Moral Philosophy Final Exam - Topic 4 - Anti-Natalism

Pure Benefit

A benefit that improves a person's condition but is not necessary to prevent a harm or satisfy a pressing need. Shiffrin argues that life is not a "pure benefit" because it inevitably includes significant burdens

Hypothetical Consent

The assumption that a person would have consented to an action if they had been able to

Rational Risks

Risks that are considered reasonable to impose on another person. Weinberg argues that procreation often involves "irrational" risks because we are imposing the "risk of life" on someone without their consent

Bentar’s Asymmetry of Harm Argument for Extreme Anti-Natalism

1. The presence of pain is bad

2. The presence of pleasure is good

3. The absence of pain is good, even if no one is there to experience it

4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is being deprived of it

5. The state of non-existence is always better than existence because it avoids all pain without being a deprivation of pleasure

Shiffrin’s Consent Argument for Extreme Anti-Natalism

Shiffrin argues that it is morally problematic to impose a "substantial burden" (life) on someone without their consent, especially when that life is not necessary to save them from a prior harm. Since non-existent people aren't in danger, bringing them into existence is an unauthorized prospective boundary violation

Weinberg’s Risk Argument for Moderate Anti-Natalism

Weinberg focuses on the risk of a bad life. She suggests that procreation is only permissible if the parents can ensure the child will have a life worth living and if the risks of severe suffering are sufficiently low

Pollyanna Syndrome

Benatar argues most people overestimate how good their lives objectively are

Weinberg’s Necessary Conditions for Permissible Procreation

1. Having a very strong interest in procreation

2. Mitigating possible damages and harms of procreation

3. Confidence that the life of the procreated person will not be objectively bad