Exam Question Flashcards

Is Hume right that inductive inferences are founded on custom, not reason?

• Definition: Induction = inference from observed cases to unobserved cases.

  • e.g. sun has risen before → sun will rise tomorrow

• Hume’s target: beliefs about unobserved matters of fact, not present perception or memory

• Causation link: we go beyond memory/senses only through cause and effect

• Hume’s fork:

  • Relations of ideas = necessary, a priori, certain

  • Matters of fact = contingent, a posteriori, denial conceivable

• Key argument: it is conceivable that the future will not resemble the past. therefore induction cannot be justified demonstratively.

• Uniformity principle: induction assumes that nature is uniform but this cannot be proven by reason or by experience

• Circularity: ‘Induction worked in the past, so it will work in the future’ already uses induction

• Conclusion: induction is not founded on reason, it is founded on custom/habit

• Positive account: repeated conjunction creates an automatic expectation and custom is the psychological mechanism behind inductive belief

• Evaluation:

  • Strong sceptical reading: Hume shows induction is unjustified

  • Weaker reading: Hume only shows induction lacks deductive/rational certainty

  • Psychological reading: Hume explains how belief arises, not whether it is justified

• Best thesis

  • Hume succeeds in showing that induction cannot be justified by reason alone, but he does not necessarily show that induction is irrational in every practical sense

What is Hume’s account of the origin of the idea of necessary connection? It is correct?

• Problem: Causation seems to involve more than: contiguity, temporal succession, constant conjunction

• Necessary connection = power, force, efficacy, production

• Hume’s method: copy principle - all simple ideas derive from impressions

• Negative phase (external): billard balls example, we perceive motion, contact, succession. we do not perceive power or necessity

• Negative phase (internal): maybe necessity comes from will/body. hume rejects this: we do not understand how will moves the body

• General argument: if we perceived necessary connection, we could know effects a priori. we cannot know effects a priorr.

• Positive phase: repeated observation of A followed by B creates constant conjunction. repetition does not reveal anything new in objects.

• Origin of idea: the mind becomes habituated to move from A to B. the felt transition of the mind is the impression behind necessary connection

• Two definitions of cause: objective: regular succession/constant conjunction. subjective: object whose appearance leads the mind to expect another.

• Strength: powerful psychological explanation of causal belief, fits Hume’s wider account of induction/custom

• Anscombe critique: Hume may define ‘observation’ too narrowly

• Craig-style critique: no a priori knowledge of effects does not prove no perception of causation

• Stroud critique: Hume may confuse the origin of the idea with its content. even if the idea originates in the mind, causal judgements still seem to be about the world.

• New Hume interpretation: Hume may be a sceptical realist: real powers may exist, but we cannot know them

• Best thesis: Hume gives a compelling account of the psychological origin of causal belief, but not a complete account of causal reality

Is Hume right that human actions are both free and casually determined?

• Problem: How can these all be true? → some actions are free, all events are casually determined, and humans are morally responsible

• Hume’s strategy: dissolve the dispute by clairfying terms

• Necessity: same as causation: constant conjunction + inference, not mysterious compulsion

• Human action as necessitated: human behaviour shows regularity. we predict actions from motives, passions, character, circumstances

• Unpredictable actions: Hume appeals to “secret opposition of contrary causes”, suprise does not mean absence of causation

• Liberty: a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will e.g. if I choose to move, I can; If I choose to stay still, I can

• Compatibilism: Freedom and determinism are compatible. Free action = action caused by one’s will, not externally constrained

• Moral responsibility: responsibility requires action to proceed from character/disposition. if actions were random or uncaused, they would not be attributable to the agent

• Strength: Hume is strong against libertarian randomness. Indeterminism does not obviously improve responsibility

• Locke locked-room objection: a man willingly stays in a room but is locked in, voluntary action may not equal free action

• Addict objection: addicts act according to will, but seems unfree. suggests freedom requires control over the will itself

• Frankfurt critique/improvement: distinguishes first-order desires and second-order volitions. freedom of will = willing what one wants to will. better explains unwilling addict.

• Best thesis: Hume is right that moral responsibility requires actions to be connected to character and motive, but his definition of libery is too thin because it ignores whether the will itself is free

Does Hume prove that is is never reasonable to believe reports of miracles?

• Definition of miracle: violation of a law of nature

• Hume’s background principle: wise person proportions belief to evidence

• Core argument: laws of nature are supported by uniform experience. testimony is fallible. therefore testimony for a miracle will usually be weaker than evidence against it.

• Balancing evidence: we should believe the miracle only if the falsehood of the testiony would be more miraculous than the miracle itself

• Connection to induction: Hume’s miracle argument depends on past regularity, it assumes strong evidence from uniform experience

• Problem/tension: If Hume is sceptical about induction, can he appeal to laws of nature so confidently?

• Hume’s critique of testimony: people are credulous, religious passion encourages exaggeration, miracles reports often arise among ‘ignorant and barbarous’ nations, competing religions’ miracle claims cancel each other out

• Strength: strong probabilistic argument, testimony needs to be weighed against background evidence

• Weakness: may define miracles in a way that makes belief almost impossible from the start. may underestimate cumulative testimony. his argument may work against causal reports but not necessarily all conceivable testimony.

• Best thesis: Hume gives a powerful general argument believing miracle reports, but he may not prove that belief in miracles is never responsible under any possible evidential conditions

How does Hume’s copy principle shape his account of causation and necessary connection?

• Theory of perceptions: impressions = vivid perceptions and ideas = faint copies

• Copy Principle: all simple ideas derive from prior impressions

• Function: tests whether philosophical concepts are meaningful. from what impression is this idea derived?

• Application to causation: Hume asks for the impression behind necessary connection. since no external/internal impression is found in single cases, he turns to habit

• Anti-metaphysical role: concepts without impressions are suspect. targets rationalist metaphysics

• Strength: gives Hume a disciplined method. forces philosophers to clarify obscure terms

• Weakness: missing shade of blue challenges universality. Stroud: Hume assumes too much about impressions/ideas. Craig: thought may not reduce to imagery.

• Best use in essays: use as setup for causation. do not spend too long unless question asks directly.

• Best thesis: the copy principle gives Hume a powerful empiricist method, but its weaknesses undermine how confidently he can use it to analyse necessary connection

How does Hume’s fork support his scepticism about induction and causation?

• Relations of ideas: necessary, a priori, denial entails contradiction, e.g. mathematics

• matters of fact: contingent, a posteriori, denial conceivable e.g. the sun will rise tomorow

• Application to induction: future predictions are matters of fact, their denial is conceivable, so they cannot be proven by reason alone

• Application to causation: causes/effects cannot be inferred a priori, we need experience

• Role in scepticism: reason cannot establish necessary truths about the empirical world

• kant link: kant challenges Hume by arguing for synthetic a priori knowledge, especially causation as a condition of experience

• evaluation: Hume’s fork is powerful but may be too restrictive, kant’s synthetic a priori directly challenges it

• Hume’s fork explains why induction and causation cannot be grounded in pure reason, but kant later argues that Hume misses the possibility of synthetic a priori principles

Is Hume best understood as a sceptic or a naturalist?

• Sceptical side: reason cannot justify induction, we do not percieve necessary connection, causal beliefs lack rational foundation

• Naturalist side: Hume explains belief through human psychology. custom/habit produces expectations, belief is natural, unavoidable, and practically necessary

• Induction example: not rationally justified and still psychologically inevitable

• Causation example: necessary connection not perceived and idea arises from mental transition

• Liberty example: free will debate dissolved by analysing human practices

• Stroud-style sceptical reading: Hume reveals deep lack of rational justification

• Psychological reading: Hume explains how belief works rather than simply rejcting it

• Best thesis: Hume is both sceptic and naturalist: sceptical about reason’s justificatory power, but naturalistic in explainin why human beings inevitably believe and act as they do

Why, according to Kant, should we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge?

• Context: Kant thinks metaphysics has failed to become a science due to no consensus, no stable progress, and no agreed method

• Problem: How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? Knowledge that is necessary and universal, but also substantive, not merely analytic

• Hume problem: Hume shows that causation cannot be justified by experience of analytic reason

• Kant’s response: Hume is right that causation is not derived from experience, but wrong to think it is merely habit

• Copernican turn: instead of assumig cognition conforms to objects, kant asks whether objects conform to cognition

• Meaning: the mind actively structures experiences through a) forms of intuition e.g. space and time b) categories e.g. causation, substance, unity

• Result: we can have a priori knowledge of objects because we know only objects as they appear under our cognitive conditions

• Metaphysical significance:

  • kant does not abolish metaphysics

  • he reforms it critically

  • metaphysics becomes inquiry into the conditions and limits of possible experience

• evaluation: strength → explains synthetic a priori knowledge and answers Hume weakness → risks idealism, depends on sharp distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves

• best thesis: kant’s copernican turn is justified is synthetic a priori knowledge is accepted; it explains how necessary knowledge of experience is possible

Explain and assess Kant’s view that space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer space.

• Core claim: space is not a property of things-in-themselves

• space = form of outer intuition

  • it is the way we represent outer objects

  • it is not derived from experience

• argument from a priori representation

  • we cannot derive space from relations between outer objects

  • to represent objects as outside one another, we must already represent them spatially

• argument from geometry

  • geometry gives synthetic a priori knowledge

  • this is possible only if space is an a priori intuition

• against newton: space is not an absolute container existing independently

• against Leibniz: space is not merely relations between things-in-themselves

• kant’s view: space is empirically real but transcendentally ideal

  • empirically real: all objects of experience are spatial

  • transcendentally ideal: space does not belong to things as they are in themselves

• neglected alternative objection

  • Kant may show space is a subjective form of intuition

  • but does he show it is not a property of things-in-themselves?

• Allison two-aspect response

  • things-in-themselves = things considered apart from our cognitive conditions

  • problem: may make Kant’s conclusion too easy/trivial

• Guyer response:

  • tries to defend Kant through modal argument about necessary spatiality of experience

  • problem: premises are controversial

• best thesis:

  • Kant gives a strong argument that space is a priori condition of experience, but his stronger claim that things-in-themselves are non-spatial is vulnerable to the neglected alternative

Does Kant’s theory of geometry provide a good argument for transcendental idealism?

• Kant’s starting point: Geometry gives necessary and universal knowledge of spatial objects

• Geometry is synthetic a priori:

  • synthetic: it extends knowledge, not merely unpacking concepts

  • a priori: its truths are necessary and not learned from experience

• key question: How can we know necessary truths about all spatial objects before experience?

• Kant’s answer: space must be an a priori form of intuition

• argument

  • geometry is synthetic a priori knowledge of space

  • such knowledge is only possible only if space is contributed by the subject

  • therefore, space is a subjective form of intuition

• why this supports transcendental idealism

  • objects of experience conform to our form of intuition

  • so spatiality belongs to appearances, not things-in-themselves

• strength:

  • explains how geometry can be necessary and applicable to experience

• weakness 1: non-Euclidean geomtry challenges kant’s assumption that Euclidean geometry describes space necessarily

• weakness 2: neglected alternative: space could both be subjective and mind-independent

• weakness 3: even if geometry requires a priori intuition, why conclude things-in-themselves are non-spatial?

• best thesis:

  • kant’s geometry argument strongly supports the claim that space is an a priori condition of experience, but it does not conclusively establish the full metaphysical thesis of transcendental idealism

Why do we face a special problem regarding our right to apply the categories to objects? How does Kant aim to solve that problem in the Transcendental Deduction?

• Categories: pure a priori concepts of the understanding

  • causation, substance, unity, plurality, etc

• problem: since categories are not derived from experience, why are we entitled to apply them to objects?

• quid facti vs quid juris:

  • quid facti: do we possess the concept?

  • quid juris: do we have a right to apply it to objects?

• metaphysical deduction:

  • derives categories from logical forms of judgement

  • shows their origin in the understanding

  • does not yet show legitimate application

• transcendental deduction

  • aims to prove categories are conditions of possible experience

• core argument:

  • experience requires synthesis of intuitions

  • synthesis requires rules

  • rules are supplied by the understanding

  • the most basic rules are the categories

  • therefore, experience requires the categories

• “Intuitions without concepts are blind”

  • sensory data alone is not yet experience of objects

  • concepts organise intuition into objective cognition

• Ameriks regressive reading:

  • kant starts from the fact that we have empirical knowledge

  • then asks what conditions make that knowledge possible

• Evaluation:

  • strength: powerful alternative to Humean empiricism

  • weakness: ambiguous meaning of “experience”

  • does kant mean perception, consciousness, or empirical knowledge?

• Best thesis:

  • kant succeeds in showing that objective experience requires conceptual structure, but whether he proves the objective validity of all categories depends on whether his notion of ‘experience’ is already loaded with what he wants to prove

Explain and assess Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy

• Conclusion: Every change has a cause

• Target: Hume’s scepticism about causation

  • Hume: causation arises from habit/custom

  • Kant: causation is a condition of objective experience

• key premise: time itself cannot be perceived

• problem: we must distinguish:

  • subjective succession: order of my perceptions;

  • objective succession: order of events themselves

• Examples

  • House: I perceive front, side, back, successively, but they coexist

  • Ship: I perceive ship upstream then downstream; but this is objective succession

• Issue: perception alone cannot distinguish these

• Kant’s solution: objective succession requires a rule determining the order of events

• That rule is causation

  • if B objectively follows A as a change in a substance, there must be some cause explaining that transition

• Important clarification

  • Kant is not saying every earlier event causes every later event

  • He is saying every change of state has some cause

• Strawson criticism:

  • Kant allegedly confuses irreversibility of perception with causal necessity

  • Famous objection: “non sequitur of numbing grossness”

• Response to Strawson

  • kant is not inferring causation from perceived irreversibility

  • he argues causal rules are conditions for knowing objective succession at all

• Evaluation:

  • strength: gives strong transcendental reply to Hume

  • weakness: unclear why objective succession requires causation rather than just temporal ordering

• Best thesis:

  • kant improves on Hume by showing that causal ordering is necessary of objective experience, but the Second Analogy only succeeds if one accepts Kant’s braoder transcendental idealist framework