Cicero

1 Cum defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, rettuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis litteris inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent.

When I at last had been freed either completely, or in a great part, from the work of advocacy and from senatorial duties, I returned especially by your encouragement, Brutus, to those studies, which had stayed in my mind, but which circumstances had made me put aside. I have now resumed them after a long time and great distance, and since all of the arts which pertain to the right way for living, involve reason and discipline for the study of wisdom, which is called philosophy, I thought I must elucidate this in Latin; not because philosophy cannot be learned from Greek writings and instructors, but my judgement has always been that our ancestors showed more wisdom than the Greeks, either in making their own discoveries, or improving upon what they received from them, at least in such subjects they judged worthy of their effort.

2 Nam mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiaris nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius, rem vero publicam nostri maiores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplina. iam illa, quae natura, non litteris adsecuti sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente sunt conferenda. quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda?

For we certainly manage the customs and the habits of life, and the domestic and family affairs better and with more refinement; indeed our ancestors certainly ruled the republic with better institutions and laws. What should I say about military affairs? In this matter we excelled very much not only in courage, but even more so in discipline. Moreover those things, which they pursued/attained by nature, not by study, must be compared neither with Greece nor with any other nation. For what gravity so great, what steadfastness so great, magnitude of spirit, honesty, loyalty, what virtue so distinguished in every respect was there in any people that it ought to be compared with our ancestors.

3 Doctrina Graecia nos et omni litterarum genere superabat; in quo erat facile vincere non repugnantes. nam cum apud Graecos antiquissimum e doctis genus sit poetarum, siquidem Homerus fuit et Hesiodus ante Romam conditam, Archilochus regnante Romulo, serius poeticam nos accepimus. annis fere cccccx post Romam conditam Livius fabulam dedit, C.Claudio,Caeci filio, M.Tuditano consulibus, anno ante natum Ennium. qui fuit maior natu quam Plautus et Naevius.

II. sero igitur a nostris poetae vel cogniti vel recepti. quamquam est in Originibus solitos esse in epulis canere convivas ad tibicinem de clarorum hominum virtutibus; honorem tamen huic generi non fuisse declarat oratio Catonis, in qua obiecit ut probrum M.Nobiliori, quod is in provinciam poetas duxisset; duxerat autem consul ille in Aetoliam, ut scimus, Ennium. quo minus igitur honoris erat poetis, eo minora studia fuerunt, nec tamen, si qui magnis ingeniis in eo genere extiterunt, non satis Graecorum gloriae responderunt.

Greece surpassed us in teaching and all kinds of writing; in such matters it was easy to conquer those not resisting. For since among the Greeks the class of poets was the most ancient class amongst the literati, since indeed Homer and Hesiod lived before Rome had been founded, Archilochus while Romulus was ruling, we received poetry rather late. When 510 years after Rome had been founded, Livy gave us his story in the consulship of Claudius Claudius, the son of Caecus, and Marcus Nobilior, a year before the birth of Ennius, who was older than Plautus and Naevius.

II. Therefore poets were known or received by us at a late date. Although it is stated in the Origins that guests at banquets were accustomed to sing about the virtues of famous men to the accompaniment of a flute player; nonetheless a speech of Cato's made clear that honour was not given to this kind of man, in which he censured Marcus Nobilior because he had led poets into his province; however, as we know, that consul had led Ennius into Aetolia. Therefore the less honour there was for poets, the less study there was, yet however, if any of great talent in that field emerged, they did not fail to match sufficiently the glory of the Greeks.

4 an censemus, si Fabio, nobilissimo homini, laudi datum esset, quod pingeret, non multos etiam apud nos futuros Polyclitos et Parrhasios fuisse? honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur ad studia gloria, iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur. summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus; igitur et Epaminondas, princeps meo iudicio Graeciae, fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur, Themistoclesque aliquot ante annos cum in epulis recusaret lyram, est habitus indoctior. ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt, discebantque id omnes, nec qui nesciebat satis excultus doctrina putabatur.

Or do we believe, if honours had been given to Fabius Pictor, the noblest of men, because he painted, that there would not now be many Polyclitii and Parrhasii amongst us? Esteem nourishes the arts, and all men are inspired by the thought of glory toward pursuit, and those things which are condemned amongst all men, always lie dormant. The Greeks held the opinion that the greatest culture lay in the songs of strings and voices; and therefore Epaminondas, the leading man in Greek history in my opinion, was said to play splendidly with a stringed instrument, whilst a few years ago Themistocles was regarded as deficient in culture since he refused a lyre at a dinner party. Therefore in Greece musicians blossomed, and everyone learned it, and he who did not know was not thought sufficiently cultivated in terms of learning.

5 in summo apud illos honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis inlustrius; at nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum.

III. At contra oratorem celeriter complexi sumus, nec eum primo eruditum, aptum tamen ad dicendum, post autem eruditum. nam Galbam Africanum Laelium doctos fuisse traditum est, studiosum autem eum, qui is aetate anteibat, Catonem, post vero Lepidum, Carbonem, Gracchos, inde ita magnos nostram ad aetatem, ut non multum aut nihil omnino Graecis cederetur. Philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum; quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi.

Geometry was held in the greatest esteem amongst them, so nothing was more illustrious than mathematicians; but we limited the scope of this art to the practical purposes of measuring and calculating.

III. Whereas on the contrary we quickly embraced the orator, and not at first the learned man but the one naturally suited to speaking, and learned afterwards. For tradition tells us that Galba, Africanus and Laelius were learned men, moreover that Cato, who preceded them in generation, was a zealous student, but afterwards was Lepidus, Carbo and the Gracchi, then such great orators down to our own day that not much, or rather nothing at all, has been yielded to the Greeks. Philosophy has lain lifeless up until our day, and has not had any illumination of Latin literature, it must be illuminated and exalted by us, so that, if we were of use to our citizens in anything while employed in public matters, we may likewise be of use, if we can, now I am at leisure.

6 in quo eo magis nobis est elaborandum, quod multi iam esse libri Latini dicuntur scripti inconsiderate ab optimis illis quidem viris, sed non satis eruditis. fieri autem potest, ut recte quis sentiat et id quod sentit polite eloqui non possit; sed mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec inlustrare possit nec delectatione aliqua allicere lectorem, hominis est intemperanter abutentis et otio et litteris. itaque suos libros ipsi legunt cum suis, nec quisquam attingit praeter eos, qui eandem licentiam scribendi sibi permitti volunt. quare si aliquid oratoriae laudis nostra attulimus industria, multo studiosius philosophiae fontis aperiemus, e quibus etiam illa manabant.

In this task we must endeavour more, because already many Latin books are said to have been thoughtlessly written by men certainly meritorious, but insufficiently educated. While it can happen that someone has the right opinion, but is not able to elegantly express that which he feels; but for anyone, who is able neither to arrange nor clarify them, nor capture a reader with any pleasure, to publish their reflections to writing, is characteristic of a man immoderately wasting both leisure and words. Therefore, they read their own books with their own followers, and no one comes in contact with them except those who want the same license for writing to be granted to themselves. Accordingly if we have with our efforts brought forth some amount of praise for oratory, we will open the fonts of philosophy much more eagerly, the source from which those efforts of mine flowed.

7 Sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientia, copia, cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloria, dicere docere etiam coepit adulescentes et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere, sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere et in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari. hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere; in quam exercitationem ita nos studiose [operam] dedimus, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus. ut nuper tuum post discessum in Tusculano cum essent complures mecum familiares, temptavi, quid in eo genere possem. ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est declamatio. ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam.

But just as Aristotle, a man of the highest intelligence, knowledge and means, when he was moved by the fame of Isocrates' rhetoric, also began to teach youth to speak and to combine wisdom with eloquence, similarly I have decided to engage in this greater and more productive art without putting aside the original study of speaking. For I have always judged the perfect philosophy to be this which can speak about the biggest questions fully and richly; we gave ourselves into this practice with such zeal that we even dared already to have debates in the manner of the Greeks. Recently, after your departure, when a few friends were with me in Tusculum, I attempted what I could in that vein. For just as I used to declaim judicial arguments, which no one did for longer than me, so this is now the declamation of my old age. I would invite anyone to propose any subject they wished to hear about; I would debate it either sitting or walking about.

8 itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli. fiebat autem ita ut, cum is qui audire vellet dixisset, quid sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. ergo ita nascetur exordium:

And so I brought together the discourses, as the Greeks would call it, of five days, into the same number of books. But it was done in such a way that, when he who wished to hear [it] had said what he thought to be true, then I would speak against it. For this is, as you know, the ancient Socractic method of arguing against another person’s opinion. For Socrates thought that in this way what was similar to truth could most easily be discovered. But so that our discussions were laid out more conveniently, I will set them out in the form of a debate, not of a narrative. This, then, will be how they begin:

10 M: Dic quaeso: num te illa terrent, triceps apud inferos Cerberus, Cocyti fremitus, travectio Acherontis, “mento summam aquam attingens enectus siti Tantalus?” tum illud, quod “Sisyphus versat saxum sudans nitendo neque proficit hilum?” fortasse etiam inexorabiles iudices, Minos et Rhadamanthus? apud quos nec te L. Crassus defendet nec M. Antonius nec, quoniam apud Graecos iudices res agetur, poteris adhibere Demosthenem: tibi ipsi pro te erit maxima corona causa dicenda. Haec fortasse metuis et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum.

VI. A: Adeone me delirare censes, ut ista esse credam?

M: An tu haec non credis?

A: Minime vero.

M: Male hercule narras.

A: Cur? quaeso.

M: Quia disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem.

M: Tell me, I pray: you are not terrified, are you, by those stories -- three-headed Cerberus in the underworld, the roar of Cocytus, the crossing of Acheron, and ‘Tantalus worn out by thirst, his chin touching the water's surface'? Then there’s that story, that 'Sisyphus rolls the rock, sweating from struggling, and yet does not advance a jot'. Perhaps you fear as well the implacable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus? Before them neither Lucius Crassus nor Marcus Antonius will defend you, nor -- since your case will be heard before Greek judges -- will you be able to use Demosthenes’ services; you will have to plead your own case for yourself before a great crowd. This is the fate, perhaps, you fear, and why you consider death an everlasting evil.
A: Do you think me so deranged as to believe such things?
M: Or do you not believe these things?
A: Truly not in the slightest.
M: Oh, that’s a sad story!
A: Tell me why?
M: Because I could be eloquent if I were to speak against such ideas.

11 A: Quis enim non in eius modi causa? aut quid negotii est haec poëtarum et pictorum portenta convincere?

M: Atqui pleni libri sunt contra ista ipsa disserentium philosophorum.

A: Inepte sane. Quis enim est tam excors quem ista moveant?

M: Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ulli.

A: Ita prorsus existimo.

M: Ubi sunt ergo ii, quos miseros dicis, aut quem locum ineolunt? Si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt.

A: Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto.

M: Igitur ne esse quidem?

A: Prorsus isto modo, et tamen miseros ob id ipsum quidem, quia nulli sint.

A: For who would not be in a case of that kind? Or what trouble is there to refute the monstrous inventions of poets and painters?
M: And yet there are tomes full of philosophers arguing against those very notions.
A: Fatuous, indeed; who is so stupid whom such things would influence?
M: If, then, there are no wretched people in the underworld, no one at all can exist in the underworld.
A: My view exactly.
M: Then where are they, the people you call wretched, or what place do they inhabit? For if they exist, they cannot be nowhere.
A: Indeed I suppose that they are not anywhere.
M: Therefore they do not even exist?
A: Exactly as you say, and yet they are wretched on account of this very thing, because they do not exist.

12 M: Iam mallem Cerberum metueres, quam ista tam inconsiderate diceres.

A: Qui tandem?

M: Quem esse negas, eundem esse dicis. Ubi est acumen tuum? cum enim miserum esse dicis, tum eum, qui non sit, dicis esse.

A: Non sum ita hebes, ut istud dicam.

M: Quid dicis igitur?

A: Miserum esse verbi causa M. Crassum, qui illas fortunas morte dimiserit, miserum Cn. Pompeium, qui tanta gloria sit orbatus, omnes denique miseros, qui hac luce careant.

M: Revolveris eodem. Sint enim oportet, si miseri sunt: tu autem modo negabas eos esse, qui mortui essent. Si igitur non sunt, nihil possunt esse: ita ne miseri quidem sunt.

A: Non dico fortasse etiam quod sentio. Nam istuc ipsum, non esse, cum fueris, miserrimum puto.

M: Now I would prefer that you trembled at Ceberus, than to say such a thoughtless remark.
A: What do you mean?
M: You are saying that the same man exists and does not exist. Where are your wits? For when you say that he is wretched, you are saying that the man who does not exist does exist.
A: I am not so dull-witted as to say that!
M: What are you saying, then?
A: I say that Marcus Crassus, for example, because he lost a fortune through death, is wretched, that Gnaeus Pompey, who was robbed of such great fame, is wretched; finally, all those who abandoned the light are wretched.
M: You return to the same place. For it is necessary that they exist, if they are wretched: but you just now were denying that they, who had died, exist. Therefore if they do not exist, they cannot be anything: thus they are not even wretched.
A: Perhaps I am not saying exactly what I think. For I consider that very state — to not exist, when you have existed — to be most wretched.

13 M: Quid? miserius quam omnino numquam fuisse? Ita qui nondum nati sunt miseri iam sunt, quia non sunt, et nos, si post mortem miseri futuri sumus, miseri fuimus ante quam nati. Ego autem non commemini, ante quam sum natus, me miserum: tu si meliore memoria es, velim scire ecquid de te recordere.

VII. A: Ita iocaris, quasi ego dicam eos miseros, qui nati non sint, et non eos, qui mortui sint.

M: Esse ergo eos dicis.

A: Immo, quia non sint, cum fuerint, eo miseros esse.

M: Pugnantia te loqui non vides? Quid enim tam pugnat quam non modo miserum, sed omnino quidquam esse qui non sit? An tu egressus porta Capena, cum Calatini, Scipionum, Serviliorum, Metellorum sepulcra vides, miseros putas illos?

A: Quoniam me verbo premis, posthac non ita dicam miseros esse, sed tantum miseros, ob id ipsum, quia non sint.

M: Non dicis igitur: “miser est M. Crassus”, sed tantum: “miser M. Crassus”?

A: Ita plane.

M: What? More wretched than to have never existed at all? So those who have not yet been born are already wretched, because they do not exist, and we, if we are going to be wretched after death, have been wretched before we were born? However, I do not remember that I was wretched before I was born: if you are of better memory, I would like to know whether you remember anything about yourself.
A: You are joking in this manner, as if I were saying that those who have not been born are wretched, and not those who have died.
M: Therefore you say that they exist?
A: On the contrary, I say that they are wretched since they do not exist, when they once existed.
M: Don’t you see that you are speaking contradictions? For what can be more of a contradiction than to say that someone who does not exist not only is wretched, but is anything at all? Or do you, having gone out by the Capenan Gate, when you see the tombs of Catalinus, of the Scipii, of the Servilii, of the Metelli, think that those men are wretched?
A: Since you press me with a word, from now on I will not say that they ‘are wretched’, but only call them wretched, on account of this reason since they do not exist.
M: So you do not say: “Marcus Crassus is wretched,” but only: “wretched Marcus Crassus?”
A: Exactly so.

14 M: Quasi non necesse sit, quidquid isto modo pronunties, id aut esse aut non esse. An tu dialecticis ne imbutus quidem es? In primis enim hoc traditur: omne pronuntiatum (sic enim mihi in praesentia occurrit ut appellarem axioma, —utar post alio, si invenero melius) id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. Cum igitur dicis: “miser M. Crassus”, aut hoc dicis: “miser est Crassus”, ut possit iudicari verum id falsumne sit, aut nihil dicis omnino.

A: Age iam concedo non esse miseros, qui mortui sint, quoniam extorsisti ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne miseros quidem esse posse. Quid? qui vivimus, cum moriundum sit, nonne miseri sumus? Quae enim potest in vita esse iucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogitandum sit iam iamque esse moriendum?

M: As if it were not necessary that, whatever you state in that way, must either exist or not exist. Or have you not even been familiarised with elementary logic? For this is among the first principles handed down: every proposition (for this is how it occurs to me at present to translate axiom — I will adopt another term later, if I find a better one) a proposition therefore is a statement which is true or false. Therefore, when you say ‘wretched Marcus Crassus’, either you say this: ‘Marcus Crassus is wretched’, so that it can be determined whether it is true or false, or you say nothing at all.
A: Well, I now concede that those who have died are not wretched, since you extorted me to admit that those who do not exist at all are not even able to be wretched. What of this? Aren’t we who are living, since we must die, wretched? For what delight can exist in life, when through day and night we must reflect that at any moment we must die?

15 VIII. M: Ecquid ergo intelligis quantum mali de humana condicione deieceris?

A: Quonam modo?

M: Quia, si mori etiam mortuis miserum esset, infinitum quoddam et sempiternum malum haberemus in vita: nunc video calcem, ad quam cum sit decursum, nihil sit praeterea extimescendum. Sed tu mihi videris Epicharmi, acuti nec insulsi hominis, ut Siculi, sententiam sequi.

A: Quam? Non enim novi.

M: Dicam, si potero, Latine. Scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere quam in Graeco Latine.

A: Et recte quidem. Sed quae tandem est Epicharmi ista sententia?

M: “Emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihil aestimo.”

A: Iam adgnosco Graecum. sed quoniam coegisti, ut concederem, qui mortui essent, eos miseros non esse, perfice, si potes, ut ne moriendum quidem esse miserum putem.

M: Therefore do you understand at all how great a weight of misery you have cast from the human condition?
A: In what way?
M: Since, if to die were wretched for the dead as well, we would have a certain unlimited and everlasting evil in life: now I see a finish line, when we have reached it, nothing beyond it ought make us afraid. But you seem to me to agree with the aphorism of Epicharmus, a man of perception and not without wit, as one expects of a Sicilian.
A: What saying? I do not know it.
M: I will say it, if I can, in Latin. For you know that I am not used to speaking in Greek in a Latin discourse any more than to speak in Latin in a Greek one.
A: And rightly indeed, but, pray tell, what is that aphorism of Epicharmus?
M: “Dying I shun, but of being dead I nothing reck.”
A: Now I recognise the Greek. But since you have forced me to concede that those who died are not wretched, go on, if you can, to make me think that to have to die is not wretched either.

24 Nam si cor aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, exstinguetur; si est Aristoxeni harmonia, dissolvetur. Quid de Dicaearcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? His sententiis omnibus nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest; pariter enim cum vita sensus amittitur; non sentientis autem nihil est ullam in partem quod intersit. Reliquorum sententiae spem adferunt, si te hoc forte delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in caelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire.

A: Me vero delectat, idque primum ita esse velim, deinde, etiam si non sit, mihi persuaderi tamen velim.

M: Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? Num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? Evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo, amplius quod desideres nihil erit.

A: Feci mehercule et quidem saepius; sed nescio quo modo, dum lego, adsentior; cum posui librum et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum coepi cogitare, adsensio illa omnis elabitur.

For if the soul is the heart or blood or brain, then assuredly, since it is material, it will perish with the rest of the body; if it is breath, it will perhaps be dispersed; if it is fire, it will be put out; if it is the harmony of Aristoxenus, it will vanish away. What should I sasy about Dicaearchus, who says that the soul does not exist at all? According to all these views nothing can affect anyone after death; for sensation is lost along with life; and for one not sensing, there is nothing which makes any difference at all. The opinions of the others offer the hope, if this happens to make you glad, that souls are able, when they have separated from the body, to arrive in heaven as if into their own home.
A: Truly it brings me happiness, and most of all I would like this to be true; then, even if it is not true, nevertheless I would wish to be persuaded it is.
M: What need of our help do you have then? Surely we cannot excel Plato in eloquence? Diligently turn over the pages of that book of his about the soul, it will leave you wanting nothing more.
A: I have done so, I assure you, and often as well; but somehow, while I am reading I agree; yet when I have laid down the book and begin to reflect in my own mind upon the immortality of souls, all that previous assent slips away.

25 M: Quid hoc? dasne aut manere animos post mortem aut morte ipsa interire?

A: Do vero.

M: Quid, si maneant?

A: Beatos esse concedo.

M: Sin intereant?

A: Non esse miseros, quoniam ne sint quidem: nam istuc coacti a te paullo ante concessimus.

M: Quo modo igitur aut cur mortem malum tibi videri dicis? quae aut beatos nos efficiet animis manentibus aut non miseros sensu carentes?

M: Why is this? Do you grant that souls either survive after death or they perish at death itself?
A: I do grant this.
M: What if they survive?
A: I admit that they are happy.
M: But should they perish?
A: I concede that they are not wretched, since they do not even exist: for, having been compelled by you, we conceded that very thing a little while back.
M: How, then, or why do you say that death seems an evil to you when it will either make us happy when our souls survived, or not wretched once we have lost sensation?

18 M: Mors igitur ipsa, quae videtur notissima res esse, quid sit, primum est videndum. sunt enim qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem; sunt qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed una animum et corpus occidere, animumque in corpore extingui. qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. quid sit porro ipse animus, aut ubi, aut unde, magna dissensio est. aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex quo excordes, vecordes concordesque dicuntur et Nasica ille prudens bis consul 'Corculum' et 'egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus'.

M: Therefore we must first see what death itself, which seems to be a very familiar thing, actually is. For there are those who think that the departure of the soul from the body is death; some think that no departure happens, but that the soul and the body die together, and that the soul is annhilated in the body. Of those who believe that the soul departs, some hold that it is immediately broken up, others that it continues to exist for a long time, others that it survives forever. Furthermore, what the soul is, where it is, from where it comes, there is great disagreement. To some the soul seems to be the actual heart, from which people are called ‘heartless’ (excordes), ‘in need of heart’ (vecordes), and ‘of one heart’ (concordes) and the wise Nasica, twice consul, was called ‘Little heart’ (Corculum) and there was ‘the man of outstanding heart, shrewd Aelius Sextus.

117 Quae cum ita sint, magna tamen eloquentia est utendum atque ita velut superiore e loco contionandum, ut homines mortem vel optare incipiant vel certe timere desistant? nam si supremus ille dies non extinctionem, sed commutationem adfert loci, quid optabilius? sin autem perimit ac delet omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitae laboribus obdormiscere et ita coniventem somno consopiri sempiterno? quod si fiat, melior Enni quam Solonis oratio. hic enim noster: 'nemo me lacrimis decoret' inquit 'nec funera fletu faxit!' at vero ille sapiens: 'Mors mea ne careat lacrimis: linquamus amicis Maerorem, ut celebrent funera cum gemitu.'

This being the case, we must draw upon great eloquence and publically declare, as if from a pulpit, the message to mankind to either begin to wish for death or at least stop fearing it. For if that final day brings not annhilation but a change of abode, what more can be wished for? But if it destroys and wipes us out altogether, what is better than to fall asleep in the midst of the toils of life, and thus, closing our eyes, to be lulled into everlasting sleep? If this were to happen, the speech of Ennius is better than Solon’s. For our poet says: ‘Let no one honour me with tears, nor hold my funeral with weeping.’ But here wise Solon says: ‘Let my death not lack tears: let us leave sorrow to friends so that they may celebrate my funeral with sounds of mourning.’

118 nos vero, si quid tale acciderit, ut a deo denuntiatum videatur ut exeamus e vita, laeti et agentes gratias paremus emittique nos e custodia et levari vinclis arbitremur, ut aut in aeternam et plane in nostram domum remigremus aut omni sensu molestiaque careamus; sin autem nihil denuntiabitur, eo tamen simus animo, ut horribilem illum diem aliis nobis faustum putemus nihilque in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a diis inmortalibus vel a natura parente omnium constitutum. non enim temere nec fortuito sati et creati sumus, sed profecto fuit quaedam vis, quae generi consuleret humano nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod cum exanclavisset omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis malum sempiternum: portum potius paratum nobis et perfugium putemus.

For our part, if any such thing should happen that it seems a sentence passed by the god that we should leave life, let us obey happily and with gratitude, and let us regard ourselves as being released from custody and relieved of our chains, so that we may move on to an eternal home plainly our own, or else lose all sensation and vexation; but if however no sentence is delivered, let us nevertheless be of that mindset so that we regard that day, so fearful to others, as favourable to us, and count nothing evil which was established either by the immortal gods or by nature, the mother of all. For we were not begotten and created not through blind chance, but without doubt there has existed some power to take thought for the human race and not give birth or nurture something which, after it had suffered the manifold burdens of hardship, then fall into the everlasting evil of death: rather, let us think that a port and refuge has been prepared for us.