cold war historigraphy

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Last updated 4:24 PM on 3/2/26
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85 Terms

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george orwell on cold war

ā€œa peace that is no peaceā€

ā€œunconquerable and in a permanent state of Cold Warā€ with each other

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roffman on russian revolt.

ā€œThe Cold War proceeded from the very moment the Bolsheviks triumphed in Russia in 1917.ā€

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herbert feis on grand alliance, usa aims šŸ˜‡

USA preoccupied during war, unbothered abt political future of EU

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melvyn leffler on grand alliance, us aims 😤

USA had own security agenda

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martin walker on declaration on liberated eastern europe, yalta

ā€œupon which all future accusations of Soviet betrayal and bad faith were madeā€

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orthodox historians on cold war — blame ussr

mcneill, george kennan, herbert feis

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revisionist historians in cold war — blame usa, weakness of ussr, questioned the validity of truman’s fears (nuclear monopoly)

william a. williams, wallace, Gar Alperovitz

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post-revisionist view

both were to blame; miscommunication and mistrust

truman was constrained by red scare

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lafeber on stalin (view on us)

stalin was reactionary, feared american imperialism

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gaddis on stalin (view on cold war)

with stalin in power, the cold war was inevitable

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lafeber on nsc-68 (increase military spending by $50 billion; monolithic)

key document of the cold war

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revisionist view of nsc-68, bacevich

this document was an excuse needed for the us to pursue an expansionist agenda

bacevich: exaggerated military threat, disregarded soviet need for security (u2 flights in 1956)

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ussr on cuban revolution

failure would throw back the revolutionary movement in many countries

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hitchcock on stalin, berlin blockade

aggressive action

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naimark on stalin, berlin blockade

economic coercion

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cumings on korean war (superpower tensions)

korean war turned us into the policeman of the world

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gaddis on stalin, korean war

presented stalin with a tempting opportunity to spread soviet influence

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acheson’s pacific perimeter speech

1950

running through the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines

excluding taiwan and korea

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truman on military rearmament, after korean war

us should not throw away its gun until we are sure the rest of the world cannot arm against us

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revisionist school of thought on cuban blockade

irresponsible, kennedy neurotic

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orthodox views of cuban blockade/quarantine

exterted maximum pressure, while incurring minimum risk of war

brinksmanship, statesman-like manner

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john mason on salt i 😃

landmark agreement that institutionalised arms control, committed both nations to formal rules and goals

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stephen ambrose on salt i šŸ‘Ž

about as meaningful as freezing the cavalry of european countries in 1938, but not the tanks

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brodie on arms race in detente; concept of deterrent

the aim had been to win wars but now the intention was to avert them

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khrushchev on arms race after abms in 1969, ussr

produce missiles like sausages

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melvyn leffler on financial benefits, detente

seek a cooperative foreign policy rather than a confrontative one

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gaddis, impact of detente 😃

making relations less dangerous

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richard pipes, impact of detente šŸ‘Ž

trick of the Soviets, to prevent and delay collapse

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gartoff on basic principles agreement 1972

charter for detente

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carter on human rights, 1977

fundamental tenet of our foreign policy

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brezhnev doctrine, 1968

forces hostile to socialism try to turn socialist country toward capitalism, it becomes a concern for all socialist countries

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dobrynin on ussr, support of angloan civil war (mpla)

ā€˜ideological bondage’, supporting causes based on ideology rather than what they can gain from it

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soviet marshal ogarkov on arms race, 1980s

ussr cannot equal the quality of US technology for a generation or two

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SDI 1981, Star Wars

abm shield composed of nuclear missiles, laser-red satellites to protect from attack, space-based laser battle stations/sensors/interceptors

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who supports the argument that arms race was responsible for end

garthoff — economic drain of arms race

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who supports the argument that gorbachev was responsible for end

siracusa — gorbachev broke ideological straitjacket

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thatcher on gorbachev, glasnost and building of trust with the west

a man we can do business with

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glasnost 1985

openness, democracy;

  • freeing political dissidents, freed Andrei Sakharov (spoke of repression of Soviets + gulag system)

  • soviet jews allowed to emigrate more easily

  • foreign govt. media broadcast freely in ussr

    • weakened appeal of communism

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perestroika 1985

restructuring of economy

  • decentralising the command economy

  • responsive to needs of people

  • restructure stagnant economy

  • reduce military spending

move from absoluteness of communism

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inf treaty 1987, @ washington conference

signals desire to disarm; eliminate an entire class of nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles

  • chernobyl 1986, dangers of nuclear power

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gorbachev doctrine, sinatra doctrine 1989

ā€˜diplomacy of despair’, needed us assistance

allowed e.e. to go free; reduced commitment to warsaw pact

reduced red army by half a million

unwilling to use force like predecessors

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reagan-gorbachev GRWN summits

nuclear war no longer a threat, cold war ā€œburied at the bottom of the seaā€

  1. Geneva 1985 — ā€œnuclear war must not be foughtā€, neither first to launch nuclear atk, despite disagreemnt over sdi

  2. Reykjavik 1986 — failed, gorbachev insisted linking SDI to nuclear disarmament, but came close to agreeing on the elimination of 50% of nuclear weapons

  3. Washington 1987 — INF treaty, eliminate intermediate, short-range missiles, witness

  4. Moscow 1988 — further arms reductions, Reagan no longer believed in ā€˜evil empire’

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McMahon and Reagan victory school on reagan in end of cw

reagan abandoned ā€œdeeply held personal convinctions about the malignant nature of communismā€ allowing a genuine rapprochement

critical of carter and policy of detente; SALT I agreement

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detente disarmament conferences (moscow 1972)

  1. test ban treaty 1963

    1. testing in atmosphere

  2. non-nuclear proliferation act 1968

    1. no transferring of arms to others or assist manufacture

  3. treaty on limitation of abms 1972

    1. 2 fixed ground-based defence sites of 100 missile interceptors

    2. ban defense against long-range missile, ensure MAD

  4. strategic arms limitation treaty 1972

    1. 5 year freeze on construction of missile launchers

    2. freeze on construction of icbms, slbms

  5. soviet-us trade agreement

    1. grain, expand bilateral trade

  6. basic principles agreement 1972

    1. rules for conduct of nuclear war

  7. agreement on prevention of nuclear war 1973

    1. inform us of conflict that threatened nuclear war

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nixon doctrine 1969

expected allied nations to provide own ground troops for defense; after vietnam war

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1969 ostpolitik

frg chancellor willy brandt, normalise relations with east germany

  • recognise east germany

  • borders at oder-neisse

  • 1969 nuclear non-proliferation treaty between frg and ussr

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1967 harmel report by nato

main aims of defense and detente, demonstrate general mood of detente in europe

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eisenhower new look, 1953

prioritizing nuclear deterrence over conventional forces to balance the federal budget

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secretary dulles massive retaliation

deter an enemy, threaten nuclear escalation (this also started the Space Race tho)

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brinksmanship, starting from eisenhower 1953

remain open to settlements with USSR to reduce the ā€˜magnitude of the Soviet threat’ 

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gaddis on peaceful co-existence šŸ‘Ž

superficial and limited in addressing fundamental conflict; merely a facade, masking underlying hostilities

economic competition undermined the effectiveness of peaceful co-existence (perpetuated arms race)

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kocho-williams on peaceful co-existence šŸ‘Ž

better defined as policy of enforced coexistence, no real improvement in superpower relationship

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soviet power struggle between who after stalin death

khrushchev, beria, molotov, malenkov, bulganin; wanted to sort out domestic issues

malenkov suggested ā€˜new course’: aimed for settlement of disputes through diplomatic negotation

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geneva summit 1955

engaged in discussion on arms control, peaceful settlement of disputes

  • Reunification of Germany āŒ

  • European security āŒ

  • Ā Mutual disbandment of NATO and Warsaw Pact āŒ

  • USA ā€˜Open Skies’ to allow aerial surveillance and reduce security fears (seen as espionage plot) āŒ

  • Disarmament šŸ¤”

    • Moratorium on nuclear testing

  • Development of contracts between East and West šŸ¤”

  • USSR withdraw from Austria, provided it did not join NATO āœ…

    • Created an independent, neutral Austria. Led to better relations a little.

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Secret Speech 1956, ā€˜De-Stalinisation’ 

  • Criticised Stalin’s ā€˜cult of personality’ 

  • Mentioned importance of ā€˜peaceful co-existence’ with West

  • Major departure from orthodox ideology of Stalin; showed clear signs of improvement of relations with the West to reduce the chance of war

  • Recognisation of Yugoslavia and Tito in 1955

56
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Camp David Summit (1959)

  • Khrushchev, first Soviet leader to visit the USA

  • ā€˜Spirit of Camp David’

  • Could not agree on much, but there would be no firm deadline over the Berlin question, and agreed to meet again in Paris

  • Optimism

    • However this was undermined by a U2 spy plane, shot down over the USSR on 1 May

    • Pilot, Powers, confessed to spying

    • Eisenhower accepted personal responsibility but did not apologise

    • ā€˜stupid U2 mess’ – EisenhowerĀ 

    • Unlikelihood of cooperationĀ 

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Paris Summit May (1960)

  • Failed

  • USSR proposed coexisting German states

  • Mutual disbandment of NATO and Warsaw Pact

  • West proposed unified Germany, free elections, refused to recognise GDR otherwise

  • Cancelled Eisenhower’s visit to the USSR

58
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Summit in Vienna (1961) with new President Kennedy

  • Khruschev challenged Kennedy to withdraw from West Berlin in 6 months, or declare war; Kennedy refused

    • Berlin Wall Aug 1961 built to retaliate, stopping the flow of emigrants into West Berlin

  • Military/physical crisis was averted, but tensions remained high, due to continued development of nuclear deterrentsĀ 

59
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hungarian uprising 1956

  • Hungarians emboldened by Polish Revolution, which led to appointment of Minister GomulkaĀ 

  • Hungarian students began demonstrating in Budapest

    • Withdrawal of Soviet troops

    • Freedom and civil rights

    • Govt under Imre Nagy (reform communist)

  • Soviet mobilised 30k troops with tanks and artillery

    • 20,000 Hungarians killed

  • Dissipated good feeling achieved at Geneva

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Suez Canal Crisis 1954

  • July 1954: Suez Canal nationalised by Egyptian president Nasser

    • France, UK, Israel saw this asĀ  opp. to remove Nasser from power; threatened colonial interests, bombed Egypt airfields

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eisenhower doctrine 1957 — middle east

  • Assist Middle Eastern countries to prevent spread of communism

  • (decline of British and French influence following the 1956 Suez Crisis.) Ā 

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ā€œautumnā€ of nations — fall of satellite empire, 1988

→ Less fearful of Soviet interventionĀ 

Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria

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hungary 1988 — relaxation of travel restrictions

  1. Hungary

    1. Stopped patrolling Austrian border (too old, replacement expensive)

    2. No more travel or social media restrictions, announced freedom of travel through Hungary

    3. Tens of thousands from GDR went on holiday to Hungary, and never came back šŸ˜‚āœŒ

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poland 1988 — solidarity

Poland – Solidarity

  1. Trade union, 10 million members, legalised 1988, then legalised all trade unionsĀ 

  2. Won 99 of 100 seats in June 1989, creating Eastern Europe's first non-communist government

  3. Gorbachev refused to use force to support the communists, Polish Communist Party collapsed

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east germany — fall of berlin wall 1989

  1. East Germany – Fall of Berlin Wall

    1. Ostpolitk, Willy Brandt

    2. Fleeing to Austria or publicly protesting

    3. Mass protest in East Berlin, Leipzig Monday demonstration, 500k people

    4. USSR announced easing of travel restrictions; dismantle the Wall, hoping to lessen public dissentĀ Ā 

    5. 125,000 fled in one day

    6. Communist Party not the only party allowed anymore; 1990 reunification of Germany

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czechoslovakia — velvet revolution 1989

  1. Czechoslovakia

  • Velvet Revolution

  • 12 opp. groups formed the Civic Forum, pressure for free elections; USSR withdraw troops, call for dissolution of Warsaw Pact

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bulgaria and romania 1989

  1. Bulgaria

  • Multi-party democracy, free elections 1990

  1. Romania

  • Romanian revolution, violentĀ 

  • President Ceaușescu executed 1989, free elections May 1990

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end of cw — arms race drain economic resource ussr

  • annual growth from 5.2% (1967) to 2% (1980)

  • 1982: soviet economy near collapse

  • used 40% of gdp to keep up with arms race, us only 2%

foreign commitments

  • Warsaw Pact: $3 billion annually

  • Soviet-Afghan War draining resources, unpopular, timely

  • Cuba: $4 billion annually

  • Vietnam: $6 billion annually

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end of cw — arms race usa

reagan, hardline

  • SDI Initiative, pushed Soviet economy to breaking point, made mad obsolete

  • Took a harder and more aggressive foreign policy

    • Hostile speeches about USSR and communism

Massive increase in US armaments, 30% of all government spending

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detente — arms race

Worsened after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which convinced both to strengthen their military → Concept of MAD, targeting cities and societies to cause max. casualties

  1. Constant need to stay ahead made the Arms Race incredibly costly

    1. USA: $19 trillion since 1940

      1. $5.8 trillion devoted exclusively to nuclear weapons

    2. USSR: spending 20% of its annual budget

  • USSR: Stagnant economy, centrally planned economy prioritised arms → consumer goods → Low living standards → Unrest. Novocherkassk Massacre (1962)

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