Law- Judicial Review

Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968)

Context: Milk Marketing Scheme allowed producers to complain if aggrieved. Padfield complained about price differential.

Issue: Can a minister refuse to refer a complaint to an investigating committee?

Outcome: House of Lords held refusal was unlawful; discretion must be exercised to promote the policy and objects of the Act.

Relevance: Seminal case on statutory purpose and implied limits on discretion. USE FOR: limits to executive power.

British Oxygen v Minister of Technology (1971)

Context: British Oxygen sought an investment grant for gas cylinders under £25. The minister had a policy not to give grants for items under that value.

Issue: Can a decision-maker have a blanket policy?

Outcome: House of Lords held the policy was lawful; public bodies can have policies for efficiency, provided they're willing to consider exceptions.

Relevance: Essential case for understanding legitimate use of policy vs unlawful fettering. USE FOR: policy, discretionary powers.

Ex parte Fewings (1995)

Context: Somerset County Council owned land where stag hunting took place. Council voted to ban hunting based on moral grounds. Issue: Can council ban hunting based on moral objections?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held the ban was unlawful; council's decision was not under relevant legal considerations.

Relevance: Authoritative framework for relevant/irrelevant considerations; public bodies cannot act on moral or political preferences. USE FOR: judicial review applied test.

Ex parte World Development Movement (WDM) (1995/1996)

Context: Government approved aid to Malaysia for a project despite advice against it.

Issue: Was aid given for proper development purposes or for improper ones?

Outcome: Divisional Court held the aid decision was unlawful, used for foreign policy/trade objectives.

Relevance: Important improper purpose case; courts will examine real motives in statutory schemes. USE FOR: limits on executive, judiciary as a constitutional safeguard.

Carltona v Commissioner of Works (1943)

Context: During WWII, the government requisitioned Carltona's factory under Defence Regulations. The requisition order was signed by a junior civil servant.

Issue: Can ministers lawfully act through civil servants, or must they personally exercise every statutory power given to them?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held the requisition was valid. Ministers may act through their civil servants.

Relevance: Creates the "Carltona principle"; delegation to officials is implied for ministerial functions. USE FOR: Government functions/power.

R v Adams (2020)

Context: Adams was convicted of terrorism offences. The Secretary of State issued a certificate stating he was 'dangerously opposed to democracy' using powers under the Counter-Terrorism Act, signed by a senior civil servant not by the Secretary of State personally. Issue: Are there limits to Carltona delegation?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held this decision was so serious that it could not be delegated under Carltona; the Minister had to make the decision personally.

Relevance: Important limit on Carltona; some decisions are too important for delegation. USE FOR: Human rights, limits to executive power.

R (Bromley LBC) v Greater London Council (ex parte Bromley) (1983)

Context: GLC implemented a policy reducing transport fares funded by a supplementary tax on London boroughs. Bromley challenged this as a breach of statutory duty. Issue: Must GLC run transport on ordinary business principles? Outcome: House of Lords held the policy was unlawful; GLC had a statutory duty to run transport on business principles, not substantial deficits. Relevance: Public bodies must exercise powers within the statutory framework, not according to political ideology. USE FOR: limits on political/executive discretion.

Attorney General v Fulham Corporation (1921)

Context: Fulham Council had statutory power to establish public baths and wash-houses. They decided to operate a commercial laundry service for the public, arguing it was ancillary (necessary as a complement) to the wash-houses.

Issue: Can a local authority use statutory powers for purposes beyond what the statute authorized?

Outcome: Court held this was ultra vires (beyond powers)

• The power was to provide washing facilities, not to run a commercial laundry business

• Clear example of exceeding statutory purpose

• Public bodies can only do what statute authorizes → express or implied powers

Relevance: Classic ultra vires case

• Establishes that statutory powers must be used for authorized purposes only

• Foundation for purposive approach to public law

• Important for understanding that public bodies (unlike individuals) have no general capacity and can only do what statute permits

• USE FOR: Illegality

R (Reilly and Wilson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2013–14)

Context: Government introduced "work for your benefit" schemes requiring unemployed people to work unpaid or lose benefits. Regulations were made under the Jobseekers Act. Court of Appeal held original regulations were ultra vires (didn't properly explain schemes as statute required). Government retrospectively validated them.

Issue: Were the regulations validly made? Can the government retrospectively validate unlawful regulations?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held original regulations were unlawful → didn't comply with statutory requirements for information to be given to claimants → Parliament then passed retrospective legislation validating them, which Supreme Court reluctantly upheld as within Parliament's power, though Justice Laws noted constitutional concerns

• Regulations must comply with parent Act

• Procedural requirements (informing people of schemes) must be followed

• Parliament can retrospectively validate unlawful acts, but this is constitutionally questionable

Relevance: Delegated legislation must comply with parent statute → basic rule of law principle

• Limits of judicial review → Parliament can retrospectively overrule court decisions (parliamentary sovereignty), though this is constitutionally controversial

• USE FOR: delegated legislation, rule of law, tension between legality and political will, limits to JR

R (Dolan) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (2020), Simon dolan lockdown measures

Context: During COVID-19 pandemic, government imposed lockdown restrictions using Health Protection (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020, made under Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984. Simon Dolan challenged regulations as ultra vires → Act didn't authorize such sweeping restrictions.

Issue: Did the 1984 Act give power to impose nationwide lockdown? Were regulations proportionate and within statutory authority?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held regulations were within statutory powers → Act gave broad power to prevent, protect against, and control disease → lockdown was emergency response within contemplated scope

• Courts should defer to executive/Parliament in public health emergency

• Statute interpreted purposively in light of public health emergency

• Proportionality satisfied given unprecedented crisis

• Court reluctant to second-guess expert judgments in emergency

Relevance: Shows courts giving executive and Parliament broad latitude in emergencies

• Purposive interpretation of statutory powers

• Deference in areas of scientific/medical judgment and crisis management

• USE FOR: flexibility of ultra vires doctrine, context always matters, courts lack skills → refrain from those areas

Wednesbury case (1948)

Context: Wednesbury Council granted cinema license but imposed condition: no children under 15 on Sundays. Cinema company challenged this as unreasonable condition beyond the council's power.

Issue: What is the test for unreasonableness/irrationality in judicial review? When can courts say a decision is so unreasonable it's unlawful?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held condition was lawful → Established classic "Wednesbury unreasonableness" test → decision is only unlawful if "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it."

• Lord Greene MR: decision must be "so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority"

• Very high threshold → must be perverse, not just wrong or unwise

• Court will not substitute its judgment for decision-maker's

• Also discussed relevant/irrelevant considerations, improper purpose, bad faith

Relevance: Foundation of irrationality review

• Sets very high threshold for intervention → courts don't review merits, only extreme unreasonableness

• Still used today though proportionality sometimes replaces it in rights cases.

• USE FOR: judicial restraint, separation of powers, proportionality, merit review

Ex parte Brind (1996)

Context: Home Secretary issued directives to broadcasters banning direct broadcasts of voices of members of proscribed terrorist organizations (could show them but had to use actors' voices or subtitles) → Journalists challenged this as violating free expression.

Issue: Should proportionality be a ground of judicial review in domestic law (pre-HRA)? Does European Convention on Human Rights apply in domestic JR?

Outcome: House of Lords rejected proportionality as general ground of review → ECHR not incorporated into domestic law yet, so cannot use it in JR

• Irrationality (Wednesbury) was only available test, and decision was not irrational.

• Lord Ackner: "The European Convention...is not part of our law" (this changed with HRA 1998)

• Proportionality not recognized as distinct ground in domestic law

Relevance: Shows pre-HRA orthodoxy: proportionality rejected, only Wednesbury available

• USE FOR: post-HRA, constitutional evolution, merits review, reluctance of cour

Ex parte Smith (1996)

Context: UK armed forces had a policy banning homosexual people from serving in the military, if a soldier was discovered to be gay or lesbian they could be investigated, dismissed from the armed forces, sometimes subjected to intrusive questioning about their private life 

• The Ministry of Defence justified the policy by saying that homosexuality would harm unit cohesion, damage morale, undermine military effectiveness

Issue: Several service members were dismissed because they were gay, Smith asked the court to say the policy was illegal because it was disproportionate

Outcome: Court of Appeal did not adopt proportionality because of Brind → Bingham reformulated irrationality in a more rights-sensitive way  → policy still did not cross the threshold of irrationality

• Bingham MR put it, “The threshold of irrationality is a high one. It was not crossed in this case.”

• Courts would ask whether the decision fell outside the range of reasonable responses BUT more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court would require by way of justification
  

Relevance: Pre-HRA domestic review was still locked into Wednesbury structure (only asked whether it was rational not proportionate)

• “Heightened” Wednesbury formula was used because rights were engaged but still maintained a high threshold

Smith and Grady (1999)

Context: The applicants then went to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) because they had the convention of human rights asking whether the interference with private life is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society (aka convention proportionality test)

Issue: Did UK's ban violate ECHR? Was domestic judicial review sufficient to protect Convention rights?

Outcome: The ECtHR approached the case under Article 8  → whether the interference with private life answered a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued

• Strasbourg held that the domestic threshold of irrationality had been set so high that it effectively excluded real consideration of those questions  

• Violation of Article 8, but also of Article 13 (threshold for irrationality is too high)

Relevance: Major impetus for incorporating proportionality into UK law through HRA 1998

• Outweighed principles in Brind → showed Wednesbury inadequate for rights protection

• ECtHR effectively required UK to adopt proportionality via HRA 

• USE FOR: HRA development, EU to UK law, proportionality, Human rights

R(Daly) (2001)

Context: Prison policy required prisoners to be absent from cells during cell searches, including when legal correspondence examined. Daly (prisoner) challenged this as breaching legal professional privilege and Article 8 (private life). He argued even a Wednesbury-type test should strike it down, or alternatively proportionality should apply

Issue: Does proportionality test differ from Wednesbury in practice? Should proportionality apply in HRA cases?

Outcome: House of Lords held policy violated Article 8 (right to private life) → Adopted proportionality as proper test in HRA cases

• Lord Steyn explained differences from Wednesbury.

• Proportionality more structured and demanding than Wednesbury:

  1. Proportionality may require attention to balance struck by decision-maker

  2. Proportionality may require evidence/justification from decision-maker

  3. Proportionality may require court to assess relative weight of different considerations

  4. Proportionality focuses on rights-limitation, not just reasonableness

• Not just semantic difference → proportionality more intrusive review but respected institutional competence and democratic accountability

Relevance: Established proportionality as distinct from and more intense than Wednesbury → Foundation for modern rights-based review

• Lord Steyn's analysis widely cited

• Shows HRA transformed JR with new rights and new methodology

• USE FOR: intensity of review, merits review, HRA, balancing of rights

Bank Mellat (No2) (2013)

Context: Treasury imposed financial sanctions on Iranian Bank Mellat, freezing assets and prohibiting UK financial institutions from dealing with it, to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons. Bank challenged as disproportionate, collective punishment without evidence Bank was involved in proliferation.

Issue: What is the proper test for proportionality? How should courts structure proportionality analysis?

Outcome: Supreme Court (majority) held sanctions were disproportionate and unlawful →  Lord Sumption set out structured four-stage proportionality test.

• Four-stage test:

  1. Legitimate aim: Is objective sufficiently important to justify limiting fundamental right?

  2. Rational connection: Is measure rationally connected to the objective?

  3. Necessity: Is it necessary? Could less intrusive measure achieve same objective?

  4. Balancing/proportionality stricto sensu: Is it proportionate in narrow sense? Do benefits outweigh harm?

• Here failed stage 3 and 4 → could target specific divisions/individuals rather than whole bank; measure too severe

• Court can engage in close scrutiny even in sensitive areas like national security

Relevance: Authoritative modern statement of proportionality test (derived from EU/ECHR law)

• Widely applied across public law

• Shows courts willing to apply searching review even to Treasury/security decisions

• USE FOR: Proportionality analysis, court scrutiny, judicial overreach

Begum v Special Immigration appeals Commission (2021)

Context: Shamima Begum (British citizen) traveled to Syria age 15 to join ISIS. Home Secretary stripped her citizenship, making her stateless (government claimed she had Bangladeshi citizenship though she never held it). She challenged from Syrian refugee camp, arguing deprivation put her at risk of death, violated right to fair hearing (couldn't return to participate), and was inhuman treatment.

Issue: How much deference in national security citizenship deprivation? What procedural rights where person cannot return to UK to participate in appeal?

Outcome: Supreme Court upheld deprivation → Heavy deference to Home Secretary in national security

• Procedural fairness limitations justified by national security → couldn't bring terrorist back for appeal

• Right to fair hearing not absolute.

• Lord Reed: strong deference to executive in national security

• Procedural rights qualified by security concerns, no right to return to participate

• SIAC could provide fair hearing even without her presence

• National security outweighed procedural fairness concerns

• Dissent (Lady Hale): concerned about extreme unfairness, effective exile, impact of decision made when she was child

Relevance: Limits of proportionality and judicial review in national security context, executive power

• Controversial → seen by critics as abandoning rule of law and rights protection

• USE FOR: limits to courts, intensity of review varies by context, executive power, HRA

R(AAA) (Syria) (2023)

Context: Home Secretary designated Syria safe for return of failed asylum seekers, allowing their removal. Claimants challenged, arguing Syria manifestly unsafe (ongoing conflict, Assad regime's record of torture/persecution). The government argued courts should defer to executives on safety assessments.

Issue: How much deference to executive factual assessments in asylum/removal cases? Can courts scrutinize evidence basis for safety determinations?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held designation was unlawful → not based on proper evidence

• Courts can examine factual basis even in immigration/foreign policy context → Syria clearly unsafe; designation irrational.

• Courts will scrutinize whether decision has adequate evidential foundation

• Deference doesn't mean abandoning rationality review

• Where serious consequences (risk of torture, death), courts examine evidence carefully

• Cannot simply assert "national security" or "immigration policy" to avoid scrutiny

Relevance: Courts won't always defer in asylum/immigration

• Where factual basis obviously inadequate, courts will intervene

• Illustrates limits of deference even in sensitive areas

• Courts distinguish between policy choices (high deference) and factual determinations (more scrutiny)

• USE FOR: contextual/intensity of review, non-justiciable areas, executive power, judicial role

R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade (2020)

Context: UK sold arms to Saudi Arabia used in Yemen conflict. CAAT argued Secretary of State failed to properly assess risk arms would be used to violate international humanitarian law (IHL). Judicial review of licensing decisions and risk assessment process.

Issue: How carefully must government assess IHL risks when licensing arms exports? What is intensity of review of such assessments?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held licensing process unlawful → government hadn't properly considered evidence of IHL violations

• Must take "hard look" at evidence

• Government suspended licenses, conducted new assessment, then resumed (later challenged again).

• Rationality review with teeth → courts examine whether assessment was serious

• Deference to foreign policy doesn't allow ignoring evidence

Relevance: Courts can provide meaningful review even in foreign policy/defence context

• "Rationality with bite"—between pure Wednesbury and full merits

• Important for understanding intensity review in sensitive areas

• Government must engage seriously with evidence

• Similar to AA but involved foreign policy

• USE FOR: Arms exports, foreign policy JR, and evidential scrutiny, court scrutiny despite sensitive topics

Anisminic

Context: Foreign Compensation Commission (FCC) rejected Anisminic's claim for compensation for property seized in Egypt. Foreign Compensation Act stated FCC's determinations "shall not be called in question in any court of law" → strong ouster clause. FCC had made error of law in interpreting who was eligible.

Issue: Can strong ouster clause ("shall not be called in question") exclude judicial review? What happens when tribunal makes error of law?

Outcome: House of Lords held error of law makes determination a nullity, so ouster clause doesn't protect it

• Ouster clause only protects valid determinations, not nullities

• Lord Reid: any error of law by FCC exceeds jurisdiction, making decision null

• Ouster protects decisions, not non-decisions (nullities)

• Very strong interpretation protecting judicial review

Relevance: Revolutionary case undermining ouster clauses

• Widened scope of judicial review by making all errors of law jurisdictional

• Fundamental to modern JR → establishes courts' insistence on maintaining supervisory jurisdiction

• Courts will read even strong ouster language narrowly to preserve review

R (Privacy International) (2019)

Context: Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) hears complaints about surveillance/intelligence agencies. Investigatory Powers Act had ouster clause: IPT decisions (including on law) "shall not be...questioned in any court." Privacy International sought JR of IPT's legal ruling. Strong ouster language similar to Anisminic.

Issue: Can extremely strong ouster clause exclude judicial review even for errors of law? Has Cart eroded Anisminic principle?

Outcome: Supreme Court (majority) held ouster ineffective → courts retain jurisdiction to review IPT's errors of law. 

• Very strong presumption against excluding judicial review, especially for errors of law → Anisminic principle reaffirmed

• Lord Carnwath (majority): even strong ouster doesn't exclude review for error of law

• Only most clear and explicit language could exclude review

• Rule of law requires courts able to correct legal errors

• Parliament would need to make unmistakably clear intent to exclude all review

• Lord Sumption (concurring, different reasoning): distinction between decisions and non-decisions still valid

Relevance: Major reaffirmation of Anisminic in modern context

• Strong statement that judicial review is constitutional fundamental, not easily excluded

• USE FOR: rule of law, judicial review/power, protection of JR

Cart (2011)

Context: Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 created two-tier tribunal system (First-tier Tribunal, Upper Tribunal). Act stated Upper Tribunal decisions "final" and created specific routes of appeal/review. Cart sought judicial review of Upper Tribunal's refusal to grant permission to appeal from First-tier.

Issue: Can High Court judicially review Upper Tribunal decisions refusing permission to appeal? Or does tribunal system's internal structure and finality provisions exclude this?

Outcome: Supreme Court held limited judicial review available, but only in exceptional circumstances → Adopted "second appeals test" from CPR 52.13 → review only where important point of principle or practice, or compelling reason

• Balance between access to justice and finality/efficiency

• Upper Tribunal is superior court of record—generally decisions final

• But complete ouster would risk errors going uncorrected

• Very narrow judicial review available as safety valve

• Must show: (1) important point of principle/practice, or (2) compelling reason

• High threshold → only about 3% of cases meeting it

Relevance: Important post-Anisminic case showing courts allowing partial ouster where compensating safeguards exist

• More nuanced than Anisminic's absolute approach

• Balance between competing principles: access to justice vs efficiency and finality

• Shows courts can accept ouster if residual review available for serious errors

• USE FOR: tribunal law, executive power?

Oceana (2023)

Context: Following Cart (2011), Parliament passed IORASA (Judicial Review and Courts Act) 2022 removing Cart JR. Act stated Upper Tribunal permission decisions not subject to review "on any basis." Oceana sought to challenge this ouster, arguing it violated rule of law and access to justice.

Issue: Can Parliament exclude Cart JR with clear words? Are there constitutional limits on Parliament's power to exclude review?

Outcome: Supreme Court (3-2) upheld ouster → Where Parliament uses clear words responding to specific judicial decision (Cart), courts will respect it, Parliamentary sovereignty prevails.

• Lord Reed (majority): Parliament has clearly excluded Cart JR with explicit language

• Safeguards remain (Upper Tribunal is expert, other review routes exist)

• Courts should not frustrate clear parliamentary intention

• Dissent (Lord Stephens): ouster breaches rule of law and access to justice

Relevance: Significant shift from Privacy International → divided court and uncertain law on ouster

• Suggests clear ouster will be respected where Parliament responding to specific case and safeguards exist

• More sovereignty-friendly than Privacy International's rule-of-law approach

• Controversial → seen as weakening JR protection

• USE FOR: ouster effectiveness, parliamentary sovereignty, evolving law

Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, Etc.) Act 2004

Context: Immigration and asylum cases historically generated huge litigation volume. Government sought to restrict JR of immigration decisions to reduce delays and costs. Act included various ouster/limitation provisions.

Outcome: Act included provisions:

• Section 26: restrictive time limits for immigration JR

• Attempts to limit grounds of review

• Procedural restrictions on immigration challenges

• Courts read these narrowly where possible, applying Anisminic principle
  

Relevance: Important example of targeted ouster in specific policy area (immigration) → Parliament's frustration with JR volume

• Courts generally resist but some restrictions effective

• Ongoing tension between efficiency/finality and access to justice

• USE FOR: abuse of executive power by limiting court scrutiny

Cooper (1863)

Context: Cooper was building a house. Statute required seven days' notice to Board of Works before building. Cooper didn't give notice (or it wasn't received). Board demolished the partially built house without hearing Cooper or giving him chance to explain.

Issue: Where statute is silent about hearing rights, can courts imply duty to give person a hearing before taking action affecting them?

Outcome: Court held demolition unlawful → even though statute didn't expressly require hearing, natural justice implied one → Board should have heard Cooper before destroying his property.

• Byles J: "even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defense"

• Fundamental principle: hear the other side (audi alteram partem)

• Fairness can be implied even where statute silent

• Where rights/interests seriously affected, person entitled to be heard

Relevance: Foundation of procedural fairness → establishes courts will imply hearing rights even where statute silent

• One of earliest natural justice cases

• Shows common law's protection of fair procedure

• Serious consequences require fair process

• USE FOR: fairness is constitutional principle not requiring express statutory basis, rights

Ridge v Baldwin (1964)

Context: Ridge (Chief Constable of Brighton) was acquitted of criminal charges but judge made critical comments about his conduct. Watch Committee (his employer) dismissed him without hearing, citing statutory power to dismiss officers they thought negligent or unfit.

Issue: Did Ridge have right to hearing before dismissal? Had natural justice been abandoned in administrative law?

Outcome: House of Lords held dismissal unlawful —> Ridge entitled to hearing before being dismissed. Revived natural justice after period where it had been thought limited to judicial/quasi-judicial acts.

• Lord Reid: natural justice applies wherever decision affects rights/interests, not just to courts/judicial bodies

• Dismissal from office for misconduct requires hearing

• "Watch committee were not entitled to dismiss the appellant without first informing him of the grounds on which they proposed to act and giving him a fair opportunity of being heard in his own defence"

• Rejection of technical distinction between judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative

Relevance: Revival of natural justice in modern administrative law. Swept away restrictive categories limiting fairness. Established that procedural fairness applies broadly across administrative action. Foundation for modern procedural fairness. Hugely influential—transformed administrative law. Every procedural fairness case builds on Ridge. Shows courts protecting individuals against arbitrary administrative action

Porter v Magill (2002)

Context: Westminster Council (Conservative) adopted a policy of selling council houses in marginal wards to create more homeowners who would vote Conservative ("building stable communities" policy). Leader Shirley Porter drove this. Auditor found this was for electoral gain, not housing need.

Issue: Can council use housing powers for partisan political advantage? When is councillor personally liable for unlawful expenditure?

Outcome: House of Lords held policy was adopted for improper purpose (electoral advantage) and was "a deliberate, blatant and dishonest misuse of public power."

• Powers must be used for statutory purposes (housing need), not partisan electoral advantage

• Using public resources for party-political gain is paradigm improper purpose

• Also established modern apparent bias test (separate issue in case): "whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility" of bias

Relevance: Leading case on improper purpose → electoral advantage is illegitimate purpose for exercise of public powers

• Establishes personal liability for deliberate misuse

• Established modern apparent bias test: "whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility" of bias.

• Objective test → not actual bias or claimant's perception, but hypothetical fair observer

• Observer is informed (knows relevant facts) and fair-minded (not unduly suspicious but realistic)

• "Real possibility" not mere suspicion, but lower than probability

• Replaces old "real danger" test

• Applies to all apparent bias cases (not automatic disqualification)

• USE FOR: protecting democratic integrity, Apparent bias test, courts responding to corruption/abuse of power

Ex parte Doody (1994)

Context: Life sentence prisoners (convicted of murder) had tariff (minimum term) set by Home Secretary. Home Secretary didn't disclose what judge/parole board recommended, didn't give reasons for departing from recommendations, didn't allow prisoners to make representations.

Issue: What procedural fairness required when Home Secretary sets tariff? Must reasons be given? What content must fair procedure have?

Outcome: House of Lords held Secretary must give gist of material considered, allow representations, and give reasons for decision, especially if departing from judicial recommendations.

• Lord Mustill: fairness is context-dependent —> "What fairness demands is dependent on the context"

• More serious the impact, more fairness required

• Reasons particularly important where: (a) affects liberty/important interests, (b) allows checking decision was lawful, (c) enables meaningful appeal

• Prisoners entitled to know case against them and respond

• No general duty to give reasons, but often required by fairness depending on context

Relevance: Leading case on contextual fairness and duty to give reasons. Establishes factors determining procedural content: nature of decision, impact on individual, type of scheme, etc. Widely cited for reasons principle. Important for understanding fairness is flexible—adapts to context. More at stake = more procedure. Foundation for modern procedural fairness analysis. Courts regularly apply Doody's contextual approach.

R (Coughlan) v North and East Devon Health Authority (2001)

Context: Coughlan (severely disabled) lived in NHS facility. Health Authority promised residents "home for life." Later decided to close facility and move residents, arguing changing priorities and costs. Coughlan challenged based on legitimate expectation of promise.

Issue: Can legitimate expectation protect substantive outcome (not just procedure)? Can promise create enforceable expectation of particular treatment?

Outcome: Court of Appeal held promise created substantive legitimate expectation that was binding—health authority could not break promise without compelling justification. No sufficient justification here.

• Three categories of legitimate expectation cases:

  1. Procedural: expectation of consultation/hearing (must honor unless good reason)

  2. Substantive—policy change: can frustrate expectation if fair and lawful (Wednesbury)

  3. Substantive—specific promise: can only defeat expectation if overriding public interest justifies it (high threshold)

• This was category 3, aspecific promise to Coughlan

• Promise enforceable absent overriding public interest

• Cost/convenience not sufficient to override

Relevance: Landmark case establishing substantive legitimate expectation.

• Controversial —> extends protection beyond procedure to actual benefits/outcomes

• Important for understanding when promises bind government

• Shows limits on government's ability to resile from commitments

• Protects individuals who rely on official assurances

• Applied in many contexts: social services, immigration, licensing, benefits

• Represents high-water mark of legitimate expectation doctrine.

For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers (2025)

Context: The Scottish Parliament passed the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018, setting a target of 50% women on public boards. Guidance issued under the Act stated that people with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) could count towards this target. For Women Scotland Ltd challenged this, arguing that “woman” in the Equality Act 2010 referred to biological women only.

• Gender Recognition Act 2004 s9(1) provides that a person with a GRC is legally recognised in their acquired gender “for all purposes,” subject to exceptions. 

• However, the Equality Act 2010 treats sex and gender reassignment as separate protected characteristics and does not expressly define “woman” or “sex.”

Issue: The key issue was whether “woman” and “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex, or whether they include trans women with a GRC. 

• Raised questions about how courts should interpret overlapping statutes, whether the GRA 2004 modifies the meaning of sex in the EA 2010, and whether statutory interpretation should prioritise equality-enhancing purposes or legal coherence

Outcome: The Supreme Court held unanimously that “woman” and “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex, not sex as modified by a GRC.

• The Court reasoned that giving “woman” a variable meaning would make the Equality Act incoherent and difficult to apply

• The Act treats sex and gender reassignment as distinct protected characteristics, so reading “woman” to include both biological women and trans women with GRCs would blur categories that Parliament deliberately kept separate

• The Court emphasised that this was a matter of statutory interpretation, not a moral or political judgment about gender identity

• Limits the ability of Scottish guidance to alter the meaning of UK-wide equality law, since equality law is largely reserved to Westminster under the Scotland Act 1998

Relevance: statutory interpretation, parliamentary sovereignty, devolution, and judicial restraint

• Shows the Court prioritising statutory coherence, ordinary meaning, and administrability over a more expansive rights-based interpretation

• Contrast with Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, where the Court adopted a more flexible interpretation to protect rights under the HRA. Here, the Court took a more restrained approach, stressing that judges interpret legislation rather than rewrite contested social policy.