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Judgement
the process through which people draw conclusions from the evidence they encounter.
Why do people sometimes draw accurate conclusions from their life experience, and sometimes not?
Experience is the foundation for judgment.
Does the info we use when making judgements differ?
Yes. ex: should i go route a or b otw home?
Many judgements begin with a _______
frequency estimate
Assessment of how often various events have occurred in the past:
Ex: how many times have i got stuck in traffic otw home going this way
Often do not have ______ to frequency information
direct access
E.g., the job is new and you haven’t driven the route many times, or you typically take one route and have limited information about the other.
You’re relying on availability as a substitute for frequency.
Attribution substitution
relying on easily assessed information as a proxy for information needed
E.g., relying on availability instead of frequency
Heuristics- rules-of-thumb (strategies) for decision making that usually lead to the correct answer (4)
• Availability
• Representativeness
• Affect
• Effort
Affect heuristic
how does the outcome make you feel?
ex: substantial dangers are often deeply frightening
How can affect lead to error?
Feelings are likely linked with little connection to the likelihood of the outcome
Effort heuristic
how much effort did you have to spend to gain the outcome?
takes more work to remember things of higher value (exam content)
How can an effect lead to error?
Value is often independent of effort (ex: $20 earned vs $20 found on the street. What one is more valuable? The one you worked for.)
Availability heuristic
the ease that examples come to mind is a proxy for frequency
Accurate, the more frequently you encounter something the more it is in your memory
Ex: colds are more common in the winter because i see more people sick in the winter
Are there errors in judgement in the availability heuristic?
Yes!
Ex: Coverage of plane crashes
tests:
Test: in english, are there more words that start with r or with r in the third position?
The availability heuristic says we would say words start with r, in reality more words have r in third position
Test #2: Who does the housework more, you or your roommate?
The availability heuristic is likely to tell you yourself, because you are not aware/present when your roommate is doing them
Is it easy or hard to overestimate the freq of rare events because they are distinctive?
easy
Availability heuristics can influence how we view ourselves:
• Group of students asked to recall past episodes in which they had been assertive
• One group gave 6 examples, another gave 12 examples
• Those that gave 6 examples judged themselves as more assertive
• Easier to come up with 6 examples
Representative heuristic
the assumption that resemblance to the prototype reflects probability
Assumption of homogeneity
- an expectation that each individual is rep of the category overall
Likelihood of category mem is judged by resemblance
Ex: is this person an accountant or a poet? ( they are reading a book with a top hat)
Representative heuristic will tell you a poet
In reality, not everyone looks like the mental category we put them in
There are more accountants, so this is more probable
What is the rep heuristic affected by? (2)
Stereotypes
Gamblers fallacy- Believe the seventh coin toss is more likely to be tails but the odds are still 50-50
The “prototype” of multiple coin tosses is an equal balance of heads and tails
When one outcome occurs many times in a row, you believe the opposite outcome is more likely to “correct” the sequence
Covariation
Making judgments about cause and effect
X and y covary, if the presence of x can be predicted by the presence of y
For example:
• Exercise and stamina
• Exercise and risk of heart attack
• Years of education and annual salary
Can be negative or positive, can vary in magnitude (strength), and you must check your belief about cause and effect.
T/F: Assumptions about covariation can lead to errors in judgment.
true
Illusions of covariation
- can falsely believe there is covariation when there is none
Ex: superstitions, blaire and the cemetary
Can illusions of covariations lead to selective attention towards data that seems to support covariation?
Yes! You see what you want to see ( peoples signs)
Confirmation bias
Confirmation bias
more responsive to evidence that confirms your beliefs (essentially ignoring information that doesn’t align with your
belief)
Ex: big dogs are vicious
Base rate information
info about how freq something occurs
Neglecting base rate info can lead to inaccurate estimates of covariation
Diagnostic info
descriptive info about a case
Ex: out of 100, how likely tom is an engineer?
2 groups: base rate info and diagnostic info
Base-rate information: 70 lawyers and 30 engineers
Diagnostic information: “Tom likes carpentry, sailing, math puzzles; dislikes politics”
One group given the base-rate with no diagnostic information, one given both the base-rate and diagnostic information.
Those given just the base rate information estimated the likelihood correctly, those given the diagnostic information ignored the base rate information and overestimated the likelihood that he is an Engineer.
Anchoring
when we don't know a value, we rely on heuristics to estimate the value
Ex: was MJ older than 2 when he died? Vs how old was MJ when he died?
Stages of anchoring:
Start with a ballpark, estimate, then adjust
The initial ballpark estimate “anchors” the judgment, and we usually adjust too little
Are judgments susceptible to anchoring effects by suggested values?
yes
note: If you first make a decision about an implausibly low anchor value, your later estimate will be too low
If you first make a decision about an implausibly high anchor value, your later estimate will be too high
What are some cases where humans reason well?
In some contexts, people seek out more accurate base rate info, are sensitive to sample size, seek potential sources of bias, etc.
Ex: your friend tells you how many times she won the lottery
Dual process models (2):
System 1 refers to thinking that is fast, automatic, and uses heuristics.
System 2 refers to thinking that is slower, effortful, and more likely to be correct.
When do you use system 1 or 2?
How much time you have
How much attention and WM is available
How the problem is presented ( what format the data is in -ex: 10% chance versus 1 in 10)
If there is less information available, what system are you using?
System 1
Emphasizing _______ will cue statistical thinking
Chance, highlighting the role of random chance
Descriptions of chance influence judgements: explicitly stating the role of random chance = system ___
2, how default is system 1
Can anything influence the likelihood of reasoning with system 2?
Yes, training.
Ex: taking a stats class improves reasoning
Statistical literacy=
Training can increase the likelihood you interact with S2
less base-rate neglect, less likely to need frequencies presented, etc.
T/F: thinking habits can predict deeper use of reasoning
true
induction vs deduction
Induction- make predictions about NEW cases based on past cases using probabilities
Bottom up
Deduction- start with a general premises and use it to reason about individual cases
top down
Induction (bottom-up):
You meet 5 dogs, and all of them are friendly.
You conclude: “Dogs are usually friendly.”
👉 You’re using specific cases → making a general prediction.
👉 It could be wrong (you just haven’t met an unfriendly dog yet).
Deduction (top-down):
Premise 1: All dogs are mammals.
Premise 2: A golden retriever is a dog.
Conclusion: A golden retriever is a mammal.
👉 You’re using a general rule → applying it to a specific case.
👉 If the premises are true, the conclusion has to be true.
Confirmation bias study: Wason (1966)
• Presented sequences like “2-4-6”
• Give participants time to figure out the rule by generating other sequences
Findings: They only sought confirming evidence
• “8-10-12”? Or “14-16-18”?
• Did not seek disconfirming evidence
• “10-8-6”? Or “1-3-5”?
researchers tend to do this
Confirmation bias
more responsive to evidence that confirms one's beliefs and less responsive to evidence that challenges one's beliefs
T/F: people show better mem for confirming evidence and distorted mem for disconfirming evidence.
true
Selective mem
reinterpreting disconfirming evidence
Ex: E.g., gamblers betting on a football game
• Wins are confirming evidence
• Losses are remembered as near-wins “I would have won if it weren’t for x...”
Belief perseverance
tendency to continue endorsing a belief even when evidence has completely undermined it
Example: Social sensitivity study (Ross et al., 1975)- Participants asked to determine whether a note was authentic or fabricated
• Given false feedback on their performance
• Even when told about random assignment to groups, rated themselves as having lower sensitivity
findings
Confirmation bias: selectively sought episodes in memory in which social sensitivity was lacking
People who got rated as low socially sensitive, they rated themselves lower later, even knowing the experiment was fake.
Utility theory
Utility theory is the idea that people make decisions by choosing the option that gives them the highest “utility”, meaning the most satisfaction, value, or benefit to them.
Do our decisions follow the principle of utility maximization, or choosing the option with the greatest expected value?
yes
framing
can impact how we interact with utility maximization
T/F: when loss is emphasized, we are more likely to seek risk than when gain is emphasized?
true
When people think in terms of gains, they tend to play it safe to protect what they already have.
Gain frame:
Option A: Get $500 for sure
Option B: 50% chance to get $1000, 50% chance to get $0
👉 Most people choose Option A (safe choice)
Loss frame:
Option A: Lose $500 for sure
Option B: 50% chance to lose $1000, 50% chance to lose $0
👉 Most people choose Option B (riskier choice)
do we always rely on utility assessments
no
Reason based choice
the idea that people make a decision only when they detect what they believe to be a persuasive reason for making that choice.
?
Giving more choices decreases the justification to choose a specific one ( when you get more choices you are less likely to make a decision all together)
Paradox of choice
if an argument cant be justified/not persuasive enough we wont accept it
T/F: Anticipated events can produce physio arousal
True
Ex: having increased HR, butterflies, sweating
What part of the brain is essential for evaluation of somatic markers (bodily-based emotional signals that guide decision-making)
The orbitofrontal cortex (what???)
T/F: Patients with orbitofrontal damage will make risky decisions
They have a failure to recognize “gut feelings”
continue to draw from the high risk stack
Affective forecasting
how well can we predict our own emotions
Are we bad at predicting future feelings?
Yes. we can predict the emotion but not the magnitude