criminal damage (cases - principles only)

Gayford v. Chouler

trampled grass - Even relatively minimal forms of damage like trampled grass can amount to a criminal damage offence

Cox v Riley

- intangible data wasn't "property", erasing it impaired the physical card's value and usefulness, making it necessary to spend time and money to restore it

Roe v. Kingerlee

mud graffiti

The defendant smeared mud on the wall of a police cell. It cost £7 to clean

There is no need for the damage to be permanent

Fisher

Blocked steam engine

D blocked up a part of a steam engine rendering it inoperable. It took 2 hours, but no parts, to repair.

Held: This was damage because it was rendered useless. → damage to one of teh part rebedering teh whole inoperable can be deemed crim damage of te whole

expanded the concept of criminal damage beyond permanent physical alteration to include "temporary functional derangement""

Fiak

flushed blankets

Facts: D flooded his police cell by putting his blanket down the toilet and repeatedly flushing

CA Held: Although not permanent, (the blanket could be washed and the cell mopped) D’s actions amounted to damage bc temporary impairment of usefulness and physical altertarion to cell and blanket. → confiurms tah permanence of damage is not required

Henderson v Battley (unreported)

Rubble dump

Facts: D deposited 30 lorry loads of rubble on V's building site which cost £2000 to restore building site to OG state 

DC Held: Necessity of expenditure of a large sum of money to restore it to its former state, it reduces its present value as a building site. This land was a perfectly good building site which did not need £2000 spent on it in order to sell or use it as such until the appellants began their operations.

Lloyd v DPP

car clamp

D parked in a private car park where signs warned that unauthorised vehicles would be clamped. D’s car was clamped and D destroyed the clamps.

Held  criminal damage committed by D destroying the clamps on his car bc he consented to bein clamped when we parked there

Grajewski (australian case)

climate siren 

Facts: D, in protest, climbed onto a ship loader, which was shut down  for 2 hours due to safety concerns. 

HCA quashed conviction: the physical integrity of the property was not altered in any respect

→ Rejection of the impaired usefulness test advised in Fisherer and Fiak; says that the functional derangement is an “effect or product" of damage rather than damage itself

→ support that by K Grevling ' Damaging Property' 

Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary

chalk protest

Facts: used water-soluble paint to paint human silhouettes on pavement as part of a protest on 40th Anniversary of Hiroshima.

DC held: this was damage bc fact that such a remedy cost money seemed to provide sufficient evidence as to criminal damage

A (A Juvenile)

spat on police

Facts: D spat on a police officer’s raincoat

DC Held: not damage as no staining or even need for professional cleaning

→ Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod in the notes in ch 27 questions whether it would not be reasonable that the policeman insisted on the coat being dry cleaned and thus fulfill the cost requirement of crim damage

Samuels v Stubbs

policeman’s hat

Facts: D stamped on police officer’s cap during a protest. Crushed state could be rectified by pushing it back to shape

Held: sufficient proof of damage if the evidence proves a temporary functional derangement of the particular article of property

Morphitis v Salmon

scratched scaffold

uperficial marks or scratches that do not impair the functionality or usefulness of the property do not amount to criminal damage

Cresswell v DPP

- wild badgers weren't "property,"

Baker

- defence only applied to acts protecting property, and the child was not property

Denton

- defendant worked in a cotton mill and set fire to it, believing his employer had encouraged the act to claim insurance money

- Section 5(2)(a) of the Act provides a defence if the defendant genuinely believes the owner would consent, even if that belief is mistaken or for a fraudulent reason

Appleyard

- The defendant set fire to a shed, genuinely believing the owner had consented and wanted it destroyed

- confirmed that an honest, albeit unreasonable, belief in consent is a valid defence

Smith

- An honest but mistaken belief the property was his negates the mens rea required for the offence

Blake v DPP

- his God-given authority wasn't provable

- a sincere but unprovable subjective belief (e.g., in divine command) is insufficient for the defence

A-G's Ref (No. 1 of 2023)

- some members of staff in the organisations were critical of their own response to climate change which justified her belief that they would have agreed to the damage

Jaggard v Dickinson

- she mistakenly believed it was her friend's house and that her friend would have consented to her gaining entry by breaking a window

- The defendant was entitled to rely on mistake as a defence under s5(2)(a)

Magee v CPS

- a driver can be deemed to know an accident occurred if the circumstances were significant enough, even if they claim ignorance

Hunt

- setting fire to a bed in an old people's home to highlight the fire alarm was defective was not inherently capable of protecting any property

- Established an objective test for considering whether someone is acting in protection of property

Hill & Hall

- link between cutting the fence and preventing the nuclear attack was too "tenuous" and not an "immediate" need for protection as required by the Act

- belief must be honestly held (subjective), the need for protection must be objectively "immediate" and the means "reasonable

DPP v Ditchfield

- defendant spray painted an area as part of a protest

- she believed the emergency of climate change required such disruptive action to force government response

- D's actions were too remote from the "immediate danger" required for a necessity defence

Jones

- anti-war protesters damaged military property, claiming necessity to prevent the "crime of aggression" (Iraq War)

- international crimes like aggression aren't automatically part of UK domestic law for defence purposes

DPP v Unsworth

- she cut the tops off the trees, causing damage, claimed the s.5(2)(b) defence

- defence requires an honest belief in the necessity of the action, not that the action was objectively reasonable

Ziegler v DPP

- peaceful protest can fall within the "lawful authority or excuse" defence if it's a proportionate means of exercising Convention rights under the ECHR

AG's Reference (No 1 of 2022)

- The ruling limits the use of ECHR arguments as a "lawful excuse" defence, especially when damage is substantial

Dudley

- D threw a petrol bomb at an occupied house, causing a large flame but only minor damage

- D intended to cause damage (burning the house down), and that intended damage (fire/smoke) inherently endangered life

Steer

- the danger to life (from the bullets) arose from the cause of the damage (the shooting), not the actual damage to the property (the broken window)

Webster

- they were reckless as to whether the impact of the stone would cause damage (e.g., to the train's roof) and whether that damage, in turn, would endanger the lives of the passengers

Wenton

- The appellant smashed a window with a brick then threw into the house a petrol canister and a lit piece of paper

- The act of smashing the window did not create the endangerment to life

- The endangerment to life came from the throwing of the petrol canister and lit paper

Parker

- the defendant used a cigarette to set fire to a sofa in the council house to help his landlady persuade the council to rehouse her

- There was no need to prove that life was endangered to establish the offence

Drayton

- The decision clarified that in Magistrates' Court charges, describing damage by fire suffices to meet the statutory requirement to charge arson.

Cunningham

- The defendant must have personally foreseen the risk of a specific kind of harm.

- Despite foreseeing the risk, the defendant chose to run it.

Stephenson

- D made a hollow in a haystack to sleep, lit a fire to keep warm, and the stack caught fire, causing significant damage

- because he had schizophrenia, he might not have foreseen the risk, even if a reasonable person would have

- The Court held the test for recklessness must be subjective

Caldwell v MPC

Caldwell Recklessness (Objective Test):

- A person is reckless if they (1) create an obvious risk of damage/danger, and;

- (2) either don't think about the risk or go ahead despite the risk

R v G

- Two young boys set fire to newspapers in a bin and left, expecting them to burn out

- the fire spread to a shop and caused £1m in damages

- A defendant is reckless if (i) aware of a risk, and (ii) it's unreasonable to take that risk in the circumstances known to them (including their own immaturity)

Elliott v C (A Minor)

- The defendant, a 14-year-old girl with low intelligence, poured white spirit on the floor of a shed and set it alight, causing fire damage

- The court applied the R v Caldwell (1982) objective test

- highlighted the perceived unfairness of the objective test, as it convicted individuals who genuinely couldn't appreciate the risk

- heavily influenced the House of Lords to overturn Caldwell in R v G

R v Parker

- argued that he had not contemplated the risk of damage to the telephone.

- Cunningham Recklessness was modified to clarify that wilfully ignoring the potential for risk does not protect one from a conviction

Chief Constable of Avon v Shimmen

- A defendant who acted upon a mistaken assessment of risk could still be reckless for where he still allowed for a degree of risk and acted anyway.