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Input - Knechel, 2013 AQ
Motivated reasoning
Professional skepticism
Knowledge en expertise
Within form pressure
Process - Knechel, 2013 AQ
During the audit
Cognitive biases: anchoring, confirmation, hindsight and dilution bias
Risk assessment is weak
Accountability bias bc of review processes
Time pressure
Output/ outcomes - Knechel, 2013 AQ
Proxies for a good audit
Restatements
Discretionary accruals
Going concern opinions
==> binary vs continued
Context - Knechel, 2013 AQ
Surrounding factors
Audit fees
Non audit services
Auditor tenure
Partner compensation
Regulation and inspection
AQ definition DeAngelo = Knechel, 2013 AQ
The market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both discover a breach in a client’s accounting system and report the breach
two compenents: Competence and independence
Independence in fact - Gramling, 2010
The auditor is actually unbiased
==> affects audit quality
Independence in appearance - Gramling, 2010
A normal, informed person would think that the auditor is unbiased
==> affects public trust
Threats to independence - Gramling, 2010
Self interest
Self review
Advocacy
Familiarity
Intimidation
SEC independence rule areas - Gramling, 2010
Financial, business and employment relationships
Non audit services (NAS)
Fees
Rotation
The audit committee
Financial, business and employment relationships - Gramling, 2010
Independence in fact ==> limited effect
Independence in appearance ==> negative effect
Non audit services - Gramling, 2010
Independence in fact ==> mixed
Independence in appearance ==> negative
Fees - Gramling, 2010
Independence in fact ==> mixed
Independence in appearance ==> negative
Rotation - Gramling, 2010
Partner and firm rotation
Independence in fact ==> mixed
Independence in appearance ==> positive
The audit committee - Gramling, 2010
Independence in fact ==> mixed
Independence in appearance ==> positive
Structural factors that influence auditors - Bazerman, 2002 (unconscious bias)
Ambiguity
Attachment
Approval
=> accounting
Familiarity
Discounting
Escalating
==> human nature
SOX - Fiolleau, 2013
Sorbonne’s Oxley act ==> Audit committee have formal authority over auditor selection and oversight
Dominant vs alternative
Dominant view: Audit committee lead to expertise and more independence
Alternative view: Audit committee is more a ceremonial role, management is still in charge.
Financial reporting supply chain - Knechel, 2020 (service perspective)
Auditor-client relationship is crucial ==> co creation of value
traditional view vs service view ==> Ironic conundrum
Ironic conundrum - Knechel, 2020 (service perspective)
regulation that tries to maximize independence by reducing cooperation may actually reduce audit quality,
because it destroys the collaborative relationship that makes a good audit possible
Unintended consequences of regulation - Knechel, 2016 (regulation)
Boilerplate document
Shadow standards
Over auditing
Less tailoring
Consequences high empolyee turnover - Khavis & Szervo, 2025 (human capital)
Increase audit fees
Reduces audit delivery quality
Lower audit quality
Higher restatements and discretionary accruals
Lower going concern options
2 Theories
Human capital theory => loss of expertise
Social capital theory => loss op relationships