meta-ethics

cognitivism

ethical language expresses beliefs and are truth apt propositions (can be true or false)

non-cognitivism

ethical language does not express beliefs/propositions, but has another function - not truth apt

moral naturalism

• type of moral realism - moral facts exist and are natural properties of the world (not supernatural/divine)

• cognitivist - ethical judgements are true or false insofar as they correctly/incorrectly refer to these natural properties

utilitarianism as moral naturalism

• bentham - all humans seek pleasure and avoid pain - these are psychological (i.e. natural) properties

• descriptive fact → prescriptive conclusion - we ought to maximise pleasure and minimise pain

• mill - ‘proof’ begins with a natural fact - that happiness is what each person desires

virtue ethics as moral naturalism

• does not reduce moral terms to naturalistic properties BUT is based on natural facts

• humans value and strive for ‘the good’ through reaching eudaimonia - this is a natural fact about human behaviour

• our function (ergon) to be guided by our reason is a natural fact about humans - to live the good life for a human is to fulfil this function

moral non-naturalism

• type of moral realism - moral facts exist and are non-natural properties

• cognitivist - ethical judgements are true or false insofar as they correctly/incorrectly refer to these non-natural properties

intuitionism - moore

• we cannot sense moral properties or argue for them on the basis of evidence

• ethical judgements are unique and cannot be analysed in non-moral or natural terms

• moral truths such as ‘killing is wrong’ are grasped as self-evident intuitions

open question argument - moore

• terms are either definable or indefinable - we can determine which by asking questions

• closed question - can only be answered with “yes” or “no” e.g. “is a bachelor an unmarried man?” - answer determined by meaning of concepts in the question - the term is definable

• open question - cannot be decided in this way - the term is indefinable

• if naturalism was correct then “is pleasure good?” would be a closed question - it would make no sense to ask as it would be the same as asking “is pleasure pleasure?” or “is good good?”

• however “is pleasure good?” is an open question - therefore “pleasure” does not have the same meaning as “good”

• we can replace “pleasure” with any concept X and the outcome would be the same - no other concept has the same meaning as “good”

• therefore “moral goodness” cannot be defined or reduced to any other property

naturalistic fallacy -