Long-term determinants of voting behaviour

Importance

• Affect multiple elections and relevant to all elections

Fraction of “core” voters pre-1970

4/5

Fraction of “floating” voters pre-1970

1/5

2 aspects of voting patterns pre-1970

1. Stable

2. Habitual

2 reasons social factors affect voting

1. Socialisation important

2. Rationality — want to advance interests of own group

7 long-term factors

1. Class

2. Party loyalty

3. Gender

4. Age

5. Ethnicity

6. Education

7. Region

Pulzer (1967)

“Class is the basis of British party politics”

Years between which class alignment was strong

1974-2017

1964-6 — % of C2DE voters voting L

64%

1966 — % of ABC1 voters voting C

66%

1974 — % of ABC1 voting C

56%

1974 — % DE voting L

57%

1979 — % DE voting L

54%

1979 — % ABC1 voting C

54%

1997 — % DE voting L

55%

1997 — % ABC1 voting C

37%

2017 — % DE voting L

45%

2017 — % ABC1 voting C

42%

2024 — % C2 voting Reform

25%

1971 — % of voters supporting “natural” party

51%

1987 — % of voters supporting “natural” party

44%

2010 — % of voters supporting “natural” party

38%

2024 — C performance across classes

• The same (±1%pt)

2024 — L, LD and Green performance across classes

• Marginally better in ABC1

1974 and 2017 — % more DE voters voting L > C

• 35% → 9%

1974 and 2017 — % more ABC1 voters voting C > L

• 37% → 4%

4 reasons for class dealignment

1. Changing class system (trad W/C → new W/C)

2. Cross-class locations

3. Emborgeoisiement (W/C think of selves as M/C and concerned w/material self-interest)

4. Sectorial divisions — private/public

Manual work force 1961-2013

• 58% → 29%

Consequence of class dealignment

• Shift in policies and ideas of parties (esp L) as forced to seek votes from ‘natural’ supporters of other parties

Partisanship pre-1970s

• Strong voting behaviour-party ID link due to primary and secondary socialisation

1964-6 — % of voters that IDed with a party

90%

1964-6 — % of voters that ‘very strongly’ IDed with a party

44%

1979 — % of voters that supported their ‘natural’ party

51%

2015 — ‘class voting’ % rise in 5 years

• 2% (to 40%)

1987 — % of voters that supported natural party

44%

2005 — % of voters that very strongly IDed with a party

10%

2010 — % of electorate ‘class voters’

38%

2017 — C performance by class

• Equally well between ABC1 and C2DE

2017 — % of W/C constituencies L

72%

2019 — C performance by class

• Did better among C2DE voters than ABC1 (48%/43%)

2019 — L performance by class

• The same — 33%

2019 — % of W/C constituencies L

53% (down by 19%)

2019 — % of W/C constituencies C

31% (from 13%)

4 reasons for partisan dealigment

1. Increased education so taking policies and issues more seriously

2. Media gives access to wider sources of info rather than just newspapers

3. Post-1980 main party idelogical change

4. Valence issues more important

Consequence of partisan dealignment

• Greater electoral volatility and more uncertainty about outcomes

  • Swings larger

  • Rise and fall of different parties

3 years in which L was supported by an equal number of men and women

1. 1997 (44%)

2. 2001

3. 2005

Gender pattern for Conservative voting

• More women voted C than men in every election 1974-2017 (except 1987 (equal), 2005 and 2010)

Change in gender alignment Thatcher → Major

• Less pronounced → reasserted

Blair/NL impact on gender bias

• Major impact

Post-1990s gender patterns in L voting

• Very little difference in men/women voting

• L gained women’s votes

2015 — gender pattern in C voting

• Men more likely to vote C than women in all age groups except 50+

  • Overall difference only 2%

2017 — gender most likely to vote C

• Men (45%/39%)

2017 — women L/C split

• 43%/43%

2019 — gender gap amongst youth

• Small

2019 — C men/women

46%/44%

2019 — L men/women

31%/35%

3 reasons for gender dealigment

1. Shifting social norms about gender and thus voting

2. Increased female participation in politics

3. Economic factors like more women in the workplace

Consequence of gender dealigment

• More support for gender equality and social justice from politicians

2024 - C % fall amongst women

17%

2024 - C % fall amongst men

23%

2024 - L % rise amongst women

1%

2024 - L % rise amongst men

3%

Reform % of men

17%

Reform % of women

13%

2 parties younger men most likely to vote for

• Green (21%)

• Independent

2024 — party older men most likely to vote for

Reform (20%)

Party EM most likely to vote for

Labour

3 reasons EM are more likely to vote L

1. More likely to be manual workers/unemployed

2. Previous pro-immigration policies

3. Previous measures to support BME communities

2001 — L % lead among Black voters

67%

2001 — L % lead among Black voters

58%

2005 — change in BME voting patterns

• Large ☪ community constituencies moved away from L due to Iraq war

2010 — C % of Indian voters

22%

2010 — C % of Black African voters

6%

2015 — L % lead among Black African voters

42%

2015 — L % lead among South Asian voters

18%

2015 — L % ☪ votes

74%

2015 — C % lead among other (not South) Asian voters

13% (but do have a much smaller pop in 🇬🇧)

2015 — C % of 🇬🇧🇮🇳

30% (especially 🕉)

2017 — L % BME votes

77%

2017 — C % BME votes

20%

2017 — other parties % BME votes

3%

2017 — L % ☪ votes

87%

2017 — C % 🇬🇧🇮🇳 votes

40% (especially 🕉)

2019 — L % BME votes

64% (lower than 2017)

2019 — C % BME votes

20%

2019 — L % White votes

29% (fallen since 2017)

2019 — C % White votes

48%

2019 — L ✡ votes

• Lost most due to antisemitism crisis but only makes up a few hundred thousand votes

2024 — L % loss of BME votes

Down 18%

2024 — L % Black votes

68%

2024 — L % Asian votes

39% (down due to 🇮🇱-🇵🇸)

2024 — L % mixed ethnic background votes

50%

2024 — Green % increase in BME votes

9%

2024 — Independent % increase in BME votes

13%

2024 — party lead in White votes

• C 19% → L 7%

2024 — reason for C losses of White votes

Reform

3 reasons for ethnicity alignment

1. Socioeconomic factors — EM more likely to be W/C

2. Historical context — long-standing relationships with political parties

3. Policies — specific policies especially re immigration

3 consequences of ethnicty alignment

1. Electoral outcomes

2. Representation of ethnic interests in gov’t

3. Mobilisation

2017 — C/L % no qualifications voters

52/35

2019 — C/L no qualifications voters

59/23