Early History of the Cold War

Gaddis, Now we Know, 1997

Broad Argument

• This is a post-revisionist argument that centres the role of Stalin and the Soviets as starting the war.

• Starts with a pre-1917 period where ideology was not really a concer, and worked together on northern fishing disputes. Only starts to become contrary toward the 20th century when travellers (like Kennan) report on the authoritarianism.

  • Only with post-WW1 and the contingency of the collapse of imperial conditions did the American and Russian ideologies become a clash - filling the ‘legitimacy vaccum’. Detailing Germany’s blunders that allowed Lenin to Russia and the US into the war.

• Both systems appealed to universalism - global markets (14 points) or global revolution, but peculiar to national character. Though in interwar period, limited conflict - US left Europe and Soviets fractured. Note: this is writing forward - there was no reason they should get into conflict, so a movement across time in this way is semi teleological.

  • Only came together thanks to Hitler’s foolishness, though this fed into a broader American hope to become involved in war (recognition of the SU previously)

• Postwar vaccum largely pushing them toward war (similar to e.g. UK v US tensions), though not inevitable. 1999 Leffler review article notes the tension here between not inevitable, and later inveitabiltiy of Stalin.

  • But Roosevelt hopes for greater role (e.g. Atlantic charter, world capitalism) using something for all parties, emphasising his idealism. And Statlin wanted ‘unilateral’ and therefore anti-US power through world revoltuion in a single nation through expansion and unconventional spying.

    • Stalin enyoyed working with Roosevelt but did not because of these security concerns, and thus forced them to accept his bases in the East.

• Stalin had no recognition of the importance of democracy - responded to request for Polish elections with ‘some propoganda work should be done’. Expected ideological acceptance, hurt when East did not want him. Stalin thought ends justified the means, that repression was fine as they defeated the Nazis. Poland as example with Lublin puppet government of his brutality.

  • West accepted this ‘dispositional’ behaviour - could not be collaborated with, e.g. in teh 1946 Kennan telegram.

  • This beviour seen as the cause of the war - East had never been trusting according to Molotov, and Stalin would accept nothing less than ‘boundless’ desire for more, seeing it as a prewar period. ‘does a fish seek water’. Note though, he cited Litvinov, who Stalin kept alive for pragmatic reasons (fearful of world opinion), shows not entirely dispositional.

• Notes Cold War also about economy and culture, not just power, since military left in tact.

• Both US and USSR made empires of different kinds (uses Lundestad) though we may read this against Hitchcock who notes that this is instead more about a manufactured consent.

• USSR suffered from generally being less popular since they were more evil. US ensured a level of agnecy and buy in from those it collaborated with.

• USSR also suffering form the falling into ‘authoritarian romanticism’ the idea that they were engaging in ideological rather than pragmatic politics, which hurt them.

  • This Stalinist structure limited later Cold War leaders, the state had been made in his dispositional image.

Hitchcock, The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West, 2010

Broad Argument

• The Marshall Plan as a coherent way for the US to nit together the West, along with a way to solve the ‘dollar gap’ issue of postwar economics.

• Plan is now seen as splitting europe and forming integration of ‘The West’.

• Plan formed in the context of struggles with Germany, and hope to make US policy more coherent, pitched initially at Harvard in 1947 with language of US benefit - e.g. make conditions under which ‘US institutions’ could exist.

  • America paves the way for the formation of the OEEC with Molotov leaving and rejecting aid to SU. US approves, with difficulty, the ECA in 1948 which runs in tandem with the OEEC - preamble noted that this was about ensuring the conditions of stable relationships. Set an understanding to elimintate trade barriers, with 5.3bn appropriated.

• Europe had already got to develop by this point and was reasonably small (e.g. only 2.4% of British GNP) - the difference was it solved the dollar shortfall and allowed the US to continue shipping industrial products.

  • More ability for people to work within their own desires - e.g. Italy was much more conservative with funds than france.

  • And gave political legitimacy to center parties that received the money (contrast with Soveit exampels of electioneering)

• Formed the ‘West’ - broke with Potsdam ideas as forming Germany (inclusion in OEEC as separate single entity) and demanded that UK and France support German state in return for aid. France got a hand in formation - advisory actor in the Ruhr.

  • Stalin responds with more hardline with Czech Coup 1948, became a ‘point of no return’.

  • Bevin helps form NATO in response of Czech and threat of Germany gets support for NATO, and France pushes for Coal and Steel community to defend themselves economically from Germany.

Leffler, The Cold War: What Do “We Now Know”?

Broad argument

• We should not take the triumphant narrative of Gaddis, and that Soviet behaviour is more rational than he suggests, responding to genuine threats of the US.

• Cold war should be interactive, seeing US actions as just as a choice as Soviet ones.

• Gaddis is writing in contrast to his earlier work (which was post-revisionist, focusing on the lack of agency that American advisors had given democracy and beurocracy in contrast with the East, and thus finding the East more culpable, though more balanced) in stressing the importance of the East much more, thus returning to a more traditional historiographical position. The Soviets were really dictated by a revolutionary-imperial expansion, they were ideologically limited.

  • In this work, Gaddis is essentially removing American Grand strategy, it was improvisational and coming from allies in Europe rather than taken away.

  • The Americans were more focused on the other parts of power than military than the Soviets which was why they failed, and US military outing were only in response to the threat of the Soviet Union.

    • As such, they created democratic capitalist system that proliferated and formed independent power centres.

    • leffler is trying to point out that the triumphant position taken (democratic capitalism was wonderful and won) distorts his reading of the causes of Cold War

• Saying there is evidence of the Soviets being rational as well as ideological - e.g. the importance of Mastny’s argument (1996) that Soviets saw revolution as a means to power, not an end itself, and was more concerned with defence.

  • This is not the ‘revolutionary romanticism’ of Gaddis but insteda realpolitik. This was informed by ideology, per Zubok and Pleshakov, but this also went along with pragmatic considerations. This responded to American actions, and was not Stalin’s decision, e.g. reacting to the death of FDR, hostility of Truman etc. (though, Leffler notes, did the US deliberately present a threat to be responded to?)

    • Mastny says this is informed by fear, but this fear is continual and so would have happened either way, Zubok and Pleshakov says Stalin does not want a Cold War but responds to US actions, and Gaddis who says Cold War happens because of Stalin’s intentions.

• Leffler argues for the security dilemna - nations take actions which are meant to defend themselves but endanger others, this is what actions in the East can be seen as. This is a mirror to Cardwell’s NSC action.

  • We should recognise the instability of Stalin in the postwar era, w the WW2 losses as a motivating factor. E.g. the work of Gori and Pons to show that security and power politics was the single most significant motivating factor. Or Yegorova showing the Iranian example a defensive nature given Anglo-American oil development here.

• Example of US agency - the actions in Germany which took the decisions to making real tension over the region, taking no middle ground (e.g. the OEEC stuff (see hitchcock)). This is what prompts Stalin to engage in ‘reactive yet portntous’ actions per the Security Dilemna. Ideology mingles with security.

  • Gaddis misses this through focus on the new archives, rather than collation together.

  • The actions of allies liek France was conditional on the US, not a mutual action.

• TLDR if we take Soviet agency and ideology seriously, we should do the same for the US which Gaddis does not do. It is a multipolar and interrelating idea, not one side. Triumphalism distroys this, saying the US was good and the SU bad was not good.

Freeman, American Empire, 2012

Broad Argument

• The US emerged from WW2 with an elite dedicated to the expansion of capitalism globally.

• Cold War a product of American iniative and instittuions, dividing Germany, and deliberately inflating Soviet threat for political purposes.

• US economically dominant after the war, and after the war had the desire to expand into varous regions. Desire to engage in foreign policy since need for economic development (Acheson noted 1944 that domestic markets could not absorb demand).

  • 2 visions, the Luce ‘American Century’ vision and Wallace vision of benevolent humanitarianism.

• A genuine hightened fear of international threat (Pearl Harbour ended perception of separation), a genuine need for international bases. Sec of War Lovett noted that we can’t ‘over-emphasize the importance’ of bases.

• Foreign policy massively centralised into a Wall Street - Government pro-globalisation individuals, and largley insulated from public concern, e.g. Stimson’s circle all from same sort of firms. Significant continuinity. Only limited success from outside lobbying e.g. from AFL supporting noncommunist international labour.

• US used their power to encourage their own visions of multilateralism - e.g. loading British loan (3.75bn in 1945) conditions to be conditional on opening the trading bloc and convertability. Issue was liquidity crisis, British convertability collapsed in 1947.

• Significant power vaccums in postwar world - e.g. around Asia and E Europe. Yalta glosses over contradictions - some land to Soviets in the East but free elections. Soviets take over East bit the exact model varied signficantly. ‘Without any set design’.

  • West do not accept given economic implications - E Europe food seen as important, and fear about taking US trade routes and a ‘deep seated’ faith in American goodness irrespective of the contradictions.

• Truman something to prove, more unsettled, and more variable approach to Stalin, though FDR had already started to confront - e.g. over iran - lend lease to Saudi and interested in keeping oil for them. Truman saw success of Iranian pull out, and took this as a key approach (in aftermath of WW2 appeasement).

• Radicalised under Kennan and Churchill (who did not accept rational USSR reasons for not doing the world bank) and makes ideological statement.

• Economic crisis in Greece a threat given the link into colonial resources. 1947 Britain could no longer support, and US admin thought Soviets would intervene (they did not ). US blames the USSR anyway (see Truman doctrine speech). Use of near apocalyptic terms.

  • Use of intervention (Marshall plan) justified further actions to defend this investment (e.g. investment into Italian elections 1948)

• The apocalyptic terms of the sentiment aided truman in 1948 election, as he could not be seen as tough on communism - made it an election on domestic politics instead.

Cadwell, NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Cold War, 2011

Introduction

• NSC (1950) has been misunderstood, as something about the expansion of US interests with defence and conintue the developmnet of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet developmnet of the atomic bomb.

  • Though this was the basis of a ‘massive propoganda campaign’ that was meant to show the Soviet goal as world domination, and does not stand up to critique.

• Lilenthal, the one Truman asked to see about the bomb, was broadly unbothered by the developmnet, and continued to want the reduction of military spending he had asked for from the JCOS breifly before.

  • March 1950 extends calls for cuts to 4bn and over 1950 the military engaged in downsicing.

  • Eisenhower (still a general) was also in agreement, suggesting that the Russian bomb was not a huge impact to US defence.

  • Or the H bomb - there was real disagreement over the producion of the Super - AEC advisory council voted against, it was only done given domestic pressure as SecDef Johnson noted - it was to protect the President not the nation. Even Kennan in Jan 1950 noted that the Russians were not becoming stronger over time.

• It was about economic issues, and the dollar gap - they hoped to ensure American markets and Western Europe to engage in ‘economic integration’. This specifically flagged in NSC 68

Mulitlateralism, The Soviet Threat, and the Origins of the Cold War

• Truman administration learned from post-ww1 (see Gaddis) that multilateralism was important - e.g. Marjolin (OEEC Sec-Gen) (worked closely with the US) noting the fear of returning depression given lack of market for US goods.

  • And a desire to internationalise New Deal - increasing production and efficiency through state action - Maier. They, in hubris, forgot the issues of it - those who did not buy in were being ‘obstinate’ or ‘hostile’

• Though not that popular in context of European universal healthcare impulses, and US public opposition to multilateralism rather than isolationism - e.g. Congress opposed a lot of this (see reduction in Marshall plan) little done to show ‘public’ sentiment.

• Making the point that teh threat to multilateralism (SU) was weak and not in a position to threaten (having to do 3 or 4 5 year plans)

  • Though they wanted to communise the East, this happened over time - signed Declaration on lIberated europe but was so open to holes thought did not really matter. It was secrity a concern, given earlier democratic elections or e.g. allowign Poland to engage in trade in 1949 with GB or not intervening in Greece over the calls for aid by Tito.

    • This because of a belief in capitalism failing, thus no need to take risks.

• There were hot spots - e.g. Iran given the control they were given in postwar agreements over Oil, but Uk and US also wanted this and Sec of State Byrnes went to UN claiming it was a territorial issue. Only left when given oil rights but not materialise.

  • Roberts puts forward argument that he was flexible in strategic concers.

• Various other examples (Germany, Czech) all showing the security implications here. E.g. Czech - coup could have been done much earlier and US noted the restraint they showed.

• Americans recognised they would not go to war, but they thought they posed a real risk - e.g. Kennan in 1950 argued there was ‘no Soviet intention’ of attack.

  • There was a threat, but this was not enough to blame them for the war. This was US response more than needed. It simply ‘refused to bow down to U.S. Demands’

Chamberlin, The Cold War’s Killing Fields, 2018

Broad Argument

• Cold War was not a ‘long peace’ but instead continual violence. US and USSR’s competition led to signficant violence in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. ‘Long Peace’ is in the Gaddis military stuff, which lauds it as a largely aviolent war.

• Framing there being 3 new forces in the post WW2 world - the two superpowers and decolonisation. There was a genuine conflict in filling the post WW2 gap in power.

  • As such, a real sentiment of ‘mutual suspicion’ between the two actors - e.g. Operation Invincible from the UK, which concluded that the Soviets had a 2 to 1 troop advantage, which inspired Soviet suspicion of the West (already there since delays on opening another front of the war)

    • Spoke to a fundamental clash of world view - Soviets engaging in a ‘brutal reign’ in the East (3/4m purged) compared with teh Free Market West.

• This domination only possible as a result of the vacuum, which Stalin sought to expand into - e.g. domination of Iran in search of oil (1945 survey), and the establishment of a separatist movement in Azerbaijan to help this. This is how West perceived threat - Kennan said resumption of Czarist expansion.

  • Soviets (from Molotov) thought they were acting rationally and nobody aided them. Testing not expanding.

• US fear continues into Turkey, would open up middle East to them - fear of them feading on Kennan’s ‘diseased tissue’. Leads to Truman doctrine. Seen as important by US for their operation PINCHER plan to invade from Turkey. Note: back’s Douglas’ argument that the Cold War rewritten to suit American interpretation and undermine their own violence.

  • Soviets interpret this as a plan to stop Soviet Democracy internationally.

• Truman interpreted that they should therefore meet Soviet Pressure ‘wherever it occured’ also through Acheson’s domino theory rotten apple thing.

  • As UK slipped in power, this was increasingly in their ex-colonial possessions. Also since Spykman’s Geography of the Peace 43 argument of the ‘Rimlands’ being the most important thing in the world to control for Eurasia.

  • there would therefore be huge violence in the decolonisation of the slipping imperial posesesions.

Westad, The Global Cold War, 2005

Broad Argument

• American Cold War behaviour motivated by a long-standing desire to expand free markets internationally. This ideology was why they continually got involved rather than economic interest and whilst contradicting their stated values.

• This built on ‘theries’ (anti-collectivism) and ‘tastes’ (commerce).

• Cold War as a period where long-standing American ideological thory understood by the Elite with ‘remarkable consensus’ to be the important part of US international policy. The ideology of the US intermingled with their pragmatic interest.

  • This is why it became international - there is an ideological element to this. (property was needed for liberty, collectivisation limited property). Racial limitations to understanding made intervention a moral necessity.

• There was therefore a desire for the US to support internationalisms, though those who would help the US. The threat was the ‘alternative modernity’ of the USSR. E.g. FDR in the 1938 SOTU that the challenge was ‘a world where stable civilisation is actually challenged’.

• Positive WW2 experience ensured that the US perceived international intervnetion as ‘key to survival’ - the hope was to internationalise New-Deal style modernity per Roosevelt into ‘positive nationalisms’.

  • This was like Japan - reforming third world brains into doing American style modernity - literally as 1945 occupation video suggested.

• Elites welcomed decolonisation as an opportunity to spread US capitalism, but saw the threat of communism as greater than the cost of colonisation - this is why Eisenhower e.g. thought the Third World showed ‘ingratitude’ toward the US and so covert action was needed.

  • This was a continuation in left and right - left as a form of development and right as part of their anti-communist perspective. E.g. intervention in Iran in 1953

• This was not a part of busienss, but instead a ‘systematic’ implication of American elite viewing free markets as the core of national itnerest. They were the ‘reluctant economic imperialist’. Compare to Cadwell, this is saying ideology is the limiting factor.

• This is why so much third world aid - it was part of ideological commitment 1956-60 c70% of global third world aid. As part of Rostow’s idea of development theory.

  • Some domestic challenge here - e.g. Malcolm X what right does the US have to lecture people internationally, greatest corrupt system is one that argues itself is freedom.

Leffler, The Grand Strategy, 2010

Broad Argument

• The US entered the postwar world seeking dominance through a liberal economic world order driven by open markets and free trade with the Soviets perceived to be a threat to this order.

• Grand Strategy relied on the rebuilding of allies as viable economies, so as to prevent the conditions under which Soviets would prosper whilst using ‘alarmist’ language to undermine the resistant Republican congress to this. Gap between public and private views therefore significant.

• Key takeaway from interwar period to not let individual powers dominate Eurasia, from a political, military, or economic position. Goal was create a world order with free trade, ‘equal access to resources’ and internationa organisation.

• Issue was collaboration with the Soviets in this, especially given disgust over the actions at Katyn and ideological opposition.

  • After the Soviets break various promises, a desire to engage in tougher policies for the region - e.g. Kennan or iron Curtain, but these did not provide a real coherent plan of what this looked like.

• Fear of communism grew due to the poor conditions of Europe, which could fall to Soviet Union. E.g. Stimson suggested there was a ‘complete’ breakdown of the European states which owuld lead to ‘prestilence and famine’ along with growing protectionism.

• Containment policies (e.g. Marshall plan) had to be justified in anti-communist language and crisis language which appealed to religious fundamentals in Congress.

  • Threat to the US was economic rather than military, which was perceived to be genuine - ‘there can be no revival fo Europe’s economy’ as Marshall Suggested. Republicans only accepted the threat as being real after the Czech Coup.

  • Other policies - e.g. the German support of currency and consolidation into trizonia. Perception was Soviets still weak militarily - e.g. ‘their economy was still in shambles’ according to Clay.

• so this is saying there was a public facing threat of communism, but the real concern was economic in terms of protectionism, but had to be publiclly shown in escalating language.

• US ensured they promised military aid to the Europeans in e.g. 1948 on the back of Bevin’s suggestion of NATO (also he notes is about ensuring there was support for US reconstruction of Germany), and wanted to support these state’s ability to get access to resources they had in colonial periods - e.g. middle Eastern oil. This was why they supported France in indochina. They perceived a threat in the periphery of Asia using Soviets and Chinese. So they needed to expand and threaten them through e.g. NSC 68

• NSC68 was therefore to ensure access to resources against the Soviets and help the dollar gap issue. The hope was to ultimately bring Germany and Japan into their sphere of influence and ensure that the Soviets they would ‘not even think about’ expansion.

  • This was e.g. the massive escalation of forces in Gemrany - e.g. from 1950 to 1952 they doubled military forces to 1.353m.

  • The point is that the goal was so high from the US that they needed to engage in this kind of massive response for a global goal.

• such action provoked the USSR.

Preston, American Foreign Relations, 2019

• Talking about the FDR invention of national security as an idea - something where the values and ideas of the US would have to be defended internationaly - as the economy stabilised, they came more into the world and as globalisation dictated this. This was justified with the importance of the Nazis - global threat to the US was justified, similar wit hthe USSR.

• After WW2, only the USSR threatening the US and its ideology important in threatening the US’s position in colonial regions. It was both the US century but also the Communist century.

  • Neither wanted a war of suffering again, and so they wanted the ‘security dilemma’ - no compromise on avoiding another war.

• Origins of the Cold War in the Truman doctrine, did not want the period of uncertainty in the post war period, pushing for a preponderance of power. It was to curb ‘expansive tendencies’ of the USSR.

• National Security Act to try and ensure their position as a defensive action - creating CIA.

Isaac and Bell, 2012, Uncertain Empire

• Arguing that the ‘Cold War’ as a term we use is influenced by elite formation - e.g. Reagan. This really comes out of Thompson in this verticle, but the idea that the Cold War was a term created to legitimise the US and make the USSR seem like ‘the other superpower’.

McMahon, 2010, US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy

Broad Argument

• Eisenhower and Kennedy both accepted the framewwork of containment but had different methods (Eisenhower believed Soviet Threat was not imminent and so prioritised fiscal discipline) (Kennedy believed Eisenhower had allowed gaps to form and so wanted a ‘flexible response).

• Despite differences, both constrained by same structures, e.g. inability to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests, tendency to lable third world nationalism as communism, and dependence on nuclear weapons.

• Eisenhower possessed a broader idea of waht the threat to the US was, defending the values, economy, and military position of the US. Wanted to have cheap defence to ensure economic position.

  • Belief that the threat was not imminent, and Soviets only wanted to maintain their position rather than escalating it - defence spending on thsi therefore not needed.

    • E.g. Eisenhower changes the idea of Soviet ‘d Day’ from 1954 to a floating nondescript date.

• As such, a focus on cutting cost through Nuclear Weapons and ‘Massive Response’ - whic had within it a ‘degree of overconfidence’ in the CIA which led to counterproductive failures in Indonesia and Syria.

• General faith, from Dulles in 1954, that the Soviets would continue to be passive in many cases.

  • Also the basis of belief in a Nucelar all or nothing reality - all conflict would be nuclear. The belief in the credible threat of nuclear usage.

    • And a hope to localise defence - e.g. sharing of nuclear power to Europeans. Did not happen, though there was a hope to do so. This is part of the ‘buy in’ part of the US empire.

    • People did not internationalise the burden - e.g. Pakistan in CETO did not give anything. They thought that the US would pay anyway. Prompted various disputes in internationalising - Baghdad Pact for Middle Eastern Pact turned Egypt to the Communists.

    • There was an inabiltiy to distinguish nationalisms from communism, but also given the US focus on Oil - e.g. Eisenhower administration appreciated globalisation but disliked the reliance on the Third World for important resources.

• Congress was not in the habit of giving money tot he third world, and cut Eisenhower’s attempts to court the Third World. Eisenhower’s approach was broadly unable to distinguish the threat from the nation and the impact on the US - e.g. any small country would have an ‘outsize’ impact on US hopes.

• Kennedy thought that the Republicans had allowed a Missile Gap to open up, though this was not true in reality, and the way to avoid nuclear war was through conventional forces and ‘flexible response;

  • Greater focus on the third world as part of an ‘anticolonial nationalism’ - e.g. Alliance for progress and covert forces like the Green Berets in Vietnam..

  • More spending accepted from the New Deal basis of his presidency.

  • Kennedy also more broadly concerned with the Soviet Unoin and China and nationalism - thus an attmept at more spending.

Douglas, American Cold War Rewrites of Russia’s War, 2012

• Trying to show that the US elite engaged in a real program of overmining the threat of the USSR to justify their own policies in many cases. That the overstatement was a constitutive goal of allies and global hollywood.

• The US leaders were in some ways lying to themselves and tricking themselves into thinking the threat of the USSR was so significant.

• This was the lie e.g. from Truman that the Russians were focused on world domination ‘first to last’

  • Russia became ‘the kremlin’ in terms of this relentless aim of making the USSR seem hostile to the US in all forms. E.g. documents from Bohen (someone writing NSC 68) that he did not know of any action that justified the repsonse.

  • This is an Arendt ‘assumption’ masquerading as an ‘ideolgoy’. They were lying to themselves .

• Rhetoric about the USSR shaped its perception and therefore the overton window of accpetable ideas.