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Last updated 5:31 PM on 4/22/26
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28 Terms

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Religion Clauses of the First Amendment

Two clauses: (1) Establishment Clause ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion") and (2) Free Exercise Clause ("or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"). The Establishment Clause prevents government from endorsing or supporting religion; the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals' right to practice religion.

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Free Exercise Clause: Belief vs. Action

Freedom to believe is absolute. Freedom to act on religious beliefs is not absolute—the government can regulate religious conduct. This distinction comes from Reynolds v. United States (1879) involving Mormon polygamy.

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Sherbert v. Verner (1963) — Compelling Interest Test

A Seventh-day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work Saturdays. Court held that to justify burdening religious exercise, the government must show (1) a compelling state interest and (2) use of the least restrictive means. This is strict scrutiny for free exercise.

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Employment Division v. Smith (1990) — Smith Test

Replaced the Sherbert compelling interest test. Justice Scalia held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion do NOT require a compelling interest to justify them. Only laws that specifically target religion face strict scrutiny.

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Lemon Test (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971)

Three-prong test for Establishment Clause cases: (1) the law must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; (3) it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. (Note: largely replaced by historical practices approach after Kennedy v. Bremerton, 2022.)

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Sliding Scale of Verbality

Expression exists on a spectrum. Pure speech (spoken/written words) gets the highest protection. Pure conduct (no communicative element) gets none. In between is expressive conduct (symbolic speech), which gets intermediate protection. The more verbal the expression, the more protection it receives.

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Political Speech

Has the highest level of First Amendment protection. Because it is essential to democratic self-governance, government restrictions on political speech face the most exacting (strict) scrutiny.

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Spence v. Washington (1974) — Spence Test

A student taped a peace sign to a flag and hung it upside down. Court established a two-part test for when conduct counts as protected expression: (1) intent to convey a particularized message, AND (2) a great likelihood the message would be understood by those who viewed it.

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United States v. O'Brien (1968) — O'Brien Test

A Vietnam protester burned his draft card. Court upheld his conviction and established the O'Brien test for regulating expressive conduct: a regulation is valid if (1) it's within the government's constitutional power; (2) it furthers an important/substantial interest; (3) the interest is UNRELATED to suppressing expression; (4) the restriction on speech is no greater than essential.

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Texas v. Johnson (1989) — Flag Burning

Gregory Lee Johnson burned a flag at the 1984 Republican Convention. Court struck down his conviction. Texas's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol was RELATED to suppressing expression, so O'Brien didn't apply — strict scrutiny did. Flag burning as political protest is protected speech.

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Why O'Brien did NOT apply in Texas v. Johnson

Under O'Brien prong 3, the government's interest must be UNRELATED to suppressing expression. Texas's interest in preserving the flag's symbolic value only mattered BECAUSE of the message Johnson was conveying. That made it content-based, triggering strict scrutiny instead.

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Associational Speech (Freedom of Association)

The right to associate with others who share your beliefs for expressive purposes. Not explicit in the First Amendment but implied by it. You have the right to group with like-minded people. Government forcing a group to accept unwanted members can violate this right (Boy Scouts v. Dale, 2000).

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Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)

The Boy Scouts expelled a gay assistant scoutmaster. Court ruled that forcing the Scouts to include him would significantly burden the organization's right to expressive association. Freedom of association includes the freedom NOT to associate.

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The Right Not to Speak (Compelled Speech)

The First Amendment protects both the right to speak AND the right to refrain from speaking. The government cannot force individuals to express beliefs they disagree with. Complementary to freedom of speech — "individual freedom of mind."

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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)

Struck down mandatory flag salute/Pledge of Allegiance in schools. Overruled Gobitis. Justice Jackson: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."

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Wooley v. Maynard (1977)

A Jehovah's Witness covered New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" license plate motto. Court held "the right of freedom of thought includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary.

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Exceptions to Free Speech (Unprotected Categories)

Six main categories: (1) Fighting words, (2) Incitement to imminent lawless action, (3) True threats, (4) Obscenity, (5) Defamation, (6) Fraud. These categories have "minimal social value" — free speech can still thrive without protecting them.

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Fighting Words — Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)

Words directed at a specific person that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." They are of such slight social value that any benefit is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. NOT the same as offensive speech generally.

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Incitement — Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

Speech advocating illegal activity is unprotected ONLY if: (1) it is directed to inciting or producing IMMINENT lawless action, AND (2) it is LIKELY to incite or produce such action. Both prongs must be met. This is the current, most speech-protective standard.

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True Threats

A speaker communicates "a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence" against a particular individual or group. Not the same as political hyperbole, jokes, or venting. See Virginia v. Black (2003) — cross burning with intent to intimidate is a true threat; cross burning as symbolic speech at a rally is not.

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Counterman v. Colorado (2023) — Subjective Element for True Threats

Held that to criminally prosecute someone for true threats, the state must prove a SUBJECTIVE element — that the defendant had some understanding of the threatening nature of his statements. A purely objective "reasonable person" standard is not enough. The required mens rea is RECKLESSNESS: the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his statements would be viewed as threatening.

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Why Counterman requires recklessness (not just objective standard)

Without a subjective element, people might self-censor to avoid being misunderstood, creating a chilling effect on protected speech. Recklessness strikes the right balance — it provides a "buffer zone" for protected speech without making it too hard to prosecute genuine threats.

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Obscenity (unprotected)

Sexual expression that appeals to prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (Miller v. California, 1973). One of the categories with "minimal social value."

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Defamation (unprotected)

False statements of fact that harm a person's reputation. For public figures, the speaker must have acted with "actual malice" — knowledge the statement was false or reckless disregard for its truth (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964).

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Fraud (unprotected)

Intentionally deceptive speech designed to secure an unfair or unlawful gain. Has no social value and causes concrete harm, so it falls outside First Amendment protection.

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Why courts say unprotected categories have "minimal" value

The idea is that obscenity, fighting words, true threats, fraud, defamation, and incitement contribute very little to the marketplace of ideas or democratic self-governance. Free speech and thought can "still thrive, and even be furthered" without protecting these categories.

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Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Regulations

Content-based (restricts speech because of its message) → strict scrutiny. Content-neutral (restricts time, place, or manner regardless of message) → intermediate scrutiny. Viewpoint-based regulations (subset of content-based) are virtually always unconstitutional.

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O'Brien Test vs. Strict Scrutiny — When does each apply?

O'Brien (intermediate scrutiny) applies to expressive conduct when the government's interest is UNRELATED to suppressing expression. Strict scrutiny applies when the government's interest IS related to the content or message of the expression.