Global War 1914-18

War economy paras x4

Mismanagement of industry

Morale

Famine as cause for defeat

Financial mismanagement

War economy intro x3

“To the economic historian, the outcome of the First World War looks to have been inevitable” - Ferguson 1988.

Coal and grain; industry, morale, famine, (finances)

War economy industry x6

Traditional historiography (Winter); German economy mismanaged. British vs German GDP growth: 7% vs -27%. German iron and steel production shrank to 80 and 60% levels.

German War Raw Materials Office founded by Rathenau, private corp. Criticised by Hanseatic businessmen.

British mining profits trebled by 1916. Albert Thomas forced out as Minister of Munitions 1917.

German workforce only 7% smaller by 1918, skilled workers exempt. French impot du sang.

28 to 16 dreadnoughts at Jutland. 600 tanks at Amiens.

Ludendorff and Haig believed the German Army could hold out for a number more months in November 1918.

War economy military morale x3

c.400,000 captured during Hundred Days Offensive.

Piave/Vittorio Veneto. Failure of leadership (uncoordinated offensives at Piave, 150k losses). Nationalist tensions, non-Austrian divisions unreliable and Hungarian divisions recalled November 1st. Link to starvation but also Wilson’s 14 points/October Rev. Ideology.

Entente morale; superior. Nivelle Mutiny 1917 was not a collapse but a protest, whereas CPs collapsed on all fronts.

War economy famine x6

Crash in living standards; German Revolution began with Kiel Mutiny - sailors on civilian rations.

German imports fell to 20% of 1913 imports by 1918 (half of which had been from enemy nations).

February 1917, First Sea Lord Jellicoe letter to cabinet, Britain soon to be forced out of the war.

Kruse and Hintze; during ‘Turnip Winter’ 1916-17 calorie consumption was 85% of prewar levels when adjusted for weight loss; hardship not famine.

Schweinmord, well-intentioned but incentivised farmers to divert 3.2m tons of grain to livestock.

Germany, Austria, Russia, sufficient food but insufficient infrastructure/coal/willingness to transport. AH failure of railway network and Hungary withholding grain.

War economy financial management x4

Austrian gov floated 8 war bonds, to keep the market liquid these could be used as collateral for a cash loan; 1491% increase in money supply. German supply increase 38% p/a.

German, British, French consumer good inflation 204, 110, 113%.

Britain funded 18% through taxation, Germany 14%. Debt grew by factors of 8 and 11% respectively.

Britain ended up a net creditor; owed (mostly to US) £1365m but was owed (primarily by dominions) £1841m. Ability to liquify overseas assets.

Military Revolution paras x4

Evolution of trenches

Offensive warfare

Technology

Naval warfare

Military Revolution intro

Alan Clark’s The Donkeys 1961. 1980s paradigm shift; Paddy Griffith’s Battle Tactics of the Western Front.

Military Revolution trenches x4

1914 trench warfare similar to C19 wars like Crimea/RJ war but on a far greater scale - no ability to outflank/avoid.

1915-16 evolution. Multiple parallel lines, concrete bunkers, barbed wire.

Defence in depth; instituted by Germany at the Somme 1916. By April 1917 only 5/40 initial corps leaders held their roles, conservative leaders like von Below removed by OHL.

At Caporetto Oct-Nov 1917 immobile Italian units had operated too rigid a defence and an overly centralised command structure. At Piave June 1918, Diaz had abolished continuous trenches and replaced it with mobile defence; AH assault crushed.

Military Revolution offense x3

Captain Andre Laffargue’s pamphlet encouraging creeping barrage and counter battery fire 1915. At Amiens, predictive fire meant genuine surprise could eb achieved.

Infiltration tactics. Von Hutier and Bruchmuller. Special units infiltrated enemy lines to target weak points like headquarters/artillery. Success at Caporetto October 1917 and Michael March-April 1918.

‘Bite and Hold’ objectives used by the Entente.

Military Revolution technology x3

Tanks. First used at the Somme with mixed results. By Amiens used in combination with other units, mostly to suppress machine guns and crush barbed wire.

Germans developed anti-tank tactics. Technology too limited to be truly revolutionary as it was by 1939.

Aviation. 1914; primitive reconnaissance, eventually began combined role operations. Air-to-air, CAS. During Michael and HDO acted as aerial artillery. Strat bombing of German industry.

Naval Warfare x4

Battlefleet development. Expectation; concentration of fire Mahan. Germans expected British into the Heligoland Bight. Jutland April-May 1916 was the only time the fleets met. Limited tactical change in the operation of battlefleets.

Aircraft carriers; first use in a sea battle at Jutland but played a limited role.

Submarines. Significance not fully anticipated pre-1914. Changed the economics of naval warfare, but no battleships sunk by submarines during major fleet action.

First Sea Lord Jellicoe February 1917 letter to the cabinet. Convoys.

Generals topics x3

Retrospective justification

Blaming material conditions

Blaming others

Generals intro x4

Falkenhayn General Headquarters. Published 1919 directly after retirement.

Ludendorff My War Memories. Written largely from memory November 1918-February 1919, published after the treaty was signed.

Haig Despatches. Written 1916-19, collected and published 1919. Official documents not private memoirs.

Brusilov Soldier’s Notebook. Published censored 1929 and uncensored 1932.

Generals retrospective justification examples x6

Falkenhayn justification of Verdun, to ‘bleed France white. Contemporary operational accounts support the view that Verdun was intended to break through the lines.

By the time Falkenhayn wrote General Headquarters, German and French casualties were roughly the same.

Verdun held by France but followed by the Nivelle Mutiny.

Haig justification of the 1916-17 campaigns. Described as necessary ‘wearing out’ of the enemy. William Philpott argues that attrition was a rational (if unfortunate) decision.

Gary Sheffield; necessary part of the learning curve.

Relieved Verdun. Contributed to the long term German manpower crisis?

Generals retrospective justification quotes x2

Falkenhayn. “Our objective […] was to inflict on the enemy the utmost possible injury with the least possible cost”.

Haig. “The strategic plan of the allies had been realised with a completeness rarely seen in war”.

Generals blaming material conditions examples

Ludendorff and Falkenhayn. Saw the home front as letting down the front line. Ludendorff