Populism and the Far Right

Populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser)

A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups—'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite'—and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.

Authoritarianism

A belief in a strictly ordered society where infringements on authority are severely punished

Nativism

A belief that states should be inhabited exclusively by the ‘native’ group and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening

Democracy

Popular sovereignty and majority rule

Liberal democracy

Popular sovereignty, majority rule and:

Constitutional protection of minority rights, freedom of expression, alternative information source

Tension between liberal democracy and populism

Populism’s monism (belief in a single general will) is hostile to:

Pluralism: if the people have one will, then there can't be multiple separate legitimate group interests that require negotiation/compromise

The protection of minorities: any constraint on the unified will of the people is an elite obstruction. Minorities who dissent aren't legitimate political actors merely exercising their rights, but rather members of the 'corrupt elite'

Institutional centres of power: politics should be an unmediated expression of the general will

Potential positive effects of populism on democracy

Gives voice to groups that are genuinely underrepresented by elites (economic integration in Latin America)

Mobilises excludes segments of society (the underclass) ensuring their representation

Implements policies preferred by marginalised groups

Builds cross-class coalitions, dynamising party systems

Potential negative effects of populism on democracy

Overrides checks and balances using popular sovereignty

Ignores minority rights by using majority rule

Impedes the ability to build stable coalitions by creating a populist/anti-populist cleavage

Strong discourages compromise by moralising politics

Exclusionary populism

Predominantly European: the people are defined in ethnic/nativist terms, and political participation is reserved for these - while the elite are the 'corrupt' multicultural establishment

There arises a third type of enemy; those within the state but outside the nation

Inclusionary populism

Predominantly Latin American: the people are defined as the socio-economic underdog, while the elite are the corrupt oligarchic establishment

Calls for material benefits and political rights to be extended to historically disadvantaged and excluded groups

Rogenhofer: Why has populism in India, Turkey, and Israel had largely antidemocratic effects?

Deeply divided societies (on the basis of religion, ethnicity)
Difficult geopolitical relationships (political conflicts with neighbours give salience to the nationalist divide)
What this means is that rather than necessarily being anti-immigration (wherein governments are trying to prevent heterogeneity), they are trying to homogenise a heterogenous society

Rogenhofer: How did Israel’s populist leader forge economic dependency?

Netanyahu used selective neoliberalism - giving tax benefits to those states who voted for his government, while letting the rest deal with the economic consequences of neoliberal economic policy

Rogenhofer: How did Israel’s populist leader weaponise the ethnoreligious divide?

Incitement against non-Jewish minorities and their allies to create a dichotomy between “the Jewish people” and their “enemies” (Israeli Arabs)
Also framed political opponents as Anti-Semites, despite many of them being Jewish
Removed Arabic as a national language of Israel, deepening the divide and making Arabs seem like second-class citizens in the context of labour force participation

Rogenhofer: Why and how do antidemocratic populist leaders undermine the independent media?

Why: the independent media is seen as restricting what should be an unmediated and unscrutinised relationship with “the people”
How: attacking the media, executing narrative-control over the state-owned media, and even building their own news sources (Netanyahu), which shows that populist leaders may only be anti-institution when it suits them

How can political competence explain the gender support gap for radical right parties? (Coffé)

Women have lower levels of internally perceived political competence and feelings of political power than men. This may discourage women from voting for nontraditional, more radical parties and instead sticking to 'safer', more mainstream parties

How can differences in policy preference explain the gender support gap for radical right parties? (Coffé)

Although men and women may have more similar attitudes towards immigration than earlier research suggested, it may be that they still differ in policy preference for dealing with these issues. Suggests that research is needed into support for particular policies, rather than just general attitudes.

How can differences in issue salience explain the gender support gap for radical right parties? (Harteveld)

Women may have similar attitudes on these issues but simply find them less salient - supported by the data, where although attitudes are similar, they are less often cited as an actual reason for voting

How can class explain the gender support gap for radical right parties? (Coffé)

Class is a less salient force among women, perhaps because they're newer to the labour market and have traditionally based their class on their husband's position in society

Which countries have a larger gender gap in radical right support than others, and why might this be? (Immerzeel)

Large gender gaps in Austria, less of a gap in Germany

Research suggests that this is because the radical right is more of a newcomer with an outspoken outsider image

How could the gender gap in radical right support change as women take a leading role? (Mayer)

The gender difference in support for the Front National narrowed as Marine le Pen (a woman) took a leading role; she took the party in a less extreme direction, e.g. by condemning anti-Semitism

What is the key takeaway from Canovan’s paper on populism?

That populism isn’t a mare political disease or sign of democratic immaturity. It arises from a permanent tension inside democracy itself

What are the two faces of democracy, according to Canovan?

The pragmatic face: concerned with institutions, compromise, elections, law, conflict-management

The redemptive face: promises popular sovereignty, renewal, directness, and political salvation through "the people"

What is Canovan’s quote regarding shadows?

Populism is a "shadow cast by democracy itself"

It arises whenever the gap between the two faces of democracy becomes too wide

What does Canovan think the three meanings of ‘the people’ are?

1. The united people: the nation as a unified whole, opposed to any parties or factions. Dislikes party conflict and longs for national unity.

2. Our people: exclusionary dimension. A culturally, ethnically, or nationally bound community.

3. Ordinary people: egalitarian dimension. "the people" means ordinary, 'decent', common people against the privileged, educated, rich, elites.

What does Canovan think the goal of populism is with regard to institutions?

The point isn't to make politics 'stupid' - but rather to remove any unnecessary institutional complexity that's only there to block popular will

Does Canovan think that democracy ought to be more around one face than the other, i.e. more about the pragmatic than the redemptive?

No. These faces are opposed but interdependent, democracy needs both.

Pragmatic democracy provides valuable checks and balances to process conflict without violence

Redemptive democracy is what gives democracy its ‘halo’ (sense of legitimacy and higher purpose)

Pragmatic democracy needs redemptive democracy, or democracy feels cynical and corrupt

How does Canovan argue the salvation vs. routine conflict-management tension generates populism?

Populism is often strongest when mainstream politics looks technocratic, managerial

If politics becomes only professional bargaining, the redemptive promise gains force in the mainstream, and actors can use this to mobilise voters

How does Canovan argue the popular sovereignty vs. real-world impotence tension generates populism?

When voters start to ask: if we're meant to be in power, why is the government not protecting us? Populists identify enemies; plutocrats, corrupt politicians, immigrants, minorities

Populism feeds on the difference between democratic promise and governing capacity

How does Canovan argue the general will vs. institutions tension generates populism?

Government is meant to express the people's will, but institutions are slow, complex, and alienating to many. So they rarely feel like 'pure' expressions of the people's will, and the argument can be made that some force of the will is lost as it passes through these institutions

Democracy needs institutions -> institutions create alienation. Populism exploits that alienation

What is the advantage of an ideological definition over more of a focus on the leader of a populist regime?

It takes into account supply and demand-side factors

The relationship between populism and representative democracy is straightforwardly

Positive. Although populists rally against representatives or the system of representation in place, this is against the wrong kind of representation, not representation per se

What are Diamond’s 3 dimensions of the QoD?

Procedure: ‘High Quality’ means that citizens have the power to evaluate whether the government respects the democratic process

Content: ‘High Quality’ means that citizens and associations enjoy extensive liberty and political equality

Result: ‘High Quality’ means that there is a broadly legitimised regime that satisfies citizen expecations of governance

Mouffe: How does the way in which ‘the people’ is constructed determine the type and degree of inclusiveness?

In relatively affluent + egalitarian societies (e.g. Austria) populist actors are likely to define ‘the people’ in ethnic terms

In relatively poor societies (e.g. Mexico) populist forces usually define ‘the people’ as the socio-economic underdog

Why does populism leave little room for pluralism?

Because it draws on a Manichean distinction between ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’

Which two dimensions of the QoD do populists usually mention and exploit a tension between?

They criticise the poor results of the democratic regime and, to solve this problem, they campaign for a modification of the democratic procedure (this modification normally consisting of appeals to direct democracy)

What does Mudde and Kaltwasser's work show regarding the effect of populism on QoD when the main populist actors are in opposition?

Populism in opposition can have a positive effect on QoD since it helps to give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the current political establishment

In the majority of cases considered by Mudde and Kaltwasser regarding the impact of populism on QoD in consolidated democracies:

The ‘checks and balances’ were sufficiently entrenched to prevent democratic erosion

In the majority of cases considered by Mudde and Kaltwasser, the effect of populism in power on consolidated democracies is suggested to be:

Dependent on the political system. In a presidential system, deadlocks lead to coups, but under parliamentarism there is a stronger incentive to remain within the democratic arena

In the cases looked at by Mudde and Kaltwasser, populism in government at the local level suggests that

Populism is much less threatening to the QoD at the sub-national than at the national level. This is because:

1. Politicians are kept under control by institutions more

2. The end goal of politicians being to rise to the national level, they have more of an incentive to build their ‘democratic credentials’ at the sub-national level by showing respect for the rules of the democratic game

How well does isolation work as a reaction to populism (Belgium)?

Isolation by non-populist parties reiterated populist logic by framing the populist part as illegitimate. This may have given populism more force, as party support continues to rise

How is confrontation used to react to populism?

Rather than just deny the legitimacy of populist actors, other parties confront them directly, e.g. by military coups

How is adaptation used to react to populism, and is it successful (Austria)?

Dominant parties assume that the claims being made by populist forces have a certain degree of legitimacy and let it direct attention to topics not yet in the political agenda

When used in Austria, showed great success, largely marginalising the populists

How is socialisation used to react to populism?

Includes populist actors in the political establishment, forcing them to accept the rules of liberal democracy and thus de-radicalise

What is Mudde’s maximum definition of the populist radical right?

A party which employs an ideology of:

Nativism: the nation-state should be culturally homogenous; non-native elements are threatening
Authoritarianism: society should be strictly ordered, and any violations of authority should be punished severely
Populism: society is divided between ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’; politics should express the ‘general will’

Why does Mudde argue that enemies matter for radical right parties?

Because identity politics requires clear boundaries. To define ‘us’ you must define ‘them. This is esp. pertinent for the populist radical right because enemies organise the worldview; non-natives are a threat, the corrupt elites betray the pure people, and deviants must be punished

Mudde typology of enemies: within the nation, within the state

Internal native enemies: These are ‘the elite’ who betray the nation because they serve foreign interests.

Bulgarian radical right party (Ataka) framed politics as a struggle between ‘national traitors’ and ‘honourable Bulgarian patriots’

Immigration is often an elite conspiracy; the left wants new voters, capital wants cheap labour

Mudde typology of enemies: within the state, outside the nation

Internal non-native enemies: In Western Europe, this is the immigrant community

The Slovak National Party framed Hungarians as ‘a disgusting and deceitful nation’ and it was claimed that their behaviour ‘borders on treason’

The targeting of minorities largely depends on their political mobilisation, nearby geopolitical tensions (Chinese minorities are chilling)

Mudde typology of enemies: outside the state, outside the nation

External foreign enemies: PRR has a deep distrust of the external world.

In postcommunist Europe, the share of people feeling threatened by neighbouring states was still 27% in 1998.

Global conspiracies

What does Mudde argue the purpose of fear is for the PRR (3 things)?

1. Homogenises the ingroup, making ‘the people’ seem unified

2. Polarises outgroups, turning difference into threat

3. Moralises conflict, making compromise look like contamination

What does Rydgren argue are the key ideological pillars of the radical right?

1. Ethnonationalism: focuses on strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogenous and returning to traditional values, deeply rooted in myths about the past

2. Protection of identity: they claim the right of national majorities to protect their cultural identity against perceived threats

What does Rydgren argue are the primary perceived threats of the radical right?

Immigration: viewed as the most significant threat to national identity. Immigrants from Muslim countries are heavily singled out as being uninclined to assimilate and potentially tied to terrorism

Supranationalism & Globalisation: The EU, MNCs, and economic globalisation are criticised for promoting universalism and eroding national sovereignty

Why does Rydgren argue that the radical right are considered ‘right-wing’?

Not because of their economic focus (this varies wildly across countries and eras). Instead because of their sociocultural authoritarianism.

They encourage inequalities in favour of the ‘native’ population

Why does Rydgren argue populism lends itself so easily to the radical right?

Radical right parties paint all established parties as a single, self-serving political class, such that the populist party can position itself as a defender of the common man fighting against political correctness

Rydgren: what is the role of the commercialisation of the media for RR parties?

The commercialisation of the traditional media has led to a focus on political scandals, which fuels the anti-establishment agenda, and allows for more personalistic appeals which the radical right thrive on

Rydgren: what is the role of the rise of unconvential media for RR parties?

The internet and social media also lets conspiracy theories and general radical sentiment flourish, especially anonymously. Also lets individuals form a collective identity in chat rooms

What is the direct impact of the radical right?

Entering government coalitions or striking long-term deals with ruling coalitions

What is the indirect impact of the radical right?

Successfully shifting the entire public discourse. Mainstream parties frequently adjust their own platforms in an exclusionary, nationalist direction to win back lost voters or prevent future losses. Through this, the radical right has established a powerful "political-religious master frame" that embeds cultural prejudice and Islamophobia deep into wider, mainstream audiences.

What did Abou-Chadi and Krause find in regard to the most common strategy amongst mainstream parties in response to RR success?

When a radical right party manages to cross an electoral threshold, the sudden institutional threat causes competing mainstream parties to shift an average of 1.5 units toward restrictionist, culturally protectionist positions

What was Krause and others’ main finding concerning the effectiveness of accommodation as a response strategy by mainstream parties?

"positional accommodation is fruitless in the best case, and can be detrimental in the worst case"

When analysing the marginal effect of mainstream parties' adopting restrictive immigration policies on the macro level (focusing on RRP's election results), Krause and others found that

There is no statistical support for the claim that accommodating RR positions weakens the RRP electorally at the macro level

At micro-level (vote switching between RRP and mainstream parties), Krause and others found that there is statistical evidence that accommodative shifts

Catalyse voter transfers between mainstream parties and the RR, and this mostly for the gain of RRPs (although the net effect is close to 0)

Krause and others found that RR gross gains as the result of mainstream party accommodation are particularly pronounced when

Mainstream parties compete with RRPs that have become consolidated players in the electoral arena

Did Krause and others find that accommodation is more effective in winning votes from the RR when there is a cordon sanitaire?

No. Data predicts that the RRP will gain more votes from mainstream parties when accommodation is used in combination with a cordon sanitaire

Ethnopluralism

Considers different cultures to be equal, but distinct and thus incompatible. Proponents of ethnopluralism claim to celebrate cultural differences and argue that these differences must be protected from things like mass migration, cultural imperialism, and one-worldism

Most common form of nativism in far right parties because it’s ‘more palatable’ to voters

What are demand-side explanations for the variable electoral success of the far right party family?

The grievances that create the 'demand' for far-right parties

What are supply-side explanations for the variable electoral success of the far right party family?

Focus on how the choices that far right parties make and the political opportunity structure in which they operate influence their success

Why does Eatwell argue that populism is inherently opposed to pluralism?

Pluralism argues for the existence of multiple groups with different interests which must be reconciled through a process of bargaining

Populism rejects the notion that there are meaningful differences in interests in ‘the pure people’ and as such denies the need for compromise

How are economic grievances a demand-side explanation for the success of far right parties?

Typical RRP voter is a young male manual labourer. Immigrants most often compete in the economic sphere with this archetype

Golder finds that unemployment rates do increase support for RRPs if there is a sufficiently high immigrant population

How are cultural grievances a demand-side explanation for the success of far right parties?

Social identity theory posits that humans naturally organise into groups which share common characteristics, and that our self-esteem causes us to place this ingroup above other outgroups. Populists exploit this tension by asserting that these values are actually incompatible

Mayda conducted a study which demonstrated that there are relevant economic and cultural reasons for anti-immigrant attitudes

How are modernisation grievances a demand-side explanation for the success of far right parties?

Populisms focus on traditional values supports those who have found themselves feeling insecure following a sudden and fundamental social change

Minkenberg’s study on Eastern Europe found that there may have been insecurity generated by the general importation of Western postmaterialist values, as an example

How are electoral rules a supply-side explanation for the success of far right parties?

Duverger’s theory that SMDP systems will disproportionately weaken support for smaller parties with an unrealistic chance of winning. Interestingly, there is only mixed support for the claim that far right parties receive fewer votes in disproportionate systems (although they obviously receive less seats)

How is party competition a supply-side explanation for the success of far right parties?

Far right parties are expected to do well when they own a salient issue

Ivarsflaten: How is cleavage structure a supply-side explanation for the success of far right parties?

Decreased salience of other cleavages benefits far right parties, esp. on the economic axis, where far right parties are inexperienced and do not generally have clear policies

The increased salience of the economic dimension also threatens the cross-class coalition that underpins the far right’s support

What and why does Rydgren argue that the winning formula for far right parties is?

To combine ethnonationalism (defining a nation by shared heritage) with populist antiestablishment rhetoric.
This is because ethnonationalism underpins welfare chauvinism, and populism sets them clearly apart from extremism by arguing that they represent true democracy

What did Golder find regarding extremist far right parties?

They almost always receive significantly less electoral support than their radical counterparts

What does de la Torre argue are the origins of left-wing populism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador?

Political parties were perceived as instruments of local and foreign elites that implemented neoliberal policies and thereby increased social inequality

1. Widespread popular resistance to neoliberalism

2. The impression that national sovereignty had been surrendered to the IMF, world bank, and US government

de la Torre: what was the threat to liberal democracy in Latin America? (with example)

Majoritarian mobilisation led by a personalistic leader took precedence over the checks and balances and respect for basic civil rights inherent to modern liberal democracy

Example: Mechanisms of horizontal accountability by other branches of government were replaced by vertical accountability, i.e. frequent elections and referendums

de la Torre: what was the purpose of social programs, and what the weakness in Venezuela?

Populist social programs rapidly targeted the poor, functioning as instruments for maintaining power

In Venezuela, major social spending initiatives coincided with elections, but these programs were inefficient and had unsustainable fiscal foundations

de la Torre: although elections were uncorrupt, how did populist leaders skew the playing field?

They silenced select media and harassed the opposition

What is de la Torre’s point about illusions? (with example)

In diverse societies, the idea of a unified people is an illusion. To maintain this illusion, populists attack pluralism and take power of private media

Protest was criminalised in Venezuela, and NGOs which defended political rights were forbidden from receiving international assistance

How does Weyland define populism and why is Mudde’s definition better?

Populism is a political strategy in which an individual leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.

Mudde better because an ideological definition allows us to analyse both supply and demand-side factors (incl. when populism isn’t in the political arena yet)

What is good about Weyland’s definition?

It picks up on the importance of numbers. Although these aren’t integral to a populist party’s rhetoric, numbers are a common tool to demonstrate legitimacy through elections, direct democracy, and mass rallies.

It’s very hard to claim that you represent the people when the people don’t support you

What is Weyland’s distinction between classical and neopopulism?

Classical, 1930-60s: emerges in polities with low levels of institutionalisation, where many citizens haven’t yet been incorporated into national political life

Neo, 1980-90s: more organisationally saturated/fragmented. Leaders appeal to people who distrust existing parties and interest groups (anti-institutional)

Why does TV and polling matter for the transition from classical to neopopulism, Weyland?

Classical populists needed rallies in order to demonstrate mass support, and to produce these rallies they needed some activists and organisational infrastructure

But opinion polls and television changed this, allowing leaders to reach millions directly, reducing need for party organisation. But this also turns the collective "people" into dispersed individuals

But because that support isn't institutionally anchored, the leaders can fall quickly too, as they do in Latin America

What are two main axes upon which Peters and Pierre build their typology of populism?

Elite vs. participatory locus: elite means populism driven mainly by political leaders, participatory means populism involves more direct public action

Democracy vs. authoritarianism

According to Peters and Pierre, Venezuela is a good example of…

Leaders using populist rhetoric in order to secure their place but then using authoritarian methods to keep the outcomes of governing to be what the leadership of the regime desires

What are the 4 typologies of populism introduced by Peters and Pierre?

Elite Democracy: Electoral Populism (Trump)

Participatory Democracy: Civic Populism

Elite Authoritarianism: Electoral Authoritarianism (Venezuela)

Participatory Authoritarianism: Consultative Authoritarianism