Sem Prag Final Exam

Deontic modality

indicates possibility and necessity relevant to some authoritative person or code of conduct which is relevant to the conversation

Epistemic Modality

indicates possibility and necessity relative to the speakers knowledge of the situation. it is a category whose primary function is to indicate the speaker’s degree of certainty concerning the proposition that is being expressed.

Kratzer’s analysis

argues that there is one set of modal operators that are indeterminate regarding modality type. the specific type of modality depends on a range of situations which is permitted by the context.

Examples of necessity words

must, have to, have got to, should, required

Examples of possibility words

may, might, could, can

Example Problem using Restricted Quantifier Notation for Epistemic Modality:

ex. Arthur must be at his house

1. [all w: is consistent with what I know about the actual world] AT_HOME(a) in w

Example Problem using Restricted Quantifier Notation for Deontic Modality:

ex. Arthur must be at this house

1. ][all w: is consistent with what the relevant authority requires] AT_HOME(a) in w

Evidential Marker

a grammatical marker that indicates the speaker’s source of information indicating whether the speaker saw, heard, inferred, or was told the information.

What is used to provide evidence for the idea that epistemic modality does not just express an attiitude toward the proposition itself, but it actually apart of a proposition?

Three tests:

Felicitous Challenge

Yes/No Question focus

Negated by normal clausal negation

Felicitous Challenge Test

This test operates on the idea that epistemic modalities can be challenged.

ex. “It must be raining” - “That’s not true, it doesn’t have to be raining”

The ability of the epistemic modality to be challenged, allows it to function such as a part of a proposition that adds truth conditional value to the proposition, and does not function as an attitude of the speaker. The sentence can be challenged as a claim.

yes/no question focus test

This test operates on the idea that epistemic modalities can be the focus of a yes/no question.

ex. “She might be home” → “Might she be home?” - “No, there is not enough evidence to support that she is home” or '“yes, she could be”

The ability of the epistemic modality to be the focus of a question allows it to function as part of a proposition differently then without a modality. Because the yes/no answers do not entail each other, the addition of the modal adds new truth conditional information to this proposition.

negated by normal clausal negation test

This test operates on the idea that modalities can fall into the scope of ordinary negation (not)

ex. “She might be home” → “She might not be home'“ - “It is not the case that she might be gone, she must be gone for her meeting”

The ability of the epistemic modality to be negated ordinarily allows it to function as part of a proposition differently then without the negation. The modal attitude is changed through negation, which adds evidence that the modal contributes truth conditional meaning to the proposition.

Propositional evidential

is one that indicates the source of information of a proposition. Unlike non-propositional evidential, they have sentential scope and typically occur with finite clauses. They define how the agent obtained knowledge. Contribute to the at-issue truth-conditional content and can be embedded, negated, and attributed to others.

Illocutionary evidential

one that indicates the source of a speaker’s information while also acting as a part of the speech’s act force. They are speaker-oriented, signaling whether the speaker has direct sensory evidence or reportative evidence, rather than modifying the truth value of the core statement itself. Comment on the whole speech act (they cannot be embedded, negated, or attributed to another).

What can be used to determine if a language’s evidential markers contribute to the propositional content of an utterance?

Four Tests

1. Can the evidential marker occur within the scope of a negation

2. Can the evidential market occur in a sentence that is embedded in a conditional construction

3. (only for hearsay) Is a speaker who uses (hearsay) committed to the marked content’s being at least possibly true?

4. Can the evidential marker be used to report someone else’s evidence or can it only be used to report the speaker’s evidence?

1. Can the evidential marker occur within the scope of a negation?

This test is used to determine whether or not the evidential marker can be negated as a part of the sentence’s truth value overall, or it scopes onto the verb.

Propositional evidential: YES — negation can scope over the evidential marker (e.g., “It is NOT the case that [I heard that p]”). Illocutionary evidential: NO — negation cannot scope over it; it remains outside the at-issue content.

2. Can the evidential market occur in a sentence that is embedded in a conditional construction

This test is used to determine whether the evidential marker makes sense embedded into a sentence and if when embedded, does the marker lost any evidential meaning.

Propositional evidential: YES — can appear inside “if” clauses (“If she went-bee...”). Illocutionary evidential: NO — it cannot be embedded in conditionals because it comments on the speech act as a whole.

3. Is a speaker who uses (hearsay) committed to the marked content’s being at least possibly true?

This is testing whether the evidential marker carries epistemic commitment from the speaker. It can only be used for hearsay markers.

If the speaker using hearsay is still committed to the content being at least possibly true, that suggests propositional/epistemic content. If no commitment is implied (the speaker just reports hearsay with no truth attitude), it behaves more like an illocutionary marker.

A propositional evidential carries the implication that the speaker treats the content as at least possibly true.

4. Can the evidential marker be used to report someone else’s evidence or can it only be used to report the speaker’s evidence?

This is testing whether the evidential is tied to the speaker specifically. An illocutionary marker must always refer to the current speaker’s evidence. If the evidential can report someone else’s evidence then is it propositional.

“because”

used to connect two propositions so it’s contribution to the meaning of the sentence will be found in the semantic relationship between the two propositions

Standard ambiguity patterns of because

1. Negation scopes over the verb

   1. She will not win because of her gender

2. Negation scopes over because

   1. She will win, but not because of her gender

Semantic functions of because

1. Content/propositional: states a real-world causal relationship between two events/states of affairs

2. Epistemic: gives a reason for the speaker’s belief or conclusion

3. Speech-act: gives the reason for making the assertion

   1. “I ask what you’re doing because I want to suggest we see a movie”

Example of ambiguity in because statements:

Mrs. Thatcher will not win because she is a woman.

Subordinate “because”

introduces a dependent clause, linking the clause to the main clause to explain cause/reason. This relationship creates a dependency and states a real-world causal relationship.

• Identifiable due to the lack of a comma pause

Paratactic “because”

introduces a new idea, provides elaboration or justification of a speaker’s assertion. It does not have a causal relationship, the because clause is a separate assertion that gives a reason for the main assertion.

• Identifiable from the use of a comma pause

comma pause

is key to determining which form of because is being used. typically paratactic formations of because will use a comma before each independent clause assertion to show that they are not causally connected.

fronting

Only subordinating because clauses can be fronted. For this reason, fronted because clauses allow only the real-world causation reading.

Two conditions that determine relevance

• The cognitive effect (more cognitive effect = more relevance)

• Processing effect (greater processing effort = less relevant)

The cognitive principle of relevance

The idea that human cognition is geared toward the maximization of relevance. Human beings are relevance seekers and the cognitive system will automatically allocate attention and processing to inputs with greater expected relevance.

Maximal relevance

when an input has the greatest cognitive effects for the lowest processing effort than any avaliable alternative input at the time.

Ostensive-inferential communication

Typical mode of communication for most humans. Includes ostensive remarks such as pointing and speaking that are used by hearers to infer meaning. Differs from Grice’s idea of meaning as it covers both showing and telling of communication.

the communicative principle of relevance

the principle that states that every utterance communicates a presumption of it’s own optimal relevance.

Optimal relevance

an utterance is optimally relevant when it is 1) at least relevant enough to be worth the listener’s processing effort and 2) most compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences.

The relevance guided comprehension procedure/heuristic

This is a heuristic that describes how listeners identify the meaning of an utterance. Listeners interpret by 1) following a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance and resolving any ambiguities and 2) to stop once the expectation of relevance is satisfied.

Explicature

An explicature is used to refer to what is explicitly communicated in an utterance. It is 1) a communicated proposition and 2) identifiable by a combination of decoding and inference.

Descriptive representation

represents the state of affairs which makes the proposition it expresses true. Truth conditional

Interpretive representation

represents a representation it resembles in context. Often occurs when speaking loosely, and is not truth conditional.

Loose Talk

a linguistic phenomena that occurs when a speaker expresses a proposition whose literal content they do not fully endorse. The speaker is aiming for interpretive relevance.

ex. John is a bear. (John is not a horse, but rather a brave person)

How does loose talk differ from Grice’s explanation?

To Grice, this violates the maxim of quality as speakers are not saying what they believe to be true. Compared to relevance theory, grice is more strict on the continuum of looseness.

Metaphorical Speech

In Relevance Theory, it is not a special mechanism but rather is apart of the continuum of looseness that is pushed to a greater degree. The proposition expressed is usually literally false, but context provides a wider array of relevant contextual implications.

How does metaphorical speech differ from Grice’s explanation?

To Relevance Theory, this claims that there is no maxim violation and the metaphorical meaning is contributed as part of an explicature and not implicature.

Conceptual Meaning

This is a meaning that encodes a concept that is apart of the truth-conditional content of an utterance. For example, words like dog, cat, red, etc.

Procedural Meaning

words that encode instructions for how to process or use the utterance. For example, so, after, all, but & pronouns.

How do procedural and conceptual meanings relate to the difference between truth conditional and non-truth conditional content?

Procedural expressions are not truth conditional however some pronouns have references that contribute to truth conditional contents. Conceptual expressions are truth conditional but illocutionary adverbs are not truth conditional despite being conceptual.