Meta ethics

Defne moral realism (3)

• The meta-ethical view that certain statements can express moral truths

• Moral judgements can either be true or false (truth-apt)

• There is a mind-independent moral reality – moral properties exist and can be discovered – so moral progress is possible

• Made either true or false by something in the real world – outside of our human attitudes/opinions

Defne naturalism (3)

• Moral properties ('the good') can be defned in terms of natural properties – they are reducible or identical to them

• They can be empirically discovered – identifed in the world of human nature

Defne non-naturalism (3)

• Moral properties cannot be defned in terms of natural properties – they are neither reducible nor identical to them

• They cannot be empirically discovered – they are not observable because they are not part of the natural world

What is the diference between naturalism and non-naturalism (5)

• Naturalism argues moral properties can be defned in terms of natural properties – they are reducible or identical to them

• It follows in naturalism that moral properties can be empirically discovered/identifed in the world

• For example, in utilitarianism 'the good' is reduced to pleasure and in virtue ethics it is reducible to fourishing/eudaimonia

• Non-naturalism argues moral properties cannot be defned in terms of natural properties – they are neither reducible nor identical to them

• Non-naturalism argues moral properties cannot be empirically discovered as they are not observable/part of the natural world

• For example, through intuitions we have a direct intuitive sense of what is right or wrong

Outline the open question argument and the naturalistic fallacy (5)

• P1: 'it is pleasure but is it morally good?' is an open question – the answer cannot be determined by the concepts in the question

• P2: If the good can be reduced to pleasure (or any other property) then they are the same – 'it is pleasure, but is it pleasure?' is a closed question (answer is decided by meanings of concept involved in question) – this isn't a question at all

• P3: The concept 'pleasure' does not have the same meaning as the concept 'morally good' so they cannot be the same thing

• P4: The good cannot be defned by non-ethical terms like pleasure (or any other property) – it is not reducible to natural properties

• C: The property of moral goodness is neither identical nor reducible to pleasurableness (or any other property)

• This means that a naturalistic fallacy has been committed – the attempt to give a non-natural object (the good) a natural property (ie pleasure) is a logical error – it cannot possibly be defned in this way

Defne intuitionism (3)

• Our moral judgements are based on our intuitions of morality (ie right and wrong) – we know what is intrinsically valuable and therefore 'good'

• The good exists as an intuition – we know this directly – it is indefnable and simple (no need to explain it further – self-evident)

• These arrive from a non-natural process – intuitions are not from the physical world – therefore they are non-natural properties

Explain why utilitarianism is a realist theory (5)

• Utilitarianism views 'the good' as pleasure – we must maximise pleasure and minimise pain

• It is self-evident from empirically observing the world – through experience we know that we naturally value our own pleasure and from this we logically derive the value it is good

• As society is the sum of individual interest, maximising pleasure for the greatest number is the most good for society (principle of utility)

• Therefore, the good has been reduced and is identical to a natural property of the world

• This makes utilitarianism a realist theory as there is a mind-independent moral reality – moral properties (pleasure) exist in the world and can be discovered – so moral truths exist

• It then follows that there are moral truths – and these are truth-apt – made true or false by something in the real world (pleasure)

Explain why virtue ethics is a realist meta ethical theory (5)

• Virtue ethics views 'the good' as eudaimonia – we must fulfl our function in order to live a good life

• It is self-evident from empirically observing the world – our distinct function is to be guided by reason – we then perform this well by acting virtuously in order to reach eudaimonia (we have logically derived this is good from what we factually observe about the world)

• Therefore, the good has been reduced to and is identical to a natural property of the world (eudaimonia)

• This makes virtue ethics a realist theory as there is a mind-independent moral reality – moral properties (eudaimonia) exist in the world and can be discovered – so moral truths exist

• It then follows that there are moral truths – and these are truth-apt – made true or false by something in the real world (eudaimonia)

Outline the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about ethical language (5)

• Cognitivism argues moral statements are descriptive claims (factual) that are truth-apt (either true or false)

• They express propositional content about a mind-independent moral reality (what is right and wrong in the world)

• So moral truths exist (are true) and can be discovered in the world – moral progress exists

• On the other hand, non-cognitivism argues moral statements are not factual claims – they are not truth-apt (neither true nor false)

• It does not describe a mind-independent moral reality (doesn't exist) – moral truths do not exist (so neither does moral progress)

• We are merely expressing our emotions/attitudes towards the world – simply human judgement about what is right and wrong

Defne cognitivism in ethics (3)

• Moral statements/judgements are descriptive claims (factual) that are truth-apt (either true or false)

• Express propositional content about a mind-independent moral reality (what is right and wrong in the world)

• So moral truths exist (are true) and can be discovered in the world – moral progress exists

Defne non-cognitivism in ethics (3)

• Moral statements are not factual claims – they are not truth-apt – neither true nor false

• Does not describe a mind-independent moral reality (doesn't exist) – moral truths do not exist (so neither does moral progress)

• We are merely expressing our emotions/attitudes towards the world – simply human judgement about what is right and wrong

Outline Hume's fork (5)

• All objects of our knowledge are divided into 2 categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact

• Relations of ideas are analytic statements – true by defnition + no further investigation of world required, to determine if it is true

• They are necessary truths – to deny them would be a logical contradiction + they are a priori – acquired independently of experience (through reason alone)

• They do not tell us anything about the nature of the world – they are tautologies (meaningless repetitions of the same terms)

• Matters of fact are synthetic statements – not true by defnition and further investigation of the world is required to determine if it is true

• They are contingent – true now but may have also been false (dependent on conditions of the world) so denying would not be a logical contradiction + a posteriori – dependent on experience

• They describe the features of the physical world – acquired empirically (through senses)

Outline Ayer's verifcation principle (3/5)

• A proposition is only meaningful if it can be verifed either true or false – 2 ways to do so:

• If it is analytically true or false – the content of the defnition tells us whether it is true or false

• Or if its truth or falsity can be empirically verifed (it is factually meaningful) – acquired through our sense experience

• Moral judgements do not make meaningful claims about what is true or false

• They are not analytic – are not true by defnition – to deny it wouldn't be a logical contradiction

• Nor are they empirically verifable – moral claims are not part of the world – therefore they are not observable

• Instead, moral judgements express feelings – simply humans expressing our feelings about certain things

Outline Mackie's argument from relativity (5)

• Morality difers between societies – there is great variation in moral views (descriptive realism) e.g. whether polygamy is permissible

• This either means that there is a mind-independent moral reality in which some cultures have greater access to others – they are able to establish objective moral facts whilst others are simply wrong

• Or that morality is a social construct of societies – we create them as opposed to them actually being in the world (therefore there are no objective moral facts)

• The second option is a better explanation of these phenomena e.g. it is much more likely and plausible that polygamy was established in one culture but not the other and their respective moral views emerged as a result

• We cannot treat morality like science in which we are trying to fnd truths about the world – it doesn't exist

• Therefore, moral judgement is simply a refection of the way humans live in their diferent societies – so therefore moral anti-realism is the correct meta-ethical view – there is no mind-independent moral reality or moral claims in the world to discover

Outline Mackie's argument from queerness (5)

• If mind-independent moral properties existed and were 'objectively prescriptive' – everybody would be obligated to follow moral statements as they would be intrinsically motivating (simply by having knowledge of them)

• This would require a special faculty to have knowledge of moral statements and a related motivational quality e.g. intuitionism (I simply know what is right or wrong)

• However, objective moral properties are unusual in the sense we would require a unique process (unlike anything else in the world) in order to acquire knowledge of and be motivated by moral properties – diferent from our normal ways of knowing about anything

• Yet we have no evidence either of the existence of moral and motivational properties nor how we would come to know about them – they are non-physical – we must simply 'trust' these unworldly properties and processes exist even if we can't perceive them in usual ways – this is highly implausible

• The issue is we have ascribed the world a property it does not have and our minds a process to identify them they do not have

• So therefore moral anti-realism is the correct meta-ethical view – a mind-independent moral world cannot exist – all moral properties are false because they do not exist

Explain Hume's argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us (5)

• Beliefs by themselves cannot motivate us to act

• They are merely descriptive statements – our reason describes something mind-independent of our emotions

• Sincere moral judgements (e.g. lying is wrong) can motivate us to act (at least to some extent)

• They are moral sentiments – they are mind-dependent and involve our personal values – feelings of approval or disapproval efecting the emotions of those who perceive the action

• Therefore, moral judgements and beliefs are distinct properties – moral judgements cannot be beliefs

Explain how Hume's is-ought gap raises an issue with moral realism (5)

• Hume argues that there is a logical error when we try to derive our moral behaviour (values) from matters of fact

• We cannot use our experience (of what is) in order to derive a sense of morality (of what ought to be)

• The values we create are subjective as they involve our emotions and opinions – we make hidden assumptions that infuence our decisions

• For example, if we take the fact 'animals do not torture eachother' and say we ought not to torture eachother – humans in the past would disagree with this as they have derived diferent values from their experiences

• This creates an issue for realism as the subjective nature of our moral values means there cannot be a moral reality that is independent of our emotions/attitudes – they are reliant on humans as we have created them

• Moral properties do not exist in the world and cannot be discovered