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Deontological Approach
The moral status of an action (right or wrong) depends on whether it conforms to moral duties or principles (rather than the consequences of actions). You cannot justify wrongdoing just because it leads to better outcomes.
Acknowledges that there are constraints on actions that puts limits on what we are permitted to do (even for good outcomes).
While consequentialism maximizes overall good, this respects moral constraints (even at the cost of producing less good).
Absolute duties (strict constraints)
Must always be followed, regardless of consequences (like do not kill the innocent/do not lie).
Moderate (threshold) duty
Duties that generally hold but may be overridden in extreme circumstances
Killing is wrong, but may be permissible if it prevents catastrophic harm
Foot's Trolley problem
Occurs when there is a runaway trolley. We are the driver, and we have to choose between running over 5 people or switching the lever to kill just one person. Intuitively, we seem to be permitted to kill the one by switching the lever.
The problem is NOT should you turn the trolley.
Why is it permissible to divert the trolley (killing one to save five), but NOT permissible to kill one person directly (e.g., in the surgeon case) to save five?
Foot’s solution to the trolley problem
It can be okay to redirect harm, but not okay to directly harm someone on purpose.
We have a negative duty not to kill (very strong), but positive duty to save lives (weaker)
Negative claims (not to be killed, used, or harmed)
Positive claims (to receive aid/help, in some cases)
In the trolley case, if you do nothing five people die (letting die). If you pull the lever, one person does (redirecting threat, not directly targeting that person)
The death of one is a side effect (not the means). Thus, this can be permissible even though someone dies.
BUT if you push a person in front of the trolley to stop it, you are using that person as a tool and their death is part of your plan (not permissible)
Thomson’s Critique of Foot’s Trolley Problem
What if you're a bystander with the lever? If you pull the lever it will kill one instead of the five.
It is less clear in this case if you kill 5 people, you let them die or you fail to save them when you pull the lever.
You are now actively intervening, not merely redirecting your own threat
It becomes unclear whether you are killing the one, or simply failing to save the five
Thomson’s Health Pebble Example
Imagine you are floating in the ocean, people will die if they don’t eat this miraculous pebble that will cure them. You are floating and have the ability to push the pebble toward one person or to the group of five
Intuitively, you would push the health pebble to the five UNLESS the person has a special claim to the pebble
Does the one have a certain claim over the pebble (if the person paid, or already started to eat the pebble?)
This case shows that there isn’t any kind of moral inertia present in the world, meaning just standing by in some cases is not permissible.
If you can and are able to you have an obligation to intervene.
Thomson’s Main Thesis
Killing is not always worse than letting die, it is complicated and depends on rights and claims
Application:
Surgeon case / bridge case: the victim has a strong claim not to be sacrificed (used as a means) and killing them violates their rights.
Trolley case: the one person does not have the same claim against being redirected into harm, the harm is not imposed in the same way (indirect). Thus, diverting the trolley can be permissible.
Rule Consequentialism
An action is morally right because it follows a rule/set of rules that, if complied with/internalized, would bring about the best consequences
Maintains parts of act consequentialism, but generates deontology from action to rules.
Rather than focusing on individual action (like act-consequentialism, it focuses on rules governing behaviour), it is indirect, as we do not assess each action by its immediate utility, we see if it aligns with optimal rules
Example:
Act-consequentialism suggests that it is right to harm others/break promises if doing so produces slightly more total good
This avoids it by arguing that a general code of rules forbidding such behaviours would have better overall consequences than a code that permitted these acts.
Incoherence objection (Rule Consequentialism)
Incoherent to call it rule-consequentialism. If we are true consequentialists we should always perform the act that maximizes good and not follow rules that sometimes fail to do so.
Reply to Incoherence objection (Rule Consequentialism)
Still better than act-consequentialism, as it may be better to bring best results in the long run, and the theorist would still say that it is consequentialist at its foundation.
Disaster/Rule worship/"impartial compliance" objection (Rule Consequentialism)
Malicious compliance. This theory requires you to follow rules even when doing so leads to catastrophic outcomes.
Reply to Disaster/Rule worship/"impartial compliance" objection (Rule Consequentialism)
Have an all-purpose rule to avoid this. If you encounter a scenario where you need to avoid the disaster and break the rule, then you can.
Downside: Risks being ad hoc and leads to the collapse objection.
Collapse Objection (Rule Consequentialism)
Suppose a rule forbids Φ. But in a specific case, not-Φ would produce better consequences. We then introduce a modified rule allowing exceptions. Over time, rules become more finely-tuned.
It seems like it loops back to act consequentialism that states that you should follow one rule, do whatever act brings about the most good.
Reply to Collapse Objection (Rule Consequentialism)
Reply: We need rules with thresholds -> rules that will hold until a certain threshold of bad consequences is reached. Only in extreme cases may rules be overridden.
Downside: Weak reply. Threshold is vague or arbitrary.
Example for Promise Keeping (Ross/Consequentialism)
You promised to meet a friend. Keeping the promise produces 100 units of good, while breaking it produces 101 units of good
Consequentialism says: break the promise because it would bring slightly more net good
This theory says: Breaking the promise feels wrong, it seems like you should still keep the promise. There should be an underivative duty to keep promises (duty of fidelity).
Ross’s Theory in Relation to Consequentialism
Agrees with consequentialists that it is good to promote the good (happiness/well-being/etc), but he rejects two key consequentialist claims, saying that:
Promoting good is NOT the only duty
We have duties like keeping promises, telling the truth, not harming others, etc. These cannot be reduced to maximize good.
There is NO single unified explanation for right action/morality (he is pluralistic)
Consequentialism tries to explain everything using one rule (maximized utility)
But this theory posits that morality is pluralistic, that there are multiple duties that aren't derived from a deeper theory
Prima Facie Duty
A duty that counts in favor of an action, but can be overridden by stronger duties
These duties are always present (they don’t disappear). Even when overridden, they still have moral weight.
Ross’ Examples of Duties
Fidelity → keep promises, Beneficence → help others , Non-maleficence → do not harm, Justice → distribute benefits fairly, Reparation → make up for wrongs, Gratitude → repay kindness, etc.
Rescuing Child from Pond Example (Ross)
Rescuing a child from a pond (duty of beneficence) while promising your friend that you will meet them (duty of fidelity).
The duty to beneficence overrides fidelity in this case, because it is stronger.
BUT it still seems like I have a duty to let my friend know and apologize -> which creates a new, activated duty.
There is moral residue left over after infringing duty
Moral residue: lingering sense that something morally important was not done, like you still have obligations
This is the key difference from act consequentialism, since it can't explain guilt/moral residue.
Since you brought about the most good in act consequentialism, you have no reason to feel bad.
Extra duties objection (Ross)
Some duties may not truly be independent. Can fidelity fit into duty of beneficence? If so, Ross doesn't need multiple duties, thus his pluralism is unnecessary.
Missing Duties Objection (Ross)
Are we missing duties? Like a duty not to steal? Does Ross list all duties needed?
Ross’s reply Missing Duties Objection (Ross)
There is no fixed/final list, it takes our sense of moral duties (common sense judgement).
Weak response though
Ad Hoc objection (Ross)
The answer to why moral duties are the way they are is just that that’s how it is? Seems Ad hoc and lacks proper explanation
Ross’s Reply to the Ad Hoc objection
Sometimes the world just is pluralistic. We have to accept that given that the natural world acts in the same way, we have hit explanatory rock bottom.
Unsatisfying
Categorical Imperative
Morality issues a directive (tells you what to do), that doesn't depend on your own desires/dislikes.
It is universal and independent from our personal feelings.
It is based on what any rational person could accept.
Unlike rule consequentialism, this theory (term under ULF) doesn't care about outcomes; what matters most is whether the action follows a rational moral rule.
Good Will (Kant)
Is the only non-conditional good (good without qualification).
Acting from duty working with the categorical imperative, not from self-interest or emotion
Doesn't call on you to maximize, just respect.
Other things (happiness, courage, intelligence) are only good conditionally
Hypothetical Imperative
If there is a special thing I desire to do (goal), a directive comes from this. If you want X, do X.
Ex: If you want to pass, study.
Doesn't apply to anyone else.
Universal Law Formula (ULF)
Act only on a maxim that you can will to become a universal law
Morality should be based on good reason (would make sense for everyone else to do/anyone would agree to, not just yourself).
Maxim
A reason/story/principle you act from
Ex: "I will Φ (action) in order to R (reason)"
ULF Test Steps
To see if an action is moral, first you:
Formulate your maxim
Imagine everyone following it (universalize it)
And ask: Does it create a contradiction? Could you rationally will this world?
Conceptual Contradiction
The rule destroys itself if universalized, thus the action becomes impossible.
Maxim of Lying Promise Example
You need money, you can get a loan by promising to repay the debt but you can't pay it back. Can you do this morally? Intuitively, no.
Φ = telling promise you won't keep, R = get money
This isn't an accepted take, you shouldn't lie. If you use the universal law and we think of a world with this law, making a promise wouldn't make sense because no one would make promises if everyone broke them all the time.
Conceptual Contradiction!
Practical Contradiction
The rule is logically possible, but you could not rationally will it because it would undermine goals of a society.
Maxim of Non-Aid
A man is doing well, but sees another person struggling. Man will do whatever he wants in life, and what happens to others doesn't concern him. Some will help, others won't but he will ignore those not doing well because that's life.
Φ = Ignoring requests for help, R = living his life how he wants
Can you rationally will this into universal law? (everyone ignoring pleas for help to live the life they want).
Passes the conceptual contradiction test, BUT not the practical contradiction test (looks for if it is reasonable once universal law wills it, if it is still an effective means to bring about the end goal)
This world wouldn't last very long because it would affect survival, for example, not helping your kids or babies would affect mankind survival.
Maxim of Developing Talents
Man has talents but finds himself laying around and indulging in pleasures rather than developing talents.
Φ = I'm fine with not developing my talents, R = to do whatever I want to/lay around
Can we rationalize this as natural law?
If everyone is a couch potato (not conceptual contradiction), but in a world were everyone did so? Most people use their talents to develop new tools and technology, and you would be relying on other's labor.
May not lead to expected results, thus it is a practical contradiction.
Kant thinks there is a maxim to develop talents.
Shopkeeper Example
Shopkeeper wants to maximize profits, he would shortchange customers in order to do so, but he knows that to make more profit he shouldn't (or else he'll loose customers)
Φ = I'll give good change, R = to maximize profits (motivated by selfishness)
His actions are morally permissible/required by the ULF, even though his motives weren't pure.
Shows that motives don't matter to the ULF.
Forbids too much Objection (ULF)
I decide to go to chipotle for lunch (Φ = Go to Chipotle, R = to have lunch). Now imagine everyone adopts this maxim, it is chaotic since not everyone can go to Chipotle.
Practical contradiction results, since the means to obtain my end becomes ineffective (it is impossible for me to get lunch).
This seems to not permit many ordinary instances, so we must reformulate our understand of maxims.
Kant’s Response to Forbids too much Objection (ULF)
We need more details/conditions that are the background conditions. We aren't Φ-ing always, but under certain variables/conditions.
Φ in C (condition), in order to R.
Weak because it leads to the other objection.
Permits too much objection (ULF)
I interview for my dream job, but the only way to get my dream job is to murder my rival. This doesn't pass the ULF.
BUT if I say "Whenever my name is Mia Reffell (condition), I can kill my rival (action) to get the job (reason)." Doesn't this seem to work?
Kant’s Response to Permits too much objection (ULF)
The spirit of the ULF is to test if your principle would be good for everyone to act on. Adding details to avoid contradictions is wrong, because you can't universalize a particular instance.
False negatives involving supererogation objection (ULF)
I decide to donate more than the average person to charity, can I will that into a universal law? No, it seems, because of how averages work. You are actually forbidden because of conceptual/practical contradictions.
Kant’s Response to False negatives involving supererogation objection (ULF)
He would likely bite the bullet, there is something weird because you are making an exception of yourself (same with someone donating less that the average person).
It may be that this maxim fails, but the action of donating more when you have enough money to may have a better maxim.
Kant’s Formula of Humanity
Treat humanity, in yourself and others, always as an end, never merely as a means. People have intrinsic value. You cannot use them as tools for your goals
Give respect to other people's ends as well, and give them space to cultivate their abilities to maximize their practical rationality
Sometimes it may seem like we use people as means (like a barista making us coffee), but when you interact with a people you usually treat them like a person (say hi, please and thank you).
Doesn't mean we have a moral obligation to go out the way to treat people as ends.
ULF and the Formula of Humanity
Both have the same results
One focuses on rational consistency and universal rules, while the other formula focuses on respect for people.
Ex: We can't kill each other because we must treat people as ends.
Virtue ethics asks us…
what a virtuous person would do
Virtue
A stable character trait that enables someone to act, feel, and think well.
Ex: Courage, honesty, generosity, compassion, etc.
These equip you to function well; they are character traits that are cultivated.
While Kant thinks that moral action may go against inclination, Aristotle thinks that virtuous activities are pleasant (it would be weird if they weren't), as a truly virtuous person enjoys doing the right thing.
If you hate being generous or resent helping others, then you aren't fully virtuous yet
Virtue Ethics
virtue is at the basis of right action, therefore an action is right only if it is what a virtuous person would do in these specific circumstances.
We can formulate rules called v-rules from these virtuous people that show us how to act (be honest, generous, etc.).
Application Problem objection (Virtue Ethics)
Not everyone can consider themselves a virtuous person, making it difficult to know what to do in a given situation.
Response to Application Problem objection (Virtue Ethics)
Think about the last time we were stuck on something, usually you ask a friend or you think about someone you admire/look up to (even those we have never met) and ask what they would do. That gives you a directive.
Eliminable Heruistic Objection (Virtue Ethics)
We translate v-rules into language of deontology. We don't need the virtuous person playing this theoretical role, we need principles from deontology (v-rules are only used as a helpful heuristic, or example).
Response to Eliminable Heruistic Objection (Virtue Ethics)
Source of the explanation is in character traits, not duties. How do we know how to do the right thing? Seems like a virtuous person would be the only one to know.
This is an appeal to Practical Wisdom (the ability to sus out what is the right thing to do). Only a virtuous person has practical wisdom. This is the best reply, not as satisfying.
Still, seems like we could be in danger of the application problem
Aristotle’s theory of virtue/well-being
The good is the end (everything we look for, do, etc.). We seek the good for our entire lives, and happiness is the ultimate good/end. Happiness is not just pleasure, it means flourishing and living a full, successful, and meaningful life.
Other things we may consider to be ends like virtue, honor, etc., we choose for the sake of happiness.
No one chooses happiness because it will bring honor or virtue, thus happiness is the ultimate end.
Happiness is self-sufficient, and evaluated holistically at the end of your life
A life of study, Aristotle thinks, will lead to a life of the most happiness.
Aristotle’s Function Argument
The good of a thing is its function and it's ability to function excellently.
Ex: the function of a harp player is to play the harp.
P1: The good of X is performing X/s function excellently
P2: The function of a human is activity involving reason
Conclusion: Therefore, the good of humans is excellent activity involving reason.
Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean
Every virtue should strike a balance, since every virtue has a vice.
Virtue lies between two extremes (not relative to your personality, rather the context).
Ex: Courage. Too little is cowardice, and too much is recklessness.
If it fits the situation (ex: getting extremely angry at an extreme injustice), it is virtuous given the context.
Thus, the mean is based on the context
Virtues are figured out using practical reasoning/wisdom + experience and moral development.
Critical Sphere of Feminist Ethics
Making objections/criticisms of existing theories from a feminist POV.
Since philosophy has been dominated by men, maybe things would look different if women were included earlier on
Ex: Arguments against Kant's "pure reasoner" (a man, which reflects male POV).
Positive Sphere of Feminist Ethics
Starting from a feminist view, then creating new theories
Philosophy of Care
Topical Sphere of Feminist Ethics
Applying feminist perspectives to specific issues (looking at topics and coming from another POV)
Ex: Abortion, Nussbaum's approach.
Context to Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach
Initially influenced by Aristotle’s idea of flourishing (eudaimonia)
Over time, Nussbaum adapts this into a modern, political theory
Focuses on real-world issues like poverty, inequality, and women’s rights
Designed to guide public policy and evaluate societies
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach
Human flourishing depends on what people are actually able to do and be (their “capabilities”)
This contrasts with liberal views (like John Rawls or John Stuart Mill), which often emphasize individual choice and letting people decide their own conception of the good
Nussbaum argues:
We need a basic list of essential capabilities
A just society must ensure people have real opportunities to achieve them
Important in global context:
When analyzing poverty, we must consider gender inequalities
Ask: What are women actually able to do compared to men?
Adaptive Preferences (Nussbaum)
Problem: people may adapt their desires to oppressive conditions
A woman in poverty may not want more freedom because she has never experienced it
Desire Fulfillment Theory (DFT) struggles here because it takes preferences at face value
Nussbaum’s solution is to look at objective capabilities, not just desires
Can she move freely? express herself? participate politically? If not, she is not flourishing—even if she doesn’t complain
Contrast with resource-based views which focus on distribution of goods
But they may ignore power dynamics inside households (e.g., control by husbands)
Nussbaum’s approach captures these internal inequalities
List of Capabilities
Proposes a universal (but revisable) list of central human capabilities developed partly through engagement with women across different cultures
Examples include:
Life (living a full lifespan), Bodily health and integrity, Senses, imagination, and thought, Emotions, Practical reason, Affiliation (social relationships), Play, Control over one’s environment (political + material), Concern for other species
It’s not just about having capabilities, but having the freedom to choose whether to exercise them
Example: choosing to eat vs. choosing to fast (for hunger strike)
Adaptive Preferences Objection to Nussbaum (Jaggar)
There's no force making people exercise their capabilities.
Imagine a world where women just got the chance to work/vote/etc. Some women may not make those choices because they are new and/or they prefer how they were living in the first place.
She overestimates how quickly behaviour changes
Nussbaums potential response to Adaptive Preferences Objection (Jaggar)
Change may take generations as norms evolve, but this response can seem weak or speculative
Half-Hearted Proceduralism Objection to Nussbaum (Jaggar)
How did Nussbaum create her list of capabilities?
Did she genuinely gather input from diverse women globally? Or did she select values that reflect Western liberal ideals?
She doesn’t provide much empirical evidence about her method, raising suspicion that she may be imposing her own framework
Is the list truly universal, or culturally biased?