Cognitive Science exam 4

metacognition/mindreading

having a cognitive system with concepts or representations about the mind (thoughts about thoughts)

general theory

propose that metacognition/mindreading is a general theory that the subject applies to oneself and others - same theory about minds applies to first AND third person cases

simulation theory

propose there is a special process for the subjects own thought (1st person) which is then taken off line to use in a simulation of others (3rd person)

introspection - thoughts about own thoughts

1st person has to do with

social cognition

3rd person has to do with

metacognition

directed towards one own thoughts (1st)

mindreading

directed towards others (3rd)

self knowledge

knowledge of one’s own self is equivalent to metacognition on psychological views of the self (self = thoughts)

Theory of mind module

what allows for metacognition/mindreading. system understands the mental causes behind the movements.

18-48 months

when do children develop full mindreading with a TOMM according to. Baron-Cohens

The process where a primary representation (e.g., ) is disconnected from its normal function/reality so it can be assigned a new, temporary meaning in play.

Define Leslie’s "Decoupler Model" of pretense.

Because the child must be aware of the representation as a mental object in order to "switch" its reference to .

Why does Leslie consider pretending a banana is a phone to be a "thought about a representation"?

Leslie: Metacognition/Pretense starts at ~13 months.

• Baron-Cohen: Full mindreading (TOMM) develops later, between 18–48 months.

Compare the developmental timelines of Leslie vs. Baron-Cohen.

It is largely restricted to metacognition (awareness of one's own representations) rather than social mindreading(attributing beliefs to others).

What is a major limitation of Leslie’s data regarding Theory of Mind?

t suggests they might be distinct skills rather than a single, unified "General Theory" of the mind.

If a child has metacognition at 13 months but can't pass a mindreading test until 48 months, what does this suggest about the two skills?

1. Sally puts a marble in a basket and leaves. 2. Anne moves the marble to a box. 3. Sally returns; the child is asked: "Where will Sally look for the marble?"

Describe the Sally-Anne Test procedure.

Children 4+: Pass (Say she will look in the basket—showing they understand her false belief).

• Children under 4: Fail (Say she will look in the box—where the marble actually is).

What are the standard results of the Sally-Anne test for different ages?

They lack mindreading/TOMM. They cannot represent a "belief about a belief" and assume everyone knows what they know (the truth).

What is the Standard Hypothesis for why children under 4 fail the sally-anne test?

They do have mindreading skills but fail due to linguistic or computational limitations (e.g., the verbal nature of the test is too complex for their developing brains).

What is the Alternative Hypothesis (Leslie & Fodor) for why younger children fail teh sally-anne test?

Non-verbal tests (like walking toward the correct box or looking-time studies) show that younger children/infants may understand false belief before they can talk about it.

What evidence supports the "Alternative Hypothesis" regarding infants and false belief? (sallyanne)

Non-verbal false belief tests where infants as young as 15 months pass by showing "increased attention" (looking longer) at unexpected behaviors.

What is the primary evidence for the innateness of mindreading?

Infants watch an actor reach for a target. When the object is moved (creating a false belief for the actor), infants look longer if the actor reaches for the correct new location, suggesting they expected the actor to act on their false belief.

Describe the Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) infant experiment.

: Infants have an implicit (practical/predictive) understanding; 4-year-olds have an explicit (verbal/reflective) understanding.

• The Infant Success (Implicit): Infants look longer at the "wrong" reach because they have a practical expectation of behavior. They are tracking the person’s history with the object, but they don't necessarily have a "concept" of belief they can think about.

• The Toddler Failure (Explicit): 3-year-olds fail the Sally-Anne test because it requires Explicit understanding. They have to "decouple" the truth from the false belief and verbally represent a mistake. This requires higher-level linguistic and computational resources they don't have yet.

According to Bermudez, what is the difference between how an infant and a 4-year-old understand false belief?

explicit false belief

verbally articulated and reflective, developed as part of high-level explanations of behavior in terms of beliefs and other mental states.

implicit false belief

• predominantly practical, focused primar-ily on aligning one’s behavior with that of others and correctly predicting how others will behave as a function of what they have or have not seen.

consciousness

“what is the greatest unresolved problem of all biology”

person consciousness

conscious in the sense they are awake

state consciousness

mental states are conscious in the sense that persons are aware of them

access consciousness

informational notion - the system has access to and utlizes info to control thought and action

phenomenal consciousness

experiential notion- subject experiences images, sights, sounds, colors, feelings, etc.

Global workspace model

• consciousness is the integration of info from various sources which is then globally broadcast to other areas of the brain 

Rosenthal’s HOT Theory of state consciousness.

A mental state (x) is conscious if and only if there is a separate Higher-Order Thought (y) in the subject that is about/targets x.

Transitive Consciousness

It is the state of being "aware of something." Like a transitive verb, a conscious mental state must have an object (the mental state being targeted by a HOT).

A conscious state is targeted by a Higher-Order Thought (HOT); a subconscious state exists but lacks a HOT targeting it.

According to Rosenthal, what is the specific difference between a conscious mental state and a subconscious one?

Lycan’s "Inner Sense" argument

argues that consciousness is an internal monitor or scanner. Just as external senses make us aware of the world, an "inner sense" represents our mental states to us.

A mental state is conscious only if there is a separate Higher-Order Thought about it.

Define Rosenthal's HOT Theory.

conscious state has a Higher-Order Thought targeting it; a subconscious one does not.

What is the difference between a conscious and subconscious state in HOT theory?

The idea that consciousness works like an internal sense that "scans" or "monitors" our mental states.

What is Lycan’s "Inner Sense" or "Monitor" argument?

The argument that if thinking about something makes it conscious, rocks should be conscious when we think of them.

What is the "Rock/Table" objection?

The possibility of having a Higher-Order Thought about a sensation that doesn't actually exist.

What is the "Targetless HOT" problem?

rock theory objection

1. Rocks are not mental states (the theory only applies to internal states).

2. Self-referential view (consciousness is a single thought pointing at itself, which physical objects like rocks can't do).

high-level thought

The primate understands the other has a belief and tries to make it a false belief.

low-level thought

The primate simply learns a behavioral rule (e.g., "If I make this sound, they run away").

Tristan gave a false leopard call to scare away a female.

• High-Level interpretation: He wanted her to falsely believe a predator was there.

• Low-Level interpretation: He knew the physical sound would make her run.

Describe the case of Tristan (Vervet monkey) and why it is inconclusive.

Precursor lying

when chimps supressed their behavior

Full fledged lying

chimps misdirect trainer away

• The Setup: A "Good Trainer" shares food; a "Bad Trainer" steals it.

• The Result: Chimps learned to misdirect the Bad Trainer by looking at empty containers (lying).

• The Conflict: High-level says they are inducing a false belief; low-level says they just learned a rule to get food.

Describe the "Good vs. Bad Trainer" experiment with chimpanzees.

• The Setup: Chimps had to beg for food from two trainers: one who could see them and one who couldn't (e.g., blindfolded or a bucket over their head).

• The Result: Chimps begged from both equally.

• Conclusion: Chimps follow face-directional cues (where a face is pointed) but don't understand the mental state of "seeing."

What happened in Povinelli’s vision experiments with chimpanzees?

Chimps use a face-directional cue but don't understand the mental state of "seeing."

What were Povinelli’s findings regarding chimps and blindfolds?

By using an "ecologically relevant" (competitive) task. Rhesus monkeys stole grapes only when a human competitor was looking away or being "silent," suggesting they track what others see and hear.

How did Santos’ experiments at Yale challenge Povinelli’s results?

interdeterminacy

When the evidence (behavior) is consistent with both a High-Level (Mindreading) and a Low-Level (Behavioral) explanation, meaning neither is proven.

Evidence E does not confirm Hypothesis H1 if E is also consistent with a contrary Hypothesis H2.

What is the "Scientific Confirmation" problem mentioned in the notes?

Unlike human infants, primates generally fail to realize a communicator has wrong/false knowledge (though recent eye-tracking tests are making this controversial).

What are the standard results for Non-verbal False Belief tests in primates?

Arguing that the High-Level model is better because it explains why an ape looks at a face (to see what they think) assumes the ape is thinking about "minds" to begin with.

According to the notes, what is the "Question Begging" argument in the eye-tracking debate?

Because the observer must recognize the sender's intention to refer to an object, which is a form of mindreading.

Why is understanding a point considered a "Gricean" communicative act?

The low-level behavior where chimps pick the object nearest to a trainer's hand rather than looking where the hand is pointing.

What is the "Closest-Distance Cue" in primate studies?

They have sclera (eye whites) and a history of human socialization/evolution that facilitates joint attention.

Why might dogs be better at eye-tracking than chimps?

Social responses: Treating the image like another animal (vocalizing/threatening). 2. Self-directed responses: Using the mirror to explore one's own body (grooming/picking teeth).

Describe the two types of responses Gallup measured in the mirror test.

The idea that mirror recognition is just a 3D physical map of the body in space, not proof of a "mental self" or metacognition.

What is the "Body Schema" alternative to Gallup's Theory of Mind?

for pragmatics of language = mutual understanding bsed upon recognized shared intentions

grice

• speaker means something by an utterance iff speaker utters x with the ention that i. X produces a response in intended audience. Ii. audience recognizes the speakers intention iii. The audience’s recognition serves as a reason for its responding

• Just substitute pointing for utterance

povinelli

whose test was about chimps from trainers where one could see them and one couldn’t

Santos

whose test was about monkeys stealing grapes