PHI Exam 3

Singers argument premise one

“Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad”

Singers argument premise two

“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it”

Singers argument premise 3

By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important.

Singers main argument conclusion

Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing something wrong

Singers Drowning child example

Singer asks us to imagine walking past a shallow pond to see a child drowning in it. He argues that you ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the vhild would presumably be a very bad thing.

How drowning child example relates to singers main argument

helps to support demanding requirement to help others (premise 2)

How drowning child example relates to charitable donation

No relevant difference between saving the drowning child and donating money to charity

potential differences to drowning child cases

1. proximity, 2. whether other people are also in a position to help, 3. Whether you have already done your “fair share” of helping (but others have not, and some people still need help)

singers response to proximity (3 points)

1. psychological difference, but not a moral difference,

2. 2. proximitymay be indirectly relevant if it affects our information and ability to help,

3. 3. this consideration is much less important in practice now than in the past “Instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation”

singers response to whether other people are also in a position to help and how pond case is modified to defend

1. psychological difference, “one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, who have also done nothing

2. but no moral difference. shows by using a modification of the shallow pond case. Singer argues that you are still obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond even if there are other people who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing.

singers response to whether or not people have already done their fair share and how pond case is modified to defend

1. observes that even if we would only need to donate our “fair share” it doesnt follow that we dont have to donate more if others are not donating like they should

2. Suppose that 5 children are drowning and there are 5 bystanders including yourself. Your fair share is 1, but you are still obligated to save the other children if the other bystanders don’t.

MacAskill’s “effective altruism”

the use of evidence and reason to work out how to benefit others by as much as possible, and the taking action on that basis

2 claims macaskill defends

duty of beneficence and maximizing beneficence

Duty if beneficence

those of us who are well off have an obligation to make helping others a significant part of our lives. (ex: donating 10% to charity, volunteer for 10 hours a week, giving social impact significant weight when choosing a career or job.)

maximizing beneficence

when we have resources we should use them, without violating anyone’s rights, in the way that produces the greatest overall good for everyone impartially considered.

how macaskill defends maximizing beneficence

We have a duty of beneficence. The point of the duty of beneficence is to help reduce the amount of death and suffering that occurs in the world. If the point of the duty of beneficence is to help reduce the amount of death and suffering that occurs in the world, then it requires doing the best one can to reduce the amount of death and suffering that occurs in the world. Therefore, maximizing beneficence is true.

MacAskill’s three general factors to figure out which charities are the most effective

Scale, Neglectedness, Tractability

Scale

How many people are affected by the problem in question

Neglectedness

How many resources are already being devoted to the problem, and how wel allocated are they

Tractability

How easy is it to make progress on solving the problem

Issues Macaskill thinks additional donations are likely to be especially effective

Global health (very tractable) and development, farm animal (large scale, highly neglected, resonably tractable) welfare, existential risks (vary in neglectedness and tractability but enormus in scale)

what does arthur call the “greater moral evil rule”

singers basic argument that says: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it

arthurs argument against “greater moral evil rule”

it does reflect one part of our ordinary code but it conficts with another part of our ordinary moral code-entitlements. Moreover, the correct moral code includes entitlements that limit the scope of the greater moral evil rule.

arthurs counterexample: entitlements to one’s body (ones organs_

If the greater moral evil rule were true, then people would be morally required to donate organs to those who need them. People are not morally required to donate and therefore the greater moral evil rule is not true.

1. Morally required actions vs 2.supererogatory actions

1. actions that are morally wrong not to perform

2. actions that are good to perform, but not morally wrong not to perform- “beyond the call of duty”

purpose or function of moral code

-promoting thr welfare of ourselves, our friends and family, and to a lesser degree all who have the capacity to be harmed

-we have a reason to support becuase we care about our own welfare and that of others

key fact about human motivation: limited altruism

they care a great deal about their own well being and the well being of their family and friends but they care much less about the well being of strangers, especially distant strangers

two important implications that favor a moral code with the riles that give substantial moral wight to entitlements

1. will be diffucult to get people to accept a code which requires they give away to avoid a greater evil for a stranger. many wouldnt do it; they arent that altruistic. people who will not live up to the rule would still feel conflicteded and guilty which makes their lives worse

2. everyones well being depends on people being willing to work to produce valuable goods and services for society. because of limited altruism, people typically will not work for free merely to benefit others. this, moral rules that allow people to keep what they earn give them an incentive to work more, which benefits others more than their not working would.

Objection on behalf of singer explaining why people would be more willing to donate than arthur thinks

What people think they can do and what they are likely to do depends a lot on social norms and expectations. If expectations change (people around you give more), then individuals may also be more willing to give more.

defender of singers view right argue that arthur fails to distinguish between what two questions

Which moral principle is true and which moral rule would produce the best results if generally accepted

even if people would not actually follow it, it could still be true that people ought to follow the greater moral evil rule

singer observed: these considerations are relevant only to the issue of what we should require from others, and not what we ourselves ought to do

According to McMahan, when it comes to superherogatory cases of helping, are people required to help in the most effective way?

No

McMahans argument for permissibility of helping in suboptimal ways

In supererogatopry cases, not helping is morally permissible. Helping in a suboptimal way is better than not helping at all and if an action is better than a morally permissible action, then it is also morally permissible. Therefore, helping in a suboptimal way is morally permissible.

What 3 cases seem to support the conclusion that it is wrong to help in suboptimal ways

Parfits arm: is it permissible to push slow stop rather than fast stop

kagans bird: is it permissible to rescue a bird rather than child from burning building

the sexist rescuer: is it permissible to rescue a boy but not a girl

McMahan’s no-gratuitous-harm account

gratuitously choosing suboptimal options is wrong. “to allow a great harm to occur when one could prevent it at no cost to anyone is wrong”

works for arm and sexist, but not bird

shows that donating to suboptimal charity is morally permissible

McMahans past-costs-dont-matter account

even if getting oneself into a certain situation was supererogatory, once one is in that situation, the past costs do not matter and we must asses the moral status of the options based on their present costs and benefits

applies to all counterexamples

how past-costs-dont matter regards to one and two stage cases

in two-stage cases (bird, arm, sexist) people are required to choose the option that does the most good at the second stage becuase past costs don’t matter

in one-stage (donating to charity). you pay the cost at the same time, so donating to suboptimal charities is permissible

objections to past costs dont matter

there can be two stage version of charity case and one stage version of bird case

so is there really a morally relevant difference between the one-stage and two-stage charity cases

longtermism

the idea that positively influencing the longterm future is a key moral priority of our time

Macaskills 3 key ideas to support longtermism

future people count, there could be a lot of them, and we can make their lives go better

future people count why

-their interests are just as important-just like the interests of physically different people

-hiking example=harm is harm, whenever it occurs

-we were once future people

the number of future people oculd be huge

on scale of typical mammalian species, if we think of humanity as like a single human life, it is currently about five months old

scale of as long as stars exist=newborn infant

we can positively affect the lives of future people

climate change, asteroid, ai, pandemics, scientific progress and technological innovation

why preventing human extinction is extremely important

becuase so many future lives are at stake. 99% vs 100% of population being killed is such a big difference becuase then trillions of future people will never exist

neutrality thesis (intuition of neutrality)

we are in favour of making people happy, but neutral about making happy people

how does neutrality thesis relate to longtermism

if humanity peacefully extinct, would that be bad? according to neutrality thesis, no. and if so, then we should reject longtermist claim thatwe have overwhelming reason to be concerned about preventing human extinction

two arguments for neutrality thesis

1. decision to have children: we typically think that people do not have a reason to create as many children as possible, just to create more happy people

2. avoid repugnant conclusion:The repugnant conclusion is the idea that a very large population of people whose lives are barely worth living could be considered better overall than a smaller population of people with very high quality lives, as long as the total happiness is greater.

Macaskills 2 arguments against the neutrality thesis

1. when we think about certain people, we think the world is better because they exsist and would be worse if they had never been born

2. if potential parents can concieve a child now who will suffer from severe migranes, or they can concieve a fully healthy child in a few months. the parents ought to wait since the migrane free child will be happier.