Evaluating Epistemology

Definitions of knowledge

K = JTB

K = IJTB

K = JTB + NFL

K = RTB

K = VTB

K = IJTB

G1 - Smith's justification is fallible it could have been wrong, it turned out to be true by coincidence, not infallible justification, so Smith can't have knowledge here,  IJTB answers G1 

G2 - The justification ( jones owning a ford is fallible, it could have been false, since the beliefs truth is accidental, it can't be knowledge, IJTB answers G2 

Perception - Perception is fallible e.g. hallucinations, perceptual beliefs can't be knowledge,  IJTB answers perception issues 

Swamping - Henrys justification is perception which is fallible, He is lucky to look at the one real barn,  In identical conditions he would have been deceived by the fake 

Evaluation - IJTB appears to answer all cases but is too niche and overly specific to be used in any useful context, so is often critiqued for this 

K = JTB + NFL

G1 - Smiths belief is based on a false premise, failing the NFL condition, so smith can't have knowledge, answering G1 

G2 - Jones owning a ford is a false lemma, this false premise violates NFL, so it cant be knowledge, answering G2 

Perception - Perception isn't necessarily a false premise, its direct experience rather than built from assumptions, perception is reliable so it must be knowledge, this is an issue with JTB + NFL 

Swamping - The farmers belief isn't based on a false premise, it passes NFL, yet the farmer still lacks knowledge because he gets lucky, so JTB + NFL can't handle this case 

Evaluation - This definition passes the Gettier cases but as it can't deal with perception nor swamping,  It is outdone by more specific definitions of knowledge, but this is still useful for its broadness 

K = RTB

G1 - Smith's right by coincidence, not reliably informed, the reasoning is unreliable, the case is not knowledge, RTB answers G1 

G2 - Disjunctions are not a reliable process, truth is accidental, Smith can't have knowledge, RTB answers G2 

Perception - Human perception is a reliable process, so perceptual beliefs count as knowledge here, thus issues with perception challenge RTB  

Swamping - Even though the farmers process is reliable the environment is unreliable, so he could be wrong, so he can't have knowledge, RTB answers this case 

Evaluation - RTB is useful as it can both answer niche cases like the barns as well as still being broadly useful, the only issue is that it does not answer the issue of perception 

K = VTB

G1 - Smith is right not by his the virtue of great intelligence but luck, so he fails the virtue condition, can't have knowledge, VTB answers G1 

G2 - Smith doesn’t have the virtue of high intelligence here either, he relies on falsehood, he cant have knowledge, VTB answers G2 

Perception - Perception is a true belief informed by the intellectual value of your perceptual confidence, the truth results from that virtue, it should be knowledge, yet it isn't,  VTB cant answer perception 

Swamping - The truth doesn’t arise because of his perceptual virtue but due to luck given the conditions, his perceptual ability isn't apt, he doesn't succeed through excellence, he can't have knowledge, VTB answers swamping 

Evaluation - Like RTB, all is answered except perception, so it has about the same usefulness as VTB,  

Criticisms of DR

Illusions

Perceptual variation

Hallucinations

Time lags

Illusions

Argument in standard form - P1: In cases of illusion, an object appears to have properties it does not really have (e.g., straight stick looks bent). 
P2: When something appears to have properties it does not have, the immediate object of awareness cannot be the physical object itself. 
P3: In illusions, what we are directly aware of is something that has misleading or non-veridical properties. 
C: Therefore, what we directly perceive is not the external, mind-independent object, but sense-data — so direct realism is false. 

Explanation and example - Consider the example of a pencil half-submerged in water. 

P1. What we directly perceive is crooked. 

P2. The mind-independent object itself is not crooked. 

C1. Therefore, what we directly perceive is not the mind-independent object itself (but rather sense data). 

P3. Illusions and veridical perceptions can be subjectively indistinguishable. 

C2. Therefore, we perceive the same kind of thing in illusions and veridical perceptions. 

C3. Therefore, we directly perceive sense data in veridical perceptions

Response from Direct Realism - Illusions are rare and special conditions (unusual lighting, refraction etc.). 

• The direct object of perception is still the physical object, but we misinterpret its properties. 

• Illusion is a failure of judgement, not perception itself. 

• The fact that we can explain illusions using physical science (e.g., refraction) shows we are still perceiving the real object. 

Evaluation - Direct realism explains illusions by saying they happen when our judgement goes wrong rather than when perception itself fails, and science can explain why appearances are misleading, this is partly convincing because it matches everyday experience it looks bent but is not, however this weakens direct realism because it forces a gap between appearance and reality which makes it look closer to indirect realism, overall direct realism can survive the illusion criticism but the response is not completely satisfying 

Perceptual variation

Argument in standard form - P1: The way an object appears changes depending on the conditions of the perceiver (angle, lighting, distance, sense organs). 
P2: Physical objects themselves do not actually change in these ways when the appearance changes. 
P3: If what we perceive changes but the object itself does not change, then what we perceive cannot be the object itself. 
C: Therefore, what we directly perceive are sense-data or appearances, not mind-independent physical objects — so direct realism is false. 

Explanation and example - Consider the example of walking around a table. 

P1. What we directly perceive changes (in terms of shape, colour, etc). 

P2. The mind-independent object does not change. 

C1. Therefore, what we directly perceive is not the mind-independent object (but rather sense data). 

Response from Direct Realism - Variation is caused by differences in perspective, not differences in the object. 

• We still directly perceive the physical object, but from different angles or in different lighting 

• colour, for example, can be understood as a relational property: it depends on the object and the conditions of viewing

Evaluation - Direct realism says objects have relational properties that depend on viewing conditions so we still directly perceive the object even when its appearance changes, this fits everyday understanding but it raises a problem because if real properties differ from how things appear then direct realism starts to resemble indirect realism, so the response works to an extent but it makes the theory less simple and less convincing 

Hallucinations

Argument in standard form - P1.     In a hallucination, we perceive something having some property F. 

P2.     When we perceive something as having some property F, then there is something that is F. 

P3.     In a hallucination, we don’t perceive a physical object at all. 

C1.     Therefore, what we perceive must be mental – sense-data*. 

P4.     Hallucinations can be experiences that are ‘subjectively indistinguishable’ from veridical perceptions. 

C2.     Therefore, we see the same thing, namely sense-data, in both hallucinations and veridical perception. 

C3.     Therefore, in all cases, we see sense-data, and not physical objects, immediately. 

C4.     Therefore, direct realism is false. 

Explanation and example - Consider the example of a pink elephant. 

P1. What we directly perceive is a pink elephant. 

P2. The pink elephant is not a mind-independent object. 

C1. Therefore, what we directly perceive is not a mind-independent object (but rather sense data). 

P3. Hallucinations and veridical perceptions can be subjectively indistinguishable. 

C2. Therefore, we perceive the same kind of thing in hallucinations and veridical perceptions. 

C3. Therefore, we directly perceive sense data in veridical perceptions. 

Response from Direct Realism - Hallucinations are not perceptions at all, but mental events caused by malfunction (drugs, illness, tiredness). 

• Veridical perception = direct relation to the world. 

• Hallucination = no relation to an external object, so it is a different kind of mental state entirely. 

• The fact they feel similar does not mean they are the same type of state. 

Evaluation - Direct realism uses disjunctivism claiming hallucinations are a totally different kind of mental event from genuine perception, this allows direct realism to maintain that real perception is a direct relation to the world, however hallucinations can feel indistinguishable from real perception which makes the disjunctivist claim seem psychologically implausible, the defence is strong in theory but many find it unconvincing, so direct realism can survive but only if disjunctivism is accepted 

Timelags

Argument in standard form - P1: We do not perceive physical objects instantly; there is always a time lag between the object and our perception (e.g., light/sound takes time to reach us). 
P2: Because of this time lag, what we are directly aware of is not the object as it currently is, but something from the past. 
P3: Something that exists in the past (as it appeared) is not identical to the external object as it is now. 
C: Therefore, what we directly perceive is not the mind-independent physical object itself, but a representation — so direct realism is false. 

Explanation and example - Consider the example of a distant star that no longer exists. 

P1. What we directly perceive exists. 

P2. The mind-independent object no longer exists. 

C1. Therefore, what we directly perceive is not the mind-independent object (but rather sense data). 

P3. Time-lag is a feature of perception in general. 

C2. Therefore, in general we perceive sense data directly. 

Response from Direct Realism - All perception involves causal processes, but this does not stop the perceived object being the cause and object of perception. 

• “Direct” does not mean “instantaneous”; it means unmediated by mental representations. 

• We still perceive the object itself — just with a very tiny delay. 

Evaluation - Direct realism responds that direct does not mean instantaneous and that perception can still be direct even with a causal chain, this fits well with science and seems convincing, critics argue that accepting causal mediation pushes direct realism closer to indirect realism, even so the time lag criticism is the least damaging and direct realism mostly survives it 

Criticisms of IDR

Scepticism about the existence of mind independent objects (veil of perception, matrix projection, imagination, dreams, hallucinations

Scepticism about the NATURE of the mind-independent objects 

Berkeley's argument that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent  

Scepticism about the EXISTENCE of mind-independent objects  1

Response - Locke on involuntary nature of perception 

Evaluation - Is involuntariness a sufficient condition of being mind independent? Hallucinations? 

Scepticism about the EXISTENCE of mind-independent objects  2

Response - Locke on coherence of the senses 

Evaluation - If there was no external world and this was all the projection of an evil demon in your head, would there be coherence and law like regularity? 

Scepticism about the EXISTENCE of mind-independent objects  3

Response - Trotter Cockburn on coherence of the sense 

Evaluation - As above 

Seems to overcome the challenge, a thought couldn’t cohere like reality, as our of hallucinations can only exist as constructions  after learnt experience after birth, we learnt orignally from the world outside of ourselves, Strange thought, what if our brains already know everything about a mind independent world and we are just slowly drip fed by our own minds what we know consiously 

Scepticism about the EXISTENCE of mind-independent objects  4

Response - Russell on best hypothosis 

 

IDR does not give the simplest explanation of reality, so it can't be the best possible hypothesis,  Direct realism cuts out the middleman 

 

"For the same explanatory power, if one postulates fewer entities  than the other, choose the one with fewer entities" 

Evaluation - Is the existence of the external world a better hypothesis than I) the external world is in my imagination ii) the external world is the projection of a demon? How would the law of parsimony fit here? ( you cannot say IDR is the simplest explanation according to the law of parsimony or Ockham's razor – compared to DR it postulates more entities exist (i.e.; sense data) But could say is more parsimonious than postulating an evil demon we have no other evidence for 

Scepticism about the NATURE of the mind-independent objects  1

Response - Locke 

Evaluation - Berkeley attack on P&S qualities 

Scepticism about the NATURE of the mind-independent objects  2

Response - Russell 

Evaluation - Still accept our knowledge of the external world is limited 

Berkeley's argument that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent  

Response - Resemblance vs representation 

We have other examples where we gain knowledge through things representing but not resembling, e.g. language 

Attacks IDR claim that sense data allows for knowledge of the world 

Evaluation - A strong response from IDR to go back to their foundational claim (never said ideas resemble mind independent objects 

Criticisms of Berkeley’s Idealism

Argument from illusions and hallucinations

Idealism leads to solipsism

Problems with the role played by God

Argument from illusions and hallucinations

Summary - Everything you perceive is in your mind, there's no distinction between hallucinations and veridical perception, idealism claims objects have the properties we perceive them to have because the objects are ideas,  

Integration - We cant distinguish between perception and imagination,  

Response - Berkely says we can distinguish objects of the imagination because they are subject to will, and aren't as vivid as real perception, they also don’t correspond with sense data, hallucinations occur when there is nothing in reality corresponding with sense data, the reason we regard them as illusions because they encourage us to make fake inferences,  

Evaluation - Hallucinations can be connected, can look like reality, do come from the same part of the mind,  

Idealism leads to solipsism

Summary - We arrive at our knowledge of other people through perception, but if other people are simply ideas then they cannot have minds and perceptions of our own, shouldn’t I therefore be a solipsist> I have no knowledge of, and therefore no reason for believing in the existence of minds other than my own, so I assert that mine is the only one 

Integration - Berkeley is against sceptics, suggesting your mind is the only one would suggest not Believing in God, as God is another mind, But Berkeley's theory would suggest solipsism is true, and thus sceptics are right, so Berkeley has a contradiction he must address 

Response - God exists and he is the reason things exist outside of your perception, hence why time and space are able to change while you're not there, this is a world where multiple minds do exist, so Berkely can uphold himself and defend himself from sceptics 

Evaluation - I don’t think the criticism matters as God can effectively explain solipsism, however you are now tied to the idea that God exists and when you believe this you encounter a whole range of other challenges, which could prove more crucial 

Problems with the role played by God

Summary - Berkely says the mind only has knowledge of its own ideas, God himself is not a sense experience so how can we know about the existence of God, If we can know the existence of God then why can't we know about the existence of an external world 

Integration - Berkely says the mind only has knowledge of its own ideas, God himself is not a sense experience so how can we know about the existence of God, If we can know the existence of God then why can't we know about the existence of an external world 

Response - Because our experience of the world is regular and predictable, science is random, so it's more likely to be explained by a perfect creator than complete random chance, the existence of God is simpler than

Evaluation - Our conscious is certainty, not chance, because every other world where it doesn't work out perfectly for us we are not conscious, so they don’t matter. 

Criticisms of Innatism

Locke criticism 1 -  uses Ockham's razor to argue that if we can explain the existence of all our concepts without the need for supposing that innate ideas exist 

Locke criticism 2 - No knowledge is universal, according to Locke certain ideas must be innate because they are universally accepted, but there are no ideas that everyone shares 

3. Locke criticism 3 - In response to  

Lockes Universality criticism, some innatists claim there are ideas "children and idiots" have, they are just not aware of it yet, Locke argues this isn’t true, the mind is transparent, any ideas in it we are aware of, otherwise can they be said to be in the mind 

4. Locke criticism 4 – reliance on the non-natural 

Most innatists claim innate ideas are put in our mind by God, Locke believes they can be explained naturally, Plato believed the mind existed before its physical form, and Leibniz and Descartes used God 

5. Locke Criticism 5 – Self evidence 

Innatists claim innate knowledge is self-evident, but this seems to be the case for a lot of knowledge that is not innate,

6. Not from Locke - "innate knowledge is actually a posteriori" 

Empiricists argue some suggestions of innate knowledge are actually gained by sense experience rather than reason, for example, the slave boy based his knowledge on experience of squares 

Often argued by Mill 

7. Not Locke - "innate knowledge is actually analytic" 

Proposed innate propositions are simply analytically true, they are true just through meaning of words, they don’t tell us anything new about the world.  

Locke criticism 1 -  uses Ockham's razor to argue that if we can explain the existence of all our concepts without the need for supposing that innate ideas exist 

Criticism - Locke criticism 1 -  uses Ockham's razor to argue that if we can explain the existence of all our concepts without the need for supposing that innate ideas exist 

Integration - Innatism is too complex and impossible to pin point and thus not worth discussing, we don’t need to have knowledge we know already exists, there are other explanations that are simpler 

Counter - Ockham's Razor states entities should not be multiplied beyond necessary, innate ideas are necessary to explain universal concepts that experience cannot fully account for, its also simpler to explain complex things from innatism than from the world empiricist account can't explain necessary truths as they are not specific sense data cases 

 

Innatism argues there is not equal explanatory power without postulating the existence of innate knowledge – no number of individual sense experiences can lead to knowledge of a universal or necessary truth 

Evaluation - I don’t consider the issue crucial as I think it is a logical point that Ockham's razor would perhaps even prefer innatism if it is a simple, already knowing things already 

Locke criticism 2 - No knowledge is universal, according to Locke certain ideas must be innate because they are universally accepted, but there are no ideas that everyone shares 

Criticism - Locke criticism 2 - No knowledge is uiversal, according to Locke certain ideas must be innate because they are univerally accepted, but there are no ideas that everyone shares 

  

Integration - There are no ideas that everyone shares so the argument that people are innate because they are universal, fails. 

Counter - The innatist can say that innate knowledge doesn’t required everyone knows it, but that they would know it if they used their reason correctly to work it out, Locke hits back by saying if its innate and we already have it, why do we need reason to discover it? In response, Leibniz points out that universality cannot be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for innateness. There could be ideas that everyone shares that are not innate, they all just happen to agree. And God could give innate ideas to certain people and not others. Leibniz is agreeing with Locke that universality is not a good argument for innateness. But he still thinks there are other good reasons for accepting innate ideas. 

Evaluation - Not crucial, response is fully justified and detailed to respond to the universalizability issue,  all innatism needs to do to respond is to show that it's not a necessary condition of universalizability for knowledge 

3. Locke criticism 3 - In response to  

Lockes Universality criticism, some innatists claim there are ideas "children and idiots" have, they are just not aware of it yet, Locke argues this isn’t true, the mind is transparent, any ideas in it we are aware of, otherwise can they be said to be in the mind 

Criticism - Locke criticism 3 - In response to  

Lockes Universality criticism, some innatists claim there are ideas "children and idiots" have, they are just not aware of it yet, Locke argues this isnt true, the mind is transparent, any ideas in it we are aware of, otherwise can they be said to be in the mind 

Integration - How can you have something "in the mind" without ever having known it is there, you wouldn’t be able to say it is in the mind otherwise, the mind must be transparent 

Counter - Leibniz may respond by arguing we can have innate ideas, but we are just unaware of them, he experimented with the idea of subconscious thoughts, and was well ahead of his time in this regard,  

Evaluation - I don’t believe the issue is crucial, as the response deals with it effectively, and is very well supported in modern science, it is possible, as we understand now, to have ideas within our brain we cannot directly access, like the subconscious Leibniz describes, so the response proves effective 

4. Locke criticism 4 – reliance on the non-natural 

Most innatists claim innate ideas are put in our mind by God, Locke believes they can be explained naturally, Plato believed the mind existed before its physical form, and Leibniz and Descartes used God 

Criticism - Locke criticism 4 – reliance on the non-natural 

Most innatists claim innate ideas are put in our mind by God, Locke believes they can be explained naturally, Plato believed the mind existed before its physical form, and Leibniz and Descartes used God 

Integration - If we don’t accept these non-natural explanations, then we can't accept the existence of innate knowledge 

Counter - However, there are forms of innatism that don’t rely on the supernatural, Chomsky thought our ability to learn language only exists if we have a pre understanding of Grammar, Others argue our innate sense of morality exists, often through evolution, this nonsupernaturalist form of innatism is called nativism 

Evaluation - The Response by Chomsky is again another view well supported by modern scientific backing, even if you don’t use God, you can still find natural explanations for the innate knowledge we have, namely evolution, so they response if effective 

5. Locke Criticism 5 – Self evidence 

Innatists claim innate knowledge is self-evident, but this seems to be the case for a lot of knowledge that is not innate,

Criticism - Locke Criticism 5 – Self evidence 

Innatists claim innate knowledge is self-evident, but this seems to be the case for a lot of knowledge that is not innate,  

Integration - How can innate knowledge being self-evident be proof of innate knowledge if it is not unique to that form of knowledge 

Counter - Simply the fact that other forms of a posteriori knowledge can be self-evident doesn’t stop the fact innate knowledge is always self-evident, it is the fact that a priori knowledge is always self-evident that gives it its identity 

Evaluation - A better criticism from Locke would be to target what it may be that doesn’t make a priori knowledge consistently self-evident, this would be better targeting what makes innatism unique 

6. Not from Locke - "innate knowledge is actually a posteriori" 

Empiricists argue some suggestions of innate knowledge are actually gained by sense experience rather than reason, for example, the slave boy based his knowledge on experience of squares 

Often argued by Mill 

Criticism - Not from Locke - "innate knowledge is actually a posteriori" 

Empiricists argue some suggestions of innate knowledge are actually gained by sense experience rather than reason, for example, the slave boy based his knowledge on experience of squares 

Often argued by Mill 

Integration - If sense experience is required to know these propositions, then they are not innate 

Counter - There are also things, as Descartes argues, that you not only have never experienced, but also can't even imagine, yet understand, so even though you may think sense experience is required, how can it be something which is needed for something you can't even imagine, let alone experience, but still understand 

Evaluation - I don’t find Descartes response entirely convincing, as I don’t think he accurately describes the difference between what you understand and what you can imagine. For example, with the 1000side shape, the "not imagining" part is simply not being able to picture it visually, but by understanding it, you have still imagined it, just linguistically, Descartes distinction between imagining and understanding doesn’t exist, so what is a posteriori still stands 

7. Not Locke - "innate knowledge is actually analytic" 

Proposed innate propositions are simply analytically true, they are true just through meaning of words, they don’t tell us anything new about the world.  

Criticism - 7. Not Locke - "innate knowledge is actually analytic" 

Proposed innate propositions are simply analytically true, they are true just through meaning of words, they don’t tell us anything new about the world.  

Integration - If these truths are not synthetic but analytic, then the innatist has failed to prove that there is innate synthetic knowledge 

Counter - There are examples of situations where knowledge is not only a priori, but also synthetic, they have meaning outside of the meaning of the words themselves, e.g maths, which provides proof by necessity rather than just analytical truth 

Evaluation - I think the criticism still stands, because even though they are instances with a priori synthetic knowledge, there are a lot of cases people generally think are innate that could be analytical, undermining a lot of naturalist theory