Tort: Trespass to the person

what is ‘intentional’?

wilson v pringle: it is the act that must be intentional; not the injury

define assault

collins v wilcock: D was seen soliciting men on the street → D’s collegue was ready to be questioned but D was not → C (police) grabbed D’s arm to restrain, and she scratched his arm → charged with assault of police officer

held: police was liable for battery; slightest amt of touching another is battery; beyond generally acceptable conduct.

definition: An act which intentionally causes C to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful force on their person.

Key elements: (1) Intention (2) Reasonable apprehension (3) Immediacy (4) Overt act by D.

define battery

collins v wilcock: actual infliction of unlawful force on another

difference between intentional & negligent act

Letang v Cooper [1965] — C sunbathing, D drove car over her legs. Sues in trespass to get around the limitation period.

Held: Must plead intention OR negligence, not both. Unintentional acts = negligence only, not trespass.

Principle: Trespass requires a deliberate act. The tort is the act, not the injury.

Elements of battery—Intent to apply force

Letang v Cooper- C was suntbathing in a carpark → injured when D drove his car over her legs

principle:

If the running over had been done intentionally, the action would be in trespass, but if unintentionally, then the appropriate form of action was negligence.

Elements of battery—recklessness?

Breslin v McKevitt [2011] — defendants planted bomb which exploded hours later.

Held: Battery succeeded. Recklessness suffices — defendants knew there were people in the town and proceeded regardless.

Principle: Subjective recklessness (appreciating the risk and being indifferent to it) suffices for battery.

elements of battery—hostility

F v Berkshire: hostile actions is not a requirement for making up battery

elements of battery—coincidence of act and intention

Car accidentally parked on officer's foot, D refused to move.

Held: Battery from the moment D knew and refused to move. Intention and act do not need to be simultaneous — D can form the intention during a continuing act.

Principle: Continuing act doctrine — the battery is the ongoing application of force once D has the requisite intention

it does not matter that the intent came post the act

elements of battery—directness

Scott v Shepherd (1773) — D threw a squib (firework) into a market, it was thrown on by A then B before injuring C.

Held: Battery. Interventions by A and B were natural/foreseeable responses, not independent acts. D remained the author of the harm.

Principle: Force can be "direct" even if transmitted through others, as long as their interventions were natural and foreseeable.

when can medical treatment of a dependent who is incapable of consent due to mental incapacity be regarded lawful?

F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] — doctors sought to sterilise a mentally incapacitated woman.

Principle: Treatment without consent is lawful where: (1) there is a necessity to act, AND (2) the action is what a reasonable person would take in C's best interests.

would a delay in harm still be battery?

DPP v K [1990] — schoolboy left acid in upturned hand dryer; C injured when using it later.

Held: Sufficiently direct for battery. A time delay does not break directness as long as the mental element is established.

Principle: Directness is about causal connection, not instantaneity.

Battery — what makes touching "unlawful"?

Collins v Wilcock [1984] — officer grabbed D's arm to stop her walking away (no lawful power to detain).

Held: Battery. The touching went beyond what was generally acceptable in ordinary life. Consent/social norms did not cover this.

Principle: Per Goff LJ: everyday touching is lawful because impliedly consented to (jostling, handshakes etc). But touching beyond that threshold is unlawful.

does horseplay and implied consent negate battery?

Blake v Galloway — teens throwing bark chippings at each other; C hit in eye.

Held: No battery. Participants impliedly consented to contact within the tacit understandings of the game. D's act was within those conventions and not negligent.

Principle: Implied consent covers contacts reasonably expected within the rules/conventions of an activity. Recklessness or high carelessness would break this.

Assault—need of positive behaviour

Innes v Wylie (1844) — policeman blocked C from entering a meeting by standing still. Held: No assault. "If the policeman was entirely passive like a door or a wall… no assault has been committed."

Principle: Assault requires an active/positive act from D. Passive obstruction is not enough.

Assault—was there means of carrying out the threat?

Stephens v Myers (1830) — D got rowdy at parish meeting, advanced on C with clenched fist, stopped by others.

Held: Assault proved. The question is whether D was advancing such that his blow would almost immediately have reached C. Yes.

Principle: D does not need to actually reach C — imminent capacity to strike is enough. There must be means of carrying the threat into effect.

Assault—objective test

thomas v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] — striking miners made threats/gestures at working miners on a bus.

Held: No assault. Pickets were held back, workers were in vehicles — no actual _capacity to carry out the threat at that moment.

Principle: D must have the present capacity to carry out the threat. Objective test.

conditional threat of assault?

Tuberville v Savage (1669) — D touched sword but said judges were in town (assize time).

Held: No assault. The words negated the threat — they showed D had no present intention to use force.

Principle: A conditional threat that negates immediacy cannot be assault. Words can qualify and cancel a threatening gesture.

Assault — can words alone (or silence) constitute assault?

R v Ireland [1998] — D made repeated silent phone calls to women who suffered psychiatric illness.

Held: Yes. Words and silence can constitute assault depending on the facts. Silent caller intends to cause fear, victim fears imminent violence — that suffices.

Principle: Per Lord Steyn: "A thing said is also a thing done." No rule that assault can only be by physical gesture. As long as there was

1. intent to cause fear

2. threat of direct immediate violence felt by C

is presence alone = assault?

Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] — C (head of state) argued advance group on his island constituted assault.

Held: No assault. No overt act causing apprehension of immediate violence alleged. Merely being present/nearby is not enough.

Principle: Must be an overt act + capacity for immediate attack. Presence alone ≠ assault.

can D assault C if D actually intended to assault X, not C?

Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] — soldiers fired at a vehicle in Kosovo; C was bystander who experienced fear.

Held: No assault on C. Soldiers did not intend to put C in fear. Transferred malice does NOT apply to assault (contrast with battery).

Principle: Assault is a personal tort — D must have intended to cause this C to apprehend unlawful force.

False imprisonment—definition

Intentional deprivation of C's liberty (complete restriction of freedom of movement) without lawful justification.

Key: Actionable per se. Length of time irrelevant (Walker v Commissioner of Police). C need not know they are imprisoned.

Is omission to act = false imprisonment

Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2010] — officers struck, governor ordered prisoners to stay in cells.

Held: No false imprisonment by the officers. They took no positive act — merely failed to turn up. The direct cause of confinement was the governor's order, not the strike.

Principle: FI requires a positive act with a direct and immediate causal link to the imprisonment. Omission generally does not suffice (absent a specific duty to release).

can restrain in FI be partial?

Bird v Jones (1845) — D erected stands on bridge, C could not pass through but could turn back.

Held: No false imprisonment. Imprisonment requires a total restraint on liberty, not merely a partial obstruction.

Principle: Per Coleridge J: "a boundary it must have" — if C has a reasonable means of exit, there is no complete restraint.

does C need to know they are imprisoned?

Meering v Grahame-White Aviation (1919) — C called in for theft questioning, guards stationed outside, didn't know.

Held: False imprisonment established even though C didn't know he was being detained.

Principle: C's knowledge of the imprisonment is not required. If freedom of movement is in fact restrained without lawful justification, there is FI. (Damages may be nominal if no suffering.)

voluntary acceptance of restraint= fi?

Herd v Weardale Steel Coal & Coke [1915] — miner went underground under his contract, refused to work, demanded to come up early.

Held: No false imprisonment. He accepted the terms of going underground — could not demand to be brought up before his shift ended.

Principle: Volenti — if C voluntarily accepted the conditions of confinement by contract, D is not obliged to release C early.

FI on contractual conditions?

Robinson v Balmain New Ferry [1910] — entry sign said fee payable to exit. C missed ferry, refused fee, was detained.

Held: No false imprisonment. C had agreed to the conditions by entering.

Principle: It is not FI to hold someone to a bargain they freely entered.

FI — is directness needed?

Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] — D told police C was shoplifting, police arrested C.

Held: No false imprisonment by D. Police acted on their own discretion using statutory authority — D merely provided information.

Principle: D is not liable for FI if they only gave information to an authority that then chose to act. D must be the "instigator, promoter and active inciter" of the imprisonment.

causation test for FI

Lumba v Secretary of State [2011] — foreign nationals detained under secret (unlawful) policy; argument that lawful policy would have reached same result.

Held: On liability (6:3): causation is irrelevant — all C must prove is that D directly and intentionally imprisoned them. Burden shifts to D to show lawful justification.

On damages: causation IS relevant — if C would have been detained anyway, only nominal damages.

Principle: The causation test affects damages, not liability.

how specific must a doctor be about risks for consent to be valid? (Volenti-defence)

chatterton v gerson: woman consented to the nerve operation but was not warned about the risk of numbness (specific risks)

Held: Consent was real. Once a patient is informed "in broad terms of the nature of the procedure" and consents, that consent is valid. Failure to explain specific risks = negligence, NOT trespass.

Principle: The threshold for vitiating consent in trespass is high — there must be a "greater failure of communication" than a mere breach of duty. General information about risks suffices.

can contractual acceptance of conditions defeat a false imprisonment claim?

heard v weardale: Miner went underground, refused to work, demanded to be brought up early — employers refused for hours.

Held: No false imprisonment. Miner voluntarily accepted the conditions of going underground as part of his contract. Could not demand early return.

Principle: Volenti — it is not false imprisonment to hold someone to conditions they freely accepted. Contractual consent to restraint defeats the claim.

Does implied consent defence apply to incapacitated persons?

Pile v Chief Constable of Merseyside: Drunk and disorderly woman covered in vomit; police removed and replaced her soiled clothing without consent; she had no recollection of events. Sued for trespass + Art 8 breach.

Held: Appeal dismissed. Removal was lawful — no trespass.

Principle: Implied consent can arise where a detainee is incapacitated and unable to express a preference, provided the act is necessary and conducted with dignity

when can medical treatment be given without consent under necessity?

f v west berkshire: Sterilisation of mentally incapacitated 36-year-old woman without her consent.

Held: Lawful.

Principle (Lord Bridge): "Treatment which is necessary to preserve the life, health or well-being of the patient may lawfully be given without consent."

Treatment without consent is justified where: (1) there is a necessity to act (not practicable to communicate with patient), AND (2) the action is what a reasonable person would take in the patient's best interests.

statutory authority—Mental Capacity Act s4

what is the civil law test for self-defence based on a mistaken belief?

ashley v chief constable of sussex: police was warned that C may have firearms before breaking into C’s house → C was naked in bed but police thought that C was armed and dangerous → shot and killed C who happened to be unarmed

Principle: In civil law (unlike criminal), a mistaken belief must be both (1) honestly AND (2) reasonably held to find self-defence.

must force in self-defence be exactly proportionate?

cross v kirkby: protestors attacked D → D retaliated with a blow argued to be disproportionate

principle: force need not be EXACTLY proportionate; it must simply not be excessive.

The standard is whether D did what was necessary in the circumstances, not mathematical precision. Some latitude is given in the heat of the moment.

how does context affect proportionality of force?

CC of merseyside v mcgrathy: Officer tasered claimant and held the taser 6 seconds longer than required.

Held: Self-defence available. In a volatile, fast-moving, dangerous situation, the response was not disproportionate even with the extra seconds.

Principle: Context is critical to assessing proportionality. What is excessive in a calm situation may be reasonable in an emergency. Courts do not apply a clinical, detached standard to split-second decisions.

what does the MCA 2005 require when dealing with incapacitous persons?

ZH v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: 16-year-old autistic boy with epilepsy, non-verbal, standing at pool edge — police intervened, caused him to jump in, then restrained him with handcuffs in a van for 30 minutes.

Held: Police acted unlawfully. Failed to comply with MCA 2005 — did not take reasonable, practicable steps before using force.

Principle (Lord Dyson): "The MCA requires no more than what is reasonable, practicable and appropriate. What that entails depends on all the circumstances." What is reasonable when there is time to reflect differs from a genuine emergency.

MCA 2005 key principles (s1): Presume capacity → take all practicable steps to help → unwise decision ≠ incapacity → act in best interests → least restrictive option.

what is the correct legal question when withholding life-sustaining treatment from an incapacitous patient?

Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James: Hospital sought declarations to withhold CPR, renal therapy and circulatory support from gravely ill, ventilator-dependent patient who lacked capacity. Held: Declarations granted (appeal dismissed). Treatments could lawfully be withheld as they were not in the patient's best interests given the deterioration.

Principle (Lady Hale): The correct question is NOT "is it lawful to withhold treatment?" but "is it in the patient's best interests to receive the treatment?" If not in best interests → must not be given → lawful to withhold.

Key clarifications on s4 MCA 2005:

• "Futile" = ineffective or offering no benefit — NOT merely failing to cure underlying disease

• "Recovery" = regaining a quality of life the patient would find worthwhile — NOT return to full health

• Best interests = holistic: medical + social + psychological welfare + patient's own values, wishes and feelings

Prisons Act 1952 s12(1)

Role in trespass: Provides the statutory authority for detention of prisoners. A prisoner confined pursuant to this authority cannot claim false imprisonment merely due to the conditions of detention.

Links to: Hague v Parkhurst — breach of conditions of lawful imprisonment don't convert it to unlawful FI.

what is the causation test for false imprisonment and lawful authority?

Lumba v Secretary of State: Foreign nationals detained under a secret unlawful policy; would have been detained under lawful policy anyway.

Held (liability, 6:3): Causation irrelevant to liability. "All that a claimant has to prove is that he was directly and intentionally imprisoned by the defendant" — burden then shifts to D to show lawful justification. Secret policy = no lawful authority = FI established.

Held (damages): Causation IS relevant — if C would have been detained lawfully anyway, only nominal damages.

Principle: The absence of lawful authority is the key. Where a public authority detains, it must have power AND exercise it lawfully.

Unlawful exercise = no authority = FI, even if lawful detention was available.

what is the rule for intentional, indirect infliction of harm?

wilkinson v downton: D told C (as a "joke") that her husband had broken both legs in an accident. Untrue. C suffered serious physical illness from the shock.

Held: D liable. Wilfully doing an act "calculated to cause physical harm" to C, which in fact causes physical harm, is actionable.

Principle (Wright J): "The defendant has wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff — that is to say, to infringe her legal right to personal safety."

Doctrinal role: Foundation of the tort of intentional indirect infliction of harm. Covers harms caused by statements/conduct, not direct physical contact (contrast with battery).

what are the three elements of the Wilkinson tort and when does it fail?

o v rhodes: Father wrote memoir about his own sexual abuse; son (with Asperger's) likely to suffer psychiatric harm from reading it.

Held: No liability. (1) Conduct directed at general public, not at O — justification existed (right to tell truth). (2) No actual intention to cause O severe distress.

Three elements confirmed:

1. Conduct — directed at C, no justification or excuse

2. Mental element — intention to cause at least severe mental/emotional distress (recklessness NOT enough)

3. Consequence — recognised psychiatric illness or physical harm
   Principle: "It is difficult to envisage any circumstances in which speech which is not deceptive, threatening or possibly abusive could give rise to liability." Truth is its own justification.

can companies be defendants under PHA 1997?

ferguson v british gas: gas company kept sending bills to C even though she owed nothing→ threatened that if she did not pay her bills, they’d report her to the credit card copy affecting her credit score

Held: Companies CAN be defendants under PHA 1997. C knowing the harassment is unjustified does NOT reduce D's liability — that is precisely who the Act protects.

is it individual acts or the whole course of conduct that must amount to harassment?

iqbal v dean mason: D sent indv letters to C → indv these were not that bad → C argued that it was the pattern that was bad

held: it is the course of conduct that contains the quality of harrassment—indv actions dont matter

look at the patterns as a whole

Is foreseeability a requirement under PHA?

jones v ruth: Hostile neighbour during building works; C suffered personal injury from intimidating behaviour; D argued harm not foreseeable.

held: foreseeability is not taken into account—only deliberate conduct matters

when does the s1(3)(a) "preventing or detecting crime" defence fail?

hayes v willoughby: D made 400+ communications to authorities alleging C's fraud; authorities repeatedly found no evidence; D continued anyway.

Held: Defence failed after June 2007 — D's conduct became irrational. No rational connection between evidence and purpose.

Principle (Lord Sumption): Rationality test (not just reasonableness): (1) good faith, (2) logical connection between evidence and ostensible purpose, (3) no arbitrariness or perversity. Purpose need not be sole purpose — dominant purpose is what counts.