Moral Realism

Moral Realism

The view that moral properties and facts exist objectively in the world. 

Cognitivism

Moral statements express beliefs and are truth-apt.

Non-cognitivism

The view that moral judgements do not express propositions that are truth-apt but rather they express emotions or attitudes.

Moral naturalism

Moral properties are natural properties that can be investigated through observation, experience, or science. 

Naturalist utilitarianism

Thinkers like Jeremy Bentham argue moral goodness can be reduced to natural facts such as pleasure or happiness.

Naturalist virtue ethics

Moral virtues are understood in terms of natural facts about human flourishing and human nature.

Moral non-naturalism

Moral properties exist objectively but cannot be reduced to natural properties like pleasure, biology, or psychology. 

Intuitionism

Some moral judgements are self-evident, i.e their truth can be known just by rational reflection upon the judgement itself.

GE Moore’s Open Question Argument

If good was a natural property like pleasure, then it would not make sense to ask if pleasure is actually good. This means it is an open question, meaning good is not the same as pleasure. Good is indefinable.

Naturalistic fallacy

The mistake of defining moral terms such as “good” purely in terms of natural properties.

Hume’s Fork

Knowledge is either relations of ideas (analytic truths) or matters of fact (empirical truths).

AJ Ayer’s Verification Principle

A statement is meaningful only if it is analytically true or empirically verifiable.

Analytic statements

A statement whereby the truth of itself is contained in the meaning of the words in it.

Mackie's argument from relativity

Widespread disagreement between cultures about morality suggests moral values are shaped by social practices rather than objective facts.

Mackie's argument from queerness

Moral properties, understood as non-natural properties, are metaphysically and epistemologically puzzling and improbable, which is a reason to believe they don't exist.

Error theory

The theory that moral judgements make claims about objective moral properties, but that no such properties exist. Thus moral judgements are cognitive, but are all false. Moral language as we mean to use it, rests on a mistake.

Metaphysically queer

Strange kinds of properties would need to exist.

Epistemologically queer

Strange ways of knowing them would be required.

Hume’s is–ought gap

You cannot logically derive a moral conclusion about what ought to be purely from statements about what is.

Hume’s motivation argument

Beliefs alone cannot motivate action because beliefs only describe facts about the world, while motivation requires a desire or feeling.