IAH 206 - Exam Three

Moral Responsibilities in Science

• Responsibilities in the Practice of Science

  • No fraud

  • Avoid QRPs

  • Careful reporting of data

  • Careful development of criticisms 

• Responsibilities of the Scientific Community

  • Respectful debate

  • Supporting diverse members of the scientific community

  • Mentoring obligations

• Responsibilities to Society

  • Good treatment of human subjects

  • No new destructive capacities?

  • Don’t make the world worse!

Responsibilities in the Practice of Science (Moral Responsibilities in Science)

• No fraud

• Avoid QRPs

• Careful reporting of data

• Careful development of criticisms 

Responsibilities of the Scientific Community (Moral Responsibilities in Science)

• Respectful debate

• Supporting diverse members of the scientific community

• Mentoring obligations

Responsibilities to Society (Moral Responsibilities in Science)

• Good treatment of human subjects

• No new destructive capacities?

• Don’t make the world worse!

The Research Agenda

• What do scientists choose to pursue?

  • Inside the “academic bubble.” 

  • Implications of research for broader society?

• What are the forces shaping the research agenda?

  • Beliefs about responsibilities, scientists' choices

  • Funding, incentives, prizes

What do scientists choose to pursue? (The Research Agenda)

• Inside the “academic bubble.” 

• Implications of research for broader society?

What are the forces shaping the research agenda? (The Research Agenda)

• Beliefs about responsibilities, scientists' choices

• Funding, incentives, prizes

The Nature of Responsibility

• Causal vs. Moral

  • Causal: What did I cause?

  • Moral: What is praise-worthy and blame-worthy?

• Many causal responsibilities do not involve moral responsibilities

  • E.g., events over which one has no control

  • E.g., events over which no one could have decided better

• Some moral responsibilities involve a lack of direct causal action

  • E.g., a failure to provide care

Causal vs. Moral (The Nature of Responsibility)

• Causal: What did I cause?

• Moral: What is praise-worthy and blame-worthy?

Many causal responsibilities do not involve moral responsibility (The Nature of Responsibility)

• E.g., events over which one has no control

• E.g., events over which no one could have decided better

Some moral responsibilities involve a lack of direct causal action (the Nature of Responsibility)

• E.g., a failure to provide care

Moral Responsibility

• What are we morally responsible for?

• What we intend

• What is foreseeable

  • Recklessness 

  • Negligence

• Foreseeability bounds

  • Reasonable person standard

  • Part of a community’s discussion

  • Anyone should have seen…

  • NOT sci-fi speculation

  • Grounded plausibility 

What is foreseeable (Moral Responsibility)

• Recklessness 

• Negligence

Foreseeability Bounds (Moral Responsibility)

• Reasonable person standard

• Part of a community’s discussion

• Anyone should have seen…

• NOT sci-fi speculation

• Grounded plausibility 

Moral Responsibility for Societal Impact in Science

• Suppose a scientist creates a virus that escapes the lab and kills people

  • When are they morally responsible?

    • If they create it with the intent to kill

    • If they created the virus under conditions that failed to meet biosafety standards (recklessness)

    • If they created the virus and accidentally released it because they were sloppy (even with biosafety measures in place)

    • If they created the virus but didn’t think it would be dangerous 

    • If they accidentally created the virus and accidentally released it

Changes to Freedom and Responsibility in Science

• 1940-2000

  • Freedom for scientists meant, in part, freedom of responsibility

  • Particularly for basic research (vs. applied)

  • Responsibility for societal impact was thought to hamper the pursuit of knowledge

  • The attainment of knowledge was worth any impact 

• 2000 - today

  • Freedom only comes with responsibility 

1940-2000 (Changes to Freedom and Responsibility in Science)

• Freedom for scientists meant, in part, freedom of responsibility

• Particularly for basic research (vs. applied)

• Responsibility for societal impact was thought to hamper the pursuit of knowledge

• The attainment of knowledge was worth any impact 

2000 - today (Changed to Freedom and Responsibility in Science)

• Freedom only comes with responsibility 

Freedom from —> with Responsibility

• AAAS 1975 Edsall Report

  • For basic researchers: no responsibilities for implications/impacts of work (for the 20th century)

  • For applied researchers: responsibilities met by institutional constraints

• By 2010, the grounds were shifting

  • Too many exceptions were rising

  • Dual-use concerns arising across science

  • On Being A Scientist (2009, 3rd ed.) 

    • “The standards of science extend beyond responsibilities that are internal to the scientific community. Researchers also have a responsibility to reflect on how their work and the knowledge they are generating might be used in the broader society.”

AAAS 1975 Edsall Report (Responsibility from —> with science)

• For basic researchers: no responsibilities for implications/impacts of work (for the 20th century)

• For applied researchers: responsibilities met by institutional constraints

By 2010, the grounds were shifting (Responsibility from —> with science)

• Too many exceptions were rising

• Dual-use concerns arising across science

• On Being A Scientist (2009, 3rd ed.) 

  • “The standards of science extend beyond responsibilities that are internal to the scientific community. Researchers also have a responsibility to reflect on how their work and the knowledge they are generating might be used in the broader society.”

International Science Council (2021)

• “Scientific freedom must come with social responsibility, for scientists in all areas of research.”

Freedom and Responsibility in the 21st Century

• Freedom (autonomy) comes with responsibility

  • The more responsibility a scientist bears, the more freedom/autonomy they have

  • The more freedom a scientist bears, the more responsibility they have

Bridgman

• scientists are NOT responsible for the impacts of their findings

• free to do whatever

  • study what you want to study

• RESPONSIBILITY INHIBITS SCIENCE

• basic scientists - not worry about impacts

• applied scientists - worry about impacts

  • this is NOT real

Douglas

• scientific freedom ONLY comes with responsibility

  • the more freedom that a scientist has, the more responsibility they hold

• responsible for reasonable + foreseeable implications

  • avoid recklessness

  • avoid negligence

    • not seeing / recognizing clear happenings

Responsibility vs. Accountability

• Moral responsibility:

  • Duties and obligations

  • Floor AND Ideals

• Accountability:

  • What you can be held accountable for

    • What you are asked to give an account for

  • Clear mechanisms for implementation 

  • About floors, not ideals

Moral Responsibility (Responsibility vs. Accountability)

• Duties and obligations

• Floor AND Ideals

Accountability (Responsibility vs. Accountability)

• What you can be held accountable for

  • What you are asked to give an account for

• Clear mechanisms for implementation 

• About floors, not ideals

What are the floors and ideals for the societal impacts of science

• Individual minimum floor:

  • Don’t make the world worse

• Individual Ideal:

  • Make the world better 

• Communal minimum floor:

  • Make the world better 

• Communal Ideal:

  • Make the world sustainably better

Ways to help scientists with responsibilities

• Oversight/accountability mechanisms 

  • Responsibility is partially or fully offloaded to someone else

  • Problem of checklist culture

• Research Ethics Consultations (RECs)

• Socio-technical integration protocols (STIR)

• Better responsible conduct of research (RCR) education

  • More than internal to science issues

  • More than human and animal subject protections

  • Learning to think about impact in the shaping of the research agenda

Oversight/accountability measures (ways to help scientists with responsibilities)

• Responsibility is partially or fully offloaded to someone else

• Problem of checklist culture

Better responsible conduct of research (RCR) education (ways to help scientists with responsibilities)

• More than internal to science issues

• More than human and animal subject protections

• Learning to think about impact in the shaping of the research agenda

Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline

1. Researchers

   1. Let's see what we can discover

      1. Someone else will worry about turning work into a product (application)

2. Applied Scientists

   1. Let’s see if we can make this practice work 

      1. Surely the researchers already thought about the impacts of the work

3. Product Teams

   1. Let’s see if we can turn this into a product

      1. People have already put so much work into making this possible

4. Marketing

   1. Let’s see who is interested in this

      1. It’s our job to market the product, not to think about the possible harmful effects

5. Consumers

   1. Let’s see what this does

      1. Surely they won’t market something problematic!

6. Problem:

   1. No one is taking responsibility for impact; no foresight is exercised 

      1. Few are trained to think about the societal impact(s) of their work!

1. Researchers (Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline)

• Let's see what we can discover

  • Someone else will worry about turning work into a product (application)

2. Applied Scientists (Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline)

• Let’s see if we can make this practice work 

  • Surely the researchers already thought about the impacts of the work

3. Product Teams (Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline)

• Let’s see if we can turn this into a product

  • People have already put so much work into making this possible

4. Marketing (Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline)

• Let’s see who is interested in this

  • It’s our job to market the product, not to think about the possible harmful effects

5. Consumers (Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline)

• Let’s see what this does

  • Surely they won’t market something problematic!

Problem (Wallach’s Research to Practice Pipeline)

• No one is taking responsibility for impact; no foresight is exercised 

  • Few are trained to think about the societal impact(s) of their work!

Dual-Use vs. Dangerous Research

• Dual-Use Research

  • Two uses: 

    • Beneficial discovery

    • Harmful use

  • Research is not intended to be harmful, but it could be used to cause harm

    • Not weapons research!

  • Requires a malicious actor who uses research for harmful purposes 

• Dangerous Research:

  • Research that brings a substantial risk if accidents occur 

  • Does not require malicious actors

  • Response: manage risks with procedures and materials 

Dual-Use Research

• Two uses: 

  • Beneficial discovery

  • Harmful use

• Research is not intended to be harmful, but it could be used to cause harm

  • Not weapons research!

• Requires a malicious actor who uses research for harmful purposes 

Dangerous Research

• Research that brings a substantial risk if accidents occur 

• Does not require malicious actors

• Response: manage risks with procedures and materials 

20th Century: rDNA Discovery - Dangerous Research and Biosafety

• 1970s:

  • Gene-editing abilities arise

    • Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology

    • They were not very precise (compared with CRISPR)

• How should this new technology be governed?

• Paul Berg’s Early Experiments

  •  Combining the virus that caused cancer in mice with a bacteriophage

  • Was going to put it into E. coli

    • Should he?

1972 Asilomar Conference - Dangerous Research and Biosafety

• 1974: The National Academy of Sciences raised concerns about rDNA 

  • Should there be a moratorium on such research?

• 1975: Paul Berg organizes a conference to discuss the issue at Asilomar, CA

• The main discussions focus on containment and risk

  • What kinds of (micro)organisms are being used?

  • What kinds of changes are being introduced?

• Levels of Risk: Minimal, Low, Moderate, High

  • Different practices and infrastructure are needed at different levels

The Main Discussions Focus on Containment and Risk (1975 Asilomar Conference)

• What kinds of (micro)organisms are being used?

• What kinds of changes are being introduced?

History of Lab Leaks (a sampling)

• 1967: Marburg virus outbreak in Germany (31 deaths)

• 1966-1978: Smallpox lab infections (less than a dozen deaths)

• 1978: Foot and mouth disease was released from the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in US

• 2003-2004: SARS infection from laboratory exposure

• 2004: Another foot and mouth disease outbreak from Plum Island 

• 2007: Foot and mouth disease lab leak outbreak in the UK leads to culling of 2000 animals

• 2013: H5N1 needlestick accident in the US

• 2014: Dengue needlestick outbreak in South Korea

History of Dual-Use Research

• 2001: US Anthrax Attacks

  • The idea that someone with technical ability could deliberately intend to harm

• 2005: The National Security Advisory Board on Biosafety (NSABB) formed

  • Tasked with providing advice on dual-use research in biosciences

  • Advisory body

• 2010: The US Select Agent List was created

  • Studies on particular toxins or pathogens

  • Studies that could make these entities more dangerous

  • Biosafety level concerns

  • Need to get approval for work with “select agents”

Dual-Use Research - Policy Issues

• Dual-Use Research → Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC)

  • Risks of substantial harm

  • Risks of easy use

  • Attempt to circumscribe areas of concern

    • E.g., Select agent lists in the US

  • This has not been a successful delineation

Failure of Delineation

• Within research on pathogens, what might be dual-use research can shift quickly

  • As shown with the H5N1 case

  • No listing of coronavirus before 2019

• Lots of other areas of science also have dual-use concerns

  • Mathematics and cryptography

  • Quantum computing and cryptography

  • AI and pathogen creation

  • Physics and Isotope Separation

  • Chemistry and chemical weapons

• Scientists can quickly discover that their area of research can be weaponized

Within research on pathogens, what might be dual-use research can shift quickly (Failure of Delineation)

• As shown with the H5N1 case

• No listing of coronavirus before 2019

Many other areas of science have dual-use concerns (Failure of Delineation)

• Mathematics and cryptography

• Quantum computing and cryptography

• AI and pathogen creation

• Physics and Isotope Separation

• Chemistry and chemical weapons

H5N1 and gain-of-function research

• H5N1 Avian Flu

  • Widespread problem in bird populations

  • Jumps to humans in close contact with infected poultry

  • High human mortality rate (up to 60%)

• Gain-of-Function Research

  • Funded by the United States

  • Trying to make the virus gain a function 

  • Use ferrets (they sneeze)

    • Similar nasal passages to humans

    • Can contract the Flu

• Result:

  • Yes, H5N1 could be transmissible

    • What should be done with this result?

H5N1 Avian Flu (H5N1 and gain-of-function research)

• Widespread problem in bird populations

• Jumps to humans in close contact with infected poultry

• High human mortality rate (up to 60%)

Gain-of-function Research (H5N1 and gain-of-function research)

• Funded by the United States

• Trying to make the virus gain a function 

• Use ferrets (they sneeze)

  • Similar nasal passages to humans

  • Can contract the Flu

H5N1 and the NSABB

• Researchers Fouchier & Kawaoka submit papers to Science and Nature 

  • With details of mutations making the virus transmissible

• Journal Editors as NSABB for advice

  • Should we publish these papers?

  • Should we withhold some parts?

• NSABB’s first decision (2011): Redact some details

  • Journals accept advice

  • Moratorium on gain-of-function research self-imposed

• NSABB’s second decision (2012): Publish it all

  • How should we share details with researchers who need to know?

  • Published papers in full in 2012

• Another moratorium on gain-of-function research

  • Imposed by the NIH 

  • Motivated by the Biosafety protocol lapses in 2014

Patchwork of Current Regulatory Mechanisms

1. Granting Agency Oversight

2. Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs)

3. Select Agent Lists 

4. Dual-Use Publication Committees (journals)

5. The National Science Advisory Board on Biosafety (NSABB)

6. Export Controls 

7. Gain-of-function oversight?

   1. Or should it be enhanced by potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP) research?

8. Note: IRBs cannot do this research!

   1. It's not human subject research 

How Oversight Can Fail - Horsepox Reconstruction

• Professor David Evans at the University of Alberta reconstructs Horsepox from mail-ordered DNA bits

  • “Did not require exceptional biochemical knowledge or skills, significant funds or significant time” (2016 report)

  • Funded by a private company, headed by an Edward Jenner enthusiast 

  • Motivation - to create safer vaccines (but they already did exist!)

• Evans checked with the University of Alberta and the Canadian government before proceeding

  • Not illegal to reconstruct Horsepox (it is to reconstruct smallpox!)

  • Horsepox is not on any select agent list 

• Dual-Use Dangers

  • Horsepox is very similar to smallpox

  • Instructions for reconstructing one are likely to work very well for the other 

  • The genetic sequence for smallpox is already published

Professor David Evans at the University of Alberta reconstructs Horsepox from mail-ordered DNA bits (How Oversight Can Fail - Horsepox Reconstruction)

• “Did not require exceptional biochemical knowledge or skills, significant funds or significant time” (2016 report)

• Funded by a private company, headed by an Edward Jenner enthusiast 

• Motivation - to create safer vaccines (but they already did exist!)

Evans checked with the University of Alberta and the Canadian government before proceeding (How Oversight Can Fail - Horsepox Reconstruction)

• Not illegal to reconstruct Horsepox (it is to reconstruct smallpox!)

• Horsepox is not on any select agent list 

Dual-Use Dangers (How Oversight Can Fail - Horsepox Reconstruction)

• Horsepox is very similar to smallpox

• Instructions for reconstructing one are likely to work very well for the other 

• The genetic sequence for smallpox is already published

Reasons Scientists Give for Pursuing Dual-Use Research

• Harmful use is not what I intended

  • Importance of moral responsibility - recklessness and negligence

  • Not just about researchers’ intentions

  • Responsibility is bound by foreseeability!

• The work is inevitable

  • May not be true

  • Inevitability is not exculpatory generally

• It is someone else’s job to ensure bad outcomes don’t happen

  • Current oversight mechanisms do not ensure this

  • If you can’t say whose job it is, it is your job!

• It is worth the risks

  • Who should make this decision?

Harmful Use is Not What I Intended (Reasons Scientists Give for Pursuing Dual-Use Research)

• Importance of moral responsibility - recklessness and negligence

• Not just about researchers’ intentions

• Responsibility is bound by foreseeability!

The Work is Inevitable (Reasons Scientists Give for Pursuing Dual-Use Research)

• May not be true

• Inevitability is not exculpatory generally

It Is Someone Elses Job to Ensure Bad Things Don’t Happen (Reasons Scientists Give for Pursuing Dual-Use Research)

• Current oversight mechanisms do not ensure this

• If you can’t say whose job it is, it is your job!

It is worth the risk (Reasons Scientists give for Dual-Use Research)

• Who should make this decision?

Challenges for Dual-Use Governance

• Scientists have not yet fully embraced societal responsibility

  • Underlying belief that more knowledge is generally good

  • Under the presumption that knowledge should be shared

• Regulatory mechanisms are NOT built for fully responsible research

  • Lots of dual-use research does not involve select agent list entities

    • Lots of dual-use research is NOT bioscience

  • Publication oversight is often misguided or too late (e.g., horsepox reconstruction)

  • Restricted sharing systems not in place (10+ years after H5N1)

• Science involves Genuine Discovery

  • We don’t know where the next case of dual-use research will occur

Scientists have not fully embraced societal responsibility (Challenges for Dual-Use Governance)

• Underlying belief that more knowledge is generally good

• Under the presumption that knowledge should be shared

Regulatory Mechanisms are NOT built for fully responsible research (Challenges for Dual-Use Governance)

• Lots of dual-use research does not involve select agent list entities

  • Lots of dual-use research is NOT bioscience

• Publication oversight is often misguided or too late (e.g., horsepox reconstruction)

• Restricted sharing systems not in place (10+ years after H5N1)

Science involves Genuine Discovery (Challenges for Dual-Use Governance)

• We don’t know where the next case of dual-use research will occur

Weapons Research

• Deliberately attempting to produce a weapon

• Why would a scientist do this?

• Current International Law

  • Biological Weapons Convention (1972)

  • Chemical Weapons Convention (1925, 1997)

Radioactive Decay

• Radioactive decay products

  • Alpha (He nucleus)

  • Beta (an electron)

  • Gamma (electro-magnetic wave)

Radioactive Decay - What Can You Use It For?

• Radioactive decay products to irradiate things

  • Radium for cancer treatment

  • Radium for watch dials

• Radioactive decay to explore the structure of the atom (and nucleus)

  • Used alpha particles to discover the presence of the nucleus in 1905

  • Using neutrons to change the isotope - and potentially produce decay 

• All small bits, very hard to control

Radioactive Decay Products to Irradiate Things (Radioactive Decay - What Can it Be Used For?)

• Radium for cancer treatment

• Radium for watch dials

Radioactive decay to explore the structure of the atom (and nucleus) (Radioactive Decay - What Can it Be Used For?)

• Used alpha particles to discover the presence of the nucleus in 1905

• Using neutrons to change the isotope - and potentially produce decay 

Discovery of Fission (1938) - A Field Turns on a Dime

• Hahn & Strassman notice an odd chemical signature

• Meitner & Frisch interpret the result

  • Practical extraction of nuclear energy becomes possible

• Words spread (among nuclear physicists) 

  • Even in an age without commercial air travel or the internet 

When to stop publishing? - The Discovery of Fission (1938)

• Backdrop of the coming WWII

  • Hitler annexed Austria in March of 1938

  • War will officially begin in September of 1939, but everyone knows it's coming

• There was a debate in 1939 on whether or not to stop publishing 

  • Neutron multiplication

  • Cross-section of carbon (a potential moderator)

    • Crucial! 

Backdrop of the coming WWII (When to stop publishing? - Discovery of Fission, 1938)

• Hitler annexed Austria in March of 1938

• War will officially begin in September of 1939, but everyone knows it's coming

There was a debate in 1939 on whether or not to stop publishing (When to stop publishing? - Discovery of Fission, 1938)

• Neutron multiplication

• Cross-section of carbon (a potential moderator)

  • Crucial! 

Nuclear Weapons Primer

• Fission - A nucleus splits, releasing massive energy

  • Key issue: whether or not a chain reaction will occur

• Fissionable Isotopes U235 and Pu239

  • Hanford produces Pu239

  • Oak Ridge produces U235

• Critical Mass

  • Slow chain reaction (nuclear power)

    • Using a moderator to slow neutrons down

  • Fast chain reaction possible (bomb)

• Bomb designs

  • U235 and the gun design 

  • Pu239 and the compression sphere

• Fusion - Two nuclei fuse together (H+H = He)

  • Hydrogen bombs, triggered by fission weapons

  • Unlimited amount of power

Fission - A Nucleus Splits, Releasing Copious amounts of energy (Nuclear Weapons Primer)

Key issue: whether or not a chain reaction will occur

Fissionable Isotopes U235 and Pu239 (Nuclear Weapons Primer)

• Hanford produces Pu239

• Oak Ridge produces U235

Critical Mass (Nuclear Weapons Primer)

• Slow chain reaction (nuclear power)

  • Using a moderator to slow neutrons down

• Fast chain reaction possible (bomb)

Bomb Designs (Nuclear Weapons Primer)

• U235 and the gun design 

• Pu239 and the compression sphere

Fusion - Two nuclei fuse together (H+H=He) (Nuclear Weapons Primer)

• Hydrogen bombs, triggered by fission weapons

• Unlimited amount of power

Niels Bohr (1855-1962)

• Danish physicist

• Founded the Institute for Theoretical Physics at the University of Copenhagen in 1920

• Wins the Nobel Prize in 1922 for work on the structure of the atom

• Quantized orbitals for electrons around the nucleus

• Developed ideas of complementarity, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics

Margarethe Bohr (1890-1985)

• Studying to be a French teacher

• Married Niels Bohr in 1912

• Key collaborator, transcriber, and editor for her husband’s work

• Had six sons

  • Harald died at 10 (meningitis)

  • Christian died at 18 (boating accident)

Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976)

• German physicist

• Meets Bohr in June of 1922

• Appointed as a professor at Leipzig in 1927

• Wins the Nobel Prize in 1932 for the development of quantum mechanics

Quantum Mechanics Basics

• At a subatomic level, stuff gets weird

• Wave-Particle Duality

  • Light as a photon, as a wave

  • Electron as a particle, as a wave

• Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg)

  • Can’t precisely know the location AND speed of an electron 

    • Detecting either requires an interaction (e.g., a photon)

Wave-Particle Duality (Quantum Mechanics Basics)

• Light as a photon, as a wave

• Electron as a particle, as a wave

Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg) (Quantum Mechanics Basics)

• Can’t precisely know the location AND speed of an electron 

  • Detecting either requires an interaction (e.g., a photon)

Copenhagen’s Story

• Heisenberg goes to Copenhagen in September 1941

• Denmark is under Nazi German occupation 

• Heisenberg is in charge of the Nazi bomb program 

• What does he want to speak to Bohr about? What is said?

The Uncertainty of the Bomb

• How much fissile material (U235 and Pu239) was needed to make the bomb?

  • Question of “critical mass”

    • How much plutonium is needed critically changes how the bomb is made

    • Could that much Plutonium even be made?

• How big would the explosion be?

  • Question of the speed of fission, speed for fast neutrons

• How feasible would it be to separate U235 from U238?

• How much Pu239 could be made in a U238 reactor?

  • Need a moderator to slow neutrons down 

  • Heavy water or carbon

    • The cross-section of carbon was kept secret (Germans couldn’t get it right)

  • Need for cadmium to stop the reaction!

    • Drop into the reactor to stop the neutrons and stop the reaction from happening 

Question of “Critical Mass” (Uncertainty of the Bomb)

• How much plutonium is needed critically changes how the bomb is made

• Could that much Plutonium even be made?

How much Pu239 could be made in a U238 Reactor? (Uncertainty of the Bomb)

• Need a moderator to slow neutrons down 

• Heavy water or carbon

  • The cross-section of carbon was kept secret (Germans couldn’t get it right)

• Need for cadmium to stop the reaction!

  • Drop into the reactor to stop the neutrons and stop the reaction from happening 

Problems with Interpreting History

• Why did Heisenberg go to see Bohr?

  • Heisenberg only wrote about the event after WWII was over

    • Would be considered treason in the time of the war

• Evidence is spotty and incomplete (for good reasons)

  • Historians still debate what the evidence means 

  • Parallels with quantum mechanics

    • Uncertainty 

    • Measurement and key intervention 

Why did Heisenberg go see Bohr? (Problems with Interpreting History)

• Heisenberg only wrote about the event after WWII was over

  • Would be considered treason in the time of the war

Evidence is spotty and incomplete (for good reason) (Problems with Interpreting History)

• Historians still debate what the evidence means 

• Parallels with quantum mechanics

  • Uncertainty 

  • Measurement and key intervention 

The Fate of the German Bomb Project

Led by Heisenberg

• Incorrect critical mass amount 

  • Weird, given how good a mathematician Heisenberg was 

• Incorrect understanding of carbon as a moderator

• Loss of heavy water from Norway

• Loss of talent to the Allies

• Aerial bombing pressure

• Lack of drive among the scientists left?

Did Heisenberg Control the Project so it Could Fail?

• Ensuring Failure?

  • Asking for too little money 

  • Never telling the Nazis about Plutonium 

  • Not getting an accurate calculation of the critical mass needed 

    • Heisenberg was an INCREDIBLE physicist; he should have gotten it right?

• While staying in control of the project

  • Trying to keep the physicists occupied 

    • Not on the battlefields

  • Trying to ensure slow failure

  • Trying to succeed in making a reactor, not a bomb 

Ensuring Failure? (Did Heisenberg Control the Project so it Could Fail?)

• Asking for too little money 

• Never telling the Nazis about Plutonium 

• Not getting an accurate calculation of the critical mass needed 

  • Heisenberg was an INCREDIBLE physicist; he should have gotten it right?