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Last updated 1:19 AM on 4/29/26
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92 Terms

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Juan Linz - The Perils of Presidentialism

  • presidentialism is inherently less stable due to rigid structures and competing claims to legitimacy

  • presidentialism: system with a fixed-term, independently elected executive

  • dual legitimacy: both president and legislature claim democratic mandate

  • rigidity: fixed terms > difficult to remove ineffective leaders

  • winner-takes-all logic: elections produce zero-sum outcomes

  • why it fails:

    • executive-legislative deadlock: no clear mechanism to resolve conflicts

    • dual legitimacy crises: competing democratic claims > institutional conflict

    • rigidity of terms: bad leaders cannot be easily replaced

    • polarization from winner-take-all elections: losers excluded > instability

  • Chile (1973) - executive-legislative conflict contributed to democratic collapse

  • Brazil (pre-1964) - fragmentation + presidential rigidity > instability

  • United States: stable - but Linz calls it an exception due to strong institutions

  • presidentalism > higher breakdown risk, especially in new democracies

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Presidents and Assemblies Shugart and Cary

  • design matters - not all presidential systems are doomed. institutional variation shapes outcomes

  • strong presidents + weak parties = instability

  • fragmented party systems > harder coalition-building

  • electoral rules shape governability

  • Brazil: strong president + fragmented parties > coalition complexity

  • Chile (post-1990): better institutional design > more stability

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Constitutional Choices for New Democracies Arend Lijphart

  • consensus democracy (not majoritarianism) is best for new democracies

  • majoritarian democracy: power concentrated in majority

  • consensus democracy: power-sharing across groups

  • PR: seats allocated proportionally to votes

  • federalism: power divided territorially

  • PR > inclusion of minorities

  • coalitions> compromise

  • power sharing > reduces conflict

  • Netherlands: classic consensus model

  • Belgium: power-sharing across linguistic groups

  • South Africa (post-apartheid): PR used to include diverse groups

  • PR + coalition government + decentralization = stability

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Quentin Quade PR and Democratic Statecraft

  • PR can weaken accountability and governance despite improving representation

  • accountability: ability to punish/replace leaders

  • fragmentation: many small parties in legislature

  • party discipline: cohesion within parties

  • PR > many parties > weak governments

  • voters cannot easily assign blame

  • Italy (post-WWII) - chronic coalition instability

  • Israel: highly fragmented party system

  • representation increases but accountability decreases

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The Failure of Europe’s Mainstream Parties Anna Gryzmala-Busse

  • mainstream parties failed due to weak responsiveness, corruption, and loss of credibility, enabling populists

  • populism: anti-elite, anti-establishment politics

  • party institutionalization: stability and rootedness of parties

  • policy convergence > voters feel unrepresented

  • corruption scandals > loss of trust

  • weak party roots > easy collapse

  • France: collapse of socialist and republican dominance

  • Italy: party system collapse in 1990s

  • Poland: rise of populist Law and Justice

  • weak parties > opens door to populism and democratic erosion

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The Ethnocracy Trap Lise Morje Howard

  • ethnocracies entrench division and undermine democracy

  • consociationalism: power-sharing across ethnic groups

  • ethnic outbidding: politicians compete by appealing to ethnic identity

  • institutionalizing ethnicity > reinforces divisons

  • leaders mobilize ethnic fear > polarization

  • no incentive for crossgroup cooperation

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina: ethnic quotas > gridlock

  • Lebanon: sectarian system > dysfunction

  • ethnic powersharing can freeze conflict instead of resolving it

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Electoral Systems for Divided Societies Benjamin Reilly

  • integrative electoral systems (not purely proportional ones) best reduce ethnic division

  • centripetalism: incentivizing moderation and crossgroup appeals

  • preferential voting: rank candidates

  • vote pooling: candidates must gain support from multiple groups

  • require politicians to seek votes beyond their ethnic group, encourage moderation over extremism, reduce ethnic outbidding

  • Australia: preferential voting encourages broad appeal

  • Fiji: attempted vote-pooling reforms

  • Papa New Guinea: limited preferential voting to reduce conflict

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Making Democracy Work - Robert D. Putnam

  • civic culture > institutional performance. regions with strong social capital have more effective governance

  • social capital: networks, trust, and norms that facilitate cooperation

  • civic engagement: participation in community and political life

  • horizontal networks: associations among equals

  • trust > cooperation > better policy implementation

  • dense civic networks > accountability

  • norms of reciprocity > reduce corruption

  • Italy (North vs South) North had strong civic traditions and effective regional governments, while South had hierarchical and clientelistic so weak performance

    • democracy works best where civic engagement is historically rooted

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Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic - Sheri Berman

  • civil society can undermine democracy if the state is weak

  • civil society: voluntary associations outside the state

  • Weimar Republic: german democracy (1919-1933)

  • political fragmentation: many competing groups without coordination

  • strong civil society + weak state > fragmentation

  • associations become politicized and polarized

  • extremist groups (eg. Nazis) mobilize through civil society

  • Germany (Weimar) had dense associational life, but no strong state to mediate conflict > collapse

  • social capital is not inherently good - depends on context

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Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches by Philip Q. Yang

  • ethnicity is socially constructed and politically mobilized, not fixed

  • ethnicity: shared identity based on culture, language, ancestry

  • primordialism: ethnic identity is fixed and ancient

  • constructivism: ethnic identity is fluid and shaped by politics

  • instrumentalism: elites use ethnicity strategically for power

  • elites activate ethnic identity for political gain

  • economic/political competition: ethnic tension

  • institutions shape how ethnicity matters

  • ethnicity is not inevitable conflict - it is politically constructed

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Serbia’s Road to War - VP Gagnon Jr

  • violence within Yugoslav wars was strategically produced by elites, not driven by ancient ethnic hatred

  • elite manipulation: leaders provoke conflict to maintain power

  • demobilization strategy: violence distracts from economic/political failure

  • leaders fear losing power

  • shift politics from economic issues > ethnic conflict

  • use media/violence to polarize society

  • Serbia/former Yugoslavia: elites mobilized nationalism to stay in power

  • ethnic conflict is often top-down, not bottom-up

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Votes and Violence Steven I. Wilkinson

  • ethnic violence is driven by electoral incentives, not spontaneous hatred

  • electoral competiton: parties competing for votes

  • vote banks: reliable blocs of voters

  • state capacity: ability to control violence

  • politicians incite violence when it helps win elections

  • violence targets groups that are politically expendable

  • strong governments prevent violence when minorities matter electorally

  • India: riots more likely where minorities are not electorally valuable. less violence where minorities are key vote blocs

  • violence occurs when it is politically beneficial and allowed

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Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society Ashutosh Varshney

  • interethnic civic networks prevent violence

  • interethnic networks: associations linking different groups

  • intraethnic networks: associations within one group only

  • crossgroup ties > communication during crises

  • shared organizations > reduce mistrust

  • local leaders coordinate to prevent escalation

  • India - cities with interethnic networks are peaceful, while cities without have riots

  • not just civil society - but what kind matters

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presidentialism

  • “head of state” and “head of government” one in the same

  • separation of powers (and elections) between the executive and legislative branch

  • cabinets appointed by presidents

  • fixed terms and term limits for presidents

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parliamentarism

  • “head of state” and “head of government” typically different

  • no separation of powers between the executive and legislative (prime minister/government emerges from the legislature)

  • government/cabinet selected by formateur w/ legislative approval

    • formateur is the person designated to form the government in a parliamentary democracy, and is often the PM designate

    • once the formateur is selected, they must put a cabinet together that the legislature will accept

  • since legislatures are rarely dominated by one party government formation involves a lot of negotiation

    • a minimal winning coalition (MWC) is one in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority

    • a single-party minority government comprises a single party that does not command a majority of legislative seats

    • a minority coalition government comprises multiple governmental parties that do not together command a majority of legislative seats

    • a surplus majority government comprises more parties than are strictly necessary to control a majority of legislative seats

  • no fixed terms for prime ministers

    • vote of no confidence

    • vote of confidence

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parliamentarism - Gamson’s Law

cabinet portfolios will be distributed among parties in strict proportion to the number of seats contributed to the government’s legislative seat total

  • party A (80 seats) and Party B (40 seats) form a government in a legislature with 200 seats

  • Party A should receive 80/120 = 2/3 of cabinet portfolios

  • Party B should receive 40120 = 1/3 of cabinet portfolios

  • implication of Gamson’s law is that you will not want more parties than is strictly necessary to receive a vote of support from a majority of the legislature

    • a single-party majority government comprises a single party that controls a majority of the legislative seats

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the perils of presidentialism

  • zero-sum game

  • executive-legislative deadlock

  • fixed-terms and “lame duck” syndrome

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the problem with parliamentarism

  • accountability issues

  • parliamentary gridlock

    • government instability

    • small parties wield too much power

  • tyranny of the majority

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alternative solutions - semi presidentialism

  • directly-elected president; prime minister elected by parliament

  • variegated power sharing between president and prime minister

    • premier-presidential

    • presidential parliamentary

  • possibility of “cohabitation” and deadlock

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presidentialism pros

  • more government accountability

  • cohesion within executive branch

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presidentialism cons

  • dual legitimacy

  • executive-legislative gridlock

  • hard to remove inefficient governments

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parliamentarism pros

  • more representation in executive

  • easier to remove inefficient governments

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parliamentarism cons

  • less accountability

  • more (potential) government instability

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electoral system

  • the set of rules and mechanisms used to determine the results of a (legislative) election. Put simply, “how votes are translated into seats”

  • three types: majoritarian/plurality, proportional, mixed

    • helps allocate power in a country

    • determines the quality and nature of political representation

    • conditions the nature and quality of the party system

    • not cleanly correlated with executive-legislative systems

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differenr systems

  • presidential plurality: Ghana, US

  • presidential proportional: Brazil, Argentina, Peru

  • parliamentary plurality: Canada, UK, India

  • parliamentary proportional: Israel, Norway, Spain

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key features of majoritarian/plurality electoral systems

  • one representative per district

  • representatives chosen by majority/plurality rule

  • three main types of majoritarian/plurality systems

    • single-member district plurality

    • majority two-round runoff

    • alternative vote

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single-member district electoral systems

  • one representative per district

  • “first past the post” selection rule

  • used in the UK, Canada, US, Belize, India, and Nigeria

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percentages

  • under a majoritarian electoral rule, need a minimum of 51% of votes to win election

  • under a plurality electoral rule w/ three parties, need 34% minimum votes to win election

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strategic voting in majoritarian/plurality electoral systems

  • plurality systems encourage strategic voting

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majority/plurality electoral systems: Duverger’s law

  • number of parties closely related to electoral system

    • Duverger’s law: single member district plurality systems > two-party systems

      • mechanical effect: the way votes are translated into seats

      • strategic effect: how the mechanical effect influences the “strategic’ behavior of voters

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disproportionality in majoritarian/plurality electoral systems

  • plurality systems produce representative institutions that are highly disproportional

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key features of proportional electoral systems

  • characterized by multi-member districts (MMD)

  • representatives chosen “in proportion” to the number of votes received

  • three main types of proportional systems

    • list proportional representation

    • single transferable vote

    • mixed-member proportional representation

  • encourage sincere voting

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key features of list PR electoral systems

  • voters select representatives to MMD according to party lists

    • closed lists

    • open lists

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proportional electoral systems: Duverger’s Hypothesis

number of parties closely related to electoral system

  • Duverger’s Law: single member district plurality systems > two-party systems

  • Duverger’s Hypothesis: PR electoral systems > multiparty systems

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district magnitude and proportionality

  • district magnitude: the number of representatives to be elected to a legislative body in each electoral district

  • the problem with PR: party extremism

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electoral rules are varied and highly consequential

  • shape allocation of political power

  • determines representativeness in politics

  • has consequences for the stability of parties, democracy

  • must “choose” electoral and party systems carefully to fulfill specific objectives and produce optimal outcomes

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political party

a group of people, who, under a common banner, field candidates to popularly elected assemblies (Pettitt 2014)

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party functions

  • coordinate political preferences and elites

  • mobilize candidates and voters during elections

  • socialize citizens and elites into democratic politics

  • represent citizen’s preferences and transmit them to the state

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explaining mainstream party weakness

  • economic anxiety

  • immigration

  • failure of representation

    • descriptive representation: representation of citizens’ ascriptive characteristics

    • substantive representation: representation of citizens’ policy preferences

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explaining poor representation

  • between-party homogeneity

  • within-party heterogeneity

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within-party heterogeneity

according to tarek abou-chadi (2025):

  • the presence of radical right parties in PR systems tends to make center-right parties become more restrictive on immigration, but..

  • the presence of green parties does not move mainstream left parties towards more action on the environment

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preferential voting

  • a system of voting whereby the voter indicates his order of preference for each of the candidates listed on the ballot for a specified office. if no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, the first and second preferences, etc. may be counted until one candidate obtains a majority

    • alternative vote

    • single transferable vote

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advantages & disadvantages of preferential voting

advantages

  • incentivizes candidates to appeal to a broader electorate

  • incentivizes voters to preference moderate candidates

  • allows for easier coalition building

disadvantages

  • difficult to understand

  • difficult to calculate

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mainstream parties have become less popular over time

  • economic anxiety

  • immigration

  • poor representation

  • to fix representation, we need more flexible electoral/party systems that:

    • offer multiple ideological choices

    • incentivize moderation

    • promote coalition building

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political objectives in fragile/divided democracies

  • socialize citizens and elites into democratic politics

  • increase representativeness of government

  • reduce polarization between groups

  • prevent (ethnic) conflict

  • ensure political stability

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consociationalism

a form of governance which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that comprises diverse societies by allocating these groups specific representation in the political system

  • executive power sharing (eg. coalition/multiparty cabinets)

  • veto-power

  • segmental autonomy (ethnic-group autonomy, culturally-based community laws)

  • proportional representation

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Consociationalism at work: Lebanon

  • executive power sharing: Maronite president, Shi’a speaker of the house, Sunni prime minister

  • veto-power: mutual veto among different sects

  • segmental autonomy: delegation of personal status code to individual communities

  • proportional representation: Senate seats divided by sect according to a formula

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parliamentarism pros and cons

pros

  • promotes consensus government

  • enhances representation through coalition-building

cons

  • diffuses political accountability

  • may reduce government stability

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presidentialism pros and cons

pros

  • promotes cohesive government

  • enhances government stability

cons

  • decreases government representativeness

  • can produce gridlock b/w executive and legislature

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plurality/majoritarianism pros and cons

pros

  • promotes parties w/ centrist ideologies

  • reduces the influence of fringe/radical parties

cons

  • “winner-takes-all” increases competition among groups

  • decreases gov’t representativeness

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proportional representation pros and cons

pros

  • increases representation of minorities

  • can promote coalition-building/cooperation

cons

  • may institutionalize ethnic/ideological differences

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parliamentary systems typically better for new democracies

  • create consensus government

  • increase representation

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proportional systems typically better for divided societies

  • diffuse ethnic competition

  • increase representation

  • promote coalition building

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consociationalism can work but..

  • must be flexible to change

  • must allow voters to choose/candidates to run on measures beyond ethnicity

  • must incentivize moderation

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civil society

the sphere of organized, non-governmental, non-violent associations that exist outside of the state, market, and family

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what civil society groups are

sports teams, youth groups, hobby groups, labor unions, religious groups, service organizations

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what civil society groups are not

  • government organizations

  • political parties

  • businesses

  • professional sports teams

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significance of civil society

  • helps citizens transmit interests to state

  • helps to “check” the state and maintain a balance of power

  • serves as a “school of democracy” which socializes citizens to engage in civic behavior (Tocqueville)

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making democracy work: answer

  • strength of civic community and social capital among residents in northern Italy make institutions function effectively

    • civic community: communities populated with dense civic associations and characterized by high levels of cooperation and civic engagement

      • number of civic associations

      • social networks

      • civic behaviors

    • social capital: networks of mutual trust and reciprocity developed through interpersonal ties

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measures of civic engagement have declined in the past 50 years

people have less social capital than before

three main shifts:

  • increased mobility of people, families

  • more women are in the workforce

  • technology has drawn people away from participation

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critiques of Putnam’s argument

  • defines civil society tautologically

    • “civic community is marked by an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and cooperation” -Putnam

  • neglects uncivil groups that maintain robust organizations and social capital

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uncivil society

  • a set of associations within civil society that challenge liberal democratic values by promoting exclusivist ideologies or predatory practices

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what uncivil society groups are

  • mafia/criminal groups

  • gangs

  • extremist groups

  • fundamentalist groups

  • hate groups

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civil society and the fall of democracy in Weimar Germany

reasons for Nazi popularity:

  • rise in anti-semitic views

  • economic frustration

  • uncivil society

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Michel’s Iron Law of Oligarchy

the principle stating that large organizations will naturally tend towards centralized elite control, undermining rank-and-file engagement in the organization

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improving civil society: democratic v hierarchical organization

  • erosion of grassroots activism and internal democracy

  • reduces inclusivity and representation

  • increases resistance to change and accountability

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bridging social capital

social capital that links individuals across multiple cleavages or categories of difference

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bonding social capital

  • social capital that exists among individuals within a single, homogenous community

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civil society can be very beneficial for democracy

  • organize/mediate citizen interests

  • counterbalance state power

    • socialize citizens into civic behavior

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questionable whether civil society is casually related to democracy

  • can be highly undemocratic in character and aims

  • can be easily coopted by political actors

  • can be susceptible to societal divisions

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for civil society and democracy to function at its highest potential

  • must focus on engaging members at the grassroots

  • must be oriented towards liberal/democratic aims

  • must incorporate members from diverse racial/ethnic, ideological, and religious groups

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ethnic group

a group of people who see themselves as united based on a shared belief in a common ancestry and common ascriptive traits

  • race

  • language

  • religion

  • customs (?)

  • region (?)

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nation

a group of people linked by unfiying traits and the desire to control a territory that is thought of as the group’s national homeland

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why ethnicity matters

  • cultural pluralism

  • objective difference

  • ethnic conflict

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three theories of ethnic attachments

  • primordialism

  • instrumentalism

  • social constructivism/institutionalism

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primordialism

a theory of ethnic identity that sees ethnicity as being “natural” or fixed, as having always existed, and as defined by kinship, language, or phenotype

  • ethnicity is fixed and unchanging

  • ethnicity always salient

  • ethnic differences are permanent (co-ethnics more likely to cooperate than non co-ethnics)

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problems with primordialism

  • ethnic categories are often fluid and changing

  • hard to tell co-ethnics from non co-ethnics

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instrumentalism

a theory of ethnic identity that sees ethnicity as a device that groups or individuals use to unify, organize, and mobilize populations to achieve larger goals

  • ethnic identification as a strategic choice

  • ethnicity chosen to optimize other (usually economic) outcomes

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problems with instrumentalism

  • ethnicity not as fluid as instrumentalism would predict

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constructivism

a theory of ethnic identity that sees ethnicity as being “created” or “constructed” through social and political processes

  • ethnicity not fixed, but fluid

  • ethnicity made salient by certain actors or institutions

  • ethnic differences can be constructed and overcome

  • study of ethnic relations between Chewas and Tumbukas in Malawi and Zambia

    • Chewas and Tumbukas are ethnic rivals in Malawi and compete often, but are ethnic allies in neighboring Zambia

    • political competition between Chewas and Tumbukas given electoral system and demography make them rivals in Malwai but allies in Zambia

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problems with institutionalism

  • hard to predict ex-ante when ethnicity will be made salient

  • institutions have unintended consequences

  • ethnic identification can be “sticky”

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case study of ethnic violence: Rwanda

  • ethnic conflict between Rwandan Armed Forces (Hutu) and Rwandan Patriotic Front (Tutsi)

  • lasted from April to July 1994

  • 500,000-1 million persons killed

defining a ifference: Hutu vs Tutsi

  • racial difference

    • separate ethnic groups with different ancestry

    • Tutsi racially superior to Hutus

    • because of ethnic differences Tutsi are inimical to Hutus

    • problem: frequently intermarry

  • class difference

    • similar ethnically but separate social classes

    • Tutsi = wealthy pastoralists

    • Hutu = poorer agriculturalists

    • problem: social mobility among Hutu and Tutsi

  • (institutionalized) political difference

    • Hutu and Tutsi are ethnically similar, and socially malleable

    • ethnic difference politicized through pre-colonial and colonial practices

      • administrative hierarchy

      • forced labor

      • Ubureetwa: a system of forced labor, performed as “payment” for living on a chieftains land

      • identification cards

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backdrop to genocide: Rwandan independence

  • continued practice of legally codifying ethnic differences

  • Hutu appointed to all administrative, military and political positions

  • Tutsi land expropriated and redistributed

  • 160,000 Tutsis killed or displaced

  • Arusha Accords: a 1993 peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front designed to end the ongoing civil war in Rwanda

    • power-sharing of ministerial posts

    • Tutsi integration into the National Assembly

    • Tutsi integration into the army

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explaining Rwandan genocide

  • ethnic hatred and fear

  • instrumentalism

  • institutions

    • Interhamwe: youth militia of the MRND, used to perpetrate violence against Tutsis during Rwandan genocide

  • international inaction

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case study of ethnic violence: the former Yugoslavia

about the Balkans

  • religious diversity

  • ethno-linguistic diversity

  • comprised of distinct nation-states

Yugoslavia

  • established as a federated republic

  • suppression of nationalist rhetoric with Communist ideology and violence

  • administrative reforms to balance ethnic tensions

    • power-sharing executive

    • decentralization and autonomy

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backdrop to ethnic conflict: Tito’s Death and Crisis

  • political vacuum

    • rotating presidency

    • five year terms

    • possibility of veto on legislation

  • economic crisis

  • secession/democratization

  • strengthening of nationalist tendencies

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ethnic conflict in Bosnia: Civil war and genocide

  • war lasting four years (91-95)

  • estimated 100k+ deaths

  • ended by joint UN/NATO intervention

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explaining ethnic violence in Bosnia

  • primordialism

    • generally friendly relations post-Tito

    • moderate rates of intermarriage

    • low support for violence

  • institutionalism

    • federal political system created imbalances in representation

    • constitutional amendment helped Milosevic consolidate power

    • democratic referenda for independence threatened serbian power in multiethnic regions

  • instrumentalism

    • ethnic security dilemma: situation in which actions taken by an ethnic group to increase its own security cause reactions from other groups, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original group’s security

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ethnic riots in India

  • ethno-religious conflict

  • violence in the form of riots

  • state-sanctioned violence

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explaining ethnic riots in india

  • electoral incentives/party system

    • electoral incentives encourage some regional governments to foment ethnic divisions

    • multiple parties + minority votes > ethnic peace

    • two parties + no minority votes > ethnic riots

  • civil society

    • civil society networks prevent ethnic riots in some areas and not in others

    • intercommunal civil society groups: civil society organizations that group individuals across multiple cleavages or categories of difference

    • intracommunal civil society groups: civil society organizations that group individuals within a single community

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ethnic conflict and civil society: the case of india

Ahmedabad

  • two parties (Congrss and BJP)

  • muslim population

  • legacy of intercommunal harmony under Gandhi

  • history of violent ethnic riots

Surat

  • two parties (Congress and BJP)

  • muslim population

  • legacy of intercommunal harmony under Gandhi

  • history of relative ethnic peace

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healing tensions after violence

  • truth and reconciliation commissions

  • integration campaigns

  • reframing history