the rise of sinn fein

initial reaction

The insurrectionists received an extremely hostile reaction from the citizens of Dublin, as they were being led away by British troops following Pearse's order to surrender.

▪ Civilians had been killed, property damaged and the lives of Dubliners disrupted.

Yet this initial hostile reaction was to change, due to the British response

british govt reaction - maxwell

major general maxwell arrived in Ireland and acted as a Military Governor, overseeing the concluding stages of the rebellion and suspending the powers of the civil authorities.

he was determined to make an example of the ringleaders in an attempt to prevent a further rebellion.

a second rate soldier, with little experience in Ireland making him unsuited. Ireland's history of suffering at English hands and the general feeling of sympathy for the rank and file who had been led into rebellion made the situation delicate.

He believed it had been a German inspired plot designed to divert British attention, lacking knowledge of the IRB

british govt reaction - martial law

• imposed over the whole country despite how it was largely a Dublin Rising

▪ The British dubbed the Easter Rising a Sinn Féin Rebellion, unaware of the IRB.

▪ When Maxwell ordered large scale arrests throughout the country, many were Sinn Féin activists and sympathisers that weren’t involved in the rising. Although nearly 1,500 were released inside a few weeks, nearly 2,000 were shipped to the mainland, and held in criminal prisons or in the special internment camp at Frongoch in north Wales.

▪ Ironically, it was in these detention centres that less ardent Nationalists were influenced by more radical comrades to the principle of resistance to British rule.

bg reaction - the executions

After the Easter Rising, General Maxwell ordered a series of executions. Between 3–12 May 1916, 15 leaders of the Rising were executed, including Pearse, Clarke, Connolly and MacDermott. The secrecy of the trials and the steady execution announcements shocked and scared Ireland, especially Dublin. Although 90 prisoners were sentenced to death, most sentences were later commuted.

British insensitivity transformed the rebel leaders into martyrs. Public sympathy grew due to Plunkett’s prison marriage and Connolly’s execution while severely wounded and tied to a chair, for example.

The religious elements including last rites and large Requiem Masses, helped create a “cult of the dead leaders.” Overall, the executions turned hostility towards the Rising into widespread support.

ipp reaction - dillon and redmond

Witnessing the unfolding reaction of Dublin citizens, Dillon deliberated on “how to prevent the reaction in favour of the revolutionaries from becoming a reaction against the parliamentarians”

▪ While Redmond, who was in London, was outraged at the revolutionaries, but combined this with pleas for mercy, Dillon took a more uncompromising line.

▪ The tension by the extended period of executions led to Dillon's famous intervention in the House of Commons on 11 May

dillon’s speech to the hoc

Despite Dillon's plea, the executions scheduled for the following day went ahead, but they proved to be the last two. On the night of 11 May Asquith crossed to Ireland and spent a week gauging opinion. Only at this stage did the government urge caution on the military authorities.

the murder of sheehy skeffington

Dillon's emotional speech publicly exposed how Francis Sheehy-Skeffington and two other journalists, Patrick Mackintyre and Thomas Dickson, had been murdered while in custody during the rising.

▪ Sheehy-Skeffington, a dedicated pacifist, had witnessed an unarmed Dublin youth’s murder by Captain J C Bowen-Colthurst. The next morning, 26 April, the officer ordered the three executed without trial, their bodies were buried in Portobello Barracks.

▪ As Sheehy-Skeffington was so popular, the atrocity attracted widespread publicity and triggered a powerful anti-British reaction, especially in Dublin.

o’dwyer’s reaction to the executions

Dr O’Dwyer, the Bishop of Limerick, wrote to Maxwell.

▪ He described the rebels as “poor young fellows”, O'Dwyer informed Maxwell that the “first intimation we got of their fate was the announcement that they had been shot in cold blood. Personally, I regard your action with horror, and I believe that it has outraged the conscience of the country.

▪ This clear indication that a member of the Catholic hierarchy had broken ranks with constitutional Nationalism was significant, but O'Dwyer was the only senior cleric to condone the rising.

casement’s execution

In London at the end of June Casement faced a high treason charge with Attorney General, F E Smith. Smith had been deeply involved in the extra-parliamentary resistance to Home Rule, ironic to Irish Nationalist observers.

▪ Casement was condemned to death and despite a powerful campaign to halt his execution, he was hanged in Pentonville jail on 3 August.

▪ This inflamed opinion in Ireland and, significantly, in the United States at a time when the British government was desperately seeking American participation in the war

impact of the rising

the execution of sixteen Irish revolutionaries, seems insignificant compared to British authorities executing 350 of their own troops on the Western Front for alleged cowardice.

▪ there was a strong, but concealed, anti-British feeling in Nationalist Ireland, revealed in the public's response. Redmond, whose wartime support for Britain was deeply sincere, could not hope to represent this changing mood.

▪ The rising had dealt the IPP a savage blow, as it highlighted Nationalist Ireland's uncertainty both in its attitude to the war effort and in its support for the wholly constitutional IPP.

what happened when asquith returned to london?

On his return from Ireland on 18 May 1916 Asquith decided that another attempt at a political settlement should be made.

▪ Clearly, successful negotiations would bolster constitutional Nationalism at the expense of the more radical separatists.

▪ Asquith also knew that a new political settlement could deflate the fierce international, especially American, criticism which had followed the executions.

what was lloyd george’s strategy for settlement?

Lloyd George knew that a settlement would be impossible if Redmond and Carson were brought together.

▪ He told Carson, who had resigned from Asquith's Coalition government in October 1915, that the remaining six counties (Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh) would be excluded. A few days later, on 29 May, Lloyd George wrote to Carson, that it would be permanent.

▪ Significantly, Redmond now shifted from the position he had occupied at the Buckingham Palace Conference, as he agreed to six counties, though only if it was temporary.

Lloyd George had secured agreement on the exclusion of six counties, but the uncertainty over the time limit remained a formidable obstacle.

how did carson respond to plans for a settlement?

In addressing a private meeting of the UUC on 6 June Carson backed the six county settlement, arguing that its rejection would seriously damage the Unionist cause in Britain.

▪ Carson was also influenced by Lloyd George's opinion that it was urgently required to restore relations with the United States.

A UUC meeting followed on 12 June and, after several highly emotional speeches, the UUC unanimously authorised Carson to continue negotiations based on the exclusion of six counties.

how did redmond respond to plans for a settlement?

In seeking Nationalist support, Redmond faced an even more difficult task.

He had to persuade Ulster Nationalists to back six county exclusion, relying on Joe Devlin and his fellow northern Nationalist MP, Jeremiah MacVeagh, who represented South Down.

Devlin immediately realised that winning their approval would be difficult, as many Catholic bishops in Ulster had already stated their opposition to any form of partition.

Moreover, Nationalists in Tyrone and Fermanagh, had met to co-ordinate resistance to the Lloyd George scheme. As both of these counties had clear Nationalist majorities, the idea of accepting their exclusion from any Home Rule settlement was terrible.

why was the irish nation league formed?

In June 1916, an Ulster Nationalist conference met in St Mary’s Hall, Belfast, with 776 delegates present. Redmond chaired the meeting and sought the Catholic hierarchy’s cooperation to avoid accusations that the IPP had packed the conference.

the delegates voted 475–265 in favour of temporary exclusion. opposition came mainly from Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Derry city. Devlin argued passionately that exclusion would only be temporary: the 26 counties would gain a parliament, while the 6 counties would remain under Westminster until a final settlement.

Those opposed launched the Irish Nation League in Omagh on 5 August 1916. Supported strongly by Catholic clergy in west Ulster. Although it was eventually absorbed by the growing Sinn Féin movement, it became an important rallying point for anti‑Redmond sentiment and contributed to the weakening of the IPP in Ulster.

how did plans for a settlement impact lloyd george and southern unionists?

• Lloyd George's manoeuvrings had drawn him into conflict with a number of Conservative ministers in the Coalition government.

• Initially complacent, Long and Lansdowne claimed Lloyd George had exceeded his brief by offering Redmond immediate Home Rule for the twenty-six counties. 

• at a small cabinet committee on 1 June, joined by Asquith, Lloyd George and Lord Crewe, Long argued that the cabinet had never endorsed the immediate implementation of Home Rule.

• On 29 May Lloyd George met Midleton and two other Southern Unionist leaders and insisted that a new Home Rule government would be a “purely provisional character” until the end of the war. In the meantime Southern Unionists would have guaranteed and special representation in the Home Rule government.

• Midleton remained cautious, worried about its provisional nature and correctly guessed that Lloyd George had already promised more to Redmond and Carson. 

• Midleton was also greatly concerned by the rise of radical Nationalism in the wake of the rising, and the implementation of a partitionist settlement. 

conservative divisions

by the end of June they divided into two camps. While Long and Lansdowne were clearly the principle opponents, they enjoyed the solid support of two other ministers, Lord Selborne, and Lord Robert Cecil.

In the other camp Bonar Law, Balfour and F E Smith, who had become Attorney General on Carson's resignation, supported the plan which Lloyd George had outlined to Carson.

the deal collapses

On 19 July, when the cabinet next met, it was clear that Long and Lansdowne were determined to thwart the scheme.

they knew that if they could persuade their colleagues that exclusion should be permanent, then Redmond would break off negotiations.

Hence, when Redmond was informed of the cabinet's change of heart, he angrily rejected permanent partition, and the Lloyd George scheme collapsed amid bitter recriminations.

impact of lloyd george negociations

• damaged the reputation of the Irish Party. The IPP accepting temporary exclusion of the six northern counties at the Ulster Nationalist Convention in St Mary’s Hall, only for the proposals to ultimately fail, facilitated the rise of Sinn Féin. Another formal attempt did not occur until the Irish Convention at Trinity College in July 1917.

• demonstrated that Redmond had been, yet again, outmanoeuvred by the Unionists and betrayed by the British government. Clearly, Redmond's influence at Westminster, where there was little appreciation of the risks he had taken, was much weaker than it had been before 1914. Against this background contemporary Nationalists increasingly came to regard Redmond's support for the war as a great mistake.

• This was a crucial factor in 1916, the year in which ww1 became a 'total war. Earlier that year, Britain had been forced to introduce conscription, and there was a growing fear that the government would soon move to extend compulsory military service to Ireland.
  

sinn fein begin to organise: the release of the internees

• In December 1916 Lloyd George, now PM, ordered the release of the Frongoch and Reading men, including Griffith and Collins providing the Sinn Fein movement with leadership and organisation​

• Michael Collins returned to Cork just after Christmas.​

• In Frongoch, he became a dominant figure in the “university of revolution”, leading discussions on military tactics, prison conditions, and participating in Irish-language classes, although he had no official rank.​

contesting elections 1917

• North Roscommon: Count Plunkett was chosen as the SF candidate but ran as an independent. 

• The campaign was characterised by Volunteer activists. Plunkett won 3077-1708. Collins had brought dynamism to the SF cause. The younger clergy were involved in the campaign. An appeal to the Paris Peace Conference for Irish self determination became a central plank in the SF programme.

• The by election had combined the old SF, the Gaelic League, the Volunteers, Cumann na mBan and the IRB. Divisions in the movement between Plunkett and Griffith were overcome and Griffith and the SF name proved triumphant.

• The growth of SF – in July 1917 it had 11,000 members, which doubled in a month and by October 1917 SF claimed to have over 200,000 members in its 1200 clubs.

• South Longford: Joe Mc Guinness selected as candidate. ‘put him in to get him out’ SF won the seat by 37 seats. Dillon had ran the IPP campaign but the bg ordered the arrest of prominent SF personnel after Roscommon. On 26 February Dillon had criticised the BG for ‘manufacturing Sinn Feiners by tens of thousands’ He was also destroyed by the 11^th hour intervention of Dr William Walsh, the Archbishop of Dublin who criticised the IPP’s concessions on partition. Sinn Fein were lucky to win S.Longford. Archbishop Walsh's intervention had been decisive , though some skilful vote rigging by SF also played a part! These by elections also emphasised a generational gap- the younger clergy and many young men who had never voted before followed SF.

• The attractions of a youthful, energetic and dynamic movement as opposed to the older , inactive and unsuccessful IPP were obvious

release of the prisoners

• Lloyd George had just succeeded Asquith, and one of his first actions as Prime Minister was to order the release of Irish prisoners from Frongoch camp and Reading jail in December 1916, in time for Christmas. ​​
  

death of thomas ashe

Thomas Ashe was arrested for seditious speeches and, along with other Volunteers in Mountjoy Jail, demanded political‑prisoner status. Following the suffragette tactic, he went on hunger strike. The authorities responded with forcible feeding, during which Ashe became critically ill and died on 25 September 1917. His death created a powerful martyr for Sinn Féin. Around 40,000 attended his Dublin funeral, organised by Michael Collins, where armed Volunteers escorted the coffin and fired shots at Glasnevin Cemetery.

Ashe’s death triggered a surge of public anger and nationalist sentiment. By late 1917, Sinn Féin had capitalised on disillusionment with the failed Home Rule project and growing anti‑British feeling after the Rising and the harsh treatment of prisoners.

ard fheis

• There were divisions within the Sf movement which appeared to be between the military and the political wings but in reality were between the republican and non Republican wings. Collins, Brugha, Rory O’Connor and DeValera insisted that SF must fight for a Republic. Arthur Griffith believed that a republic was unobtainable and that to commit SF to the goal of a republic was unnecessary and unrealistic.

• The Ard Fheis overcame these difficulties, Griffith agreed to stand down as President of SF in favour of DeValera. 

• a new SF constitution was drawn up

• ‘SF aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish republic.’

• obviously favoured the Republicans but was ambiguous enough to hold together all elements of the separatist movement. DeValera stated ‘we are not doctrinaire Republicans’

• DeValera was also elected as president of the Volunteers.

• In his dual role DeValera symbolised the unity of the reconstructed separatist movement. he fused together the physical force and constitutional elements, crucial in the struggle for Irish freedom. people wanted freedom, though the precise constitutional form was of little general interest. DeValera was now the undisputed leader of the separatist movement.

sinn fein’s situation by end of 1917

• Yet while the people identified with the uncompromising and defiant Nationalism adopted by the new Sinn Féin, few were willing to support another attempt at rebellion. ​

• The dramatic rise of Sinn Féin in 1917 demonstrated that the people wanted freedom, though the precise constitutional form which this might take was of little general interest.​

• By the end of 1917 it was also evident that de Valera had emerged as the undisputed leader of the separatist movement. He was a charismatic leader, a fact illustrated by Griffith's out-of-character willingness to stand aside at the October Ard-Fheis, and to the people he was the personification of the whole separatist movement. ​

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the irish convention july 1917-april 1918

• The Irish Convention was another LG initiative to solve the Irish Question. Britain was still keen to appease Irish American opinion.

• First meeting was held in trinity college 25 July 1917. 95 members – 52 nationalists, 26 UU, 9SU. Chaired by Sir Horace Plunkett. UU reluctantly agreed to participate. Carson persuaded them to join to secure Ulster’s position and protect  the SU minority.

• SU’s would attend only with adequate representation. Some SU’s under Middleton concluded that some form of Irish government was inevitable and common ground with the IPP should be found.

• Sf refused to send any delegates meaning the convention was doomed from the beginning. Ulster unionist stubbornness as Carson wanted nothing less than permanent exclusion. They also refused to speak, frustrating both the SU’s and nationalists

• UU wanted Westminster to retain control but nationalists wanted it to be transferred to Dublin. Midleton (SU) suggested giving Dublin control of internal taxation and allowing Westminster to retain control over customs duties.

• At the beginning of 1918 Midleton went to LG to get assurances that if the SU compromise had only UU dissenting, the government would give it legislative effect.

• Redmond had to decide on abandoning an Irish parliament's right to levy its own customs duties or to hold out for fiscal autonomy. Redmond favoured making ONE LAST CONCESSION.

• his speech in Jan 1918 emphasised the sacrifices that nationalists were willing to make and criticised the UU for their negative attitude.

However when he returned to Dublin Devlin and Bishop O’Donnell opposed the Midleton compromise having consulted Dillon. Redmond  then had to withdraw his support for the compromise

impact of irish convention

a humiliating personal defeat for Redmond who announced that he could no longer be of service to the Convention. Ulster and fiscal control could not be resolved.

a split developed in the movement between the more liberal SU’s under Midleton who could accept HR. This group had large British interests in business or land. The other group largely consisted of those whose land and business were confined to Ireland. They genuinely feared HR believing that only the Union could safeguard their future.

The Irish convention never really stood any chance of success: the UU remained implacably opposed to any form of HR. Redmond was prepared to give up fiscal autonomy but this drew him into conflict with his closest colleagues. Redmond was ill and he died on 6 March knowing that he had failed to deliver HR.

Redmond was prepared to make concessions for no political gain savage blow to ipp

Sinn Fein had denounced the convention as a futile exercise.

ipp wins by-elections

In spite of all it’s problems the IPP still won three successive by elections in the early part of 1918. two of these elections S. Armagh and E Tyrone were Ulster seats. The IPP could still count on the AOH and Ulster. Both of these constituencies were in the jurisdiction of Cardinal Logue who outspokenly criticised Sinn Fein. Even though the Younger clergy supported SF, Logue’s support acted as a counter weight.

More significantly both opposed were dominated by the partition issue. To Catholic voters in Ulster it seemed that SF offered no alternative to the IPP on partition. The IPP’s pledge to fight against partition in Westminster was more attractive than SF’s abstentionist policies.

conscription crisis

• the cabinet now turned to Ireland to produce the 150,000 men it needed to go against the counter offensive despite american warnings.

• Dublin authorities informed LG that he would need many troops to enforce conscription. Sir henry Wilson, the army’s chief of Imperial staff urged the PM to press ahead​

• On 10th April a Military Service Bill gave the government power to impose conscription on Ireland by order in Council without further debate, whenever appropriate.​

• At the same time LG assured that a HR measure would be introduced before conscripts were enrolled to make conscription more acceptable to Nationalists.​

The crisis which followed demonstrated the governments extraordinary naivety and its complete failure to understand the Nationalist psyche.

impact of conscription crisis

• By 16^th April the bill was passed by the Commons. Dillon the new leader of the IPP warned – ‘all Ireland will rise against you’ before leading his party from the House.

• The anti conscription campaign began in Ireland.

• 18^th April – conference at the Mansion House committee at which all shades of nationalist opinion joined in condemnation against Conscription. It was attended aby SF, IPP leaders, labour etc

• Anti conscription pledge drafted by deValera and singed by huge numbers of supporters outside church doors on the following Sunday and on 23 April a one day general strike was called. Nationalist Ireland was energised in a way that even superseded the reaction to 1916.

• The clear beneficiary was Sinn Fein. SF’s consistent denunciation of Irish participation in the war meant that people naturally turned to Sinn Fein.

• The Church claimed that the Irish people had a right to resist conscription. 

• The binding between SF and the catholic hierarchy put an end to the claim that SF were a bunch of revolutionaries leading Ireland to rebellion.

• Although the BG never implemented it, the legislation remained in place, allowing SF to exploit this background threat for most of 1918. guaranteed victory over the IPP at the post war general election.

german plot

In May 1918, a new Viceroy arrived, Lord French. He decided to get tough with the SF leadership.

On the 17 May he ordered the arrest of the entire SF leadership, claiming that he had uncovered a German plot within SF

Collins knew of the plot and let the leadership be arrested and deported…knowing full well the good publicity this would generate. On the following morning  French issued a statement claiming that a German plot had been uncovered.

73 were arrested, including DeValera, Griffith, Plunkett, Cosgrave and markievicz. The public mood became even more pro SF. SF turned this to an electoral advantage and Griffith (in jail) romped to a by-election victory in east Cavan using the old ‘Put him in to get him out’ slogan.

Clearly the conscription crisis and the German plot had worked to SF’s  advantage and further government crackdowns only consolidated SF’s supremacy

government repression

• On 3 July French issued a proclamation which declared Sinn Féin, the Volunteers, Cumann na mBan and the Gaelic League to be dangerous organisations. Their meetings were declared illegal and the government threatened to prosecute those attending such gatherings. Even hurling matches were banned, as the authorities stepped up their attack on the separatist movement. 

• Sinn Féin continued to expand, attracting new members and organising a campaign of passive resistance to British rule. 

• Hundreds of public meetings were held that summer and, on one August Sunday, 1,500 hurling matches were played, as Sinn Féin and the GAA defied the government ban. 

At the same time, the government proclaimed certain counties, particularly in Munster. Michael Collins came to assume a key role within both the military and political movements. With most of the Sinn Féin leadership in English jails, Collins was busy helping to reorganise the Volunteers while directing political opposition to Britain, even though he was on the run from the authorities. 

the abstention of labour/labour stands down

• Sinn Fein’s victory can also be explained by the abstention of the Labour party from the election

• Sinn Féin turned its fire on the Labour party, but a conference in September confirmed Labour's intention to contest the general election. They had promised to join Sinn Fein in abstaining from Westminster but not necessarily agreeing to sit in Sinn Fein’s alternative assembly.

• Sinn Fein were very concerned that Labour could win up to 20 seats, many in Dublin

• All through October the Sinn Féin press kept up a sustained attack on Labour's decision. While there was some discussion about an electoral pact which would give Labour a number of Dublin seats, individual Labour leaders were coming under intense pressure to withdraw from the contest. 

• on 1 November the party's executive voted 96 to 23 to stand down from the election. Labour's withdrawal angered the IPP and delighted Sinn Féin which was now able to concentrate its campaign on the national question. 

• Labour’s decision was down to having difficulty in finding suitable candidates, many like Markievicz, were already committed to Sinn Fein.

• as an all Ireland party, that had to consider its supporters in Ulster, many would not have been happy with the alternative options of competing with Sinn Fein by offering an advanced nationalist manifesto or agreeing to an electoral pact.

• To placate its northern wing by contesting the election and trying to avoid a taking up a position on the national question would have resulted in losing considerable ground to Sinn Fein and the remnants of the IPP.
  

1918 election campaign

• By the end of 1918 Sinn Féin had 1,354 clubs and a burgeoning membership. Yet it was in rural areas that Sinn Féin was strongest, and this gave Labour's decision to withdraw from the general election added significance, as Sinn Féin enjoyed a free run against the IPP in urban constituencies.

•  Clearly, Sinn Féin would enjoy a huge advantage over the IPP in terms of organisational strength.

• The war ended on 11 November 1918, and polling for the general election was to be held on 14 December. Sinn Féin issued a four-point manifesto. 

• It would abstain from Westminster; 

• it would use “any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection"; 

• it would establish its own constituent assembly;

•  and finally, it would take Ireland's case for independence to the Peace Conference.

 The programme had served Sinn Féin well during its period of rapid growth in 1917-18, and it proved irresistible in the general election

ipp campaign/weaknesses

• The old UIL organisation which was practically dead in many constituencies. Dillon had to rely on the press to carry the IPP message, which reminded voters of the many reforms won by the old party and criticised the policy of abstention.

•  Yet even here the IPP was at a disadvantage. the Freeman's Journal, the party's main organ, to between 20,000 and 25,000 copies, when it could have expected its circulation to be around 50,000. 

• Sinn Féin was also active, selecting candidates for the various constituencies and making detailed preparations for the election. This was in sharp contrast to the apathy and defeatist attitude which characterised the IPP's preparations. The IPP were unable to field candidates in many constituencies, 25 Sinn Fein candidates were returned unopposed in Kerry and Cork.
  The IPP suffered from having little new to offer.

• It ran on its record of having achieved land reform, advancing home rule and having the old age pension introduced to Ireland in 1908, a platform that offered little to new youthful voters

• the IPP had agreed to a partitionist settlement, and along with recent government mistakes in the shape of conscription all contributed to the annihilation of Irish constitutional nationalism in 1918.
  

election results

• The 1918 election was a resounding success for Sinn Fein.

• SF – 73 seats

• IPP- 6 seats (they only won these due to an electoral pact in Ulster) The Irish Party failed to contest every seat. 25 SF candidates were returned unopposed in republican strongholds like Kerry and Cork

• 26 Unionist seats

• The other crucial factor was the extension of the franchise – all men over 21 and women over 30 increased the electorate from 700,000- 2,000,000. Many first time voters were attracted to SF, it is estimated that about 70% of the 1918 electorate were first time voters

Sinn Féin’s “landslide” victory is questionable. The proportion of votes gave Sinn Féin only 46.9 per cent of the total vote, unionists 28.5 per cent and the Irish Party 21.7 per cent 

• The IPP retained a stronger hold on nationalist political sentiment in Ulster than Sinn Fein. In constituencies where the pact did not operate the IPP tended to return a larger share of the vote than Sin Fein. 

• Although the Irish party failed to contest every seat, this was one of the most hotly contested elections and a higher number of seats were contested than in any election since 1892