Marrin 3

Marrin (2017)

IA is a duplicated step in the decision making process

Marrin (2017)

Strategic IA frequently doesn’t influence the creation of better policy

Marrin (2017)

Decision-makers frequently make decisions without asking for analysis

Marrin (2017)

“No matter how right we are, DMs will upon occasion disregard the thrust of our findings”

Marrin (2017)

Analysts feel worthless and become “bewildered and indignant”

Marrin (2017)

“Policy without Intelligence”

Marrin (2017)

Analysis influences policy less frequently on the biggest national security issues

Marrin (2017)

DMs reject analysis due to a combination of political commitments and cognitive biases

Marrin (2017)

Competing bureaucratic pressures, a wide range of political considerations, and perceptions of analytic processes

Marrin (2017)

Explanations for DM disregard cannot account for its prevalence across domains

Marrin (2017)

Analysts need to understand how IA is used by DMs

Marrin (2017)

Analysis is: What’s going on? So what? What is to be done?

Marrin (2017)

DMs and their staff already engage in all 3 steps of analysis

Marrin (2017)

IA is an input to, not a substitute for policy analysis

Marrin (2017)

Very little of information acquired by policy officials is shared with the IC

Marrin (2017)

It is very difficult for intelligence analysts to provide DMs with better intel than they already have

Marrin (2017)

DMs tend to think their own general knowledge of a situation is adequate

Marrin (2017)

Senior DMs often know much more about foreign questions than the IA experts do

Marrin (2017)

Strategic IA may increase DM uncertainty

Marrin (2017)

IA serves as a check on DM judgement by contradicting and frustrating or confusing and being redundant

Marrin (2017)

Hoping that Yugoslavia would stay together was convenient for the HW Bush administration

Marrin (2020)

Objectivity as a construct is different from independence, neutrality, or honesty. Instead, it is best defined as NOT being subjective, which is the presence of bias

Marrin (2020)

Analysis should be emotionless, regard alternative perspectives, and acknowledge adjustments in argumentation

Marrin (2020)

Analytic objectivity is different from independence

Marrin (2020)

Assessments must not be distorted by advocacy of an audience, agenda, or policy

Marrin (2020)

The situation as it exists to a hypothetical omniscient being, devoid of inevitable human prejudices

Marrin (2020)

IA exists to guarantee the DM will face unpleasant facts not supporting their policy

Marrin (2020)

Objectivity: the search for an absolute truth

Marrin (2020)

Independence: the separation of IA from DMs to unimpede the search for truth

Marrin (2020)

Substantive biases are essential for effectiveness amidst high production volumes and tightening deadlines

Marrin (2020)

More independent and objective IA is not necessarily more correct

Marrin (2020)

“We seek the truth; speak truth to power; obtain, analyze, and provide intelligence objectively”

Marrin (2020)

IA is not about truth; truth is too absolute to be practically acheived

Marrin (2020)

The notion that intelligence holds the truth undermines the process of policy support

Marrin (2020)

If DMs usually ignore inconvenient and unwanted facts inseparable from IA, objectivity is of little practical value

Marrin (2020)

Some believe “policy ought to be made in an arena from which politics are banished”

Marrin (2020)

Greater proximity risks loss of integrity, while greater distance risks loss of influence

Marrin (2020)

Aspiration of objectivity should be a mission statement, not a standard

Marrin (2020)

Standards should embrace relativity: honesty, intellectual integrity, ‘call it as you see it’

Marrin (2020)

Objectivity is reached through exposure to alternate viewpoints and challenges of argumentation

Peterson (2011)

Every intelligence product must be rooted in a strong understanding of its audience

Peterson (2011)

The most precious commodity in Washington is not information - but time

Peterson (2011)

Policymakers often assume [analysts] have a policy agenda too

Peterson (2011)

My experience is that clients will take frequent bad news and unhappy assessments as long as they are well-reasoned, supported by data, and presented without arrogance

Peterson (2011)

Relatively few people have read the NIE on Iraq’s WMDs, but everyone knows what it says

Peterson (2011)

The service mentality is focusing on how best to meet the customers needs

Peterson (2011)

Success is not measured by the number of units produced, but by how well the product addresses and answers the specific concerns of an identified and targeted audience

Peterson (2011)

Who is the primary audience for this piece and what is their specific intelligence question?

Peterson (2011)

A good intelligence question has the following: narrows the subject matter, contains a what, who, why, or where it is going, a specific open-ended questionPeterson (2011)

Peterson (2011)

IA products need “because” or else it is just another opinionPeterson (2011)

Peterson (2011)

Good analysis makes the complex comprehensible, which is not the same as simple

Peterson (2011)

IA is good when responding to questions, not when analysts have to supply bothPeterson (2011)

Peterson (2011)

If your vision extends 1 year, grow wheat; 10 years, plant trees; 10,000 years, develop men

Peterson (2011)

Policymakers do not always see how we can help them

Peterson (2011)

Every poorly reasoned piece of finished intel tarnishes a brand name

Fingar (2025)

The IC has the tendency to lower the bar and warn about unlikely events in the wake of an unmitigated crisis

Fingar (2025)

IC analysts and PMs should work together to develop the best possible understanding of a situation

Fingar (2025)

Wise policymakers recognize that they need the objective input of analysts far greater than they need a sycophant

Fingar (2025)

Integration between analysts and PMs fosters intimate understanding of mission and individual objectives, requirements, and timelines

Fingar (2025)

Distance diminishes the ability of the IC to know what is needed and decreases the ability of the PM to draw on the expertise of the IC

Fingar (2025)

PMs dislike mandatory information sharing within the IC and view it as a loss of bureaucratic advantage

Fingar (2025)

PMs must not let displeasure undermine trust in their supporting analysts

George (Art)

Strategy matches a state’s ends (interests) to its means (power)

George (Art)

Strategists must develop a clear picture of the domestic and international environment

George (Art)

Analysts who study strategic thinking are better able to help strategists

George (Art)

Analysts collect information that relates to the real and potential costs/risks of a policy action

George (Art)

Analysts assess how adversaries and allies have reacted to US policy

George (Art)

The strategist must first define the enduring American interests before requesting intelligence

George (Art)

The current IC has a central mission of warning of terrorist attacks

George (Art)

After 9/11, DMs claimed warnings were not explicit enough and were buried in assessments while analysts claim their warnings were seldom read and dismissed as crying wolf

George (Art)

If analysts put themselves in the mindset of strategists, they can warn more effectively

George (Art)

DMs have little time to read the latest IA and determine if it merits closer inspection

George (Art)

“Well, you warned me, but you didn’t convince me”

George (Art)

Creating an environment hostile to negative reports contributed to the downfall of Hitler, Stalin, and Saddam Hussein

George (Art)

“No plan survives first-contact with the enemy”; “Fallacy of the first move”

George (Art)

Every strategist is by nature their own analyst