Poli Vio

Strauss

*challenges idea that genocide is based in ethnic hatred; but rather structural conditions(centralize authority, political instability, + localized pressure) that the state can create.

-Rwanda: Hutu gov’t used genocide to eliminate enemies, by spreading gov’t prapoganda that Tutsi’s were complicit in Pres Assassination.

-Tutsi survival was seen as a threat to Rwanda state survival; Tutsi as public enemy

-Ongoing war creates conditions for fear and insecurity (susceptible population with conformity, coercion, and material incentives)

Aksoy + Carter

*electoral systems shape outbreaks for political violence, proportional representation can reduce terrorism by providing pathways for political participation

-PR allows smaller group (often ethnic groups) rep and availability to participate in politics, reduced likelihood for political grievances, which can lead to violence

-majoritarian systems vs PR systems

-reduced likelihood of new terrorists group forming compared to majoritarian systems

Aksoy

*Elections influence behavior of terrorists groups attacks; terrorists groups attack during elections to maximize public attention

-terrorism around elections garners public/media attention, coerces voters, and can discredit states

-terrorism during elections happens more in democratic states with intense political competition

-terrorism more likely in months before elections than after (elections are key driver)

Chenoweth

*Democracies are more susceptible to terrorism due to institutional restrains, but are better equipped to recover from attacks and are more stable

-Restraints: free media, less repressive gov’t, terrorists have greater aptitude to attack civilians

-Democracies that have more intense political environments, are less established and divides in the public are more likely to have terrorism attacks

-democracies have less state-sponsored terrorism than autocracies

Aksoy, Carter, & Wright

*Authoritarian institutional structures influence the likelihood of terrorism

-personalists regimes vs institutionalized regimes (legislatures and parties)

-regimes w/ established institutionalized regimes have less terrorism because they provide groups a pathway to air out grievances

-single-party regimes = low terrorism, personalists regimes = higher terrorism, wealthier authoritarian regimes no matter the type = have less terrorism

Toft

*territorial divides of ethnic groups plays critical role in ethnic wars, because territory is seen as indivisible and essential to survival

-wars are more likely when ethnic groups are geographically concentrated and see territory as indivisible

-ethnically concentrated areas are better able to organize

-ethnic wars more likely if state secludes geographically concentrated ethnic groups and when both groups see territory as indivisible

-states resists granting autonomy for fear of secessionist movements, and when its strategically or symbolically important

Carter, Shaver, Wright

*geography and ethnic demographics influence the persistence of civil conflict because rugged terrain and distribution of ethnic groups provide insurgents shelter from the state and aids rebellion

-rough terrain makes it easier to not assimilate and resist gov’t pressure because governments don’t have resources to properly infiltrate

-geographically concentrated ethnic groups can be a home base for insurgents and provide resources

-ethnic geographic distribution and rough terrain support conditions for conflict

Ross

*natural resources play a critical role in wars, and the type of resource, it’s location, & interaction with political and economic factor determine how resources contribute to conflict

-How resources contributes: greed/looting (motivate conflict to capture wealth and gives rebel groups way to sustain themselves), grievances (resource wealth created inequality), opportunity (funding for insurgents), & state weakness (undermines states dependence)

-geographic concentration of resources can lead to secessionists

Cohen

*rape in civil wars ins’t random but shaped by political military and social conditions. Military objectives, combatants behavior, and structure of conflict play a role in the prevalence of rape in civl wars

-rape used a military/political tool to terrorize and dehumanize enemy

-military discipline/training has less prevalence of rape

-rape occurs more when armed groups control civilian population and victims tend to be more from enemy groups

-presence of peacekeepers and sanctions on army leads who allow rape limit incidents

Thomas + Bond

*challenges the idea that women are passive victims in war, but are rather active members and contribute to political violence, which can be explained through personal, societal, and political factors

-women join for ideological commitments, pursuit of justice, survival, and social movement

-political environment, social norms, and recruitment practices affect their participation

-left-wing groups take in women because they can fit certain roles (personal empowerment and standing up to oppression)

-women are combatants and leaders in these roles

Yashar

*Guatemala: states weak capacity, complicity presence of illicit actors, and territorial disputes contribute to high homicide rates

-high levels of corruption and complicity in illicit economies

-gang territorial disputes contributes greatly to high homicide

-indigenous communities are disproportionately impacted

*Nicaragua: state has formed nuanced approach to violence and crime by selectively tolerating some illicit actors/economies and with a focus on community engaged policies rather than militarization

-lower homicide rates

-selective tolerance of illicit actors/economies can shift later

-community fostering and less militarization helps with surveillance ability

Fortna

*Civil wars where terrorism use terrorism last longer and is a survival tactics, but doesn’t help obtain political objectives

-terrorism during civil wars is used to instill fear, prolong survival, garner attention, and pressure states

-groups that use terrorism have hard time getting coaltion with allies

-terrorism decreases likelihood of settlements because states don’t want to set a precedent of negotiations with terrorists

Manekin + Mitts - Minorities and Bias Perception in Israel

*ethnic polarized areas may fail to generate support for “out groups” regardless of their method of peace, which means minorities may face barriers in putting pressure on major “in group” states and goes against the assumption that nonviolent resistance is universally effective

-Israeli has biased views of peaceful Palestinian protestors, and were more likely to support police intervention against them (threat perception bias)

-”in group” vs “out group” and ethnic ID overshadowing other factors

Getmansky + Zeitzoff - Proximity to Violence and Voting in Israel

*terrorism can reshape political landscapes by intensifying voter support for parties that prioritize security (usually right wing)

-proximity to violence increase voter turnout and support for right wing parties (support for security and militarization)

-psychological impacts on groups voting on security rather than policy

-terrorism motivates participation in democracy (still perpetuating violence) and calls for security rather than peace

-Israel and Gaza bombings

Aksoy - China on Russian Invasion of Ukraine

*military aggression in one country can influence public opinion on force in another state.

-Russian invasion led Chinese citizens to think they can do the same to Taiwan with limited repercussions (sanctions) and see military as viable option for territorial disputes

-Military actions of Western influence was greater deterrence on Chinese population than economic sanctions

-state media influential on public w/ pro Russian narrative and propaganda and Anti-west sentiments

Walter 2006

*gov’t chose to resist some separatist movements but not others to maintain their reputation

-rep is crucial for setting a precedent for no future separatists and signaling state strength to outside forces

-gov’t more likely to fight separatists when issue is more visible to public

-states want to appeal to domestic groups (state strength) and international groups (strong ally)

-state more likely to go against separatist groups when there are multiple in the state and will protect territory they see as symbolically important (even if not economically important)

Walter 1997

*without 3rd party guarantee, commitment problems in civil war make negotiated settlements unstable. International actors play a critical role in instilling peace post civil war.

-civil wars end in outright military victory vs interstate war both sides keep their military

-civil wars have commitment barriers (need of one side to demobilize their military/asymmetrical military, deep seated mistrust, fear of betrayal)

-3rd party neutrality, credible enforcement, and long term engagement are needed

-long term commitment is vital to success, no pulling our preemptively

Nomikos - Mali and it’s Peacekeepers

*peacekeepers play an important role in fostering intergroup cooperation by providing security, incentives for collaboration, and being mediators.

-enforce cooperation of rival groups and are crucial for long term peace

-mitigate violence and encourage dialogue

-community oriented communities are more likely to be successful with peacekeepers (that’s why peacekeepers are community oriented with community leaders

-locally rooted in peace efforts to be more sustainable

-incentives for cooperation through aid given to area

Genocide

-Rwanda (Hutu & Tutsi’s)

-Role of Ethnic Hatred

• Tutsi’s positively discriminated against, once colonial power were gone Hutu majority took over gov’t.

• Civil war between Tutsi rebels and Hutu gov’t

-Role of Politics/Political Parties

• Moderates were trying to negotiate peace, Pres dies and rebel group spoils peace. UN peacekeepers leave and don’t do enough.

-Strauss

• civil wars isn’t only because of ethnic hatred, state is responsible (ethnic categorization & state power)

• radical forces took over (fear & insecurity of public, centralized gov’t/state power) they implement Anti-Tutsi policy writing them off as the enemy.

Elections

-Emergence of Armed Groups

• election institutions can make it easy or hard to participate in political the political process or gain representation.

• Hinderance of political participation can induce violence

-Timing of Violence

• approach of elections and onset of violence is more likely with less permissiveness.

• political institutions can influence can shape political violence

• election permissiveness should help counter group emergence, but don’t expect that with groups that anti-system groups as they want to over the whole system

• Aksoy - elections and timing of violence

-Group Emergence

• Electorla systems: election permissiveness (people being represented?), sometime threshold for representation, PR vs. majoritarian systems

• Group goals: within-system (invoke change within gov’t system) & anti-system (want to dispantle systems like capitalism)

• Aksoy + Carter - PR systems and outbreak of violence

Regime Type

-Democracies and Higher Terrorism

• Chenoweth - democracies have higher rate of terrorism but are more vulnerable and more stable post attacks

-Debate on Democracies Side

• low cost of organizing

• public sentiment affects politicians

• executive repressive constraints

• Media freedom

-Regime Type

• Democracies: electoral instituions

• Anocracies (both): parts of both

• Dictator: legislatures and political parties

-Within-Dictatorship Variation

• Legislatures: allow for expression of greveince and possibility to shape politics

• Parties: mobilize opposition, (cooptation = working with elites without necessary advantage)

• Aksoy, Carter, & Wright - Variance in Dictatorships

Geography

-Geography Influence on Violent Conflict

• Fearon + Laitin - terrain can be an equalizer for ethnic groups

• Toft - territorial disputes/patterns can motivate conflict

• Carter, Shaver, & Wright - geographic exclusion of ethnic groups can motivate conflict (resist assimilation because of terrain characteristics)

• Ross - territory can provide resources for rebellion

• groups seeing territory as indivisible is likely going to end in conflict

• settlement patterns are what determines a groups capabilities and legitimacy, settlement patterns affect minority claims of independence

• state likely to view territory as indivisible if they are precedent setting

-Resources and Civil War

• resources effect onset, intensity, and duration of civil war (Hypothesis)

• Extraction of resources can lead to grievances

• resource wealth can engage 3rd parties into onset of political violence for their benefit

Gender

-Victim of Sexual Violence and Victor in Political Violence

• Cohen - recruitment mechanism as a determinant of wartime sexual violence

• Thomas and Bond - Supply (fulfill social role, seek revenge, and get rep) side and Demand side factors. Women want to supply their work to terrorist groups and are demanded more by leftists groups that are larger.

• Women are targets of sexual violence, and sexual violence can be seen as a way to encourage community members to get involved.

Crime

-Some Countries Experience More Violence

• Yashar - Guatemala vs Nicaragua

• Drug routes, state capacity, competition between criminal groups affect political violence

• State capacity discusses corruption, jurisdiction of the state, and prison system.

• Higher homicidal rates in areas where illicit actors have territorial disputes

Does Violence Work?

-Terrorisms Influence

• Fortna - groups that use terrorism don’t get their political objectives, but do contribute to longer lasting conflicts (outcomes and duration)

-Violence vs Non-Violence

• Manekin + Mitts - minority non violent mobilization often perceived as violent. Negatively impacts their ability to use non violence as a means of achieving political objectives

Consequences

-Voting Behavior

• Bosnia - voting for ethnic parties, in group cohesion but out groups mistrust

• Israel - voting towards right wing parties with proximity to violence

• Crimean Tatars - identity and attachments to voting, based on what ancestors have passed down. Legacy of voting. People who talk about past violence are more likely to affect political outcomes (like historically voting for one party)

• China - Hawkishness (aggressive tactics) in how Russian invasion of Ukraine bolstered Chinese support of taking over Taiwan

Ending of Violence

-War is Costly

• Walter 2006 - states continue to fight, even thought war is costly, to build reputation

• Walter 1997 - in civil wars credible commitment problems is central issue in continued conflict

-Potential Solution

• Third party enforcement/peacekeeping

• Mali - importance of unbiased peacekeepers

-Institutional Solution

• ending route after violence is over

• Consociationalism vs Succession/Partition

• Consociationalism: Grand Coalition (leaders of different groups coming together), Proportionality (PR), Minority Veto, and Segment Autonomy/Federalism (ethnic groups in charge of social networks like schools)

Hypothesis for Resource Related Civil War

• Hypothesis on the onset of civil war

1. Looting by potential rebels -> startup costs funded -> civil war

2. Resource extraction -> grievances among locals -> civil war

3. Resrouce extraction -> incentive for separatism -> civil war

4. State depends on resource revenues -> state weakness -> civil war

• Hyppthesis on the duration of civil war

1. Looting by weaker (stronger) party -> more amrs -> war prolonged (shortened)

2. War (peace) appears financially proffitbale -> less (more) incentive for peace -> war prolonged (shortened)

3. Resource wealth in separatists region -> commitment problem -> war prolonged

• Hypotheses on the intensity of civil war

1. Two sides engage in resource battles -> more casualties

2. Two sides engage in cooperative plunder -> fewer casualties

Election Institutions

Are rules and laws that shape how elections are run in a country. It is relevant because they are relevant for interest