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Juan Linz - The Perils of Presidentialism
presidentialism is inherently less stable due to rigid structures and competing claims to legitimacy
presidentialism: system with a fixed-term, independently elected executive
dual legitimacy: both president and legislature claim democratic mandate
rigidity: fixed terms > difficult to remove ineffective leaders
winner-takes-all logic: elections produce zero-sum outcomes
why it fails:
executive-legislative deadlock: no clear mechanism to resolve conflicts
dual legitimacy crises: competing democratic claims > institutional conflict
rigidity of terms: bad leaders cannot be easily replaced
polarization from winner-take-all elections: losers excluded > instability
Chile (1973) - executive-legislative conflict contributed to democratic collapse
Brazil (pre-1964) - fragmentation + presidential rigidity > instability
United States: stable - but Linz calls it an exception due to strong institutions
presidentalism > higher breakdown risk, especially in new democracies
Presidents and Assemblies Shugart and Cary
design matters - not all presidential systems are doomed. institutional variation shapes outcomes
strong presidents + weak parties = instability
fragmented party systems > harder coalition-building
electoral rules shape governability
Brazil: strong president + fragmented parties > coalition complexity
Chile (post-1990): better institutional design > more stability
Constitutional Choices for New Democracies Arend Lijphart
consensus democracy (not majoritarianism) is best for new democracies
majoritarian democracy: power concentrated in majority
consensus democracy: power-sharing across groups
PR: seats allocated proportionally to votes
federalism: power divided territorially
PR > inclusion of minorities
coalitions> compromise
power sharing > reduces conflict
Netherlands: classic consensus model
Belgium: power-sharing across linguistic groups
South Africa (post-apartheid): PR used to include diverse groups
PR + coalition government + decentralization = stability
Quentin Quade PR and Democratic Statecraft
PR can weaken accountability and governance despite improving representation
accountability: ability to punish/replace leaders
fragmentation: many small parties in legislature
party discipline: cohesion within parties
PR > many parties > weak governments
voters cannot easily assign blame
Italy (post-WWII) - chronic coalition instability
Israel: highly fragmented party system
representation increases but accountability decreases
The Failure of Europe’s Mainstream Parties Anna Gryzmala-Busse
mainstream parties failed due to weak responsiveness, corruption, and loss of credibility, enabling populists
populism: anti-elite, anti-establishment politics
party institutionalization: stability and rootedness of parties
policy convergence > voters feel unrepresented
corruption scandals > loss of trust
weak party roots > easy collapse
France: collapse of socialist and republican dominance
Italy: party system collapse in 1990s
Poland: rise of populist Law and Justice
weak parties > opens door to populism and democratic erosion
The Ethnocracy Trap Lise Morje Howard
ethnocracies entrench division and undermine democracy
consociationalism: power-sharing across ethnic groups
ethnic outbidding: politicians compete by appealing to ethnic identity
institutionalizing ethnicity > reinforces divisons
leaders mobilize ethnic fear > polarization
no incentive for crossgroup cooperation
Bosnia and Herzegovina: ethnic quotas > gridlock
Lebanon: sectarian system > dysfunction
ethnic powersharing can freeze conflict instead of resolving it
Electoral Systems for Divided Societies Benjamin Reilly
integrative electoral systems (not purely proportional ones) best reduce ethnic division
centripetalism: incentivizing moderation and crossgroup appeals
preferential voting: rank candidates
vote pooling: candidates must gain support from multiple groups
require politicians to seek votes beyond their ethnic group, encourage moderation over extremism, reduce ethnic outbidding
Australia: preferential voting encourages broad appeal
Fiji: attempted vote-pooling reforms
Papa New Guinea: limited preferential voting to reduce conflict
Making Democracy Work - Robert D. Putnam
civic culture > institutional performance. regions with strong social capital have more effective governance
social capital: networks, trust, and norms that facilitate cooperation
civic engagement: participation in community and political life
horizontal networks: associations among equals
trust > cooperation > better policy implementation
dense civic networks > accountability
norms of reciprocity > reduce corruption
Italy (North vs South) North had strong civic traditions and effective regional governments, while South had hierarchical and clientelistic so weak performance
democracy works best where civic engagement is historically rooted
Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic - Sheri Berman
civil society can undermine democracy if the state is weak
civil society: voluntary associations outside the state
Weimar Republic: german democracy (1919-1933)
political fragmentation: many competing groups without coordination
strong civil society + weak state > fragmentation
associations become politicized and polarized
extremist groups (eg. Nazis) mobilize through civil society
Germany (Weimar) had dense associational life, but no strong state to mediate conflict > collapse
social capital is not inherently good - depends on context
Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches by Philip Q. Yang
ethnicity is socially constructed and politically mobilized, not fixed
ethnicity: shared identity based on culture, language, ancestry
primordialism: ethnic identity is fixed and ancient
constructivism: ethnic identity is fluid and shaped by politics
instrumentalism: elites use ethnicity strategically for power
elites activate ethnic identity for political gain
economic/political competition: ethnic tension
institutions shape how ethnicity matters
ethnicity is not inevitable conflict - it is politically constructed
Serbia’s Road to War - VP Gagnon Jr
violence within Yugoslav wars was strategically produced by elites, not driven by ancient ethnic hatred
elite manipulation: leaders provoke conflict to maintain power
demobilization strategy: violence distracts from economic/political failure
leaders fear losing power
shift politics from economic issues > ethnic conflict
use media/violence to polarize society
Serbia/former Yugoslavia: elites mobilized nationalism to stay in power
ethnic conflict is often top-down, not bottom-up
Votes and Violence Steven I. Wilkinson
ethnic violence is driven by electoral incentives, not spontaneous hatred
electoral competiton: parties competing for votes
vote banks: reliable blocs of voters
state capacity: ability to control violence
politicians incite violence when it helps win elections
violence targets groups that are politically expendable
strong governments prevent violence when minorities matter electorally
India: riots more likely where minorities are not electorally valuable. less violence where minorities are key vote blocs
violence occurs when it is politically beneficial and allowed
Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society Ashutosh Varshney
interethnic civic networks prevent violence
interethnic networks: associations linking different groups
intraethnic networks: associations within one group only
crossgroup ties > communication during crises
shared organizations > reduce mistrust
local leaders coordinate to prevent escalation
India - cities with interethnic networks are peaceful, while cities without have riots
not just civil society - but what kind matters
presidentialism
“head of state” and “head of government” one in the same
separation of powers (and elections) between the executive and legislative branch
cabinets appointed by presidents
fixed terms and term limits for presidents
parliamentarism
“head of state” and “head of government” typically different
no separation of powers between the executive and legislative (prime minister/government emerges from the legislature)
government/cabinet selected by formateur w/ legislative approval
formateur is the person designated to form the government in a parliamentary democracy, and is often the PM designate
once the formateur is selected, they must put a cabinet together that the legislature will accept
since legislatures are rarely dominated by one party government formation involves a lot of negotiation
a minimal winning coalition (MWC) is one in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority
a single-party minority government comprises a single party that does not command a majority of legislative seats
a minority coalition government comprises multiple governmental parties that do not together command a majority of legislative seats
a surplus majority government comprises more parties than are strictly necessary to control a majority of legislative seats
no fixed terms for prime ministers
vote of no confidence
vote of confidence
parliamentarism - Gamson’s Law
cabinet portfolios will be distributed among parties in strict proportion to the number of seats contributed to the government’s legislative seat total
party A (80 seats) and Party B (40 seats) form a government in a legislature with 200 seats
Party A should receive 80/120 = 2/3 of cabinet portfolios
Party B should receive 40120 = 1/3 of cabinet portfolios
implication of Gamson’s law is that you will not want more parties than is strictly necessary to receive a vote of support from a majority of the legislature
a single-party majority government comprises a single party that controls a majority of the legislative seats
the perils of presidentialism
zero-sum game
executive-legislative deadlock
fixed-terms and “lame duck” syndrome
the problem with parliamentarism
accountability issues
parliamentary gridlock
government instability
small parties wield too much power
tyranny of the majority
alternative solutions - semi presidentialism
directly-elected president; prime minister elected by parliament
variegated power sharing between president and prime minister
premier-presidential
presidential parliamentary
possibility of “cohabitation” and deadlock
presidentialism pros
more government accountability
cohesion within executive branch
presidentialism cons
dual legitimacy
executive-legislative gridlock
hard to remove inefficient governments
parliamentarism pros
more representation in executive
easier to remove inefficient governments
parliamentarism cons
less accountability
more (potential) government instability
electoral system
the set of rules and mechanisms used to determine the results of a (legislative) election. Put simply, “how votes are translated into seats”
three types: majoritarian/plurality, proportional, mixed
helps allocate power in a country
determines the quality and nature of political representation
conditions the nature and quality of the party system
not cleanly correlated with executive-legislative systems
differenr systems
presidential plurality: Ghana, US
presidential proportional: Brazil, Argentina, Peru
parliamentary plurality: Canada, UK, India
parliamentary proportional: Israel, Norway, Spain
key features of majoritarian/plurality electoral systems
one representative per district
representatives chosen by majority/plurality rule
three main types of majoritarian/plurality systems
single-member district plurality
majority two-round runoff
alternative vote
single-member district electoral systems
one representative per district
“first past the post” selection rule
used in the UK, Canada, US, Belize, India, and Nigeria
percentages
under a majoritarian electoral rule, need a minimum of 51% of votes to win election
under a plurality electoral rule w/ three parties, need 34% minimum votes to win election
strategic voting in majoritarian/plurality electoral systems
plurality systems encourage strategic voting
majority/plurality electoral systems: Duverger’s law
number of parties closely related to electoral system
Duverger’s law: single member district plurality systems > two-party systems
mechanical effect: the way votes are translated into seats
strategic effect: how the mechanical effect influences the “strategic’ behavior of voters
disproportionality in majoritarian/plurality electoral systems
plurality systems produce representative institutions that are highly disproportional
key features of proportional electoral systems
characterized by multi-member districts (MMD)
representatives chosen “in proportion” to the number of votes received
three main types of proportional systems
list proportional representation
single transferable vote
mixed-member proportional representation
encourage sincere voting
key features of list PR electoral systems
voters select representatives to MMD according to party lists
closed lists
open lists
proportional electoral systems: Duverger’s Hypothesis
number of parties closely related to electoral system
Duverger’s Law: single member district plurality systems > two-party systems
Duverger’s Hypothesis: PR electoral systems > multiparty systems
district magnitude and proportionality
district magnitude: the number of representatives to be elected to a legislative body in each electoral district
the problem with PR: party extremism
electoral rules are varied and highly consequential
shape allocation of political power
determines representativeness in politics
has consequences for the stability of parties, democracy
must “choose” electoral and party systems carefully to fulfill specific objectives and produce optimal outcomes
political party
a group of people, who, under a common banner, field candidates to popularly elected assemblies (Pettitt 2014)
party functions
coordinate political preferences and elites
mobilize candidates and voters during elections
socialize citizens and elites into democratic politics
represent citizen’s preferences and transmit them to the state
explaining mainstream party weakness
economic anxiety
immigration
failure of representation
descriptive representation: representation of citizens’ ascriptive characteristics
substantive representation: representation of citizens’ policy preferences
explaining poor representation
between-party homogeneity
within-party heterogeneity
within-party heterogeneity
according to tarek abou-chadi (2025):
the presence of radical right parties in PR systems tends to make center-right parties become more restrictive on immigration, but..
the presence of green parties does not move mainstream left parties towards more action on the environment
preferential voting
a system of voting whereby the voter indicates his order of preference for each of the candidates listed on the ballot for a specified office. if no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, the first and second preferences, etc. may be counted until one candidate obtains a majority
alternative vote
single transferable vote
advantages & disadvantages of preferential voting
advantages
incentivizes candidates to appeal to a broader electorate
incentivizes voters to preference moderate candidates
allows for easier coalition building
disadvantages
difficult to understand
difficult to calculate
mainstream parties have become less popular over time
economic anxiety
immigration
poor representation
to fix representation, we need more flexible electoral/party systems that:
offer multiple ideological choices
incentivize moderation
promote coalition building
political objectives in fragile/divided democracies
socialize citizens and elites into democratic politics
increase representativeness of government
reduce polarization between groups
prevent (ethnic) conflict
ensure political stability
consociationalism
a form of governance which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that comprises diverse societies by allocating these groups specific representation in the political system
executive power sharing (eg. coalition/multiparty cabinets)
veto-power
segmental autonomy (ethnic-group autonomy, culturally-based community laws)
proportional representation
Consociationalism at work: Lebanon
executive power sharing: Maronite president, Shi’a speaker of the house, Sunni prime minister
veto-power: mutual veto among different sects
segmental autonomy: delegation of personal status code to individual communities
proportional representation: Senate seats divided by sect according to a formula
parliamentarism pros and cons
pros
promotes consensus government
enhances representation through coalition-building
cons
diffuses political accountability
may reduce government stability
presidentialism pros and cons
pros
promotes cohesive government
enhances government stability
cons
decreases government representativeness
can produce gridlock b/w executive and legislature
plurality/majoritarianism pros and cons
pros
promotes parties w/ centrist ideologies
reduces the influence of fringe/radical parties
cons
“winner-takes-all” increases competition among groups
decreases gov’t representativeness
proportional representation pros and cons
pros
increases representation of minorities
can promote coalition-building/cooperation
cons
may institutionalize ethnic/ideological differences
parliamentary systems typically better for new democracies
create consensus government
increase representation
proportional systems typically better for divided societies
diffuse ethnic competition
increase representation
promote coalition building
consociationalism can work but..
must be flexible to change
must allow voters to choose/candidates to run on measures beyond ethnicity
must incentivize moderation
civil society
the sphere of organized, non-governmental, non-violent associations that exist outside of the state, market, and family
what civil society groups are
sports teams, youth groups, hobby groups, labor unions, religious groups, service organizations
what civil society groups are not
government organizations
political parties
businesses
professional sports teams
significance of civil society
helps citizens transmit interests to state
helps to “check” the state and maintain a balance of power
serves as a “school of democracy” which socializes citizens to engage in civic behavior (Tocqueville)
making democracy work: answer
strength of civic community and social capital among residents in northern Italy make institutions function effectively
civic community: communities populated with dense civic associations and characterized by high levels of cooperation and civic engagement
number of civic associations
social networks
civic behaviors
social capital: networks of mutual trust and reciprocity developed through interpersonal ties
measures of civic engagement have declined in the past 50 years
people have less social capital than before
three main shifts:
increased mobility of people, families
more women are in the workforce
technology has drawn people away from participation
critiques of Putnam’s argument
defines civil society tautologically
“civic community is marked by an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and cooperation” -Putnam
neglects uncivil groups that maintain robust organizations and social capital
uncivil society
a set of associations within civil society that challenge liberal democratic values by promoting exclusivist ideologies or predatory practices
what uncivil society groups are
mafia/criminal groups
gangs
extremist groups
fundamentalist groups
hate groups
civil society and the fall of democracy in Weimar Germany
reasons for Nazi popularity:
rise in anti-semitic views
economic frustration
uncivil society
Michel’s Iron Law of Oligarchy
the principle stating that large organizations will naturally tend towards centralized elite control, undermining rank-and-file engagement in the organization
improving civil society: democratic v hierarchical organization
erosion of grassroots activism and internal democracy
reduces inclusivity and representation
increases resistance to change and accountability
bridging social capital
social capital that links individuals across multiple cleavages or categories of difference
bonding social capital
social capital that exists among individuals within a single, homogenous community
civil society can be very beneficial for democracy
organize/mediate citizen interests
counterbalance state power
socialize citizens into civic behavior
questionable whether civil society is casually related to democracy
can be highly undemocratic in character and aims
can be easily coopted by political actors
can be susceptible to societal divisions
for civil society and democracy to function at its highest potential
must focus on engaging members at the grassroots
must be oriented towards liberal/democratic aims
must incorporate members from diverse racial/ethnic, ideological, and religious groups
ethnic group
a group of people who see themselves as united based on a shared belief in a common ancestry and common ascriptive traits
race
language
religion
customs (?)
region (?)
nation
a group of people linked by unfiying traits and the desire to control a territory that is thought of as the group’s national homeland
why ethnicity matters
cultural pluralism
objective difference
ethnic conflict
three theories of ethnic attachments
primordialism
instrumentalism
social constructivism/institutionalism
primordialism
a theory of ethnic identity that sees ethnicity as being “natural” or fixed, as having always existed, and as defined by kinship, language, or phenotype
ethnicity is fixed and unchanging
ethnicity always salient
ethnic differences are permanent (co-ethnics more likely to cooperate than non co-ethnics)
problems with primordialism
ethnic categories are often fluid and changing
hard to tell co-ethnics from non co-ethnics
instrumentalism
a theory of ethnic identity that sees ethnicity as a device that groups or individuals use to unify, organize, and mobilize populations to achieve larger goals
ethnic identification as a strategic choice
ethnicity chosen to optimize other (usually economic) outcomes
problems with instrumentalism
ethnicity not as fluid as instrumentalism would predict
constructivism
a theory of ethnic identity that sees ethnicity as being “created” or “constructed” through social and political processes
ethnicity not fixed, but fluid
ethnicity made salient by certain actors or institutions
ethnic differences can be constructed and overcome
study of ethnic relations between Chewas and Tumbukas in Malawi and Zambia
Chewas and Tumbukas are ethnic rivals in Malawi and compete often, but are ethnic allies in neighboring Zambia
political competition between Chewas and Tumbukas given electoral system and demography make them rivals in Malwai but allies in Zambia
problems with institutionalism
hard to predict ex-ante when ethnicity will be made salient
institutions have unintended consequences
ethnic identification can be “sticky”
case study of ethnic violence: Rwanda
ethnic conflict between Rwandan Armed Forces (Hutu) and Rwandan Patriotic Front (Tutsi)
lasted from April to July 1994
500,000-1 million persons killed
defining a ifference: Hutu vs Tutsi
racial difference
separate ethnic groups with different ancestry
Tutsi racially superior to Hutus
because of ethnic differences Tutsi are inimical to Hutus
problem: frequently intermarry
class difference
similar ethnically but separate social classes
Tutsi = wealthy pastoralists
Hutu = poorer agriculturalists
problem: social mobility among Hutu and Tutsi
(institutionalized) political difference
Hutu and Tutsi are ethnically similar, and socially malleable
ethnic difference politicized through pre-colonial and colonial practices
administrative hierarchy
forced labor
Ubureetwa: a system of forced labor, performed as “payment” for living on a chieftains land
identification cards
backdrop to genocide: Rwandan independence
continued practice of legally codifying ethnic differences
Hutu appointed to all administrative, military and political positions
Tutsi land expropriated and redistributed
160,000 Tutsis killed or displaced
Arusha Accords: a 1993 peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front designed to end the ongoing civil war in Rwanda
power-sharing of ministerial posts
Tutsi integration into the National Assembly
Tutsi integration into the army
explaining Rwandan genocide
ethnic hatred and fear
instrumentalism
institutions
Interhamwe: youth militia of the MRND, used to perpetrate violence against Tutsis during Rwandan genocide
international inaction
case study of ethnic violence: the former Yugoslavia
about the Balkans
religious diversity
ethno-linguistic diversity
comprised of distinct nation-states
Yugoslavia
established as a federated republic
suppression of nationalist rhetoric with Communist ideology and violence
administrative reforms to balance ethnic tensions
power-sharing executive
decentralization and autonomy
backdrop to ethnic conflict: Tito’s Death and Crisis
political vacuum
rotating presidency
five year terms
possibility of veto on legislation
economic crisis
secession/democratization
strengthening of nationalist tendencies
ethnic conflict in Bosnia: Civil war and genocide
war lasting four years (91-95)
estimated 100k+ deaths
ended by joint UN/NATO intervention
explaining ethnic violence in Bosnia
primordialism
generally friendly relations post-Tito
moderate rates of intermarriage
low support for violence
institutionalism
federal political system created imbalances in representation
constitutional amendment helped Milosevic consolidate power
democratic referenda for independence threatened serbian power in multiethnic regions
instrumentalism
ethnic security dilemma: situation in which actions taken by an ethnic group to increase its own security cause reactions from other groups, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original group’s security
ethnic riots in India
ethno-religious conflict
violence in the form of riots
state-sanctioned violence
explaining ethnic riots in india
electoral incentives/party system
electoral incentives encourage some regional governments to foment ethnic divisions
multiple parties + minority votes > ethnic peace
two parties + no minority votes > ethnic riots
civil society
civil society networks prevent ethnic riots in some areas and not in others
intercommunal civil society groups: civil society organizations that group individuals across multiple cleavages or categories of difference
intracommunal civil society groups: civil society organizations that group individuals within a single community
ethnic conflict and civil society: the case of india
Ahmedabad
two parties (Congrss and BJP)
muslim population
legacy of intercommunal harmony under Gandhi
history of violent ethnic riots
Surat
two parties (Congress and BJP)
muslim population
legacy of intercommunal harmony under Gandhi
history of relative ethnic peace
healing tensions after violence
truth and reconciliation commissions
integration campaigns
reframing history