Constitutional Law I

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

During the Korean War, President Truman ordered the seizure of steel mills to prevent a strike that he believed would disrupt wartime production. The steel companies challenged the seizure, arguing that the President lacked the authority to take private property without congressional approval. The court held that the President lacked authority to seize the steel mills because his power must stem from either the Constitution or Congress, and here neither authorized the seizure; moreover, Congress had explicitly rejected seizure as a remedy, placing the President’s action in direct opposition to legislative will, and the Commander-in-Chief power does not extend to domestic lawmaking or property seizure.

Presidential Power Rule

Article II makes the President Commander in Chief and requires that he faithfully execute the laws. Presidential power depends on Congress:

(1)  When the President acts pursuant to an express or an implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum

(2) When the President acts where Congress is silent, his authority rests on whether he has some independent power conferred by the Constitution, also known as the twilight zone (Neagle).

(3) When the President acts contrary to Congress's express or implied will, the President’s power is at its lowest and is unconstitutional (Youngstown).

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

Congress authorized the President to prohibit the sale of arms to countries involved in the Chaco War if he found that doing so would promote peace, and President Roosevelt issued a proclamation banning such sales. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. was indicted for violating the ban and argued that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the President. The Court held that Congress’s delegation of power to the President, when it authorized him to ban arms sales during the Chaco War if he found it would promote peace, was constitutional because in foreign affairs the President serves as the sole organ of the nation, meaning he acts as the country’s single voice in dealing with other nations and is better able to act with speed and flexibility, when he has broader discretion.

Domestic Action vs. Foreign Action

• Youngstown:
  Not really about lawmaking—it’s about whether the President can take domestic action (seizing steel mills) without Congress. The Court says no, because the President cannot make or execute policy domestically without constitutional or statutory authority.

• Curtiss-Wright:
  This one does involve lawmaking in a sense (delegation), but the key issue is whether the President can exercise broad discretion in foreign affairs. The Court says yes, and allows Congress to give the President flexible authority because of his inherent foreign affairs powers.

Foreign Affairs

The President has broad authority in foreign affairs. Congress may delegate more broadly in this area, especially because the President acts as the nation’s “sole organ” in external relations (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.). The President may act with congressional authorization or where Congress has acquiesced (Dames & Moore v. Regan). State laws that conflict with federal foreign policy are preempted, and executive agreements can preempt state law even without Senate ratification (American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi).

Dames & Moore v. Regan

After the Iran hostage crisis, President Carter (and later Reagan) entered into an executive agreement with Iran that nullified legal claims by U.S. nationals against Iran and transferred those claims to an international tribunal. Dames & Moore, which had pending claims in U.S. courts, challenged the President’s authority to suspend and settle those claims. The Court held that the President had authority to suspend, transfer, and terminate claims against Iran, because although Congress had not expressly authorized this, it had passed related statutes and consistently allowed similar practices without objection, demonstrating implicit congressional approval, so the President acted within the zone of twilight.

American Insurance Association v. Garamendi

California enacted a law requiring insurance companies to disclose information about policies issued in Europe during the Holocaust era to help victims recover unpaid claims. Insurance companies challenged the law, arguing that it interfered with federal foreign policy, including executive agreements aimed at resolving Holocaust-era claims. The Supreme Court held that the California law was preempted because it conflicted with the President’s foreign policy expressed through executive agreements, and thus impermissibly intruded on the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs.

Dellums v. Bush

Members of Congress sued President George H. W. Bush to prevent him from initiating military action against Iraq during the Gulf War without a congressional declaration of war. They argued that the Constitution requires congressional authorization before engaging in offensive military operations. The court dismissed the case as not ripe, holding that because Congress had not yet taken a clear institutional position opposing the President’s actions, the dispute was premature and not appropriate for judicial resolution. It wasn’t enough that some members of Congress objected. Congress as a whole had not formally acted (like passing a resolution opposing the President), so there wasn’t a true constitutional clash between the branches. The President hadn’t yet definitively initiated war in a way that created a concrete injury. The situation was still developing, so the court said the dispute was premature.

The Prize Cases

At the outset of the Civil War, President Lincoln ordered a naval blockade of Southern ports without a formal declaration of war from Congress, and Union forces seized ships attempting to violate the blockade. The ship owners challenged the seizures, arguing that the blockade was unconstitutional absent a congressional declaration of war. The Supreme Court upheld the blockade, holding that the President has authority to respond to an actual state of war or rebellion without a formal declaration from Congress, and may take necessary measures such as imposing a blockade.

War-Making Authority Rule

Article I, § 8 says that Congress has the power to declare war and other powers related to war, like providing for the common defense, to raise and support armies (Dellums, Prize)

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was captured in Afghanistan and detained indefinitely by the U.S. government as an “enemy combatant” without formal charges or trial. Hamdi challenged his detention, arguing that it violated his constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court held that although Congress (through the Authorization for Use of Military Force) authorized the detention of enemy combatants, a U.S. citizen detainee must be given meaningful notice of the basis for detention and a fair opportunity to challenge it before a neutral decisionmaker.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

Salim Hamdan, a detainee at Guantánamo Bay, was set to be tried by a military commission established by President George W. Bush for alleged war crimes. He challenged the legality of the commission, arguing that it was not authorized by Congress and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. The court held that The President cannot create military tribunals that depart from statutes (UCMJ) or international law because POTUS has to follow the binding federal law enacted under Congress’s Article I powers and the Supremacy Clause, and under Youngstown, the POTUS cannot act contrary to those laws without congressional authorization.

Domestic Affairs Rule

The Court recognizes two versions of executive protection: (1) executive immunity and (2) executive privilege. Executive immunity provides absolute immunity from civil suits involving the President’s official acts. Fitzgerald. The President is not immune from civil suits involving the President’s unofficial acts. Jones. The Executive enjoys no immunity from criminal cases. Vance. Executive privilege provides the President with a limited privilege against compelled disclosure of high-level executive branch communications. The court will request to compel information to determine if the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality will overcome the judicial interest of fair justice. Nixon. Discovery orders trying to compel members of the executive branch in civil cases don’t share the same urgency as criminal cases. Cheney. The President’s personal records can be subpoenaed if the legislative purpose (1) justifies involving the president, (2) is narrow in scope, (3) is specifically related to the public purpose, and (4) does not overburden the President. Mazars.

United States v. Nixon

During the Watergate investigation, a special prosecutor subpoenaed tape recordings of President Nixon’s conversations, but Nixon refused to produce them, claiming absolute executive privilege. The dispute centered on whether the President could withhold evidence in a criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court held that executive privilege is not absolute and cannot be used to withhold relevant evidence in a criminal trial, requiring President Nixon to comply with the subpoena.

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

A former Air Force analyst, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, sued former President Nixon for damages, alleging he was fired in retaliation for whistleblowing (snitching) about cost overruns. Nixon (head of the military) argued that he was absolutely immune from civil liability for actions taken while in office. The Supreme Court held that the President is entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages liability for official acts taken while in office. Nixon claimed that Fitzgerald was fired as part of a reorganization and cost-cutting effort within the Air Force, basically a downsizing rationale tied to budget concerns.

Clinton v. Jones

Paula Jones sued President Bill Clinton for alleged conduct that occurred before he became President, and Clinton sought to delay the lawsuit until after his presidency. He argued that a sitting President is immune from civil litigation while in office. The Supreme Court held that the President is not immune from civil litigation for unofficial acts committed before taking office, and the lawsuit could proceed while he was still President. Can also sue a President if the act was while he was in office, but was an unofficial act.

Cheney v. United States District Court

Environmental groups sued to obtain records from Vice President Cheney’s energy task force, alleging that private industry representatives had improperly influenced its recommendations. Cheney sought to block discovery, arguing that it would intrude on executive branch confidentiality and decision-making. Discovery order dismissed. Discovery orders compelling members of the executive branch to produce information for use in civil cases aren’t permissible and do not share the same urgency or significance as a request to compel information in criminal cases. Executive privilege is weaker in criminal cases (must yield to the need for evidence) but stronger in civil cases, where courts are more willing to protect executive confidentiality and limit intrusion.

Difference from United States v. Nixon and Cheney v. United States District Court

• In United States v. Nixon (criminal context):
  The Court said the need for evidence in a criminal trial outweighs executive privilege, so the President had to turn over the tapes.

• In Cheney v. United States District Court (civil context):
  The Court was much more protective of the executive, emphasizing that civil discovery should not unduly intrude on executive-branch decision-making.

Trump v. Mazars

Congressional committees seeking information about the President’s finances issued subpoenas to the President, his children, and his affiliated businesses. The President challenged the subpoenas because they lacked a legitimate purpose and violated the separation of powers. (He didn’t assert executive privilege). Congress has the power to subpoena the President’s personal records for a legislative purpose if that purpose is: (1) justifies involving the president, (2) narrow in scope, (3) specifically related to the public purpose, and (4) does not overburden the President. The information sought was not privileged and didn’t implicate executive immunity.

Trump v. Vance

A New York state grand jury, through District Attorney Cyrus Vance, issued a subpoena to obtain President Trump’s personal financial records as part of a criminal investigation. Trump sought to block the subpoena, arguing that a sitting President enjoys absolute immunity from state criminal process under Article II and the Supremacy Clause. The Supreme Court held that the President is not absolutely immune from state criminal subpoenas for private papers and must comply absent a valid claim of privilege or other specific constitutional objection. The subpoena was constitutional. The Court rejected absolute immunity because history doesn’t support it, the Constitution doesn’t require it, and existing legal protections already sufficiently protect the President.

Trump v. United States

After leaving office, former President Donald Trump was criminally prosecuted for actions related to his efforts to challenge the 2020 election results. He argued that a former President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts taken while in office. The Supreme Court held that a former President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for core constitutional powers, presumptive immunity for other official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts. Presumptive immunity is a rebuttable presumption of immunity for official acts, meaning the President is initially protected unless the government can show prosecution would not intrude on executive power.