weakens states' role - questionable nature of states being main actors

S3: Pooled sovereignty arguably increases power and influence - gives them a structural power they would not otherwise have, meaning state can enhance its position, all the way acting in their own sovereign self-interests