POL379 Week 10 Baroud, The Intifada Takes off (2000¬ – 2001)

Context of the Second Intifada (2000–2001)

• Key background events

  • Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon (May 2000)

  • Collapse of Camp David Summit (July 2000)

  • Ariel Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif / Al-Aqsa (September 2000)

  • Sharon’s election as Prime Minister (February 2001)

  • Global shift after 9/11 and the War on Terror

• Overall context

  • Combination of failed diplomacy, rising militarization, and shifting global politics created conditions for renewed uprising

Background: Competing Interpretations of Camp David Failure

• U.S. and Israeli narrative

  • Clinton administration portrayed Israeli proposal as a “generous” or far-reaching offer that Palestinians rejected

  • Barak (former prime minister of Israel) claimed Israel had made maximum concessions/turned every stone

    • Argued Palestinians rejected peace despite these efforts

• Palestinian perspective

  • Viewed their position as a historic compromise and accepted Israel on 78% of historic Palestine. They sought a state in remaining 22%

    • Believed offer did not provide genuine sovereignty

  • Key assumption

    • Israel concedes only under pressure, not through negotiations alone

What did the Second Intifada (2000–2005) do?

Produced long-term grievances and conditions for revolt

Lebanon Precedent (a cause of the Second Intifada)

• Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon seen as result of armed resistance. Hizbollah’s success suggested occupation could be forced to end through force

• Shifted Palestinian expectations toward resistance

• Israeli response: Strengthened military control and fortified settlements in West Bank and Gaza

  • Attempted to prevent “Lebanon model” from spreading

Contradiction between “peace” and militarization (a cause of the Second Intifada)

• Despite Oslo framework, Israel expanded militarization through strengthened settlements, praised settler leadership, deployed heavy weaponry

• May 2000 protests (Nakba Day). Israeli forces killed 6 Palestinians, injured over 1,000

  • Result: exposed contradiction between diplomatic process and realities on the ground, and reinforced perception that Oslo was not genuine peace

• The myth of the “generous offer”

  • Post-Camp David narrative

    • Israel claimed no Palestinian partner for peace

  • Lack of formal written proposal undermines this claim

    • Shifted blame for failure onto Palestinians

• Justified later unilateral Israeli policies

Sharon’s provocation (September 2000, a cause of the Second Intifada)

• Visit to Al-Aqsa / Temple Mount

  • Accompanied by over 1,000 police and troops, seen as deliberate provocation

• Immediate consequences:

  • Clashes and killings across occupied territories, sparked outbreak of uprising

  • Killing of Muhammad al-Durra became iconic image

• Strengthened Sharon’s position → contributed to his election

Institutionalized repression (a cause of the Second Intifada)

• Intifada as response to systemic conditions, not isolated events

• Structural elements of repression

  • Legal frameworks: Law of Return (Jewish immigration rights), Absentee Property Law (confiscation of Palestinian property)

• Military occupation and suppression of resistance, Media framing portraying Palestinians as aggressors, use of humiliation as a control mechanism

Characteristics of the Second Intifada

• Systematic military repression, example: Khan Yunis (2000)

  • Earlier violence (e.g., 1956 killings) shows long-term pattern

• Targeted assassinations

  • Assassination lists became normalized policy under Sharon (Former Israeli Prime Minister 2001-06)

  • Key targets included leaders from: PFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades

  • Its purpose was to eliminate leadership and disrupt organizational capacity of resistance

• Suicide bombings

  • Conducted by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah factions

  • Targeted civilian areas (buses, cafés, malls)

  • Revenge for Israeli repression, religious factors, national liberation goals

  • It’s impact increased Israeli security measures and shifted international opinion

Khan Yunis (April 2001)

• First major Israeli re-entry into Area A since Oslo II

• Use of missile fire, helicopters, bulldozers

• Destruction

  • Over 30 homes demolished

  • Around 500 people made homeless

Casualties and Detentions (2000–2005)

• Palestinians

  • Killed: ~3,993

  • Injured: ~44,403

  • Arrested: ~90,000 cumulatively

• Israelis

  • Killed: ~1,083

  • Injured: ~8,341

• Significance

  • High human cost reinforced cycle of violence and retaliation

Politics during the Second Intifada

The Mitchell Report (2001)

• Led by former US Senator George Mitchell. The report describes possible causes of the al-Aqsa Intifada, and gives recommendations to end the violence, rebuild confidence and resume negotiations. It was published on 30 April 2001. Aimed to de-escalate conflict

• Key recommendations

  • Ceasefire, confidence-building measures, full settlement freeze

  • It linked de-escalation to Israeli obligations, especially on settlements.

• Israeli response

  • Required Palestinians to stop violence first

  • Israel itself maintained control over interpretation of “calm”

  • Allowed continued settlement “natural growth”

  • Israel wasn’t equally required to halt assassinations, lift closures, or withdraw

• Significance

  • Highlighted imbalance in obligations

Impact of 9/11 on the Conflict

• Shift in global discourse

  • Israel framed Palestinian struggle as part of “war on terror”

• Effects on international politics

  • Reduced global sympathy for Palestinians

  • Increased legitimacy of Israeli military actions

• U.S. policy shift

  • Initially cautious (needed Arab allies), later reduced pressure on Israel

• Consequences for Palestinians

  • Harsher repression, diplomatic marginalization

Arab Peace Initiative (2002)

• Proposal by Arab League

  • Full normalization with Israel in exchange for:

    • Withdrawal to 1967 borders, Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as capital, a just solution to refugee issue

• Significant because It shifted the issue from a purely bilateral Israeli-Palestinian framework to a broader regional peace offer.

• Israeli response

  • Rejected key elements such as the required full withdrawal to the 1957 borders and just solution for Palestinian refugees

U.S. Policy: “Arafat Must Go” (2002)

• Bush administration stance

  • Called for new Palestinian leadership

  • Effectively excluded Arafat from negotiations, saying he must go for a peace process settlement with Israel to move forward

• Influences

  • Israeli preferences, U.S. internal political actors (e.g., Cheney, Rumsfeld)

• Consequences

  • Further weakened Palestinian leadership

  • Deepened political crisis within Palestinian Authority

The Road Map (2002–2003)

• Developed by the Quartet: U.S., EU, Russia, UN

• Goals: Restart peace process and establish phased path to two-state solution

• Phase 1

  • End violence, Palestinian reforms, Israeli withdrawal from reoccupied areas, settlement freeze

• Phase 2

  • International conference, Palestinian elections, possible provisional Palestinian state

• Phase 3

  • Final-status negotiations: Jerusalem, Refugees, Borders, Settlements

  • Target: final agreement by 2005

• Israeli reaction

  • Security-first approach, demanded Palestinian compliance first

  • Rejected full settlement freeze

  • Maintained control over key areas

• Palestinian reaction

  • Accepted plan as the only diplomatic opportunity, better than Bush’s speech (2002) bc it referred to ending the occupation

  • Viewed it as a framework for eventual statehood

Palestinian Political Changes (2003)

• Reform of Basic Law (under strong Israeli/Quartet pressure)

  • Creation of Prime Minister position

  • Reduced Arafat’s centralized power

• The amendment transferred much of the executive and administrative authority previously concentrated in the presidency to the prime minister and Council of Ministers.

  • Mahmoud Abbas became the first Prime Minister

• Later developments

  • After Abbas became president in 2005, Fatah and the presidency moved to roll back the 2003 reforms and re-strengthen presidential authority through decrees and legal measures, especially when Hamas won the legislative elections in 2006.

Israel’s Disengagement from Gaza (2005)

• Occurred during Second Intifada when Gaza already economically devastated (“de-development”).

  • Also because of long history of Israeli problems.

• Settler presence before 2005 withdrawal: ~8,000–8,500 settlers in 21 settlements, controlled significant land.

• The purpose of disengagement was not to end occupation

  • Aimed to: remove direct responsibility for Gaza, maintain external control, present withdrawal as peace move, strengthen control over West Bank

• Roy’s interpretation

  • Not coordinated with the Palestinian Authority because Israel didn’t want disengagement to turn into a political process that might strengthen the PA.

  • Restructured occupation rather than ending it, making Gaza externally controlled rather than internally.

  • Israel retained control over: Borders, airspace, movement of goods/people, key resources (water, electricity)

• Broader effects

  • Roy argues that it increased the fragmentation of Palestinian territories

    • Warns that “developing” Gaza without ending the structure of control would only modernize poverty and normalize the new arrangement.

    • Disengagement would shrink Palestine politically/geographically, turning Gaza into a tightly enclosed enclave while the West Bank was absorbed and divided.

The Separation Wall

Built during Second Intifada (2000-05), amid suicide bomings and justified by Israel as security measure.

• Approved by Ehud Barak (Israeli Prime Minister) in November 2000, construction began under Ariel Sharon in June 2002 (Israeli Prime Minister 2000-06)

• Length: ~640 km (twice Green Line) and includes fences, trenches, patrol roads, and concrete walls (up to 9m high)

• Route deviates into West Bank and incorporates settlement blocs

• Effects

  • Annexes ~9.5% of West Bank, leaves ~395,000 Palestinians on Israeli side, severely impacts East Jerusalem, and cuts off Palestinian communities

• Lagerquist’s argument

  • Wall is not just security measure, its a tool of territorial restructuring

  • Consequences

    • Fragmentation into isolated territories, separation of Jerusalem from Palestinian life, loss of land, resources, mobility, undermines viability of Palestinian state