AP GOV Required SCOTUS Cases

engel v. vitale

clause: 1A establishment clause

facts: ny public schools authorized general, non-denominational prayer that was optional, but ten parents sued a local school board that required the prayer.

question: does voluntary, school-organized recitation of a daily prayer violate the establishment clause?

holding: yes, government may not sponsor prayer

reasoning: establishment clause creates “wall of separation” between church and state. clause forbids government from endorsing or supporting religion. endorsement becomes a factor used in the Lemon test for establishment clause cases.

significance: reinforces a strict “wall of separation” between church and state even if participation is voluntary. shifts border between church and state. shows warren court’s activism as compared to past eras.

type: civil liberty case

wisconsin v. yoder

clause: 1A free exercise clause

facts: wisconsin required children to attend school until age 16, which conflicted with the amish belief that stopped education at age 14, so amish parents sued

question: does the state’s interest in promoting education override parents’ right to the free exercise of their religion?

holding: no, though the state has a legit interest, it OWs by the parent’s religious beliefs

reasoning: weighing effects of law - severe on the amish, not on the state. compulsory education “would gravely endanger, if not destroy” their beliefs.

significance: competing claims of right must be weighed against each other. there must be a balance between majority religious practice and individual free exercise; a question of reasonable accommodations for major threats.

type: civil liberty case

tinker v. des moines

clause: 1A free speech clause

facts: 5 high schoolers wore black armbands to school in protest of the vietnam war. school officials told them to take it off, but they refused, so they were suspended until compliance. parents sued.

question: do students have a right to free speech at school? if so, does the free speech clause protect symbolic expression?

holding: yes, both students and symbolic speech are protected

reasoning: students do not “shed their constitutional rights … at the schoolhouse gate”; they have fundamental free speech rights. to limit speech, schools must show “reason to anticipate it would substantially interfere with the work of the school”, not simply controversy.

significance: clear protection of symbolic speech. only scotus cause upholding a challenge to school limitations. “shed their constitutional rights … at the schoolhouse gate”

type: civil liberty case

schenck v. us

clause: 1A free speech

facts: 2 months after entering WWI, congress passed the espionage act that outlawed refusal of duty in the military. socialist party leader charles schenck was convicted of violating the act by distributing leaflets saying the draft violated 13A involuntary servitude clause. he sued.

question: does the espionage act, as applied, violate schenck’s 1A right to free speech?

holding: no, this speech poses a clear and present danger to the us

reasoning: context matters. in wartime, greater limitations on rights are permitted. “clear and present danger”. man cannot “falsely shout fire in a theater”

significance: clear and present danger remains good law, but modified to require imminency, in immediate danger of occurring. public order vs individual liberties.

type: civil liberty case

nyt v. us

clause: 1A free press

facts: daniel ellsberg, secretly copied classified government documents about the vietnam war that revealed contradictions between gov’t public statements and internal analyses. he gave copies to nyt and washington post. espionage act made it a crime to obtain classified info with intent to hurt us. after nyt published pentagon papers, nixon admin sued.

question: can the government stop a newspaper from printing classified information prior to publication?

holding: no, there is a heavy presumption against prior restraint

reasoning: government failed to overcome the “heavy presumption against prior restraint”, as it did not prove the publication would cause direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to national security

significance: individual liberties tend to triumph, even over national security. us needs to have heavy presumption against prior restraint to block press.

type: civil liberty case

citizens united v. fec

clause: 1A free speech

facts: bipartisan campaign finance act (bcra) made it illegal for corporations to engage in electioneering communications for 60 days before election/30 days before primary. citizens united wanted to make a film against hilary clinton during forbidden period, so sued

question: is the bipartisan campaign finance act’s (bcra) prohibition against electioneering communication by corporations a violation of the 1A protection of the freedom of speech?

holding: yes, because corporations were just groups of people

reasoning: limitations put upon corporations to run political ads and comms were not materially different from censorship of speech toward individuals, because we use money to express ourselves (e.g. boycotting)

significance: money = speech, so now corporations, npos, etc can donate unrestrictedly as long as they don’t directly collaborate with candidates. indirectly leads to pacs and superpacs.

type: civil liberty case

mcdonald v. chicago

clause: 2A right to bear arms (+ 14A due process clause)

facts: in 2008, scotus held that 2A righ to bear arms protects an individual right to handgun ownership against federal interference. 3 residents of chicago wanted to have that holding incorporated against state and local governments, striking down chicago’s similar ban.

question: does the 2A apply to limit state governments?

holding: yes, 2A protects a fundamental right

reasoning: bill of rights applied only against the federal government. the civil war amendments (14A) changed the federalism balance, forbidding states from depriving liberties. scotus thus incorporated the liberties/fundamental rights against the states, but does so selectively. fundamental = deeply rooted in us history and tradition.

significance: not a question of bearing arms, but whether it extends/is incorporated into the states.

type: civil liberty case

gideon v. wainwright

clause: 6A right to counsel (+ 14A due process clause)

facts: 1938 - scotus held federal gov’t had to provide lawyers to anyone that couldnt afford it. 1942 - scotus said states did not have the same duty, except for death penalty. clarence gideon was charged with robbing a florida pool hall, asked for a lawyer, but state court refused and found him guilty. submitted habeas corpus petition.

question: does the right to counsel apply generally against states?

holding: yes, the right to counsel is essential to a fair trial

reasoning: the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial”

significance: example of the conflict between liberty and order, as well as when and whether to follow stare decisis or overrule precedent.

type: civil liberty case

baker v. carr

clause: 14A equal protection

facts: tennessee hadn’t reapportioned its state legislative districts in 60 years even though constitution required it every 10 years. rural areas with 500 people had same reps as urban areas with 5000 people. charles baker sued to address inequity. district court dismissed lawsuit as a “political” question not subject to court resolution.

question: do federal courts have the jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions about state legislative boundaries?

holding: yes, federal courts have jurisdiction. did not decide yet whether tn’s districts were unfair, sent back to the district court to decide that question.

reasoning: constitution gives federal courts power to decide cases “arising under” the constitution or federal laws. case clearly arises under the equal protections clause. courts would not decide the political question of how to draw districts, but would just be telling legislature to fix a constitutional violation.

significance: creates precedent for all future legislative redistricting challenges. after return to scotus, announces “one-person, one-vote” rule of equal representation.

type: civil rights case

shaw v. reno

clause: 14A equal protection

facts: nc gained a 12th house seat as a result of 1990 census. state legislature created a new district map including one majority-minority district, and submitted to DOJ for approval as required by voting rights act. attorney general required a second majority-minority district. to comply, nc extremely gerrymandered a district. 5 white voters challenged the map’s use of race. district court dismissed case, ruling that race-based districting to benefit minorities does not violate constitution.

question: is race-conscious districting constitutionally permissible?

holding: race-conscious districting must satisfy strict scrutiny.

reasoning: history of racial-gerrymandering is troubling, classifying citizens on race conflicts with ideal of equality. districting should be assessed against compactness, contiguity, and tradiitonal considerations (counties/geographical feaures)

significance: no racial gerrymandering. leads to less majority-minority districts and fewer minority reps.

type: civil rights case

brown v. board of education

clause: 14A equal protection

facts: african american students were denied admittance to public schools based on laws allowing segregation, arguing this violated the 14A

question: do state-sanctioned segregation of public schools violate the equal protection clause of the 14A?

holding: yes, race-based segregation is illegal

significance: reversed plessy v. ferguson principle of “separate but equal”. desegregated schools.

type: civil rights case

us v. lopez

clause: commerce clause

facts: 1990 - gun-free school zones act (gfsza, or girlfriend sza) outlawed knowingly carrying a gun within 1000 feet of a school. alfonso lopez jr carried concealed handgun into his tx high school. initially charged under state law making possession a crime, but later charges dropped in favor of a federal charge under gfsza.

question: did congress have the power to pass the gfsza?

holding: no, possession of a gun near a school does not affect commerce

reasoning: carrying a gun near a school zone is not an economic activity. congress may regulate (1) channels of interstate commerce, e.g. highways/waterways, (2) people and things moving in or carrying out commerce, and (3) activities with substantial effect on commerce. no evidence that possessing guns near school affects national market.

significance: symbolizes new federalism/rehnquist-era limits on commerce. shrunk scope of which congress can use commerce clause.

marbury v. madison

clause: jurisdiction clauses of judicial branch in article iii

significance: established judicial review, affirming the court’s power to declare acts of congress unconstituional and cementing its role as the final interpreter of the us constituion