non cognitivism

Non-cognitivism is the view that moral statements are not beliefs and are not capable of being true or false, but instead express emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions.

non cog vs realism

All non-cognitivist theories are anti-realist, but not all anti-realist theories are non-cognitivist (i.e. error theory)

emotivism

Emotivism says that moral judgements express (non-cognitive) feelings of approval or disapproval.

So, according to emotivism, when someone says “murder is wrong!”, what they really mean is “boo! murder!”

none of these attitudes are capable of being true or false. They are just expressions of approval or disapproval – not beliefs. Hence, emotivism is a non-cognitivist theory.

Hume: Treatise of Human Nature emotivism

Hume provides two arguments for the view that moral judgements are not judgements of reason

According to Hume, judgements of reason – e.g. a belief that grass is green – don’t motivate us to act in any way. Instead, it’s emotions and desires that motivate us to act.  my belief that “murder is wrong” will motivate me not to murder or my belief that “giving money to charity is good” will motivate me to give money to charity.

• Moral judgements can motivate action

• Judgements of reason cannot motivate action

• Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason

  • (In other words, moral judgements are non-cognitive)

humes fork emotivism

David Hume divides all meaningful cognitive statements (claims about reality) into two types:: Relations of idea These are: true by definition knowable by logic alone a priori (no experience needed) and

Matters of factabout the world known through experience a posteriori: eg “It is raining”

Hume asks what categories ‘murder is wrong fits into not relation of ideas because You can imagine a world where people think murder is fine o it’s NOT true by definition like maths or logic.and not matter of facts You cannot observe “wrongness”

so concludes They are not genuine cognitive (truth-apt) statements at all. therefore they are Moral statements are expressions of:

• approval (“I disapprove of murder”)

• or disapproval (“Boo murder”) supporting non cognitivism

humes is ought gap

Hume argues that moral ought (Value judgements about what should be the case “You ought not torture people) statements are a completely different kind of thing to factual is  (Factual claims about what is the cases eg “That is an act of torture)tatements.

 You cannot logically derive ought statements like ‘you ought not torture’ from statements about what is, such as ‘that is an act of torture’. We can argue that this is evidence for non-cognitivism: the reason we cannot derive ‘ought’ statements from ‘is’ statements is because the former type of statement is non-cognitive while the latter is cognitive.

is statements capable of being true or false whereas  whereas ‘ought’ statements like “Smith shouldn’t have done that” are expressions of emotion that are not capable of being true or false:

ayer verification principle

: a statement only has meaning if it is either:

• An analytic truth (e.g. “a triangle has 3 sides”)

• Empirically verifiable (e.g. “water boils at 100c”)

• Ayer argues that moral judgements fail the verification principle. Firstly, “murder is wrong” is clearly not an analytic truth. Ayer also argues that “murder is wrong” is not empirically verifiable either 

• aturalism would argue that we could prove that murder causes pain, anger, etc. However, Ayer argues that this is not the same as proving murder is wrong. Hence, Ayer rejects naturalism: 

• Ayer also argues that there is no way to empirically verify the presence of non-natural properties. Even if “murder is wrong” did possess the non-natural property of wrongness, how could we ever prove this? It’s not empirically verifiable, nor is it an analytic truth. Hence, Ayer also argues against non-naturalism: The existence of non-natural properties cannot be empirically proven.

istead of expressing factual statements about the external world, Ayer concludes that moral judgements simply express feelings of approval or disapproval and seek to evoke the same feelings in others

So, like Hume, Ayer is an emotivist.

prescriptivism

Prescriptivism says that moral judgements express (non-cognitive) instructions that aim to guide behaviour.

So, according to prescriptivism, when someone says “murder is wrong!”, what they really mean is something like “don’t murder people!”

R.M. Hare: The Language of Morals

Hare agrees with emotivism that moral judgements express (non-cognitive) attitudes. But Hare argues this isn’t main point of moral judgements: The main point of moral judgements is to guide conduct. For example, “stealing is wrong” implies the imperative “don’t steal”.

‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. Hare argues that the meaning of these terms is not simply to describe but mainly to commend or criticise.

the standard of what we condemn or critics are not objective and there are no facts that can determine one set of standards as correct or incorrect.

When I say “she is a good person” I am assuming a certain set of moral standards and commending that person against those standards. This commendation is the primary meaning of ‘good’ and provides (imperative) guidance on how others should act.

strawberry example

Hare uses the example of a “good strawberry” to argue that value terms are not purely descriptive, because “good” cannot be reduced to properties like “sweet and juicy.” Instead as if you said This is a good strawberry because it is sweet and juicy it would become circular therefore , when we call something good, we are not only describing it but also expressing approval or commending it.

problems non cognitivism Moral argument and reasoning

if non-cognitivism is correct, moral statements like “murder is wrong” are just expressions of emotion or commands, not beliefs. But we clearly use moral statements in logical arguments and reasoning, which only makes sense if they function like beliefs that can be true or false. Therefore, moral judgements must behave like factual claims rather than just expressions of feeling or commands.

problems anti realism moral nihilism

If moral anti-realism is true, it can be argued that this leads to moral nihilism: the view that no actions are inherently wrong. There’s nothing true about moral judgements such as “murder is wrong”. This then raises the question of why anyone should bother to be moral at all

realisation that moral values are just expressions of feelings doesn’t mean we should (or could) stop having these moral feelings.

There may also be practical reasons to behave as if some moral judgements are true. For example, if you were always stealing from your friends, chances are they wouldn’t remain friends with you for very long like suggested by social contract theory hobbs

problems anti realism moral progress

1. f moral anti-realism is true, then there would be no moral progress

2. But there has been moral progress

3. Therefore moral anti-realism is false

Why should the anti-realist accept there’s been objective moral progress when it doesn’t accept the existence of objective morality in the first place?