the rise of sinn fein

initial reaction

The insurrectionists received an extremely hostile reaction from the citizens of Dublin, as they were being led away by British troops following Pearse's order to surrender.

▪ Civilians had been killed, property damaged and the lives of Dubliners disrupted.

Yet this initial hostile reaction was to change, due to the British response

british govt reaction - maxwell

major general maxwell arrived in Ireland and acted as a Military Governor, overseeing the concluding stages of the rebellion and suspending the powers of the civil authorities.

he was determined to make an example of the ringleaders in an attempt to prevent a further rebellion.

a second rate soldier, with little experience in Ireland making him unsuited. Ireland's history of suffering at English hands and the general feeling of sympathy for the rank and file who had been led into rebellion made the situation delicate.

He believed it had been a German inspired plot designed to divert British attention, lacking knowledge of the IRB

british govt reaction - martial law

• imposed over the whole country despite how it was largely a Dublin Rising

▪ The British dubbed the Easter Rising a Sinn Féin Rebellion, unaware of the IRB.

▪ When Maxwell ordered large scale arrests throughout the country, many were Sinn Féin activists and sympathisers that weren’t involved in the rising. Although nearly 1,500 were released inside a few weeks, nearly 2,000 were shipped to the mainland, and held in criminal prisons or in the special internment camp at Frongoch in north Wales.

▪ Ironically, it was in these detention centres that less ardent Nationalists were influenced by more radical comrades to the principle of resistance to British rule.

bg reaction - the executions

After the Easter Rising, General Maxwell ordered a series of executions. Between 3–12 May 1916, 15 leaders of the Rising were executed, including Pearse, Clarke, Connolly and MacDermott. The secrecy of the trials and the steady execution announcements shocked and scared Ireland, especially Dublin. Although 90 prisoners were sentenced to death, most sentences were later commuted.

British insensitivity transformed the rebel leaders into martyrs. Public sympathy grew due to Plunkett’s prison marriage and Connolly’s execution while severely wounded and tied to a chair, for example.

The religious elements including last rites and large Requiem Masses, helped create a “cult of the dead leaders.” Overall, the executions turned hostility towards the Rising into widespread support.

ipp reaction - dillon and redmond

Witnessing the unfolding reaction of Dublin citizens, Dillon deliberated on “how to prevent the reaction in favour of the revolutionaries from becoming a reaction against the parliamentarians”

▪ While Redmond, who was in London, was outraged at the revolutionaries, but combined this with pleas for mercy, Dillon took a more uncompromising line.

▪ The tension by the extended period of executions led to Dillon's famous intervention in the House of Commons on 11 May

dillon’s speech to the hoc

Despite Dillon's plea, the executions scheduled for the following day went ahead, but they proved to be the last two. On the night of 11 May Asquith crossed to Ireland and spent a week gauging opinion. Only at this stage did the government urge caution on the military authorities.

the murder of sheehy skeffington

Dillon's emotional speech publicly exposed how Francis Sheehy-Skeffington and two other journalists, Patrick Mackintyre and Thomas Dickson, had been murdered while in custody during the rising.

▪ Sheehy-Skeffington, a dedicated pacifist, had witnessed an unarmed Dublin youth’s murder by Captain J C Bowen-Colthurst. The next morning, 26 April, the officer ordered the three executed without trial, their bodies were buried in Portobello Barracks.

▪ As Sheehy-Skeffington was so popular, the atrocity attracted widespread publicity and triggered a powerful anti-British reaction, especially in Dublin.

o’dwyer’s reaction to the executions

Dr O’Dwyer, the Bishop of Limerick, wrote to Maxwell.

▪ He described the rebels as “poor young fellows”, O'Dwyer informed Maxwell that the “first intimation we got of their fate was the announcement that they had been shot in cold blood. Personally, I regard your action with horror, and I believe that it has outraged the conscience of the country.

▪ This clear indication that a member of the Catholic hierarchy had broken ranks with constitutional Nationalism was significant, but O'Dwyer was the only senior cleric to condone the rising.

casement’s execution

In London at the end of June Casement faced a high treason charge with Attorney General, F E Smith. Smith had been deeply involved in the extra-parliamentary resistance to Home Rule, ironic to Irish Nationalist observers.

▪ Casement was condemned to death and despite a powerful campaign to halt his execution, he was hanged in Pentonville jail on 3 August.

▪ This inflamed opinion in Ireland and, significantly, in the United States at a time when the British government was desperately seeking American participation in the war

impact of the rising

the execution of sixteen Irish revolutionaries, seems insignificant compared to British authorities executing 350 of their own troops on the Western Front for alleged cowardice.

▪ there was a strong, but concealed, anti-British feeling in Nationalist Ireland, revealed in the public's response. Redmond, whose wartime support for Britain was deeply sincere, could not hope to represent this changing mood.

▪ The rising had dealt the IPP a savage blow, as it highlighted Nationalist Ireland's uncertainty both in its attitude to the war effort and in its support for the wholly constitutional IPP.

asquish return

On his return from Ireland on 18 May 1916 Asquith decided that another attempt at a political settlement should be made.

▪ Clearly, successful negotiations would bolster constitutional Nationalism at the expense of the more radical separatists.

▪ Asquith also knew that a new political settlement could deflate the fierce international, especially American, criticism which had followed the executions.

lloyd george’s strategy

Lloyd George knew that a settlement would be impossible if Redmond and Carson were brought together.

▪ He told Carson, who had resigned from Asquith's Coalition government in October 1915, that the remaining six counties (Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh) would be excluded. A few days later, on 29 May, Lloyd George wrote to Carson, that it would be permanent.

▪ Significantly, Redmond now shifted from the position he had occupied at the Buckingham Palace Conference, as he agreed to six counties, though only if it was temporary.

Lloyd George had secured agreement on the exclusion of six counties, but the uncertainty over the time limit remained a formidable obstacle.

carson

In addressing a private meeting of the UUC on 6 June Carson backed the six county settlement, arguing that its rejection would seriously damage the Unionist cause in Britain.

▪ Carson was also influenced by Lloyd George's opinion that it was urgently required to restore relations with the United States.

A UUC meeting followed on 12 June and, after several highly emotional speeches, the UUC unanimously authorised Carson to continue negotiations based on the exclusion of six counties.

redmond

In seeking Nationalist support, Redmond faced an even more difficult task.

He had to persuade Ulster Nationalists to back six county exclusion, relying on Joe Devlin and his fellow northern Nationalist MP, Jeremiah MacVeagh, who represented South Down.

Devlin immediately realised that winning their approval would be difficult, as many Catholic bishops in Ulster had already stated their opposition to any form of partition.

Moreover, Nationalists in Tyrone and Fermanagh, had met to co-ordinate resistance to the Lloyd George scheme. As both of these counties had clear Nationalist majorities, the idea of accepting their exclusion from any Home Rule settlement was terrible.

the irish nation league

In June 1916, an Ulster Nationalist conference met in St Mary’s Hall, Belfast, with 776 delegates present. Redmond chaired the meeting and sought the Catholic hierarchy’s cooperation to avoid accusations that the IPP had packed the conference.

After five hours of intense debate, the delegates voted 475–265 in favour of temporary exclusion. opposition came mainly from Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Derry city. Devlin argued passionately that exclusion would only be temporary: the 26 counties would gain a parliament, while the 6 counties would remain under Westminster until a final settlement.

Those opposed launched the Irish Nation League in Omagh on 5 August 1916. Supported strongly by Catholic clergy in west Ulster. Although it was eventually absorbed by the growing Sinn Féin movement, it became an important rallying point for anti‑Redmond sentiment and contributed to the weakening of the IPP in Ulster.

southern unionists

• Lloyd George's manoeuvrings had drawn him into conflict with a number of Conservative ministers in the Coalition government.

• Initially complacent, Long and Lansdowne claimed Lloyd George had exceeded his brief by offering Redmond immediate Home Rule for the twenty-six counties. 

• They first voiced their concern at a meeting of a small cabinet committee on 1 June, joined by Asquith, Lloyd George and Lord Crewe, who heard Long argue that the cabinet had never endorsed the immediate implementation of Home Rule.

• On 29 May Lloyd George met Midleton and two other Southern Unionist leaders and insisted that a new Home Rule government would be a “purely provisional character” until the end of the war. In the meantime Southern Unionists would have guaranteed representation in the Home Rule government in addition to the special representation.

• Midleton remained cautious, worried about its provisional nature and correctly guessed that Lloyd George had already promised more to Redmond and Carson. 

• Midleton was also greatly concerned by the rise of radical Nationalism in the wake of the rising, and the implementation of a partitionist settlement. 

conservative divisions

by the end of June they divided into two camps. While Long and Lansdowne were clearly the principle opponents, they enjoyed the solid support of two other ministers, Lord Selborne, the President of the Board of Agriculture, and Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade in addition to his duties as deputy Foreign Secretary.

In the other camp Bonar Law, Balfour and F E Smith, who had become Attorney General on Carson's resignation, supported the plan which Lloyd George had outlined to Carson.

the deal collapses

On 19 July, when the cabinet next met, it was clear that Long and Lansdowne were determined to thwart the scheme.

they knew that if they could persuade their colleagues that exclusion should be permanent, then Redmond would break off negotiations.

Hence, when Redmond was informed of the cabinet's change of heart, he angrily rejected permanent partition, and the Lloyd George scheme collapsed amid bitter recriminations.

impact of lloyd george negociations

• The failure of the Lloyd George negotiations damaged the reputation of the Irish Party. The IPP having accepted the temporary exclusion of the six northern counties at the Ulster Nationalist Convention in St Mary’s Hall, only for the proposals to ultimately fail, facilitated the rise of Sinn Féin. Another formal attempt did not occur until the Irish Conventionat Trini ty College in July 1917.

• The failure of the Lloyd George initiative and, more particularly, the circumstances, demonstrated that Redmond had been, yet again, outmanoeuvred by the Unionists and betrayed by the British government. Clearly, Redmond's influence at Westminster, where they was little appreciation of the risks he had taken, was much weaker than it had been before 1914. Against this background contemporary Nationalists increasingly came to regard Redmond's support for the war as a great mistake.

•  This was a crucial factor in 1916, the year in which the European conflict became a 'total war. Earlier that year, Britain had been forced to introduce conscription, and there was a growing fear that the government would soon move to extend compulsory military service to Ireland.
  

sinn fein begin to organise: the release of the internees

• In December 1916 Lloyd George, now PM, ordered the release of the Frongoch and Reading men, including Griffith and Collins providing the Sinn Fein movement with leadership and organisation​

• Michael Collins returned to Cork just after Christmas.​

• In Frongoch, he became a dominant figure in the “university of revolution”, leading discussions on military tactics, prison conditions, and participating in Irish-language classes, although he had no official rank.​

contesting elections 1917

• North Roscommon: Count Plunkett was chosen as the SF candidate but ran as an independent. 

• The campaign was characterised by Volunteer activists. Plunkett won 3077-1708. Collins had brought dynamism to the SF cause. The younger clergy were involved in the campaign. An appeal to the Paris Peace Conference for Irish self determination became a central plank in the SF programme.

• The by election had combined the old SF, the Gaelic League, the Volunteers, Cumann na mBan and the IRB. Divisions in the movement between Plunkett and Griffith were overcome and Griffith and the SF name proved triumphant.

• The growth of SF – in July 1917 it had 11,000 members, which doubled in a month and by October 1917 SF claimed to have over 200,000 members in its 1200 clubs.

• South Longford: Joe Mc Guinness selected as candidate. ‘put him in to get him out’ SF won the seat by 37 seats. Dillon had ran the IPP campaign but the bg ordered the arrest of prominent SF personnel after Roscommon. On 26 February Dillon had criticised the BG for ‘manufacturing Sinn Feiners by tens of thousands’ He was also destroyed by the 11^th hour intervention of Dr William Walsh, the Archbishop of Dublin who criticised the IPP’s concessions on partition. Sinn Fein were lucky to win S.Longford. Archbishop Walsh's intervention had been decisive , though some skilful vote rigging by SF also played a part! These by elections also emphasised a generational gap- the younger clergy and many young men who had never voted before followed SF.

• The attractions of a youthful, energetic and dynamic movement as opposed to the older , inactive and unsuccessful IPP were obvious

release of the prisoners

• Lloyd George had just succeeded Asquith, and one of his first actions as Prime Minister was to order the release of Irish prisoners from Frongoch camp and Reading jail in December 1916, in time for Christmas. ​​
  

death of thomas ashe

Thomas Ashe was arrested for seditious speeches and, along with other Volunteers in Mountjoy Jail, demanded political‑prisoner status. Following the suffragette tactic, he went on hunger strike. The authorities responded with forcible feeding, during which Ashe became critically ill and died on 25 September 1917. His death created a powerful martyr for Sinn Féin. Around 40,000 attended his Dublin funeral, organised by Michael Collins, where armed Volunteers escorted the coffin and fired shots at Glasnevin Cemetery.

Ashe’s death triggered a surge of public anger and nationalist sentiment. By late 1917, Sinn Féin had capitalised on disillusionment with the failed Home Rule project and growing anti‑British feeling after the Rising and the harsh treatment of prisoners.

ard fheis

• There were divisions within the Sf movement which appeared to be between the military and the political wings but in reality were between the republican and non Republican wings. In the republican side the leaders were Collins, Brugha,Rory O’Connor and DeValera who insisted  that SF must fight for a Republic. the non republican wing was Arthur Griffith who believed that a republic was unobtainable and that to commit SF to the goal of a republic was unnecessary and unrealistic.

• The Ard Fheis managed to overcome these difficulties, Griffith agreed to stand down as President of SF in favour of DeValera. 

• - a new SF constitution was drawn up

• ‘SF aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish republic.’

• obviously favoured the Republicans but was ambiguous enough to hold together all elements of the separatist movement. DeValera stated ‘we are not doctrinaire Republicans’

• DeValera was also elected as president of the Volunteers.

• In his dual role DeValera symbolised the unity of the reconstructed separatist movement. he fused together the physical force and constitutional elements, crucial in the  struggle for Irish freedom. people wanted freedom, though the precise constitutional form was of little general interest. DeValera was now the undisputed leader of the separatist movement.

sinn fein’s situation by end of 1917

• Yet while the people identified with the uncompromising and defiant Nationalism adopted by the new Sinn Féin, few were willing to support another attempt at rebellion. ​

• The dramatic rise of Sinn Féin in 1917 demonstrated that the people wanted freedom, though the precise constitutional form which this might take was of little general interest.​

• By the end of 1917 it was also evident that de Valera had emerged as the undisputed leader of the separatist movement. He was a charismatic leader, a fact illustrated by Griffith's out-of-character willingness to stand aside at the October Ard-Fheis, and to the people he was the personification of the whole separatist movement. ​

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the irish convention july 1917-april 1918

• The Irish Convention was another LG initiative to solve the Irish Question. Britain was still keen to appease Irish American opinion.

• First meeting was held in trinity college 25 July 1917. 95 members – 52 nationalists, 26 UU, 9SU, 6 labour and 2 liberals. Chaired by Sir Horace Plunkett. UU agreed to participate although reluctantly. Carson persuaded them they should join to secure Ulster’s position and protect  the SU minority.

• SU’s would attend as along as they had adequate representation. Some SU’s under Middleton concluded that some form of Irish government was inevitable and they would have to establish common ground with the IPP.

• Sf refused to send any delegates which meant that this convention was doomed from the beginning. Ulster unionist stubbornness also added to this. Carson wanted nothing less than permanent exclusion. They also refused to speak, frustrating both the SU’s and nationalists

• UU wanted Westminster to retain control but nationalists wanted it to be transferred to Dublin. Midleton (SU) suggested giving Dublin control of internal taxation and allowing Westminster to retain control over customs duties.

• At the beginning of 1918 Midleton went to LG to get assurances that if the SU compromise had only UU dissenting, that the government would give it legislative effect.

• Redmond had to decide whether to abandon an Irish parliament's right to levy its own customs duties or to hold out for fiscal autonomy. Redmond favoured making ONE LAST CONCESSION.

• his speech in Jan 1918 emphasised the sacrifices that nationalists were willing to make and criticised the UU for their negative attitude.

However when he returned to Dublin Devlin and Bishop O’Donnell opposed the Midleton compromise having consulted Dillon. Redmond  then had to withdraw his support for the compromise

impact of irish convention

This episode marked a humiliating personal defeat for Redmond who announced that he could no longer be of service to the Convention. Ulster and fiscal control could not be resolved.

a split developed in the movement between the more liberal SU’s under Midleton who could accept HR and try to become influential in a new Ireland. This group had large British interests in business or land. The other group largely consisted of those whose land and business were confined to Ireland. They genuinely feared HR believing that only the Union could safeguard their future.

The Irish convention never really stood any chance of success: the UU remained implacably opposed to any form of HR. Redmond was prepared to give up fiscal autonomy but this drew him into conflict with his closest colleagues. Redmond was ill and he died on 6 March knowing that he had failed to deliver HR.

Redmond was prepared to make concessions for no political gain savage blow to ipp

Sinn Fein had denounced the convention as a futile exercise.

ipp wins by-elections

Despite its wider decline, the IPP won three by‑elections, including two in Ulster (South Armagh and East Tyrone). The party still benefited from the AOH and retained significant support in Ulster. Both constituencies lay within the diocese of Cardinal Logue, a strong critic of Sinn Féin, whose influence helped counterbalance the younger clergy who favoured Sinn Féin.

Crucially, these contests centred on the partition issue. For many Catholic voters in Ulster, Sinn Féin offered no credible alternative to the IPP on partition. The IPP’s promise to fight partition at Westminster was far more appealing than Sinn Féin’s abstentionist policy, which seemed to leave Ulster Catholics without parliamentary protection.

conscription crisis

the cabinet now turned to Ireland to produce the 150,000 men it needed to go against the counter offensive despite american warnings.

• The authorities in Dublin had informed LG that he would need many troops to enforce conscription, Sir henry Wilson, the army’s chief of Imperial staff urged the PM to press ahead​

• On 10th April introduced a Military Service Bill which gave the government power to impose conscription on Ireland by order in Council without further debate, whenever appropriate.​

• At the same time LG gave an undertaking that a HR measure would be introduced before conscripts were enrolled in order to make conscription more acceptable to Nationalists.​

impact of conscription crisis

• On 16 April 1918, the Commons passed the Conscription Bill. Dillon, now leader of the IPP, warned that “all Ireland will rise against you” and led his party out of the House. This triggered a united anti‑conscription campaign across Ireland.

• On 18 April, a major conference at the Mansion House brought together all strands of nationalist opinion — Sinn Féin, the IPP, Labour, clergy — in a rare moment of unity. De Valera drafted an anti‑conscription pledge promising to “resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal.” Huge crowds signed it outside churches, and on 23 April a one‑day general strike paralysed the country outside Belfast. Nationalist mobilisation was even greater than after the 1916 Rising.

• Sinn Féin became the clear political beneficiary. Its long‑standing opposition to the war contrasted sharply with the IPP’s earlier support for Britain, so the public naturally turned to Sinn Féin for leadership. Crucially, the Catholic Church openly opposed conscription, declaring the Irish people had a right to resist. The hierarchy’s cooperation with Sinn Féin gave the movement new respectability, undermining claims that it was a dangerous revolutionary fringe.

• Although conscription was never actually enforced, the legislation remained on the statute books, allowing Sinn Féin to exploit the threat throughout 1918. The crisis unleashed intense nationalist anger and revitalised Sinn Féin, ensuring its decisive victory over the IPP in the post‑war general election.

german plot

In May 1918, the new Viceroy, Lord French, escalated tensions by ordering the arrest of the entire Sinn Féin leadership on 17 May, claiming—without evidence—that he had uncovered a “German Plot” involving Sinn Féin. Michael Collins, aware of the arrests in advance, allowed them to happen, recognising the propaganda value.

A total of 73 Sinn Féin leaders were arrested, including de Valera, Griffith, Plunkett, Cosgrave and Markievicz. The arrests backfired spectacularly: public opinion swung even more strongly behind Sinn Féin. Griffith, still in jail, won the East Cavan by‑election easily using the slogan “Put him in to get him out.”

The combination of the conscription crisis and the German Plot arrests massively strengthened Sinn Féin. Instead of weakening the movement, British repression only increased Sinn Féin’s popularity and consolidated its dominance in nationalist Ireland.

government repression

On 3 July 1918, Lord French issued a proclamation declaring Sinn Féin, the Volunteers, Cumann na mBan and the Gaelic League to be dangerous organisations. Their meetings were banned, and even hurling matches were prohibited as the government intensified its crackdown on separatism.

Despite arrests and repression, Sinn Féin continued to grow, attracting new members and organising passive resistance to British rule. Public anger at the government’s actions was widespread: hundreds of meetings were held, and in open defiance of the ban, 1,500 hurling matches were played on a single Sunday in August.

The government also proclaimed several counties — especially in Munster — in an attempt to suppress Volunteer activity. With much of the Sinn Féin leadership imprisoned in England, Michael Collins emerged as a central figure. While on the run, he reorganised the Volunteers and helped direct political resistance, becoming increasingly influential in both the military and political wings of the movement.

labour stands down

On 1 November 1918, Labour voted by 96 to 23 to withdraw from the general election. This decision infuriated the IPP but delighted Sinn Féin, which could now focus entirely on the national question without competition from a left‑wing alternative.

Labour withdrew partly because it struggled to find suitable candidates — many potential figures, such as Countess Markievicz, were already aligned with Sinn Féin. As an all‑Ireland party, Labour also had to consider its supporters in Ulster, who would have been unhappy with either of the realistic options:

• competing with Sinn Féin by adopting a strongly nationalist manifesto, or

• entering an electoral pact with Sinn Féin.

Either approach risked alienating Labour’s northern base. Contesting the election while avoiding a clear stance on the national question would have caused Labour to lose ground to both Sinn Féin and the remnants of the IPP. Withdrawal therefore became the only viable option — and it handed Sinn Féin a major strategic advantage.

1918 election campaign

Sinn Féin’s sweeping victory in the 1918 general election was strengthened by the Labour Party’s withdrawal. Although Labour initially planned to contest the election — and Sinn Féin feared it could win up to 20 seats, especially in Dublin — sustained pressure from Sinn Féin throughout October forced Labour to step aside. Labour had promised to abstain from Westminster but would not commit to joining Sinn Féin’s alternative assembly, making them a political threat. Their withdrawal gave Sinn Féin a free run in urban constituencies, while Sinn Féin was already dominant in rural areas.

By late 1918, Sinn Féin had 1,354 clubs, a rapidly expanding membership, and a far stronger organisational machine than the IPP. The Volunteers and Sinn Féin clubs provided energetic election workers, giving the party a decisive advantage.

After the war ended on 11 November, the election was set for 14 December. Sinn Féin issued a four‑point manifesto:

• abstention from Westminster

• using “any and every means available” to weaken British control

• establishing an Irish constituent assembly

• taking Ireland’s case to the Peace Conference

This programme had driven Sinn Féin’s rapid rise since 1917 and proved irresistible to voters, ensuring a landslide victory over the IPP.

ipp campaign/weaknesses

By 1918 the UIL (United Irish League), once the IPP’s grassroots machine, was effectively dead in many constituencies. As a result, Dillon had to rely heavily on the press to spread the IPP message, reminding voters of past achievements and criticising Sinn Féin’s abstentionism. Even this was weakened by a paper shortage, which cut the circulation of the Freeman’s Journal — the party’s main newspaper — to around 20,000–25,000, roughly half of what it should have been.

Meanwhile, Sinn Féin was highly organised, selecting candidates early and preparing thoroughly for the election. In contrast, the IPP’s campaign was marked by apathy and defeatism. The party could not field candidates in many areas, allowing 25 Sinn Féin candidates to be returned unopposed in Kerry and Cork.

The IPP also suffered from having nothing new to offer. Its platform relied on old achievements — land reform, Home Rule, and the 1908 old‑age pension — which meant little to younger voters with no memory of these reforms. What they did remember was the IPP’s acceptance of a partitionist settlement, and the government’s recent mistakes, especially conscription. Together, these factors contributed to the complete collapse of constitutional nationalism in the 1918 general election.

election results

The 1918 election produced a dramatic Sinn Féin victory, described by Coakley as one of the greatest electoral landslides of the twentieth century. Sinn Féin won 73 seats, the IPP only 6 (helped by an Ulster pact), and Unionists 26. The IPP failed to contest every seat, allowing 25 Sinn Féin candidates to be returned unopposed in areas like Kerry and Cork.

A key factor was the huge extension of the franchise, which expanded the electorate from 700,000 to 2 million; around 70% were first‑time voters, many of whom preferred Sinn Féin’s radical message over the IPP’s record‑based platform.

However, Sinn Féin’s “landslide” is qualified: it won 46.9% of the total vote, compared with 28.5% for Unionists and 21.7% for the IPP. The IPP kept much of its old vote but failed to attract new supporters and remained stronger than Sinn Féin among nationalists in Ulster. Despite the IPP’s organisational weakness, the election was still one of the most heavily contested since 1892.