National Security Theoretical readings

Theoretical readings for exam 3

Dixon. 2009. “What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings” 

Some factors tend to increase the probability of a civil. War occurring: Larger population, ethnic dominance, ethnic heterogeneity, neighboring state at war, soil degradation, oil exports, new state, democracy. (inverted U), regime instability. 

Some factors decrease the likelihood. Higher econ. Dev., higher econ. Growth, longer duration without war, and separate civ. War in the past. Year, and mass education. 

Civ. Wars can lead to regional instability, terrorism, the spread of unrest, humanitarian crises, econ. Dislocations, transnat. Crimes, so they matter to US nat. Secur. 

Desch 1989. “The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery.” 

Great pows. Have strategic interests. Protecting its interests in certain areas outside of the homeland (intrinsic value). Areas outside the homeland that have little intrinsic value but are strategically vital to the defense of the homeland or some other valuable area (extrinsic value), such as shipping lanes. 

Intrinsic areas are the balance of pow. In Europe, the Persian Gulf, and NE Asia. power

Extrinsic can be areas like the Caribbean and Central America. 

Holmes 2015. “What is National Security?” 

Nat. Security has historically been understood in terms of ensuring the sov.

Reiter and Stam. 1998a. “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness” 

Democs. Win more often. One reason could be that they fight more effectively. 

The findings indicate that logistics, initiative, leadership, and morale are all associated with an increased likelihood that a state will be successful on the battlefield. Indi. Soldiering is more consequential than organizational influences. 

The findings indicate the democracy. Regimes are more likely to have better indi. Soldiering because of higher levels of initiative and better leadership. 

Reiter and Stam. 1998b. “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory.” 

Democs. Win more often. One reason could be that they are better at selecting the wars they fight. 

States that initiate wars tend to win more often. Democs. That initiate wars are particularly likely to win. Democs. That are targeted are also somewhat more likely to win as compared with non-democ.

Gartner and Segura. 1998. “War, Casualties and Public Opinion.”   

Wars typically do not start as unpopular. 

When casualties increase, people react to the new deaths; when casualties slow down, people judge the war by the total deaths.

Public support decreases w/ deaths

Lyall and Wilson. 2009. “Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars” 

Mechanization makes modern armies too isolated and logistically heavy to gather the local intelligence needed to defeat insurgencies.

Sullivan. 2007. “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars.” 

Weaker actors who received military support also make it less likely that a strong state will succeed. If a strong state has a local government ally, this makes it more likely that the strong state will succeed.  

Brute force objectives more likely to succeed (Regime change) 

Gartzke. 2001. “Democracy and Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States’ Anticipation of Casualties” 

No matter the regime type the money spent on war stays the same

Van Evera 1998. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.” 

What matters most is not the actual offense–defense balance, but how leaders perceive it.

when offense is easy way is more likely

Meessen et al. 2020. “TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN HYBRID CAMPAIGNS.” 

The term hybrid warfare is popularized following the Russian annexation of Crimea and associated incursions into eastern Ukraine  

Includes disinfo, lawfare, spec ops assassinations and other tactics, sleeper cells, mili. Exercises as psychological warfare, econ. Sticks, carrots, and sledgehammers, hiding behind proxies, political machinations, formation of digital islands, cyberspace. 

These tactics may influence US success in developing world. 

Mazarr. 2020. “The Essence of the Strategic Competition with China.” 

Comp. With China can impact US success in developing world too. 

The author makes the contention that mili. Pow. Is not likely to be decisive in terms of strategic comp. Betw. The US and China  

The author emphasizes the imp. Of shaping the defining ideas and norms of how internat. Relations will operate (soft pow.)  

Instead, a contest of norms, ideas, and legitimacy are imp. Future aspects of the rivalry.   

What factors influence parts of the world, legitimacy and norms —ex currency yen v dollar

Mearsheimer. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." 

Instits. Do not have an inde. Effect on events in global soci. 

when great powers have equal powers, a power war is not likely to happen

Mearsheimer is an offensive realist. He believes there is an imperative of obtaining secur., great pows. Pursue hegemony, there is ambiguity to what sufficient pow. Is to achieve secur., other goals are considered after. States seek to maximize pow. 

Keohane and Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." 

According to libs., internat. Instits. Have an inde. Influence in facilitating the coop. That goes beyond simply reflecting the immediate interests of states 

For liberal institutionalists, they argue (contrary to Mearsheimer's offensive realism) that not all stronger states pursue power maximization.  

Soysa et al. 1997. “Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Measures of National Capabilities.” 

tests power transition theory. The theory is basically trying to determine when under what conditions are great pow. Conflicts more likely to occur  

Great power v rising state = likley war

Copeland. 1996. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations." 

when trade is going away war is likely

Fearon. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War."  

States are rational, but wars are irrational due to cost. The only 2 rational reasons for war are commitment problems and private info with incentives to represent

Stinnett and Diehl. 2001. “The path(s) to rivalry: Behavioral and structural explanations of rivalry development.” 

States become rivals because they’re both major rivals, (US v Russia)

Lake. 1992. “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War.” 

Democracies experience less rent seeking—corrupt or self‑serving resource extraction— than authoritarian. so, democracies are not expansionist, unlike authoritarian regimes.

democracies don’t fight each other

Tannenwald. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.” 

Global Taboo on nukes, reason for why states don’t use them.

Biddle. 2001. “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory.” 

goes against van evera. Biddle does not think that the offense-defense balance can be effectively used to analyze the likelihood of conflict and aggressive for. The main point of the article is that the tech that is present in the internat. Sys. Does not matter nearly as much as how mili. Units are employed  

Mahbubani. 2020. “Is China Expansionist?” 

Chinas not inherently expansionist- its military buildup reflects economic growth and defensive aims

Stoker and Whiteside. 2020. “BLURRED LINES: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War.”  

The authors argue that the concepts of gray‑zone conflict and hybrid warfare are misleading forms of strategic rent seeking, blurring the line between war and peace and risk prompting unnecessary military responses from states that misinterpret minor provocations as acts of war.

Scobell. 2022. “China’s Calculus on the Use of Force: Futures, Costs, Benefits, Risks and Goals.” 

When China thinks they’re more likely to achieve it’s goal, its more willing at any cost.  The greater likelihood of failure the PRC will be less willing to accept costs, but the more willing it Is to accept risk  

Jo and Gartzke. 2007. “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.” 

Major powers are more likely to make nukes unless in the NPT

The biggest factors in developing a nuclear weaps. Are the following: Diffusion of nuclear tech, Conventional mili. Threat, Major pow. Status  

The biggest factor in reducing the likelihood a nuclear weaps. Program are the following: Nuclear threat, NPT membership  

Betts. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence 

The pow. Of knowledge is contingent upon who has it, how accurate it is, and how it can be used.

The enemies of intel are US opponents (Russia/China), intel failures, and inherent enemies of the "human condition" or how the intel. Sys. Operates  

 

Mueller et al. 2023. “Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War: From Strange Patterns to Alternative Futures.”   

the Russia Ukraine war use cyber-attacks, hybrid warfare, yet thus has not changed the war

Biddle 2007. “Strategy in War.” 

Grand strat. Defining the secur. Objectives of a state and means of achieving those goals  

Mili. Strat. (e.g. theater strat.) This is how mili. Force is employed once the grand strat. Of a state has determined which wars will be fought  

Operational art. It is the way in which mili. Forces are employed to achieve strategic ends in a series of battles (I.e. campaigns)