Life and Death Midterm

Physicalism

there are only physical things; we are our bodies

Dualism

there are physical objects and immaterial things; we are our souls (centers of conscious experience)

Inference to the best explanation (abduction)

must infer the existence of some things to explain other things; big bang; dualists use this to try to explain the soul

Consciousness

An IBE argument dualists use; the soul explains consciousness/the phenomenological (qualitative) aspects of mental lines indirect to behavior

Free will

An IBE argument dualists use; objects follow deterministic physical laws that doesn’t explain this (incompatibilism); opponents argue the laws of physics are probabilistic and for compatibilism where there can be determinism and this

Descartes’ argument/The Cartesian argument

1) I can imagine my mind existing without my body

2) If I can imagine my mind existing without my body, then it is logically possible for my mind to exist without my body

3) For any x and y if it’s logically possible for x to exist without y, then in actuality x must be distinct for y

C) Our minds are distinct from our bodies so there are immaterial things (souls)

personal identity

what you must retain for a person to persist through time

numerical identity

being equal or the same; x=y

qualitative identity

being exactly alike in all qualities (could destroy one without the other)

spacetime worms

objects extending over space and time; external parts of something that are connected by intermediate parts

person-slices/stages

the different snapshots of someone (infancy vs. adulthood)

transitivity of identity

identity changes over time; x’s brain = y’s brain iff x’s brain is sufficiently similar

uniqueness of identity

if y≠z then it’s not that case that x=y and x=z is wrong (you are identical to one person and one person only)

personality (psychological) theory of personal identity

x=y iff x’s personality = y’s personality; change is permitted but must be gradual

Locke’s “epistemic” challenge

P1) We know people persist through time

P2) If people were souls, we wouldn’t know that people persist through time

→who says we need a direct method of observation to have knowledge of the persistence of souls?

C) So people must not be souls

→could use an analogous argument to show we aren’t physical objects because we don’t know those persist through time either

Body (brain) theory of personal identity

x=y iff x’s body = y’s body; same brain, some body because the brain houses the personality; maybe only need around 50% of the brain

brain-chains

the persistence of the same brain across time (change allowed)

soul theory of personal identity

x=y iff x’s soul = y’s soul; same soul, same person; person goes where soul goes

personality chains

the persistence of the same personality through time (change allowed)

teletransportation

a thought experiment that tests the validity of body and personality theory involving a machine re-creating your body in a new location

functioning teletransportation

A machine scans your body, then sends your information to another location, then vaporizes your original body, reconstructing it at the new location.

Is this teletransportation light-speed travel?

If yes, counters body theory.

If no, counters personality theory

malfunctioning teletransportation

You enter the machine but you’re still on Earth because you were not vaporized, meaning your are cloned.

Creates tension with the personality view and favors the body view.

duplication

An objection to the personality view where there are two people with personality copies but if personal identity is unique then you can duplicate personalities but can’t duplicate people so people must not be their personalities.

Williams’ evil neuroscientist case (s)

1) Your memories beliefs, and desires are swapped with someone else’s so you have a new body but the same brain, who would you chose the scientist to torture? → personality is key to personal identity

2) Before the torture you are granted amnesia and are deludes that your the other person and the same is done to them, who would you chose the scientist to torture? → body is key to personal identity

fission

If you split the brain into 2 bodies (lefty and righty) then you can

1) die but this leads to the no-branching requirement

2) survive as one but this is too arbitrary

3) survive as left and right together but you can’t be two people at once or two people through time

brain transplant

An accident befalls you and your identical twin, destroys your body but leaves brain intact, destroys twin’s brain but leaves their body intact. Place your brain in twin’s body. Should you opt in?

→ Yes, the brain is the part of the body that matters to identity

hemisphere transplant

If humans can survive the loss of an entire brain hemisphere without any meaningful change to psychological or physical functioning, should you opt in to transfer one hemisphere to twin’s body?

→Yes, only need some of the brain to maintain personal identity

divided consciousness

Eventually there would be a point where you can’t be a single person with two bodies and this because at some point left and right would become two different people

no-branching condition

x=y iff there is a personality/brain-chain that connects x to y and the chain doesn’t split

survival isn’t what matters

survival with the same personality or one that is sufficiently similar is what matters

Epicurus’ puzzle (1st version)

1) If death is bad there must be a time at which it is bad for me

→ timeless facts

2) It can’t be bad for me that I’m dead when I’m dead

→ comparative badness

3) It can’t be bad that I’m dead when I’m not dead

C) So death can’t be bad for me

Epicurus’ puzzle (2nd version)-

1) For all times t something is bad for me at t only if I exist at t (existence requirement)

→ the dead can be harmed (slander)

2) For all times t if I’m not dead at t, then death isn’t bad for me at t

3) For all times t if I’m dead at t, then I don’t exist at t

C) So death can’t be bad for me

Lucretius’ puzzle

1) Pre-birth non-existence isn’t bad

→ pre-birth non-existence was bad for us (this is intuitively wrong)

2) Pre-birth non-existence is a as much of a deprivation as post-death non-existence

→ can find a way to distinguish deprivations (loss vs. schmoss)

3) If post-death non-existence is bad, it’s because post-death non-existence is a deprivation

→ can explain the badness of death in terms of something other than deprivation

C) death isn’t bad

The deprivation view

death is bad because it deprives you of good things you would have had, had you not died; death is a comparative bad

intrinsic harms/benefits

something is good/bad in an absolute, robust sense (like pain)

instrumental harms/benefits

something is good/bad because of what it causes/leads to (losing your job)

comparative harms/benefits

something is good/bad because there is something better/worse (opportunity costs)

the challenge from unborn/merely possible people

there are too many possible unborn or merely possible people to reject the existence requirement (where you need to exist to be depraved)

bold existence requirement

something can be bad for you only if you exist at the same time as that thing

(modest) existence requirement

something can be bad for you only if you exist at some time or the other

loss

not having something you could have gotten

schmoss

not having something your going to get

immortality

must this be a good thing: No, you could keep suffering to the point where non-existence is comparatively better

could this be a good thing: No, you would get bored

→lobotomized brain or server restart

would this be a good thing: depends, but probably not