recent changes curtailed executive dominance over parliament?

Structure of the essay?

• P1 - The Wright Reforms

• P2 - Reformed House of Lords

• P3 - Increasingly weak governments and assertive backbenchers

P1 - Wright Reforms - limited executive dominance over parliament

• One key argument that posits executive dominance over parliament has been limited is the introduction of the Wright Reforms after the 2010 General Election

• A central reform was making the Select Committee chairs elected by their peers in a secret ballot within party groups.

  • Prior to 2010, chairs were selected by party whips.

  • This reform limits executive dominance as it has allowed prominent backbench MPs who oppose the government on key issues to obtain key roles in Select Committees; chairs are independently elected and thus more likely to conduct evidence-based inquiries and challenge ministers effectively.

• In November 2025, the Treasury Select Committee summoned key HMRC officials to answer questions about the wrongful removal of child benefit from 3656 parents during the governments anti-fraud crackdown.

• This directly influenced government policy after ministers had to publicly respond to their findings, which resulted in reinstating payments and issued backdated compensation where necessary.

P1 - Wright Reforms - has not limited executive dominance over parliament

• Although the Wright Reforms increased powers of backbenchers, it has had little impact in decreasing the dominance of the executive parliament as the government continues to control the legislative agenda and can effectively ignore parliamentary scrutiny.

• Whilst the government is expected to respond to SC reports within 60 days, this deadline is frequently missed and responses are delayed. Crucially, committee recommendations are not binding.

  • Even where the government accepts around 40% of recommendations, these are typically minor of technical amendments

  • Although the chairs are no longer chosen by the party whips, they are still made up of a majority of governing party MPs, which might influence the scrutiny provided.

• For example, in October 2025, the Transport Select Committee produced a report, ‘Buses Connecting Communities’ which entailed how modifications to the transport sector would increase productivity.

  • One of the proposals they suggested was free transport for under 22s, arguing it would make working longer distances easier, which would in turn be more profitable for the government and economy.

  • Despite this, the government blocked this suggestion, arguing it was fiscally uncertain on the outcomes.

• This highlights the limits of select committee scrutiny - although they are more independent, their authority and influence is wholly reliant on cooperation of the government, suggesting that the executive may still dominance parliament.

P2 - Reformed House of Lords - limited executive dominance of parliament

• House of Lords has become more professional and expert-oriented since reforms, such as the House of Lords Act 1992, further limiting executive dominance by enhancing the quality and effectiveness of scrutiny.

  • Many life peers are ex-professional politicians who are able to provide leadership in the House of Lords and have experienced in parliamentary scrutiny.

• Since New Labour’s reforms, the House of Lords has increasingly been composed of life peers, appointed through the House of Lords Appointment Commission, based on expertise rather than hereditary.

  • Many are former senior politicians, civil servants, economists, judges, academics, and industry leaders.

• This professionalisation means scrutiny in the HOL is more detailed and less partisan than in the economy. As Lords are not seeking re-election, they are less constrained by Party pressures and more effective.

• For example, in December 2025, the Starmer government suffered 8 defeats on the Employment Rights Act. Two amendments were ultimately accepted after the Lords insisted on changes

  • Lords rejected proposal for day-one protection against unfair dismissal and instead voted for a 6 month qualifying period

  • Lords amended on allowing workers to opt out of guaranteed hours provisions in order to remain on existing zero-hour contracts.

• This shows how the professionalisation of the Lords has enhanced their scrutiny abilities, thus not being able to rely on majorities and instead having to reach consensus.

P2 - Reformed House of Lords - has not limited executive dominance

• HOL doesn’t limit executive dominance over parliament because HOL influence continues to be limited by its lack of primacy and legislative powers.

• The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 prevent the Lords from voting down financial bills and mean that the Lords can only delay legislation for up to a year, after which the Commons can force through legislation.

• The Salisbury convention prevents the Lords from voting down any legislation that fulfils a commitment in the governing party’s manifesto.

  • Therefore, whilst the the removal of hereditary peers under the HOL Act 1999 increased independence within the chamber, the executive can still override the Lords, meaning executive dominance remains in tact.

• For example, The House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill was introduced following Labour’s 2024 manifesto commitment to remove the remaining 92.

  • Because the reform was explicitly mentioned in the governing party’s manifesto, the Salisbury Convention restricts the Lords from blocking the bill outright.

• Although peers attempted to delay the legislation by submitting 46 pages of amendments at committee stage to a two-page bill, they cannot prevent its passage.

• This shows that while the Lords may revise and delay legislation, it cannot block major government reforms, and thus executive dominance is still in tact because the Commons is dominated by the executive, and power lies there to force through legislation.

P3 - Increasingly weak governments and assertive backbenchers - has limited executive dominance

• It can be argued that since 2010, increasingly weak, divided, or minority governments have reduced executive dominance by empowering backbench MPs, whose rebellions have forced significant policy concessions.

• In comparison to governments before 2010, these governments have suffered frequent defeats in the House of Commons and therefore had to compromise on certain policies.

  • When a government is weak, they rely on united support from backbenchers to pass their programme, increasing the powers of MPs as they can exert influence through rebellion.

• Theresa May was defeated 33 times as Prime Minister, including three defeats on bills related to Brexit in one day. By contrast, Blair was defeated just 4 times in the House of Commons over 10 years.

• In July 2025, the government was forced to make major concessions on their flagship welfare reform bill.

  • The Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Act (2025) was diluted due to fear of large backbench rebellion.

  • 126 Labour MPs signed a ‘reasoned amendment’ opposing the cuts. Despite the concessions from the government, 47 Labour MPs still rebelled in the final vote.

• This shows a key way in which backbenchers can exert influence by rebelling against government bills.

P3 - Increasingly weak governments and assertive - has not limited executive dominance

• It can be argued that the minority governments of May and Johnson, which allowed for a plethora of rebellions were exceptions and the majority of governments since 2010 have had little difficulty in passing policies they wish to pass due to large Commons majorities, party discipline, and prime ministerial patronage.

• FPTP frequently produces governments with large majorities. Where a government commands a comfortable majority, party discipline and the whipping system makes defeats in the Commons rare.

• The PM’s power of patronage allows them to control both the government and their party in parliament and ensure MPs are loyal to the government. MPs seeking promotion are incentivised to demonstrate loyalty by voting with the government.

  • When the government has a significant majority in the House of Commons, rebellions are much less likely to be successful and therefore great deal rarer.

• In the 2019-2024 Parliament, the vast majority of MPs rebelled against the party line less than 2% of the time, with just 8 MPs rebelling more than 5% of the time, and the highest percentage of the rebellions being David Davis at 9.2% of the time.

• The Safety of Rwanda Act 2024 passed the House of Commons with no Conservative rebellions and only 11 abstentions as it was subjected to a strict three-line whip.

  • This was despite significant public and parliamentary controversy, especially from One-nation Conservatives who disagreed with the Act’s human rights provisions.

• This shows how the executive can dominate Parliament when it commands a large majority as discipline remains highly effective.