Criminal Law Case Facts

Martin

Actus Reus/Omission.

the court overturned a conviction for being drunk on a public highway because the defendant was forcibly and involuntarily transported to the public place by police, establishing that actus reus requires a voluntary act.

Newton

Actus reus/omission

the California Court of Appeal reversed the voluntary manslaughter conviction of ————, ruling that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on "involuntary unconsciousness" as a complete defense, despite evidence suggesting ——- was in a state of reflex shock from an abdominal gunshot wound when a police officer was killed.

Jones

Actus reus/omission

—- was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the death of a friend's 10-month-old infant, Anthony Lee, who died of severe malnutrition and neglect while in her sole care, though the conviction was overturned because the jury wasn't required to find she had a specific legal duty to act.

Pope

Actus reus/omission

—- was convicted of child abuse for failing to intervene or seek medical help while witnessing a mother—who had been taken into — home—fatally beat her three-month-old infant during a religious frenzy, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that — had no legal duty to act because she did not fall into a specific class of persons (such as a parent or legal guardian) responsible for the child's supervision.

Cunningham

Mens rea.

—wrenched a gas meter from the wall of an empty house to steal the money inside, unintentionally causing a gas leak that partially asphyxiated his future mother-in-law in the adjoining unit. The court famously overturned his conviction for "maliciously" administering a noxious substance because the trial judge incorrectly defined "malice" as general "wickedness" rather than requiring proof that the defendant either intended the harm or was reckless—meaning he personally foresaw the risk and chose to take it anyway.

Elonis

Mens rea.

—- was convicted under a federal anti-threat statute for posting violent rap lyrics on Facebook directed at his estranged wife, coworkers, and an FBI agent, despite his claim that the posts were therapeutic artistic expression and not "true threats" intended to cause harm. The Supreme Court ultimately overturned his conviction, ruling that the "reasonable person" (objective) standard used by the lower courts was insufficient for a criminal conviction; instead, the government must prove the defendant had a subjective intent to threaten or at least knew their communication would be viewed as a threat.

Jewell

Mens rea.

— was convicted of drug trafficking after he was paid by a stranger in Mexico to drive a car across the border containing 110 pounds of marijuana in a secret compartment he suspected existed but deliberately chose not to investigate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, establishing the "willful blindness doctrine, which treats a defendant's deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as legally equivalent to actual knowledge when they are aware of a high probability of the illegal facts.

Regina v. Prince

Mens rea.

— was convicted of unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen out of her father's possession, even though he reasonably and sincerely believed she was eighteen based on her appearance and her own claims. The court upheld his conviction, establishing a landmark precedent for strict liability by ruling that for certain "malum prohibitum" offenses (acts that are wrong because they are prohibited), a defendant's mistake of fact regarding a crucial element—like age—does not provide a legal defense.

People v. Olsen

Mens rea.

—-were convicted of committing lewd acts with a girl under the age of 14 after they entered her family's camper and — engaged in sexual intercourse with her, despite her previous claims to them that she was over 16. The California Supreme Court upheld the convictions, ruling that a defendant’s good-faith, reasonable mistake regarding a victim's age is not a defense to charges involving a child under 14 (tender years), as the statute is intended to provide strict protection for younger minors.

B v. Director of Public Prosecutions

Mens rea.

a 15-year-old boy was charged with inciting a 13-year-old girl to commit an act of gross indecency on a bus, but his conviction was eventually quashed because the House of Lords ruled that he should have been allowed to use his honest—though mistaken—belief that she was over 14 as a defense. The House of Lords clarified that for serious crimes where a statute is silent on the mental element (mens rea), there is a strong common law presumption that the prosecution must prove the defendant acted with a guilty mind. This ruling effectively moved away from the strict liability precedent set in Regina v. Prince, establishing that a defendant's honest belief regarding a victim's age is a valid defense even if that belief is not reasonable.

Morrissette

Mens rea.

—, a scrap metal collector, was convicted of "knowingly converting" government property after he openly salvaged three tons of spent, rusting bomb casings from a remote Air Force bombing range in Michigan, honestly believing the casings were abandoned junk. The Supreme Court overturned his conviction, ruling that even though the federal statute did not explicitly mention intent, a "guilty mind" (mens rea) is an inherent requirement for traditional common-law crimes like theft and cannot be presumed by a judge or bypassed through strict liability.

Staples

Mens rea.

— was convicted for possessing an unregistered machine gun after his AR-15 rifle—which he claimed to believe was a semi-automatic—fired more than one shot per trigger pull due to internal modifications, despite his lack of knowledge that the weapon had been altered to function as a fully automatic. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, ruling that because of the long-standing tradition of lawful gun ownership, the government must prove the defendant knew the specific characteristics that brought his firearm under the strict regulations of the National Firearms Act.

Marrero

Mens rea.

a federal corrections officer was arrested for carrying a loaded pistol in a Manhattan social club under the mistaken—but documented—belief that he fell within a statutory exemption for "peace officers," a defense the New York Court of Appeals ultimately rejected by ruling that a mistake of law regarding the meaning of a statute is not an excuse for a crime.

Cheek

Mens rea.

—, an airline pilot, was convicted of tax evasion for failing to file returns and claiming his wages were not taxable income, based on his sincere—though legally incorrect—belief that the tax laws were unconstitutional or did not apply to him. The Supreme Court overturned his conviction, ruling that a sincere, good-faith belief that one is not violating the law—even if that belief is objectively unreasonable—negates the "willfulness" required for criminal tax offenses.

Lambert

Mens rea.

—, a resident of Los Angeles with a prior forgery conviction, was convicted of violating a municipal ordinance that required convicted felons to register with the police if they remained in the city for more than five days, despite her having no actual knowledge of the registration requirement. The Supreme Court overturned her conviction, ruling that the ordinance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it punished "wholly passive" conduct—a failure to act—without providing fair notice or proof that the defendant was likely aware of her legal obligation. This established a rare exception to the principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," specifically for regulatory crimes where the behavior is not intuitively wrongful.

McBoyle

Legality.

— was convicted of transporting a stolen airplane across state lines under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which the Supreme Court overturned by ruling that an aircraft does not fall under the statutory definition of a "motor vehicle."

Yates

Legality.

—, a commercial fisherman, was convicted of violating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for tossing undersized red grouper back into the Gulf of Mexico to hide them from federal inspectors, a conviction the Supreme Court overturned by ruling that a fish is not a "tangible object" within the meaning of a statute designed to prevent the destruction of corporate financial records.

Keeler

Legality.

—was charged with murder after he intercepted his pregnant ex-wife on a mountain road and intentionally kicked her in the abdomen to "stomp the baby out," causing the death of a five-pound, viable fetus. The California Supreme Court ultimately prohibited his prosecution for murder, ruling that a fetus was not a "human being" under the state's 1850 homicide statute and that extending the definition to include a fetus would violate due process by failing to give the defendant fair warning of his criminal liability

Morales

Legality.

— and several others were arrested under a city ordinance that authorized police to disperse any group of two or more people "loitering" in public with "no apparent purpose" if at least one person was reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member. The Supreme Court ultimately struck down the law as unconstitutionally vague, ruling that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to provide ordinary citizens with fair notice of what conduct was prohibited and granted the police "absolute discretion" to determine what constitutes loitering.

Acosta

Causation.

—led police on a 48-mile high-speed chase in a stolen car that triggered a mid-air collision between two pursuing police helicopters, resulting in three deaths. The California Court of Appeal overturned his second-degree murder conviction, ruling that while his reckless flight was a proximate cause of the deaths because a crash was a foreseeable—even if rare—consequence of such a chase, there was insufficient evidence of implied malice, as he did not consciously disregard the specific risk to the pilots.

Arzon

Causation.

— intentionally set fire to a couch in an abandoned building, creating a hazardous smoke condition that, when combined with an independent fire on another floor, led to the death of a responding firefighter. The New York Supreme Court upheld his second-degree murder conviction, ruling that —- conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the death because his actions placed the firefighter in a vulnerable position where the fatal outcome was a foreseeable result of the initial arson.

Campbell

Causation.

— was charged with murder after he provided a gun and ammunition to his intoxicated friend, Kevin Basnaw, and encouraged him to kill himself after discovering Basnaw had been having an affair with — wife. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's refusal to dismiss the murder charge, ruling that inciting or providing the means for a suicide does not constitute "murder" under common law because suicide is not a homicide (the killing of one human being by another), and the state legislature had not yet enacted a specific law against assisted suicide.

Kevorkian

Causation.

the Michigan Supreme Court addressed multiple charges against —, ultimately ruling that while the U.S. Constitution does not protect a "right to die" and providing the means for a suicide is not "murder" under common law, such actions can still be prosecuted as the distinct felony of assisting a suicide.

The court's decision arose from two separate incidents where — used his "suicide machines"—one involving lethal intravenous drugs and the other carbon monoxide gas—to help terminally ill women end their lives. The court established a critical legal boundary:

Assisting a Suicide: Providing the physical means (like a machine or gas) while the patient performs the final act is a felony, but not murder.

Murder: Only "active participation" in the final overt act that causes death, such as pushing a syringe plunger himself, qualifies as murder.

Root

Causation.

— was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after his opponent in a high-speed drag race on a rural highway was killed in a head-on collision with an oncoming truck while attempting to pass — in a no-passing zone.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the conviction, ruling that — reckless conduct was not a "sufficiently direct" cause of the death to meet the higher standard of criminal causation. The court held that the victim’s own independent, "suicidal" decision to swerve into oncoming traffic was a superseding cause that insulated — from criminal liability, emphasizing that the broad "proximate cause" standard used in civil tort law is inappropriate for criminal homicide prosecutions.

McFadden

Causation.

— was convicted of two counts of involuntary manslaughter after engaging in a high-speed drag race on a city street that caused his opponent to lose control and collide with an oncoming vehicle, killing both the opponent and a 6-year-old passenger in the third car.

The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the convictions, ruling that even though — car never made physical contact with the other vehicles, his reckless participation in the race was a proximate cause of the deaths because such a fatal collision was a foreseeable consequence of his conduct. This decision is a notable contrast to Commonwealth v. Root, as the Iowa court explicitly rejected the "direct causal connection" standard in favor of a broader foreseeability test for criminal causation

Atencio

Causation.

— and a companion were convicted of involuntary manslaughter after they participated in a "joint enterprise" of Russian roulette with a friend who fatally shot himself on his turn, following their own successful, unharmed turns.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the convictions, ruling that by taking their own turns, the defendants provided mutual encouragement and cooperation in a reckless activity, which established a causal link to the victim's death even though they did not pull the trigger for him. The court famously distinguished this from drag racing cases like Commonwealth v. Root by noting that Russian roulette is a game of pure chance with no element of skill to mitigate the risk.

Smallwood

Attempt.

— who knew he was HIV-positive, was convicted of attempted second-degree murder for engaging in unprotected sexual assaults, but the Maryland Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, ruling that his knowledge of his HIV status alone was insufficient to prove he had the specific intent to kill his victims.

Rizzo

Attempt.

— and his accomplices were arrested while driving around New York City searching for a specific bank messenger they intended to rob, but their convictions for attempted robbery were overturned because they had not yet found the victim or reached a point "dangerously near" the commission of the actual crime.

Jackson

Attempt.

the Second Circuit upheld the convictions of defendants who were arrested while "casing" a bank for a second time with loaded shotguns, masks, and altered license plates, ruling these actions constituted a "substantial step" toward robbery rather than mere preparation.

Davis

Solicitation.

a Missouri case frequently paired with People v. Rizzo, the court overturned a conviction for attempted murder because the defendant's acts—hiring an undercover agent to kill his wife, providing a photograph of her, and paying a $600 deposit—were considered mere preparation rather than an overt act that went beyond the planning stage.

This ruling established that a solicitation of another to commit a crime does not, by itself, constitute an "attempt" under the proximity test, as no direct movement was made toward the actual execution of the murder.

Jaffe

Impossibility.

— was convicted of attempting to receive stolen property after he purchased 20 yards of cloth he believed was stolen, but his conviction was overturned because the cloth had already been recovered by its owners and was no longer "stolen" at the time of the transaction. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that because the completed act would not have been a crime, Jaffe could not be guilty of a criminal attempt—a classic application of the legal impossibility defense.

Dlugash

Impossibility.

— was convicted of attempted murder for firing five bullets into the chest of a man who had already been shot in the head by another person and appeared dead, as the court ruled that his subjective belief that the victim was alive made him legally liable for the attempt regardless of whether the man was already a corpse.

Hicks

Accomplice liability.

— was convicted of murder after being present when his companion, Stand Rowe, shot and killed Andrew Colvard, with the prosecution alleging that —- statement to the victim to "take off your hat and die like a man" constituted aiding and abetting.

The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, ruling that the trial judge's jury instructions were flawed because they failed to require proof that — acted with the specific intent to encourage the murder and incorrectly suggested that his mere presence for the purpose of aiding was sufficient even if no actual assistance was provided.

Gladstone

Accomplice liability.

— was convicted of aiding and abetting the sale of marijuana after he told an undercover informant he had no drugs to sell but provided a map and directions to the home of another individual, Robert Kent, who subsequently sold the informant marijuana.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that merely providing information or a referral does not constitute aiding and abetting without evidence of a "nexus" or prior communication, agreement, or association between the defendant and the principal seller.

Rosemond

Accomplice liability.

— was convicted of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a drug deal after a shootout occurred during a marijuana sale, even though it was unclear whether he or his accomplice fired the gun.

The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, ruling that to be guilty of aiding and abetting a "combination" crime like this, the defendant must have advance knowledge of every element—specifically the gun—in enough time to have a "realistic opportunity" to withdraw from the enterprise.

McVay

Accomplice Liability

a steamship captain and a manager were indicted for manslaughter as accessories before the fact after they allegedly counseled a steamer’s engineer to continue operating a vessel with a dangerously worn-out boiler, which eventually exploded and killed several passengers.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the indictment, establishing the landmark rule that a person can be held liable as an accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter if they intentionally encouraged a reckless or negligent act that they should have foreseen would likely result in death.

Roebuck

Accomplice liability.

— was convicted of third-degree murder as an accomplice after he helped lure a man to an apartment complex where the victim was ambushed and shot to death by another person.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the conviction, resolving a long-standing legal debate by ruling that a defendant can be an accomplice to an unintentional killing (like third-degree murder) as long as they intentionally aided the principal's conduct and acted with the required mental state of malice—defined as a conscious disregard for the extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury.

—s Argument: He contended that it was logically impossible to be an accomplice to an "unintentional" crime, arguing that one cannot "intend" to facilitate a result that was not intended by the shooter.

The Court's Ruling: The court rejected this "logical impossibility" argument, clarifying that accomplice liability depends on the defendant's intent to aid the act itself while sharing the principal's level of culpability (malice or recklessness) regarding the fatal outcome.

Russell

Accomplice liability.

the New York Court of Appeals upheld the second-degree murder convictions of three men who engaged in a mutual gun battle in a public housing complex, resulting in the death of a bystander by a stray bullet, even though ballistics could not prove which specific defendant fired the fatal shot.

The court established that because the defendants tacitly agreed to engage in a "private war" with a shared "community of purpose," they could all be held liable as accomplices for depraved indifference murder regardless of who pulled the trigger.

Luparello

Accomplice liability.

— was convicted of first-degree murder after he hired several men to find and "thump" a former friend to extract information about an ex-girlfriend's whereabouts, resulting in his agents intentionally shooting and killing the man when they confronted him.

The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, ruling that under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is liable for any additional crimes committed by their co-conspirators that are a foreseeable result of the originally intended criminal act (the assault).

Wilcox

Accomplice liability.

—, a magazine editor, was convicted of aiding and abetting an illegal performance by American jazz musician Coleman Hawkins because his presence in the audience, combined with his subsequent favorable reporting on the show, was ruled to be a deliberate act of encouragement for the unauthorized concert.

Hayes

Accomplice liability.

a Missouri man was convicted of burglary for assisting a relative of a store owner in entering the store, unaware that the "accomplice" was actually feigning cooperation to trap him.

The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the burglary conviction, ruling that because the person who actually entered the building lacked the necessary criminal intent, their actions could not be legally attributed to —. This established the principle that for a defendant to be guilty as an accomplice, there must be a "community of motive"—meaning the parties must share the same criminal intent for the act of one to be imputed to the other.

Fact Summary: — proposed a burglary to a man named Hill, who notified the authorities and pretended to help; — opened a window and helped Hill inside, but since Hill only entered to catch — and not to steal, the court found no legal burglary occurred.

Legal Outcome: — could not be convicted of burglary as an accomplice but remained liable for petit larceny for taking a side of bacon Hill handed out to him.

Pinkerton

Conspiracy.

brothers —- operated an illegal whiskey bootlegging business on their shared farm, leading to a multi-count indictment for tax evasion and conspiracy.

At trial, evidence showed that — alone committed most of the specific criminal acts—such as the actual sale and transportation of the whiskey—while — was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary for other crimes during part of the operation. Despite his lack of direct participation in these specific acts, — was convicted of the substantive crimes committed by his brother because he had never affirmatively withdrawn from their ongoing criminal partnership.

Lauria

Conspiracy.

—, the owner of a telephone answering service, was charged with conspiracy to commit prostitution after he admitted to knowing that several of his clients were prostitutes and continued to provide them with messaging services for their business.

The California Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the indictment, ruling that a supplier of lawful goods or services does not become a co-conspirator to a misdemeanor based on mere knowledge of a buyer's illegal intent alone. The court established that for such a supplier to be liable, there must be evidence of an intent to further the criminal activity, which can be inferred if the supplier:

Has a stake in the venture (e.g., charging inflated prices).

Provides goods or services with no legitimate use.

Conducts a disproportionate volume of business with the criminals.

Supplies goods for the commission of an aggravated felony.

Kotteakos

Conspiracy.

thirty-two defendants were indicted for a single massive conspiracy to defraud the government by obtaining fraudulent housing loans through a common broker, Simon Brown, despite evidence showing they were actually involved in eight or more separate, independent "spoke" conspiracies that shared a common "hub" but had no "rim" connecting them to one another.

The Supreme Court overturned the convictions, ruling that trying the defendants together for a single conspiracy when multiple distinct ones existed was a prejudicial error that violated their right to be tried individually rather than en masse.

Bruno

Conspiracy.

eighty-eight defendants were convicted of a single sprawling conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics across the East Coast, despite the smugglers, middlemen, and retailers never meeting, because the court ruled they were all links in a single "chain" with a shared community of interest in the success of the entire operation.

Commonwealth v Carroll

First Degree Murder

a man shot his sleeping wife twice in the head after an exhausting argument, leading the court to rule that premeditation can happen in the blink of an eye—it’s the intent to kill, not the length of time, that makes it first-degree murder.

State v Guthrie

First Degree Murder

a restaurant worker snapped and fatally stabbed a coworker in the neck after being teased with a dish towel, leading the court to rule that premeditation requires a "look before you leap" moment of actual reflection rather than just a split-second impulse. So he won this appeal and the charge of first degree murder was reversed.

Girouard v State

Second Degree Murder

a soldier snapped and stabbed his wife 19 times after she spent the night taunting him about his sexual performance and telling him she wanted a divorce, leading the court to rule that "words alone" are never enough provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter.

The old rigid, majority rule that the provocation needs to fall under a certain category such as witnessing your spouse having intercourse with another.

Maher v People

The Minority Rule on Provocation for Voluntary Manslaughter

a man followed his wife’s lover into a tavern and shot him in the head after being told of their affair just minutes prior, leading the court to rule that provocation is a jury question and "words alone" can be enough if they would drive a reasonable man to lose his self-control.

The modern rule on provocation that information creates the same rage as seeing it yourself.

People v Casassa

Second Degree Murder

a man became obsessed with a neighbor who rejected him and eventually stabbed her to death after breaking into her apartment, leading the court to rule that the "Extreme Emotional Disturbance" defense fails if the defendant’s internal "distress" is so bizarre or self-created that it is not reasonable to the average person.

EED 2 factor test

1. defendnat must have actually experienced EED (court here found that he WAS EED)

2. the EED must be reasonably explained or excused (not so here).

EED usually requires a pre-existing psychiatric condition

Commonwealth v Welansky

Involuntary Manslaughter

a nightclub owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after nearly 500 patrons died in a flash fire because he had locked the emergency exits to prevent "dine and dashes," proving that choosing profit over safety constitutes "wanton and reckless" conduct.

This is opaque recklessness- you don’t appreciate the seriousness of the risk that you’re disregardining. you think you’re doing nothing wrong.

Crucially, the court ruled that it doesn't matter if —- didn't realize the danger. As long as a reasonable person in his position would have known that locking those doors created a grave risk, he is legally reckless.

People v Hall

Criminally Negligent Homicide

a former ski racer flew down a mountain at speeds up to 60 mph and collided with a beginner skier, leading the court to rule that recklessness exists when a person consciously ignores a high risk of death, even if they didn't intend to hurt anyone.

Here he was only convicted of negligence because the jury didn’t think that the state proved that he had subjectively realized that he was risking someone’s life at that moment.

State v Williams

Involuntary Manslaughter

a young Native American couple was convicted of manslaughter after their infant died from an untreated tooth infection because they were too afraid of losing the child to social services to seek medical help, leading the court to clarify that ordinary negligence is enough for manslaughter if the defendant fails to exercise the "ordinary caution" of a reasonable person.

1L Note: This case is famous because the law has since changed. The Washington statute used here was eventually repealed. Today, most jurisdictions would follow the Model Penal Code approach, likely charging this as Negligent Homicide (a lower felony) because it involves a failure to perceive a risk (negligence) rather than a conscious disregard of one (recklessness).

Commonwealth v Malone

Second Degree Murder

a teenager killed his friend while playing a "Russian Roulette" style game with a revolver, leading the court to rule that intentional acts of extreme recklessness constitute "implied malice," making the killing a murder rather than manslaughter.

United States v Fleming

Second Degree Murder

a drunk driver sped down a parkway at 100 mph and veered into oncoming traffic, killing another driver, which led the court to rule that driving with "extreme recklessness" constitutes malice, elevating a typical vehicular death from manslaughter to second-degree murder.

People v Serne

Felony Murder

Facts: The defendants were indicted for murder after allegedly setting fire to a house and shop to collect insurance money, resulting in the deaths of two children, but they were ultimately acquitted by the jury because the prosecution could not prove the fire was started with the intent to kill or with knowledge that death was a probable consequence.

Rule: The court ruled that a felony-murder conviction requires proof that the defendant committed a felony with the knowledge that their act was known to be dangerous to life and likely to cause death, rather than simply holding them strictly liable for any death that occurs during a felony.

People v Phillips

Felony Murder

Facts: A chiropractor was convicted of second-degree murder after a young patient with terminal cancer died following his claim that he could cure her without surgery, but the California Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the felony-murder rule cannot be applied to grand theft because it is not an inherently dangerous felony.

Rule: The California Supreme Court ruled that the felony-murder rule only applies to felonies that are "inherently dangerous to human life" when viewed in the abstract, and since grand theft (even by false pretenses) does not meet this standard, it cannot be used to support a second-degree murder conviction.

Hines v. State

Felony Murder

Facts: The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the felony-murder conviction of a convicted felon who accidentally shot and killed his friend while hunting, ruling that possessing a firearm while impaired by alcohol and firing into dense foliage created a foreseeable risk of death that rendered the status-felony "inherently dangerous."

Rule: The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a status-felony (such as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) can serve as the predicate for felony murder if the defendant's specific conduct—in this case, firing a gun into dense brush while intoxicated—is deemed "inherently dangerous" and creates a foreseeable risk of death.

People v. Burton

Felony Murder

Facts: During an attempted armed robbery at a local business, the defendant and his accomplices entered with loaded firearms, and as the situation escalated, the defendant fired several shots into a crowd of people, resulting in the death of one individual and the wounding of another.

Rule: The California Supreme Court ruled that the merger doctrine does not apply to armed robbery because the crime has an independent felonious purpose (stealing property) separate from the assault, allowing it to serve as the basis for a first-degree felony-murder conviction.

People v. Chun

Felony Murder

Facts: After the defendant and several fellow gang members engaged in a drive-by shooting by firing multiple rounds into another vehicle, a passenger in that car was killed by the gunfire, leading the court to determine if the underlying crime of shooting at an occupied vehicle should "merge" with the resulting death.

Rule: The California Supreme Court ruled that the felony-murder rule cannot be applied if the underlying felony is "assaultive" in nature (such as shooting at an occupied vehicle), because the felony "merges" with the homicide and cannot serve as an independent basis for a murder conviction.

State v. Canola

Felony Murder

Facts: The defendant and three accomplices held up a jewelry store at gunpoint, triggering a shootout with the store owner that resulted in the death of one of the accomplices and the owner's employee, leading the court to decide if a felon can be held liable for a death caused by a victim resisting the crime.

Rule:
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the felony-murder rule does not apply when a death is caused by a third party (like a resisting victim or police officer) rather than the defendant or their accomplices, essentially adopting the "agency theory" of liability (THE KILLING MUST BE IN FURTHERANCE OF THE FELONY).

Gregg v. Georgia

Death Penalty

Facts: After being convicted of a double murder and armed robbery for killing two men who had picked him up while hitchhiking, —- challenged his death sentence, leading the Supreme Court to decide if the death penalty itself violated the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Rule: The Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty does not inherently violate the Eighth Amendment, provided that the legal system includes a bifurcated trial and specific statutory guidelines to prevent the sentence from being imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

Atkins v. Virginia

Death Penalty

Facts: After — was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder for the shooting of a U.S. Airman, his case reached the Supreme Court to determine whether executing a person with intellectual disabilities constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment."

Rule: The Supreme Court ruled that executing individuals with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" because their reduced mental capacity lessens their moral culpability and makes the death penalty's goals of retribution and deterrence inapplicable.

McCleskey v. Kemp

Death Penalty

Facts: After

—- was sentenced to death for the murder of a white police officer during a furniture store robbery, he challenged the ruling using a comprehensive statistical study as evidence of systemic racial bias, but the Supreme Court upheld his sentence, declaring that general statistics are insufficient to prove a constitutional violation without evidence of intentional discrimination in his specific trial.

Rule: To challenge a death sentence under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant must prove that purposeful discrimination existed in their specific case, as general statistical evidence of racial disparities in the legal system is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Rusk

Facts: After meeting at a bar, — took Pat’s car keys and led her to his apartment, where she eventually submitted to sex after he lightly choked her and she became terrified by his "heavy look."

Rule: the "force" required for a rape conviction is satisfied if the defendant’s actions—such as seizing the victim’s property and using psychological intimidation—create an objectively reasonable fear that overcomes the victim's will to resist.

From Professor: Victim’s far must be reasonably grounded to obviate the need for either proof of physical force or physical resistance from the victim.

DiPetrillo

Facts: After staying late at a design firm, — took his teenage employee to dinner and then back to the office, where he used his physical size and position of authority to ignore her verbal protests and forcibly engage in non-consensual sexual contact.

Rule: "force" is established when a defendant uses their physical size and position of authority to overcome a victim's verbal resistance, ruling that a victim is not required to physically resist or experience "additional" violence beyond the non-consensual act itself.

MTS

Facts: the defendant engaged in consensual kissing and heavy petting with a teenager in her bedroom but then proceeded to achieve sexual penetration without her affirmative consent or any additional force beyond the act itself.

Rule: "forcible compulsion" is established by the act of non-consensual penetration itself, meaning no additional physical violence or threats are required as long as the victim did not provide affirmative and freely given permission.

McFadden (rape)

• Facts: —, an "energy healer," performed a massage on a woman at Anini Beach. He touched her anal area, but claimed he honestly believed she consented based on her initial "feedback" and lack of immediate objection.

• Initial Trial: A jury found him guilty of Second-Degree Sexual Assault.

• Appeal Outcome: The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the conviction.

• The Rule: The court ruled that a defendant is entitled to a Mistake of Fact jury instruction regarding consent if there is any evidence—no matter how weak or self-serving—that the defendant honestly believed the victim consented to the sexual contact

Evans

Facts: a defendant posing as a researcher lured a woman into a "social experiment," eventually leading her to a generic apartment where he used a series of elaborate psychological ruses and subtle intimidation to coerce her into sexual intercourse without using overt physical violence.

Rule: a defendant's use of elaborate psychological deception and ruses to obtain sexual intercourse constitutes "fraud in the inducement" rather than "forcible compulsion," meaning that scamming or tricking a victim into sex does not meet the legal definition of rape unless accompanied by actual force or threats of immediate violence.

Sherry

Facts: three doctors took a nurse to a secluded summer home where, despite her repeated verbal protests and clear lack of consent, they engaged in a "group" sexual encounter under the mistaken belief that her lack of physical resistance implied she was merely "playing a game."

Rule: a defendant’s belief in a victim’s consent must be objectively reasonable to serve as a defense, meaning a sincere but unreasonable "mistake of fact" regarding consent does not negate criminal intent for rape.

From Professor: When a woman says “no,” any implication other than a manifestation of non-consent that might arise in that defendant’s mind is legally unreasonable, and thus, the defendant has no mistake of fact defense. A mistake of fact in this context must be both honest and reasonable.

Fischer

• The Scenario: Similar dorm room setup, but — behavior was more aggressive (locking the door) and he infamously claimed he thought "no means yes" based on a consensual encounter earlier that day.

• The Ruling: The conviction stood.

• The Reason: The court rejected the "mistake of fact" defense regarding consent. They ruled that a prior consensual encounter does not create a reasonable belief that a person is consenting when they are saying "no" and being physically pinned down.

Peterson

Facts: After a verbal dispute over a car windshield, — retrieved a pistol from his house and shot an advancing, unarmed victim despite having a safe path to retreat and having initially provoked the confrontation by brandishing the weapon.

Rule: The right to self-defense is barred for an initial aggressor who provokes a conflict or for anyone who fails to fulfill a duty to retreat when a safe path of escape is available.

From professor: The elements of self-defense:

(1) there must be a threat, actual or apparent, of deadly force against the defendant

(2) the threat must be immediate and unlawful.

(3) The defendant must have honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent peril of death or serious injury, and that his response of force, even deadly force, was necessary to save himself.

Goetz

Facts: After four youths on a New York subway approached him and asked for five dollars, —, who had been mugged previously, pulled out an unlicensed pistol and shot all four men, paralyzed one with a final "insurance" shot, and then fled the scene.

Rule: a defendant’s "reasonable belief" in the necessity of deadly force must be evaluated through a hybrid standard, requiring both that the defendant subjectively believed they were in imminent danger and that this belief was objectively reasonable for a person in the defendant’s specific circumstances.

Kelly

Facts: After enduring years of brutal physical and psychological abuse, — stabbed her husband with scissors when he approached her in a public space, leading the court to admit expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome to explain why she perceived an imminent threat of death despite the lack of an immediate weapon.

Rule: expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome is admissible to help the jury determine whether the defendant's belief in the "imminence" of a deadly threat was objectively reasonable based on her specific history of abuse.

From Professor: A woman who has repeatedly been subjected to physical or psychological abuse in cycles of battering, specifically two or more cycles, is defined by experts as a “battered woman.” The specific relevance of the battered woman’s experience to Self Defense is that she is a repeat witness to the batterer’s cyclical behavior toward her and is in the best position to have an honest and reasonable belief that she is about to be attacked by her batterer and that her life is in imminent danger.

Norman

Facts: After enduring twenty years of horrific physical and psychological torture, —- shot her sleeping husband in the back of the head to prevent her own certain death during his next waking hour, leading the court to rule that his "dormant" status at the time of the killing precluded a self-defense claim because the threat was not "imminent."

Rule: a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense in a "non-confrontational" killing because the requirement of "imminent" harm is strictly defined as an immediate, looming threat that is about to happen, rather than an "inevitable" threat posed by a dormant abuser.

Abbott

Facts: the defendant engaged in a physical brawl with a father and son using a hatchet and a kitchen knife, leading the New Jersey Supreme Court to rule that a person cannot use deadly force in self-defense if they have a known, completely safe path to retreat.

Rule: A defendant cannot use deadly force in self-defense if they know they can avoid the necessity of doing so by retreating with complete safety to themselves and others.

Ceballos

Facts: the defendant rigged a loaded .22 caliber target pistol to fire at his garage door when opened, which shot an unarmed teenager in the face, leading the court to rule that the use of deadly mechanical "spring guns" is prohibited because they lack the human discretion to assess whether a deadly threat actually exists.

Rule: The use of a deadly mechanical trap to protect property is prohibited because a device cannot exercise the human discretion necessary to determine if an intruder actually poses the imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm required to justify lethal force.