Private Nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher - Tort Law - Lecture 13

What the 8 core principles of private nuisance outlined in Fearn v Tate?

1. The scope of private nuisance

2. Nuisance can be caused by any means

3. ‘Unreasonable’ interference

4. The interference must be substantial

5. The ordinary use of land (includes ‘reasonable user’ or ‘reciprocity’)

6. The locality principle

7. Coming to nuisance is no defence

8. The public interest

Hunter v Canary Wharf on the 1st principle (the scope of private nuisance) outlined in Fearn v Tate,

• What is the context and outcome?

• What is meant by only those with a property right over the land can sue for private nuisance?

Context → There was the building of the Canary Wharf tower, and two complaints, which was that (1) the presence of tower blocked TV reception, and (2) the building works led to dust and noise, constituting a nuisance. Some of the claimants didn’t have property rights, nor leases in their names.

Outcome → HOL stated that in order to sue in private nuisance, claimants must have a right over the right. Therefore, we need to ask as the first thing ‘do they have a property right?.’ If they don’t have a property right, they can’t sue as per Hunter v Canary Wharf (This requires either a freehold or leasehold over the land. if it is not mentioned, you can raise the question in the PQ, and you don’t have to answer it. If they just live there, they dont have a claim or property right without a lease or freehold.)

Hunter v Canary Wharf is the authority of the 1st principle when it comes to the scope of private nuisance.

Fearn v Tate on the 2nd principle for private nuisance (nuisance can be caused by any means) outlined in Fearn v Tate, what does this mean?

The nuisance can be tangible or intangible, or an obstruction.

The Supreme Court overturned this the notion of ‘overlooking’ not causing a nuisance, and instead affirmed that nuisance can be tangible, intangible or obstruction. Examples include physical damage, smell, noise or even people taking photographs.

St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping on the 2nd principle (nuisance can be caused by any means) outlined in Fearn v Tate,

• What is the context and outcome?

• And what did the court recognise as being a nuisance?

Context → There is conflict between rural, old aristocratic use of land versus industrial use of land. There was high levels of pollution due to factories around St Helens and impacted the claimants use of land in two different ways of causing a nuisance, such as

1. damage to property such as killing livestock, plants and trees,

2. another way of causing a nuisance is 'sensible personal discomfort' (amenity) which is damaging anemity of property in the sense that you can’t use it the same way, due to coughing or etc NOT being able to appreciate it in the SAME way (coughing and spluttering impacts the amenity of the land, and not your harm as a person, it is towards the land)

Outcome → The court recognised physical damage to land, or ‘sensible personal discomfort’ (aka amenity) as amounting to nuisance being caused by ANY means.

Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd on the 2nd principle (nuisance can be caused by any means) outlined in Fearn v Tate,

• What is the context and outcome?

Context → The claimants Katherine Lawrence and Raymond Shields bought a bungalow near a stadium/track operated by Fen Tigers Ltd and others (defendants) in 2006. The stadium had hosted motorsports since 1976 (stadium) and 1992 (track), causing significant noise. The claimants sued for nuisance based on noise levels. The defendants argued they had planning permission, the activity was established before the claimants arrived, and they had a prescriptive right to make noise.

Outcome → The court rejected the argument that a nuisance claim fails simply because the claimant moved to the area after the noisy activity had already started (rejection of ‘coming to the nuisance' argument as no defence for the defendant). The court held that planning permission does not authorize a nuisance. While relevant to the character of the area, it does not provide immunity from nuisance claims. The defendants failed to prove they had a prescriptive right to cause the noise, as they could not prove the activity constituted an actionable nuisance for a continuous 20-year period.

This case focused on the claimant’s personal discomfort, rather than physical injury to property, regarding noise pollution and demonstrated protections for ‘quiet enjoyment’ of their property from noise pollution.

Hunter v Canary Wharf on the 2nd principle (nuisance can be caused by any means) outlined in Fearn v Tate,

• What 3 types of private nuisance did it establish?

House of Lords outlined three types of private nuisance -

1. nuisance by encroachment on a neighbor's land (e.g., tree roots),

2. direct physical injury to a neighbor's land (e.g., damage from vibrations), and

3. interference with a neighbor's quiet enjoyment of their land (e.g., noise or dust).

What does Fearn v Tate mean about the 3rd principle of private nuisance (‘unreasonable’ interference)?

The requirement that the interference must be “unreasonable” is just another way of saying that - as it is also put - the interference must be “unlawful”.

This is not the reasonableness test applied in negligence, it is different, since private nuisance is strict liability. Instead, it is another way of saying it is 'unlawful'. We can ignore the question of reasonableness per Fearn v Tate.

What does Fearn v Tate and Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd mean about the 4th principle of private nuisance (the interference must be substantial)?

• What is meant by the interference must be ‘substantial’? And what test must we use to assess this?

• In the test, who’s perspective must we assess when deciding whether the interference is substantial - either the defendant or claimant?

Both Fearn v Tate and Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd outline that …

Interference must be SUBSTANTIAL and this is an objective test of the ordinary, reasonable person in the claimant’s position. It is NOT a subjective test where we focus on how the claimants feel, it is objective test assessing whether the interference would be substantial to an ordinary, reasonable person in the claimant’s position.

What does St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping mean about the 4th principle of private nuisance (the interference must be substantial)?

• What is meant by the interference must be ‘substantial’? And what can the interference NOT be?

St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping outlines that …

In order for the interference to be substantial, the interference CANNOT be trifling and of small inconveniences

What does Bamford v Turnley mean about the 5th principle of private nuisance (the ordinary use of land),

• What does ordinary use of land mean? Is typical use or uncommon use of land priortised then?

‘Those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action.’

Bamford v Turnley priortises the typical use over uncommon use, therefore we must observe whether the claimant and defendants are engaged in ordinary use of land.

Robinson v Kilvert on the 5th principle of private nuisance (the ordinary use of land),

• What is the context, outcome and importance?

• What is otherwise known as the ‘sensitive use’ doctrine?

• And what happens when the claimant engages in uncommon use of land, can they make a claim in private nuisance, or not?

• What is the standard for private nuisance when it comes to usage of land? And the defendant’s liability depending on this?

Context → The claimant (Robinson) rented the upper floor of a building to store sensitive brown paper, while the defendant (Kilvert) ran a paper box factory in the cellar. Kilvert heated the cellar to dry timber, which was an ordinary use of his property. The heat rose, drying out and damaging Robinson's sensitive paper, but it would not have damaged "ordinary" paper.

Outcome → The court held that because the damage was caused by the delicate nature of the paper rather than unreasonable activity, it was not a nuisance. A defendant is not liable for nuisance if their actions only damage exceptionally delicate or hypersensitive property. The court ruled that the standard for nuisance is based on ordinary, not sensitive, usage (therefore, the defendant is not liable if their actions would NOT have damaged normal property.)

Importance → This case is authority for the sensitive use doctrine. It supports the notion that if a defendant does what itself is noxious/interference with ordinary enjoyment of neighbours property, then it is a nuisance. If it is not in itself noxious but harms a particular trade and interferes with the ordinary use of land, then it is not a nuisance. Therefore, doing something special on land (aka not being of ordinary use of land), it will be INFERRED that it is not a nuisance and this is called the SENSITIVE USE DOCTRINE (not used frequently, but is nuanced by Fearn case).

Fearn v Tate Gallery on the 5th principle of private nuisance (the ordinary and common use of land),

• What is the context, outcome and importance?

• How does Fearn v Tate Gallery develop on Robinson v Kilvert especially on the ‘sensitive use’ doctrine?

• Was the defendants use regarded as abnormal or ordinary and common use of the land?

Context → The claimants own flats in a block of flats neighbouring the Tate that are at around the same height above ground as the viewing platform and have walls constructed mainly of glass. On the south side of the viewing platform, visitors can see directly into the claimants’ flats. At the time of the trial the viewing platform was open every day of the week and was visited by an estimated 500,000-600,000 people each year. The trial judge found that a very significant number of visitors display an interest in the interiors of the claimants’ flats. Some look, some peer, some photograph, some wave. Occasionally binoculars are used. Many photographs have been posted online. The claimants seek an injunction requiring the Tate to prevent its visitors from viewing their flats from the viewing platform, or alternatively, an award of damages. Their claim is based on the common law of nuisance.

Outcome → The court recognised that the defendants were not making ordinary use of the land and the area was an art exhibit and therefore, people were looking through and peeking through. The defendant was using its land in an abnormal and unexpected way, it is no answer to a claim in nuisance to say that the claimant would not have suffered a nuisance if their property had been of different design or construction. Though, the court recognised that if they lived nextdoor to an ordinary building or residential building, and people going about their building seeing through it, that would not be a nuisance.

Importance → This case nuances Robinson v Kilvert. This case acknowleges both sensitivity to ordinary or abnormal use of land.

Christe v Davey focuses on the role of MALICE when it comes to the 5th principle of private nuisance (the ordinary use of land),

• What is the context and outcome?

• Can the defendant’s actions motivated by malice constitute a nuisance?

Context → The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and her family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house which adjoined the defendant’s property. The defendant had complained of the noise on many occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and beating trays and shouting in retaliation.

Outcome → The defendant’s actions were motivated by malice and therefore did constitute a nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his actions. The court said it would have reached a different view if the defendants actions had not been malicious, the music teacher’s level of noise wasn’t nuisance but the SAME level of noise with MALICE is a nuisance. Therefore, we can convert the level of noise into malice.

Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett focuses on the role of MALICE when it comes to the 5th principle of private nuisance (the ordinary use of land),

• What is the context and outcome?

• Can the defendant’s actions motivated by malice constitute a nuisance?

Context → Claimant breeds foxes for fur, and neighbour nextdoor fires a gun on a fox to interrupt the claimant’s business of breeding fur.

Outcome → The court said this would NOT be nuisance if they were shooting rabbits (or any other animal not being foxes or relating to his business), but doing so with malice to specifically interrupt a neighbours business is a nuisance.

What does Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc meant by ‘reasonable user’ (which is under the heading of the 5th principle of ‘ordinary and common use of land’)

• What does ‘reasonable user’ actually mean? And does it focus on reasonableness, or does it focus on ‘give and take of neighbouring land occupiers’?

• And what does this ‘give and take’ mean?

(‘reasonable user’ and ‘reciprocity’ aka freedom to build are all under the 5th principle of ‘ordinary and common use of land’ - helps assess the 5th principle)

Liability for nuisance is “kept under control by the principle of reasonable user—the principle of give and take as between neighbouring occupiers of land, under which ‘those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action’

Reasonable user focuses on the 'give and take of neighbouring land occupiers'.

Reasonable user does not mean reasonableness or an objective standard. Reasonable user focuses on 'give and take'. RECIPROCITY is key in Fearn v Tate, where ‘reasonable user’ is outlined as people engaging in a common activity on land owe each other tolerance for one another’s activities on neighbouring land.

What does Hunter v Canary Wharf meant by ‘reciprocity’ aka freedom to build (which is under the heading of the 5th principle of ‘ordinary and common use of land),

• What is the context and outcome?

• Can the simple presence of a building generally be classifed as a nuisance or no?

• And under what circumstances can the simple presence of a building be classified as a nuisance as per Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett or Christe v Davey?

(‘reasonable user’ and ‘reciprocity’ aka freedom to build are all under the 5th principle of ‘ordinary and common use of land’ - helps assess the 5th principle)

Context → One of the claims was that the building blocked TV reception and prevent claimants from watching TV.

Outcome → The court concluded the tower block was just there and its simple presence cannot in itself be a nuisance. The mere presence of a building cannot be a nuisance.

• In Hunter v Canary Wharf, the supreme court said mere presence of a building might be a nuisance, it was erected for reasons of malice (referring to Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett or Christe v Davey - such as malice // deliberately creating something to block aircraft landing on the area)

St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping is the authority for the ‘locality principle’ which is the 6th principle of private nuisance,

• What is the context and outcome?

• When is the ‘locality principle’ relevant - is it in a claim of physical damage or sensible personal discomfort (aka amenity)? Where does the ‘locality principle’ NOT apply?

• How does Robinson v Kilvert ‘sensitive use’ doctrine influence this locality principle set out in St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping?

Context → C bought property in a factory district. Several months later, D began smelting works on its property, situated within a mile and a half of C’s. C alleged that the fumes from D’s works had caused damage to trees and shrubs on his land. C sued D for nuisance.

Outcome → The locality is only relevant where the alleged nuisance is sensible personal discomfort, if there is physical damage there is automatically nuisance (unless the property or person affected is hypersensitive: see Robinson v Kilvert). St Helens case as an authority for locality principle, locality applies to the amenity claim, but NOT physical damage to property. Property damage cannot be the line that is crossed.

What does Sturges v Bridgman mean about the 6th principle of private nuisance (the locality principle)?

“What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey”

• What is ordinary and common in certain areas or the type of nuisance that is accepted elsewhere might constitute a nuisance in another part of the country, therefore we need to take into account the locality of the area where the nuisance is occurring.

What does Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd mean about the 6th principle of private nuisance (the locality principle)?

• What is the context and outcome?

• How to apply the locality principle in a PQ?

• What three factors must be accounted for when applying the ‘locality principle’ in St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping?

Context → The claimants (Lawrence) moved near a stadium and motocross track (operated by Fen Tigers Ltd) in 2006, which had been operating since the 1970s. The claimants sued for noise nuisance.

Outcome → The court rejected the argument that a nuisance claim fails simply because the claimant moved to the area after the noisy activity had already started (rejection of the ‘coming to nuisance’ argument). The court held that planning permission does not authorize a nuisance. While relevant to the character of the area, it does not provide immunity from nuisance claims. The defendants failed to prove they had a prescriptive right to cause the noise, as they could not prove the activity constituted an actionable nuisance for a continuous 20-year period.

Outcome → There are various factors which can be considered when addressing the ‘locality principle’ -

• Focusing on 'planning permuision' role = a strategic planning permission carefully reached could be relevant to the character of locality

• ‘a classic issue of fact and judgment for the judge trying the case’

• What is the relevance of the defendant’s activity? → The defendants activity is relevant to assessing to the extent that it is a nuisance.

What if there is a PQ → In the PQ, you outline the legal proposition and state that the locality principle is not helpful and probably wouldn't be applied in confidence by the courts.

What does Fearn v Tate Gallery mean about the 7th principle of private nuisance (public interest),

• Is there any defence if the defendant’s activity is in public interest?

• Does planning permission provide a defence against private nuisance claims as per Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd?

• Is planning permission relevant to the locality principle? If not, why?

There is no defence that the defendant’s activity is of public benefit (relevant to remedy).

Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd affirms that planning permission is not a defence to claiming private nuisance.

This discussion is no longer relevant to the assessment of the principle of locality, planning permission is not a defence or relevant to liability for the locality principle.

What does Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd mean about the 7th principle of private nuisance (public interest),

• Does planning permission provide a defence against private nuisance claims as per Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd?

• Are planning permission utilised in exceptional cases when it comes to locality principle?

• And can planning authority specific requirements and thresholds help influence the court’s decision as to the threshold for reasonableness in the locality?

Planning permission is generally no defence against private nuisance claims as per Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd.

However, in ‘exceptional cases’, there may be a considered planning decision by the competent authority leading to a fundamental change in the pattern of uses, which cannot sensibly be ignored in assessing the character of the area against which the acceptability of the defendant’s activity is to be judged.

Planning permissions provide no defence, but Lord Neuberger and Lord Carnwath in Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd leave room for council’s actions and permissions to help inform the court’s judgment on reasonableness of the locality principle. For instance, if a planning authority states something specific such as the races cannot be done at certain times which is reasonable (aligning with the context of Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd), or something else specific indicated by the planning authority, this is useful to assess the threshold for reasonableness, but only when there is a THRESHOLD mentioned.

‘The fact that the planning authority takes the view that noisy activity is acceptable after 8.30 am, or if it is limited to a certain decibel level, in a particular locality, may be of real value … in a case where the claimant is contending that the activity gives rise to a nuisance if it starts before 9.30 am, or is at or below the permitted decibel level’

What does Allen v Gulf Oil Refining mean about the 7th principle of private nuisance (public interest) specifically STATUTORY AUTHORITY?

• What is also the context and outcome?

• Can statutory authority be a defence to private nuisance claims?

AoP and statutory authority is a defence against private nuisance.

Context → The case is the operation of a oil refinary on the commission of an AoP.

Outcome → If you have an act of parliament for your activity, parliament can authorise the overriding of your neighbours property rights, only if the private nuisance is inevitable to arise from the granting of statutory authority, but this is usually a rare instance.

What are the remedies you can claim for private nuisance claims? And is it rare to get any other remedies?

Injunction is the primary remedy.

It is very rare to do anything else other than impose an injunction and it is the first thing, damages can be awarded for physical damages, but injunction is still primary.

Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting on remedies available to private nuisance, under what limited 4 circumstances can damages be awarded in lieu?

Limited circumstances in which damages may be awarded in lieu:

1. injury to C’s rights is small;

2. capable of being estimated in money;

3. and adequately compensable by a small sum; and

4. case is one in which it would be oppressive to D to grant an injunction

Shelfer hasn't survived lawrence, Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd updated the law

Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd on remedies available to private nuisance,

• How has the approach changed from Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting, and

• What did Lord Neuberger say about the 4 tests, role of public interest in private nuisance and planning permission within private nuisance?

In Fen Tigers, the Supreme Court ruled that judges should not be rigidly bound by these four conditions, but the Shelfer tests still remain. Instead, there is now …

• Broader Discretion: The courts now have the flexibility to award damages in lieu of an injunction, even if one or more of the Shelfer tests are not strictly satisfied.

• Public Interest & Planning: Judges can consider wider public interest factors and the existence of planning permissions when deciding whether to halt an activity or award compensation.

• The Starting Point: While an injunction remains the standard prima facie remedy for a breach of property rights, the decision of whether to enforce it depends on a case-specific review of all relevant facts and circumstances

As per Lord Neuberger’s statements -

• ‘First, the application of the four tests must not be such as “to be a fetter on the exercise of the court’s discretion”. Secondly, it would, in the absence of additional relevant circumstances pointing the other way, normally be right to refuse an injunction if those four tests were satisfied. Thirdly, the fact that those tests are not all satisfied does not mean that an injunction should be granted’

• ‘As for public interest, I find it hard to see how there could be any circumstances in which it arose and could not, as a matter of law, be a relevant factor’

• Planning permission in turn ‘may provide strong support for the contention that the activity is of benefit to the public.’

Corby Group Litigation Claimants v Corby BC on distinguishing statutory, public and private nuisance,

• What is the context, outcome and importance?

• Is personal injury recover Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd and Transco Plc v Stockport?

Context → British steel moved out and the land was highly contaminated and the council wished to regenerate the area and clean it up, the process was inadequete, there was still dust and mess for the local people and the claimants were pregnant at the time, born with birth deformities.

Outcome → The Court of Appeal held in favour of the claimants and did not strike out the public nuisance claim. This Case is authority for personal injury is recoverable in public nuisance. The right protected by public nuisance is the right to not be exposed to activity which harms public health. Previous cases such as Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd and Transco Plc v Stockport had stated that personal injury was not recoverable in nuisance. The Court of Appeal in this case held that insofar as those statements related to public nuisance (as opposed to private nuisance) they should be treated as obiter and non-binding.

Importance → This case is authority as special damage can also arise in public nuisance too. Public nuisance has been abolished and replaced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing Act and it is a criminal offence - it can be sued as a tort if the person suffers a special damage, not suffered in common is what that means in terms of special damage.

What two statutes outlines that negligence is different from private nuisance?

• Occupiers Liability Act 1957

• Occupiers Liability Act 1984

How is private nuisance different from statutory nuisance?

Statutory nuisance is a regulatory scheme, rather than relying on litigants instead local government/authorities can enforce nuisance in a local area and outlined in the Environmental Protection Act 1990, escaping limitations of private law.

What is the rule in Rylands v Fletcher? What are the 4 components to the rule?

‘the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape’.

The 3 components are -

1. That the defendant brought something onto his land;

2. That the defendant made a “non-natural use” of his land

3. The thing was something likely to do mischief if it escaped;

4. The thing did escape and cause damage.

What is the context and outcome of Rylands v Fletcher?

Context → The defendants employed independent contractors to construct a reservoir on their land. The contractors found disused mines when digging but failed to seal them properly. They filled the reservoir with water. As a result, water flooded through the mineshafts into the plaintiff’s mines on the adjoining property. The plaintiff secured a verdict at Liverpool Assizes.

Outcome → The Court of Exchequer Chamber held the defendant liable and the House of Lords affirmed their decision.

Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and the relationship with nuisance, what is the context, outcome and importance?

Context → Defendants made processed leather, and they used a solvent in their manufacturing and the solvent was kept in large drums, moved by a forklift truck and over years, little bits spilt onto the concrete floor and seeped through the floor, chalk and into the aquafur/underwater source which was then provided to citizens of Cambridge and statute stated they couldnt use water with certain chemicals, and the Water company had to look elsewhere to find a new water source abiding by regulations.

Outcome → The court concluded Rymans v Fletcher is one application of private nuisance, Rymans v Fletcher is a one-off incident rather than a reoccurring issue.

Importance → This case is the authority to indicate thet Rymans v Fletcher is private nuisance and is subject to being 'reasonably foreseeable' (if you have a one off escape, was it reasonably foreseeable? foreseeablity demonstrates that the harm and damage must be foreseeable) Cambridge water fails on foreseeability, the finding indicated that it wasnt reasonable fofeseeable that the solvent would go through such a complicated journey to become a environemental hazard

• Foreseeability is required!

Transco plc v Stockport MBC on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and implications of the Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather, what is the context, outcome and importance?

Context → Water is supplied to customers through a massive pipe and the water escaped, floating away and washing away the land underneath someone's property and cost of urgent action is what they wanted to recover from the company.

Outcome → The court reinforced the existence of Rymans v Fletcher

Reed v J Lyons & Co on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and ACCUMULATION OF SOMETHING LIKELY TO DO MISCHIEF (ESCAPE), what is the context, outcome and importance?

Context → The defendant manufactured explosives during the war and plaintiff was injured when inspecting the factory.

Outcome → If there is no escape from the defendants land, then there is no liability via rylands v fletcher

Stannard v Gore on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and ACCUMULATION OF SOMETHING LIKELY TO DO MISCHIEF (ESCAPE), what is the context, outcome and importance?

Context → defendant stored large amounts of tires in his land, and they caught fire, the fire spread to the neighbouring land.

Outcome → The rule in Rylands v Fletcher applied, but the wheels didnt escape, the fire escaped, hence the rule was difficult to apply as the mischief that occurred was not the thing that escaped.

Rickards v Lothian on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and NON-NATURAL USER introduced by HOL, what is the context, outcome and importance?

‘some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for general benefit of the community’

'general benefit of the community' does not mean it is natural, storage of chemicals in a semi-industrial rural area is a natural use of land, since it is for the general benefit for the community, such as employment, economic development, but it is regarded as a non-natural use

Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and NON-NATURAL USER introduced by HOL, what is the context, outcome and importance? (departure from Rickards v Lothian)

Moves away from ‘benefit of the community’

Storage of chemicals is ‘classic case’ of non-natural use – cf High Court decision

Transco plc v Stockport MBC on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and NON-NATURAL USER introduced by HOL, what is the context, outcome and importance? (departure from Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather)

extraordinary risk to neighbouring property / extraordinary & unusual / quite out of the ordinary in the place & at the time / high threshold for a claimant to surmount

Retreats from the Cambridge waters case, but HOL in Transco case limits the ability for us to say something is a non-natural use of land and the water being delivered by pipes was a natural use of land = and they focused on other language such as 'extraordinary and unusual' and these critierais create a high threshold and must be taken seriously

Reed v Lyon on the rule within Rylands v Fletcher and NON-NATURAL USER introduced by HOL, what is the context, outcome and importance?

Context → War time cases where the manufacturor was manufacturing explosives

Outcome → The court stated that the manufacturing of explosives during wartime is a natural use

Rickards v Lothian on the defences to rules in Rylands v Fletcher, what is the context, outcome and importance?

Context → There was a blocking of a sink by a third party

Outcome → There was no tort but part of the tort is the malicious act of the third party which is a DEFENCE to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher